ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE TIMÆUS,

EXTRACTED FROM THE COMMENTARIES OF PROCLUS ON THAT DIALOGUE.
Page 473. The former of these is, indeed, apprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason.

Let us, in the first place, consider how manifold intelligence is, and collect by reasoning its various progressions. The first intelligence, therefore, is intelligible, which passes into the same with the intelligible, and is in no respect different from it. This is essential intelligence and essence itself, because every thing in the intelligible subsists after this manner, viz.: essentially and intelligibly. The second is that which conjoins intellect with the intelligible, possessing an idiom connective and collective of the extremes, and being life and power; filling, indeed, intellect from the intelligible, in which also it establishes intellect. The third is the conjoined intelligence in a Divine intellect itself, being the energy of intellect, through which it embraces the intelligible which it contains, and according to which it understands and is what it is: for, it is energy and intelligence itself, not indeed intelligible, but intellectual intelligence. The intelligence of partial intellects posses the fourth order; for each of these contains all things partially, viz. intellect, intelligence, the intelligible, through which it is conjoined with wholes, and understands the whole intelligible world. The fifth intelligence is that of the rational soul; for as the rational soul is called intellect, so its knowledge is intelligence, viz. a transitive intelligence, with which time is connate. In the sixth place, you may rank, if you please, phantastic knowledge, which is by some denominated intelligence, and the phantasy itself is called a passive intellect, because it knows whatever it knows inwardly, and accompanied with types and figures. For it is common to all intelligence to possess the objects of its knowledge inwardly,
inwardly, and in this it differs from sense. But the highest kind of intelligence is the thing known itself. The second is that which sees the first totally, and is the thing known secondarily. The third is the thing known partially, but perceives wholes through that which is partial. The fourth sees wholes indeed, but partially, and not collectively. And the fifth is a vision accompanied with passivity. Such, therefore, are the diversities of intelligence.

At present, however, neither phantastic intelligence must be assumed; for this is not naturally adapted to know true being, because it is indefinite, and knows the imaginable accompanied with figures. Eternal being, however, is unfigured; and, in short, no irrational knowledge is capable of beholding being itself, since neither is it naturally adapted to perceive universal. Nor does Plato here signify the intelligence in the rational soul; for this does not possess collective vision, and that which is coordinated with eternal natures, but proceeds according to time. Nor yet are total intelligences to be here understood; for these are exempt from our knowledge; but Timæus coordinates intelligence with reason. The intelligence, therefore, of a partial intellect must now be assumed; for it is this in conjunction with which we once saw true being. For as sense is below the rational soul, so intelligence is above it. For a partial intellect is proximately established above our essence, which it also elevates and perfects; and to which we convert ourselves when we are purified through philosophy and conjoin our intellectual power with its intelligence. This partial intellect is participated by all other proximate daemoniacal souls, and illuminates ours, when we convert ourselves to it, and render our reason intellectual. It is this intellect which Plato in the Phædrus calls the governor of the soul, and says that it alone understands true being, which is also perceived in conjunction with this intellect, by the soul which is nourished with intellect and science. In short, as every partial soul is essentially suspended from a certain daemon, and every daemon has a daemoniacal intellect above itself, hence, every partial soul will have this intellect ranked prior to itself as an inpartitionable essence. Of this intellect, therefore, the first participant will be a daemoniacal soul, but the second, the partial souls under this, which likewise makes them to be partial. It also appears that the intellect immediately above every daemon, so far as it is a whole and one, is the intellect of the daemon which proximately participates it, but that it also comprehends the number of the souls which are under it, and the intellectual paradigms
paradigms of them. Every partial soul, therefore, will have as an indivisible essence its proper paradigm, which this intellect contains, and not simply the whole intellect, in the same manner as the daemon which is essentially its leader. Hence, the impartible belonging to every partial soul, may be accurately defined to be the idea of that soul, comprehended in the one intellect which is defined to be the leader of the daemoniacal series, under which every such soul is arranged. And thus it will be true that the intellect of every partial soul is alone supernally established among eternal entities, and that every such soul is a medium between the impartible above it and the partible nature below it. This, then, is the intelligence prior to the soul, and which the soul "participates when its intellectual part energizes intellectually. Hence, in the latter part of this dialogue, Plato says, that this intelligence is in the Gods, but that it is participated by a few only of the human race.

It likewise appears that Plato, unfolding the knowledge of eternal being, calls it at first intelligence, but he also joins with intelligence reason. For, when reason understands perpetual being, as reason it energizes transitively, but as perceiving intellectually it energizes with simplicity, understands each particular so far as simple at once, but not all things at once, but passing from one to another, at the same time intellectually perceiving everything which it transitively sees, as one and simple.

In the next place, let us consider what reason is, and how it is connate with intelligence. Reason, therefore, is threefold, doxastic, scientific, and intellectual. For since there are in us opinion, the dianoetic part, and intellect, which last is the summit of the dianoetic part, and since the whole of our essence is reason, in each of these parts reason must be differently considered. But neither is opinion naturally adapted to be conjoined with the intelligence of intellect in energy; for, on the contrary, it is conjoined with irrational knowledge, since it only knows that a thing is, but is ignorant of the why. Nor is the dianoetic part, so far as it proceeds into multitude and division, capable of recurring to an intellect above the human soul, but on the contrary, it is separated through the variety of its reasons from intellectual impartibility. It remains, therefore, that the summit of the soul, and that which is most characterized by unity in the dianoetic part, must be established in the intelligence of a partial intellect, being conjoined with it through alliance. This, then, is the reason which understands in us intelligibles, and an energy which Socrates in the Republic calls intelligence,
intelligence, in the same manner as he calls the dianoetic power a knowledge subsisting between intelligibles and objects of opinion. In a subsequent part of this dialogue, Plato says, that this reason, together with science, is ingenerated in the soul when revolving about the intelligible. Science, however, has a more various energy, exploring some things by others; but the energy of intellect is more simple, surveying beings by an immediate projection of its visive power. This highest, therefore, and most indivisible part of our nature, Plato now denominates reason, as unfolding to us intellect and an intelligible essence. For, when the soul abandons phantasm and opinion, together with various and indefinite knowledge, and recurs to its own impartiality, according to which it is rooted in a partial intellect, and when recurring it conjoints its own energy with the intelligence of this intellect, then, together with it, it understands eternal being, its energy being both one and twofold, and sameness and separation subsisting in its intellections. For then the intelligence of the soul becomes more collected, and nearer to eternal natures, that it may apprehend the intelligible together with intellect, and that our reason, like a lesser, may energize in conjunction with a greater, light.

But how is true being comprehended by a partial intellect, or by reason? For true being is superior to all comprehension, and contains in itself all things with an exempt transcendency. In answer to this it may be replied, that intellect possessing its own intelligible, is on this account said to comprehend the whole of an intelligible essence; but reason, through an intellect coordinate to itself receiving conceptions of real beings, is thus through these said to comprehend being. Perhaps, also, it may be said that reason running round the intelligible, and energizing, and being moved as about a centre, thus beholds it; intelligence, indeed, knowing it without transition and impartially, but reason circularly energizing about its essence, and evolving the united subsistence of all things which it contains.

Let us, in the next place, consider what opinion is. According to Plato, then, the doxastic power comprehends the reasons of sensibles, knows the essence of these, and that they are, but is ignorant of the cause of their existence: the dianoetic power, at the same time, knowing both the essences and the causes of sensibles, but sense having no knowledge of either. For it is clearly shown in the Theaetetus that sense is ignorant of essence, being perfectly unacquainted with the cause of what it knows. Hence it is
is necessary that opinion should be ranked in the middle, and that it should know the essences of sensibles through the reasons or productive principles which it contains, but be ignorant of their causes. For in this right opinion differs from science, that it alone knows *that* a thing is, science being able to speculate the cause of its subsistence. Sense follows opinion, and is a medium between the organ of sense and opinion. For the organ of sense apprehends sensibles with passivity; and on this account it is destroyed when they are excessive. But opinion possesses a knowledge unattended with passion. Sense participates in a certain respect of passion, but has also something gnostic, so far as it is established in the doxastic nature, is illuminated by it, and becomes invested with reason, being of itself irrational. In this the series of gnostic powers is terminated, of which intelligence is the leader, being above reason and without transition. But reason has the second order, which is the intelligence of our soul, and transitively passes into contact with intelligibles. Opinion is in the third rank, being a knowledge of sensibles. For the diaeotic power subsisting between intelligence and opinion, is gnostic of middle forms, which require an apprehension more obscure than that of intelligence, and more clear than that of opinion. Hence opinion must be placed next to reason, because it possesses gnostic reasons of essences, but is otherwise irrational, as being ignorant of causes. But sense must be considered as entirely irrational. For, in short, each of the senses knows the passion subsisting about the animal from a sensible nature. Thus, for instance, with respect to an apple, the sight knows that it is red from the passion about the eye; the smell, that it is fragrant from the passion about the nostrils; the taste, that it is sweet; and the touch, that it is smooth. What then is it which says that this thing which thus affects the different senses, is an apple? It is not any one of the partial senses; for each of these knows one particular thing pertaining to the apple, but does not know the whole. Nor yet is this effected by the common sense; for this alone distinguishes the differences of the passions; but does not know that the thing which possesses such an essence is the whole. It is evident, therefore, that there is a certain power better than the senses, which knowing the whole prior to those things which are as it were parts, and beholding the form of this whole, is impartibly connective of these many powers. Plato calls this power opinion; and on this account he denominates that which is sensible, the object of opinion.

Further
Further still, as the senses frequently announce to us things different from what they are in reality, what is it which judges in us, and says, that the sun, when it afferts that the diameter of the sun is no more than a foot in length, is deceived, and that this also is the case with the taste of the diseased, when honey appears to it to be bitter? For it is perfectly evident that in these, and all such like cases, the senses announce their passion, and are not entirely deceived. For they affert the passion which is produced about the instruments of sense, and which is such as they announce it to be; but that which declares the cause, and forms a judgment of the passion, is different. There is therefore a certain power of the soul which is better than sense, and which no longer knows sensibles through an organ, but through itself, and corrects the gross and inaccurate information of sense. This power which subsists as reason with respect to sense, is irrational with respect to the knowledge of true beings; but sense is simply and not relatively irrational. Hence Socrates in the Republic shows, that opinion is a medium between knowledge and ignorance. For it is a rational knowledge, but is mingled with irrationality, in consequence of knowing sensibles in conjunction with sense. Sense, however, is irrational alone; in the first place, because it subsists in irrational animals, and is characteristic of every irrational life; and in the second place, because contrary to all the parts of the irrational soul, it is incapable of being persuaded by reason. For the irascible and desiderative parts, submit to reason, are obedient to its commands, and receive from it instruction. But sense, though it should ten thousand times hear reason affirming, that the sun is greater than the earth, would at the same time see it of the dimension of a foot, and would not announce it to us in any other way. In the third place, sense is irrational alone, because it does not know that which it perceives: for it is not naturally adapted to perceive the essence of it. Thus, for instance, it does not know what a white thing is, but it knows that it is white through passion. It is also distributed about the instrument of sense, and on this account therefore is irrational. In the fourth place, this is true of sense, because it is the boundary of all the series of knowledge, possesses an essence most remote from reason and intellect, belongs to things external, and makes its apprehension through body; for all these particulars indicate its irrational nature. Every thing generated, therefore, is apprehended by opinion, in conjunction with sense; the latter announcing the passions, and the former producing from itself the reasons of generated natures, and knowing their essences. And as reason, when in cont
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for tact with intelligence, seizes the intelligible, so opinion, coordinated with sense, knows that which is generated. For the soul being of a middle essence, fills up the medium between intellect and an irrational nature: for by her summit, or the vertex of the dianoetic part, she is present with intellect, and by her extremity she verges to sense. Hence Timæus, in the former conjunction, ranked intelligence before reason, as being more excellent; but in the second conjunction he places opinion before sense. For there reason is posterior to intelligence, as being a lesser intellect; but here opinion is prior to sense, as being rational sense. Opinion, however, and reason bound the whole extent of the rational essence; but as the great Plotinus says, intellect is our king, and sense our messenger. And reason indeed, together with intellect, seizes the intelligible; but by itself it speculates the middle reasons of things. Opinion, together with sense, seizes that which is generated; but by itself it considers all the forms which its own essence contains.

P. 474. It was generated. For this universe is visible, and has a body, &c.

As the demiurgus of wholes looking to himself, and always abiding after his accustomed manner, produces the whole world totally, collectively, or at once, and with an eternal sameness of energy, so Timæus being converted to himself, lays down the whole theory, recurring to intellect from the dianoetic power, and proceeding into reasoning from intellect. Doubting therefore, and interrogating himself, he energizes according to the self-moved nature of the soul; but answering, he imitates the projection of intellect. In the first place, therefore, he comprehends the dogma in one word τὸ γεγονός, it was generated, and enunciates the conclusion prior to the demonstration, directly after the manner of those that energize enthusiastically, who perceive the whole collectively, and contract in intellect the end previous to the digression, in consequence of seeing all things at once. But in the second place syllogizing, he descends from intellect to logical evolutions, and an investigation through demonstration of the nature of the world. In a perfectly divine manner, therefore, he indicates from hypotheses the whole form of the universe. For if the world is visible and tangible, and has a body, but that which is visible, tangible, and has a body, is sensible, and that which is sensible, and the object of opinion in conjunction with sense, is generated: the world therefore is generated. And
this he shows demonstratively from the definition: since geometricians also use demonstrations of this kind. And thus much concerning the form of these words.

It is however evident that Timæus, in giving a certain generation to the world, establishes it at the same time remote from temporal generation. For if the world has a certain, and not every principle of generation, but that which is generated from time has the principle of all generation the world is not generated from time. Further still, let us attend to the wonderful hypotheses of Atticus, who says, that what according to Plato was moved in a confused and disordered manner is unbegotten; but that the world was generated from time. Since then Plato admits that there is a cause of generation, let us see what he asserts it to be. For the world is sensible and tangible. Whether therefore was every thing sensible generated from time, or not every thing? For if every thing, that which was moved in a confused and disordered manner was also generated from time: for he says, that this likewise was visible. But if not every thing, the reasoning is unsyllogistic, according to Atticus, and concludes nothing. Unless indeed Atticus should say that the world is visible and tangible, but that what was moved in a confused and disordered manner is not now visible, but was so prior to the fabrication of the world, since Plato thus speaks, “Every thing which was visible, being moved in a confused and disordered manner;” but here he says, “The world is visible and tangible, and has a body.” Plato therefore shows that every thing which is visible and tangible is generated, but not every thing which was so. Should Atticus then thus speak, (for the man is skilful in taking up one word in the place of another,) we must say, that in the definition of what is generated, there is nothing of this kind, but it is simply said, that every thing generated is the object of opinion, in conjunction with irrational sense; so that if any thing is perfectly sensible, it will also be generated. But every thing visible is sensible, so that what was moved with confusion and disorder was generated. Nor is it proper to say that it was unbegotten according to time, but that the universe was generated in time; since either both were generated, or both are unbegotten. For both are similarly called visible and generated by Plato. But if both were generated, prior to this the world was changed into disorder: for generation to a contrary is entirely from a contrary. And if the maker of the world is good, how is it possible that he should not harmonize it beautifully; or that having beautifully harmonized it, he should destroy it?
But if he was not good, how not being good, did he make it to be orderly and elegantly arranged? For to effect this is the work of a beneficent artificer. But if being visible and generated, it is not generated according to time, it is not necessary immediately to assign to the universe a temporal generation, because it is said to be visible and generated. And thus much in reply to Atticus.

Let us however return to our principles, and inquire whether the world always was, as being eternal, or is not eternal, but consubstantial with time, and whether it is self-subsistent, or produced by another. Such then is the inquiry. The answer to which is, that it was produced by another, and is consubstantial with time. But a thing of this kind is generated. For if it has a composite form, it has generation in consequence of its composition. And if it alone subsists from another cause, it is generated, as not producing itself. And if it is eternal, it has its whole subsistence coextensive with time. For it was fabricated with reference to something else, and it was generated as a flowing image of real being. As therefore that which is composite is to that which is simple, and as time is to eternity, so is generation to essence. If then a simple and uniform essence is eternal, an essence composite, multiform, and conjoined with time, is generation. Hence Plato divinely inquires, whether the world originated from a certain principle. For that which was once generated, originated from a temporal, fabricative, final, material, and formal principle. For principle being predicated multifariously, that which is produced in time originates according to all these modes. But the world originated from a certain, and not from every principle. What then was this principle? It was not temporal: for that which originates from this, is also allotted the principle of its generation from all the others. It originated indeed from that most leading and proper principle, the final, as Plato himself teaches us in the course of this Dialogue. For it was generated through the good, and this is the principle of generation from which it originated. In the first place, therefore, he shows that the world is generated, from its composition: for it is tangible and visible. These then are the extremities of the universe: for heaven is visible, but earth is tangible; and the visible is in earth, so far as it participates of light, and the tangible in heaven, so far as a terrestrial nature is comprehended in it according to cause. In short he says that the world has a body, that we may also take into account the middle perfections of the universe. And in this Plato speaks agreeably to the oracle, which says, “The world is an imitation of intellect, but that which is fabricated...
fabricated possesses something of body." So far therefore as the universe has something corporeal, it is generated, for according to this it is both visible and tangible. But every thing visible and tangible is sensible: for sense is touching and seeing. But that which is sensible is the object of opinion, as being mingled with dissimilars, and as incapable of preserving the purity of intelligible forms. And every thing of this kind is generated, as having a composite essence. Plato therefore does not subvert the perpetuity of the universe, as some have thought he does, following Aristotelian hypotheses: and that this is true, we may easily learn as follows.

Time, says Plato, was generated together with heaven, or the universe. If therefore time is perpetual, the universe also is perpetual. But if time has a temporal beginning, the universe also has a temporal beginning; though it is of all things most absurd that time should have a beginning. But the advocates for the temporal origin of the world say, that time is twofold, one kind being disordered, and the other proceeding according to number; since motion is twofold, one disordered and confused, and the other orderly and elegant; and time is coordinate with each of these motions. But it is possible indeed for body to be moved equably or unequally, but impossible to conceive time equable and unequable: for thus the essence of time would be a composite. Though, indeed, why do I thus speak? for when motion is unequable, time is equable. Now, therefore, there are also many motions, some more swift, and others more slow, and one of which is more equable than another, but of all of them there is one continued time, proceeding according to number. Hence it is not right to make this twofold time. But if time is one and continued, if it is unbegotten, the universe also is unbegotten, which is consubstantial with time. But if time is generated, an absurdity will ensue; for time will require time in order to its being generated, and this when it has not yet a being; since when time was generated, time was not yet.

Further still, Plato conjoins the soul of the universe, immediately on its generation with the body of the universe, and does not give to it a life prior to that of the corporeal nature. Soul however ranks, according to him, among perpetual beings. If therefore soul is consubstantial with body, but soul has a perpetual subsistence, body also is perpetual according to Plato: for that which is consubstantial with a perpetual nature is unbegotten.

Again, Thaæstus here says, that the soul is generated, but Socrates in the Phæædrus
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drus says, that it is unbegotten. Hence he calls that which is clearly unbegotten according to time, after another manner begotten. Again, Plato calls the world incorruptible, in the same manner as those who contend that it was generated in time. But in the Republic he clearly asserts, or rather the Muses and not Plato, that every thing which is generated according to time is corruptible. But from these things you may understand what I say: for the world is shown by them to be unbegotten. For if the world is incorruptible, but nothing generated according to time is incorruptible, the world is not generated according to time. But why is a syllogism of this kind necessary, since Plato clearly says in the Laws, that time is infinite according to the past, and that in this infinity myriads on myriads of fertile and barren periods of mankind have taken place? Or rather, that we may reason from what we have at hand, Plato a little before, in this very dialogue, says, “that in those places where neither intense cold nor immoderate heat prevails, the race of mankind is always preserved, though sometimes the number of individuals is increased, and sometimes suffers a considerable diminution. But if the race of mankind always is, the universe also must necessarily be perpetual.

Again, therefore, if the demiurgus of the universe ranks among eternal beings, he does not at one time fabricate, and at another not; for he would not possess a sameness of subsistence, nor an immutable nature. But if he always fabricates, that which he produces always is. For what could be his intention, after having been indolent for an infinite time, in converting himself to fabrication? Shall we say that he apprehended it was better so to do? Was he then ignorant before that this was better or not? For if he was ignorant, he will, though a pure and divine intellect, be deprived of knowledge, which is absurd to suppose. But if he knew that it was better, why did he not begin to generate and make the world? In another respect also, those appear to me to be against the demiurgus of the universe, who say that the world once was not. For if the world once had no existence, the demiurgus once did not make it: since that which is made and the maker subsist together. But if he once did not make, he was then a maker in capacity; and if in capacity, he was then imperfect, and afterwards perfect, when he made the world. If, however, prior and posterior subsist about him, it is evident that he does not rank among beings who eternally energize, but among those that energize according to time, passing from not making to making. However, he produces time. How therefore, possessing an energy indigent of time, did he through this energy produce time?
time? For he once made time, of which notwithstanding he is in want, in order that he may make time.

How therefore may the world be said to be generated? We reply, as that which always is to be generated, and always will be generated. For a partial body not only is to be generated, but there was a time when it was generated. But all heaven, or the universe, alone subsists in the being to be generated, or in becoming to be, and is not at the same time that which was generated. For as the solar light proceeds from its proper fountain, so the world is always generated, and always produced, and is as it were always advancing into being.

P. 474. To discover therefore the Artificer and Father of this Universe, &c.

Father and artificer differ with respect to each other, so far as the former is the cause of being, and the supplier of union, but the latter of powers, and a multiform essence; and so far as the former stably comprehends all things in himself, but the latter is the cause of progression and generation; and so far as the former signifies ineffable and divine Providence, but the latter a copious communication of reasons or productive principles. But this universe signifies corporeal masses, the whole spheres, and those things which give completion to each. It also signifies the vital and intellectual powers which are carried in the corporeal masses. It likewise comprehends all mundane causes, and the whole divinity of the world, about which the number of mundane gods proceeds. The one intellectual, divine soul, and whole bulk of the universe, and its conjoined, divine, intellectual, phýchical, and corporeal number, since every monad has a multitude coordinate with itself, are also to be assumed in the place of the world. For the universe signifies all these. Perhaps too the addition of this is significant of the world being in a certain respect sensible and partial. For the whole of an intelligible nature cannot be denominated this, because it comprehends all intellectual forms. But to the visible universe the particle τὰς, or this, is adapted, in consequence of its being allotted a sensible and material nature. It is difficult therefore, as he says, to find the artificer of this universe. For since, with respect to invention, one kind proceeds from things first according to science, but another from things secondary according to reminiscence, invention from things first may be said to be difficult, because the discovery of the powers which are situated
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situated between, is the province of the highest theory, but that from things secondary is still more difficult. For, in order to behold from these the essence of the demiurgus, and the powers which he contains, it is necessary to survey the whole nature of his productions. We must therefore behold all the apparent parts of the world, and its unapparent powers, according to which the sympathy and antipathy of the parts in the universe subsist; and prior to these stable physical reasons and natures themselves, both the more partial and the more total, material and immaterial, divine and demonical, and those of mortal animals. And further still, we must survey the genera of life, the eternal and the mortal, the undefiled and the material, the total and the partial, the rational and the irrational, and all the completions pertaining to essences more excellent than ours, through which every thing between the gods and a mortal nature is bound together. We must also be able to perceive all various souls, and different numbers of gods, according to different parts of the universe, together with the ineffable and effable impressions of the world, through which it is conjoined with the father. For he who, without surveying these, attempts the vision of the demiurgus, will, through imperfection, be deprived of the intellectual perception of the father of the universe. But it is not lawful for any thing imperfect to be united with that which is all perfect. It is necessary, indeed, that the soul becoming an intellectual world, and assimilated in her power to the whole and intelligible world, should approach near to the maker of the universe, and through this approximation become familiar with him, through continuity of intellectual projection. For an uninterrupted energy about any thing calls forth and resuscitates our essential reasons. But through this familiarity the soul, being stationed at the gate of the father, will become united with him. For the discovery of him is this, to meet with him, to be united with him, to associate alone with the alone, and to see him with immediate vision, the soul for this purpose withdrawing herself from every other energy. The discovery therefore of the father of the universe is such as this, and not that which is effected by opinion; for such a discovery is dubious, and not very remote from the irrational life. Nor yet is it scientific; for this is syllogistic and composite, and does not come into contact with the intelligible essence of the intellectual demiurgus. But the discovery of which Plato now speaks subsists according to immediate visible projection (κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τὴν ἑποτήκην), a contact with the intelligible, and an union with the demiurgic intellect. For this may be properly denominated difficult, whether
as laborious, and appearing to souls after all the journey of life*, or as the true labour of souls. For after the wandering of generation and purification from its stains, and after the light of science, intellectual energy, and the intellect which is in us, will shine forth, establishing as in a port the soul in the father of the universe, purely seating her in demiurgic intellects, and conjoining light with light, not such as that of science, but more beautiful, intellectual, and uniform than this. For this is the paternal port, and the discovery of the father, viz. an undefiled union with him.

But when Plato says, “it is impossible to reveal him through the ministry of discourse to all men,” it perhaps indicates the custom of the Pythagoreans, who preferred in secrecy assertions respecting divine natures, and did not speak concerning them to the multitude. For, as the Elean guest in the Sophista says, “The eyes of the multitude are not sufficiently strong to look to truth.” This also, which is a much more venerable assertion, may perhaps be said, that it is impossible for him who has discovered the father of the universe, to speak of him, such as he has seen him. For this discovery was not effected by the soul speaking, but by her being initiated in divine mysteries, and converting herself to the divine light; nor was it in consequence of her being moved according to her proper motion, but from her becoming silent, according to that silence which leads the way. For since the essence of other things is not naturally adapted to be enunciated through names, or through definition, or even through science, but by intelligence alone, as Plato says in his seventh Epistle, after what other manner is it possible to discover the essence of the demiurgus than intellectually? Or how, having thus discovered him, can that which is seen be told through nouns and verbs, and communicated to others? For a discursive energy, since it is attended with composition, is incapable of representing a uniform and simple nature. But here some one may say, Do we not assert many things concerning the demiurgus, and other gods, and concerning the one itself, the principle of all things? We reply that we speak concerning them, but we do not speak the *auro, or the very thing itself, which each of them is. And we are able indeed to speak of them scientifically, but not intellectually: for this, as we have said before, is to discover them. But if the discovery is a silent energy of the soul, how can speech flowing through the mouth be sufficient to lead into light that which is discovered, such as it truly is?

* And this is what Homer divinely insinuates in the Fable of Ulysses.
After this, Proclus, following, as he says, the light of science, investigates who the demiurgus of the universe is, and in what order of things he ranks. For Numenius the Pythagorean (says he), celebrating three gods, calls the first father, the second maker, and the third work or effect (\(\pi\omega\nu\alpha\)), for the world, according to him, is the third god; so that with Numenius there is a two-fold demiurgus, viz. the first and second god, but that which is fabricated is the third divinity. Numenius, however, in thus speaking, in the first place, does not act rightly in connumerating \textit{the good} with these causes. For \textit{the good}, or the supreme principle of things, is not naturally adapted to be conjoined with certain things, nor to possess an order secondary to any thing. But with Plato \textit{father is here ranked after artificer}. Further still, he compranges that which is exempt from all habitude, viz. the ineffable cause of all, with the natures under, and posterior to, him. But these things ought to be referred to subordinate natures, and all habitude should be taken away from that which is first. That which is paternal therefore in the universe cannot be adapted to the first principle of things. And, in the third place, it is not right to divide father and artificer, since Plato celebrates one and the same divinity by both these names. For one divine fabrication, and one fabricator and father, are everywhere delivered by Plato.

With respect to Harpocration, it would be wonderful if he were consistent with himself in what he says concerning the demiurgus. For this man makes the demiurgus two-fold, and calls the first god Heaven and Saturn, the second Jupiter and Zena, and the third Heaven and the World. Again, therefore, transferring the first god into another order, he calls him Jupiter, and the king of the intelligible world; but he calls the second, the Ruler; and the same divinity according to him is Jupiter, Saturn, and Heaven. The first god therefore is all these, though Plato in the Parmenides takes away from \textit{the one}, or the first god, every name, all discourse, and every habitude. We indeed do not think it proper to call the first even father; but with Harpocration the first is father, son, and grandson.

Again Atticus, the preceptor of Harpocration, directly makes the demiurgus to be the same with \textit{the good}, though the demiurgus is called by Plato \textit{good (\(\alpha\gamma\nu\beta\sigma\alpha\))}, but not \textit{the good (\(\alpha\gamma\nu\beta\sigma\alpha\))}. The demiurgus is also denominated by Plato \textit{intellect}; but \textit{the good} is the cause of all essence, and is beyond being, as we learn from the 6th book of the Republic. But what will he say respecting the paradigm, to which the demiurgus looks in fa-
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bricating the world? For it is either prior to the demiurgus, and so according to Atticus there will be something more antient than the good; or it will be in the demiurgus, and so that which is first will be many, and not the one; or it will be after the demiurgus, and so the good, which it is not lawful to assert, will be converted to things posterior to itself, and will intellectually apprehend them.

After these men, Plotinus the philosopher places a two-fold demiurgus, one in the intelligible world, and the other the governor of the universal. And he says rightly: for in a certain respect the mundane intellect is the demiurgus of the universe. But the father and artificer, whom he places in the intelligible, is transcendently the demiurgus; Plotinus calling every thing between the one and the world intelligible: for there, according to him, the true heaven, the kingdom of Saturn, and the intellect of Jupiter, subsist. Just as if any one should say that the sphere of Saturn, that of Jupiter, and that of Mars, are contained in the heavens: for the whole of an intelligible essence is one many, and is one intellect comprehending many intelligibles. And such is the doctrine of Plotinus.

In the next place, Amelius (the disciple of Plotinus) makes a triple demiurgus, three intellects, and three kings, one that is, the second that hath, and the third that sees. But these differ, because the first intellect is truly that which is; but the second is indeed the intelligible which it contains, yet has that which is prior to itself, participates entirely of it, and on this account is the second. And the third is indeed likewise the intelligible which it contains; for every intellect is the same with its conjoined intelligible; but it contains that which is in the second, and sees the first: for that which it possesses is obscure in proportion to its distance from the first. According to Amelius, therefore, these three intellects and artificers are the same as the three kings with Plato, and as Phanes, Heaven, and Saturn, with Orpheus; and that which is especially the demiurgus according to him is Phanes. To Amelius, however, it is proper to say, that Plato is every where accustomed to recur from multitude to the unities from which the order in the many proceeds; or rather prior to Plato, from the very order of things themselves, the one is always prior to multitude, and every divine order begins from a monad. For it is indeed requisite that a divine number should proceed from a triad*, but prior to the triad.

* As all things abide in their causes, proceed from them and return to them, as is demonstrated by Proclus
ON THE TIMEUS.

triad is the monad. Where therefore is the demiurgic monad, that there may be a triad from it? And how is the world one, not being fabricated by one cause? For it is requisite by a much greater priority that the cause of the world should be united and be monadic, that the world may become only-begotten. Let there then be three artificers; but who is the one prior to the three; looking indeed to one paradigm, but making the word only-begotten? It is not proper, therefore, that the demiurgic number should begin from a triad but from a monad.

After Amelius, Porphyry, thinking to accord with Plato, calls the supermundane soul the demiurgus, and the intellect of this soul to which he is converted, animal itself, as being according to him the paradigm of the demiurgus. It is requisite, therefore, to inquire of Porphyry, in which of his writings Plotinus makes soul to be the demiurgus, and how this accords with Plato, who continually denominates the demiurgus a god and intellect, but never calls him soul? How likewise does Plato call the world a god? And how does the demiurgus pervade through all mundane natures? For all things do not partake of soul; but all things partake of demiurgic providence. And divine fabrication indeed is able to generate intellect and gods; but soul is not naturally adapted to produce anything above the order pertaining to soul. I omit to observe that it is by no means certain that Plato knew any imparticipable soul.

To Porphyry succeeds the divine Jamblichus, who having written largely against the opinion of Porphyry, and subverting it as being Plotinean, delivers to us his own theology, and calls all the intelligible world the demiurgus. If therefore he means that all things subsist demiurgically in the demiurgus, both being itself, and the intelligible world, he accords with himself, and also with Orpheus, who says,

All that exists in confluent order lies
Within the belly of the mighty Jove.

Proclus in his Elements of Theology, this must also be true of the immediate and first procession from the highest god. The first offspring, therefore, from the ineffable principle of things will be an all-perfect triad, the leader of a divine number; and in like manner every divine number will proceed from a triad, and this from a monad: for there is no number prior to three, unity being the principle of number, and the duad partaking of the nature both of unity and number. This will be evident from considering that it is the property of number to receive a greater increase from multiplication than addition, viz. when multiplied into itself; but unity is increased by being added to, but not by being multiplied by itself, and two in consequence of its middle nature produces the same when added to, as when multiplied by itself. See the Introduction to The Parmenides.
Nor is it in any respect wonderful that each of the gods should be the universe, but at the same time each differently from the rest; one demiurgically, another according to connecting comprehension (συστημα), another immutably, and another in a still different manner according to a divine idiom. But if Jamblichus means that the whole extent between the world and the one is the demiurgus, this indeed is worthy of doubt, and we may reply to the assertion from what he himself has taught us. For where are the kings prior to Jupiter, who are the fathers of Jupiter? Where are the kings mentioned by Plato, whom Jamblichus arranges above the world, and about the one? And how can we say that eternal being itself is the first being, but that the demiurgus is the whole intelligible order, who is himself also eternal being as well as animal itself? For shall we not thus be compelled to say that the demiurgus is not eternal being; unless so far as he also is comprehended together with other eternal beings? But that Jamblichus himself, though most prolific in these things, has in some of his other writings more accurately celebrated the demiurgic order, may be inferred from this, that in speaking concerning the fabrication of Jupiter in the Timæus, after the intelligible triads, and the three triads of gods in the intellectual hebdomad, he assigns the third order in these processions to the demiurgus. For he says that these three gods are also celebrated by the Pythagoreans, who denominate the first of these intellects, and which comprehends in itself total monads, simple, indivisible, boniform, abiding in and united with itself, and consider it as possessing such like signs of transcendency. But they say that the most beautiful signs of the middle intellect, and which collects together the completion of such like natures, are that which is prolific in the gods, that which congregates the three intellects, replenishes energy, is generative of divine life, and is the source of progression and beneficence to every thing. And they inform us that the most illustrious tokens of the third intellect, which fabricates wholes, are prolific progressions, fabrications and connected comprehensions of total causes, whole causes bounded in forms, and which emit from themselves all fabrications, and other prerogatives similar to these. It is proper, therefore, to judge from these assertions, what the Jamblichean theology is concerning the demiurgus of wholes.

After him Theodorus*, following Amelius, says, that there are three artificers; but he does not arrange them immediately after the one, but at the extremity of the intelligible and intellectual gods. He likewise calls one of these essential intellect, another intellec-

* Theodorus, as well as Jamblichus, was the disciple of Porphyry.
tual essence, and another the fountain of souls; and says that the first is indivisible, the second is distributed into wholes, and that the third has made a distribution into particulars. Again, therefore, we may say the same things to him as we said to the noble Amelius, that we acknowledge these to be three gods, or analogous to these, but not also three artificers; but we say that one of these is the intelligible of the demiurgus, the second his generative power, and the third that which is truly demiurgic intellect. But it is requisite to consider whether the fountain of souls is to be arranged as the third: for power belongs to the middle, as he also says, and hence the fountain of souls should be partially, and not universally, denominat ed the fountain of life. For the fountain of souls is only one of the fountains in this middle; since life is not in souls only, nor in animated natures alone, but there is also divine and intellectual life prior to that of the soul, which they say, proceeding from this middle, emits a diversity of life from distributed channels. Such then, in short, are the dogmas of antient interpreters respecting the demiurgus.

Let us now, therefore, briefly relate the conceptions of our preceptor on this subject, and which we think accord in a very eminent degree with those of Plato. The demiurgus, therefore, according to him, possesses the extremity* of the intellectual divine monads, and the fountains of life, emitting from himself total fabrication, and imparting dominion to the more partial fathers of wholes. He is likewise immovable, being eternally established on the summit of Olympus, and ruling over two-fold worlds, the supercelestial and celestial, and comprehending the beginning, middle, and end of all things. For of every demiurgic distribution, one kind is of wholes with a total subsistence, another of wholes with a partial subsistence, another of parts with a total, and another of parts with a partial subsistence. But fabrication being fourfold, the demiurgic monad binds in itself the total providence of wholes, but a demiurgic triad is suspended from it which governs parts totally, and distributes the power of the

* There are three divine orders, which according to antient theologians are said to comprehend the total orders of the gods, viz. the intelligible, (the immediate progeny of the ineffable principle of things,) the intelligible and at the same time intellectual; and the intellectual order. The demiurgus of the universe subsists at the extremity of this last.

† There is wanting here in the original το ζη του μείζον φυσιον.
monad*; just as in the other, or partial fabrication, a monad is the leader of a triad which orderly distributes wholes partially, and parts partially. But all the multitude of the triad revolves round the monad, is distributed about it, divides its fabrications, and is filled from it. If these things then are rightly asserted, the demiurgus of wholes is the boundary of the intellectual gods, being established indeed in the intelligible, but full of power, according to which he produces wholes, and converts all things to himself. Hence Timæus call him intellect, and the best of causes, and says that he looks to an intelligible paradigm, that by this he may separate him from the first intelligible gods; but by calling him intellect, he places him in an order different from that of the gods, who are both intelligible and intellectual: and by the appellation of the best of causes, he establishes him above all other supermundane fabricators. He is, therefore, an intellectual god exempt from all other fabricators. But if he was the first deity in the intellectual order, he would possess a permanent characteristic, abiding after his accustomed mode: for this is the illustrious prerogative of the first intellectual god. If he was the second deity of this order he would particularly the cause of life; but now in generating soul, he energizes indeed together with the crater, but is essentially intellect. He is therefore no other than the third of the intellectual fathers: for his peculiar work is the production of intellect, and not the fabrication of body. For he makes body, yet not alone, but in conjunction with necessity; but he makes intellect through himself. Nor is it his peculiar work to produce soul: for he generates soul together with the crater; but he alone both gives subsistence to and causes intellect to preside over the universe. As he is therefore the maker of intellect, he very properly has also an intellectual order. Hence he is called by Plato, fabricator and father; and is neither father alone, nor fabricator alone, nor again, father and fabricator. For the extremes are father§ and fabricator; the former possessing the summit of intelligibles, and fulfilling prior to the royal series, and the latter fulfilling at the extremity of the order; and the
one being the monad of paternal deity, and the other being allotted a fabricative power in the universe. But between both these are, father and at the same time artificer, and artificer and at the same time father. For each of these is not the same; but in the one the paternal, and in the other the fabricative has dominion; and the paternal is better than the fabricative. Hence the first of the two media is more characterized by father; for, according to the Oracle, "he is the boundary of the paternal profundity, and the fountain of intellectual natures." But the second of the media is more characterized by artificer: for he is the monad of total fabrication. Whence also I think that the former is called Metis (μετίς) but the latter Metietes (μετιέτης); and the former is seen, but the latter fees. The former also is swallowed up, but the latter is satiated with the power of the former; and what the former is in intelligibles, that the latter is in intellectual; for the one is the boundary of the intelligible, and the other of the intellectual gods. Likewise concerning the former Orpheus says, "The father made these things in a dark cavern;" but concerning the latter, Plato says, "Of whom I am the demiurgus and father." And in his Politicus he reminds us of the doctrine of the demiurgus and father; because the former of these divinities is more characterized by the paternal, and the latter by the demiurgic peculiarity. But every god is denominated from his idiom, though at the same time he comprehends all things. And the divinity indeed, who is alone the maker or artificer, is the cause of mundane natures; but he who is both artificer and father is the cause of supermundane and mundane natures. He who is father and artificer is the cause of intellectual, supermundane, and mundane natures; and he who is father alone is the cause of things intelligible, intellectual, supermundane and mundane. Plato, therefore, thus representing the demiurgus, leaves him ineffable and without a name, as subsisting prior to wholes, in the allotment of the good. For in every order of gods there is that which is analogous to the one; and of this kind is the monad in every world. But Orpheus also gives him a name as being thence moved; and in this he is followed by Plato in other parts of his writings: for the Jupiter with him, who is prior to the three sons of Saturn, is the demiurgus of universe.

After the absorption, therefore, of Phanes, the ideas of all things appeared in Jupiter, as the theologist (Orpheus) says:

Hence with the universe great Jove contains
Heav'n's splendid height, and aether's ample plains;
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The barren sea, wide-bosom’d earth renown’d,
Ocean immense, and Tartarus profound;
Fountains and rivers, and the boundless main,
With all that nature’s ample realms contain;
And gods and goddesses of each degree,
All that is past, and all that e’er shall be;
Occultly, and in confluent order lie
In Jove’s vast womb, the ruler of the sky.

But being full of ideas, through these he comprehends wholes in himself, which also
the theologian indicating, adds,

Jove is the first and last, high thundering king;
Middle and head, and all things spring from Jove.
King Jove the root of earth and heav’n contains:
One power, one daemon is the source of all.
For in Jove’s royal body all things lie,
Fire, earth, and water, aether, night, and day.

Jupiter, therefore, comprehending wholes, at the same time gives subsistence to all things
in conjunction with Night. Hence to Jupiter thus inquiring,

Tell me how all things will as one subsist,
Yet each its nature separate preserve?

Night replies,

All things receive enclos’d on ev’ry side,
In aether’s wide ineffable embrace:
Then in the midst of aether place the heav’n,
In which let earth of infinite extent,
The sea, and stars, the crown of heav’n, be fixt.

And Jupiter is instructed by Night in all the subsequent mundane fabrication: but after
she has laid down rules respecting all other productions, she adds,

But when around the whole your pow’r has spread
A strong coercive bond, a golden chain
Suspend from aether.

viz. a chain perfectly strong and indissoluble, proceeding from nature, soul and intellect.
For being bound, says Plato, with animated bonds, they became animals,
ON THE TIMÆUS.

The divine orders above the world * being denominated Homerically a golden chain. And Plato, emulating Homer, says in this dialogue, "that the demiurgus binding intellect in soul, and soul in body, fabricated the universe, and that he gave subsistence to the junior gods, through whom also he adorns the parts of the world." If therefore it is Jupiter who possesses one power, who swallows Phanes in whom the intelligible causes of wholes primarily subsist, who produces all things according to the admonitions of Night, and who confers dominion both on other gods and the three sons of Saturn, he it is who is the one and whole demiurgus of the universe, possessing the fifth order among those gods that rank as kings, as is divinely shown by our preceptor in his Orphic conferences, and who is coordinate with Heaven and Phanes; and on this account he is artificer and father, and each of these totally.

But that Plato also has these conceptions concerning the mighty Jupiter is evident from the appellations which he gives him in the Cratylus, evincing that he is the cause and the supplier of life to all things: for, says he, that through which life is imparted to all things is denominated by us διός and ζωή. But in the Gorgias, he coordinates him with the sons of Saturn, and at the same time gives him a subsistence exempt from them, that he may be prior to the three, and may be participated by them, and establishes Law together with him, in the same manner as Orpheus. For, from the admonitions of Night, according to Orpheus, Law is made the afferor of Jupiter, and is established together with him. Further still, Plato in his Laws, conformably to the theologian, represents total Justice as the associate of Jupiter: and in the Philebus he evinces that a royal soul and a royal intellect presubsist in Jupiter according to the reason of cause; agreeably to which he now also describes him as giving subsistence to intellect and soul, as unfolding the laws of fate, and producing all the orders of mundane gods and animals, as far as to the last of things; generating some of these by himself alone, and others through the celestial gods as media. In the Politicus also he calls Jupiter the demiurgus and father of the universe, in the same manner as in this dialogue, and says that the present order of the world is under Jupiter, and that the world is governed

* Instead of του εἶναι περίεξελθυν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγκοσμίων, as in the original, it is necessary to read as in our translation του εἶναι περίεξελθυν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐγκοσμίων.
according to fate. The world, therefore, living a life under the dominion of Jupiter, has Jupiter for the demiurgus and father of its life. The divine poet Homer likewise represents him fabricating on the summit of Olympus, ("Hear me, all ye gods and goddesses!") and converting the two-fold coordinations of divinities to himself. Through the whole of his poetry, too, he calls him the supreme of rulers, and the father of men and gods, and celebrates him with all demuric conceptions. Since, therefore, according to all the Grecian theology, the fabrication of the universe is ascribed to Jupiter, what ought we to think respecting these words of Plato? Is it not that the deity which is celebrated by him as artificer and father is the sovereign Jupiter, and that he is neither father alone, nor father and artificer? For the father was the monad, as the Pythagoreans say: but he is this very order of gods, the decad, at which number proceeding from the retreats of the monad arrives, this being a universal recipient, venerable, circularly investing all things with bound, immutable, unwearied, and which they call the sacred decad. After the paternal monad, therefore, and the paternal and at the same time fabricative tetrad, the demiurdic decad proceeds; being immutable indeed, because immutable deity is confubstantial with it, but investing all things with bound, as being the supplier of order to things disordered, and of ornament to things unadorned, and illuminating souls with intellect, as being itself intellect totally; body with soul, as possessing and comprehending the cause of soul; and producing things which are truly generated as middle and last, in consequence of containing in itself demiurdic being.

P. 485. In the first place, he received one part from the whole, &c.

After Proclus has discussed every thing pertaining to the mathematical speculation of the psychogonic * diagram, an epitome of which we have given in the Introduction to this dialogue, he proceeds to a more principal and profound explanation of this part of the Timaeus, as follows: In the first place, says he, we think it proper to speak about the division of the soul, according to which it is divided in these ratios, and likewise to remove whatever may be an impediment to us in apprehending the truth concerning it. Let no one therefore think that this division is corporeal, for we have before shown that the medium of the soul is exempt from body, and from the whole of that essence which is

* Viz. the diagram pertaining to the generation of the soul.
divided about it. Nor let any one who admits that it is better than body suppose that it
ought to be divided after the same manner as the extremes and intervals by which body is
measured. For things which possess interval, are not totally through the whole of
themselves present to themselves, and when divided are not able to preserve an unconfused
union. But soul, participating of an impartible destiny, is united to itself, and exhibits all
the same elements subsisting in all the same. Nor again, let any one suppose that this
is a section of number. For soul is indeed number, but not that which subsists according
to quantity, but that which is essential, self-begotten, uniform, and converted to itself.
Nor let any one compare the presence of these ratios in all things to spermatic reasons:
for those are imperfect, corporeal and material, and are in every respect surpassed by
the immaterial and pure essence of the reasons of the soul. Nor yet let any one assimilate
the above-mentioned parts to the theorems of science, in consequence of each possessing
the whole: for we do not now consider the knowledge, but the essence of the soul.
Nor is it proper to think that diversities of essences are similar to the distinctions of
habits: for the latter are all-variably diversified in those that possess them, but the
former are established with a sameness of subsistence in demiurgic boundaries. It is
requisite, therefore, to suspend the primary principle of the psychogonic division from
a demiurgic cause, and from those perfect measures which eternally subsist in beings,
and to which the demiurgus also looking divides the soul. For as he divides this
universe by intelligible paradigms, so also he separates the essence of the soul by the
most beautiful boundaries, assimilating it to more antient and principal causes. The
mode, therefore, of division is immaterial, intellectual, undefiled, perfective of the essence
of the soul, generative of the multitude it contains, collective through harmony into
one order, and connective of things divided; at the same time being the cause of the
unmingled purity in the soul, and producing a confluent communion of reasons. And
the demiurgus indeed to consume the whole by dividing it into parts: and thus,
after a manner, Timeus also affirms; for he says, that the demiurgus consumed the
whole from which he separated these parts. But as he had previously said that soul is
not only partible, but also impartible, it is requisite to preserve both, and to consider that
while the whole of remains impartible, a division into multitude is produced: for if
we take one of these only, I mean the section, we shall make it only indivisible. The
whole, therefore, is divided together with the whole remaining impartible; so that it

\[ x = 2 \]

equally
equally participates of both. Hence it is well observed by the daemoniacal Aristotle, that there is something impartible in partible natures, by which they are connected; so that it is much more necessary that something impartible should remain in things whose nature is not only partible, but also impartible. For if it should not remain, that which consists from both will be alone partible. But that it is necessary that the whole should remain in the generation of the parts is evident; since the demiurgus is an eternal fabricator. But he constituted the soul one whole prior to its division: for he does not produce at one time and destroy at another; but he always produces every thing, and this eternally; and makes that which is produced to remain such as it is. The wholeness, therefore, is not destroyed in giving subsistence to the parts, but remains and precedes the parts. For he did not produce the parts prior to the whole, and afterwards generate the whole from these; but, on the contrary, produced the whole first, and from this gave subsistence to the parts. Hence the essence of the soul is at the same time a whole and possesses parts, and is one and multitude. And such is the division which Timaeus assumes in the soul.

But let the mode of its explanation accord with the essence of the soul, being remote from apparent harmony, but recurring to essential and immaterial harmony, and sending us from images to paradigms. For the symphony which flows into the ears, and consists in sounds and pulsations, is entirely different from that which is vital and intellectual. Let no one therefore stop at the mathematical speculation of the present passage, but let him excite in himself a theory adapted to the essence of the soul. Not let him think that we should look to intervals, or differences of motions; for these things are very remote, and are by no means adapted to the proposed object of inquiry; but let him

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* That which ultimately connects bodies must necessarily be impartible; for if it also consisted of parts, those parts would require something else as the cause of their connection, and this something else, if also partible, another connecting principle, and so on ad infinitum. Body, therefore, derives its connection from the presence of something incorporeal.

† Whole, as Proclus soon after this informs us, has a triple subsistence, prior to parts, in a part, and posterior to parts. We have a beautiful image of the first of these of which Proclus is now speaking, in the centre of a circle considered as subsisting with the extremities of the radii terminating in it. For these extremities, considered as giving completion to the centre, so far as centre, may be said to be as it were parts of it; but when they are considered as they may be, as proceeding from the centre, they are posterior to it.
consider the assertions essentially, and examine how they indicate the medium pertaining
to the soul, and how they exhibit demiurgic providence. In the first place, therefore,
since wholeness is triple, one being prior to parts, another subsisting from parts, and
another in each of the parts, that wholeness of the soul which is now delivered is that
which subsists prior to parts; for the demiurgus made it one whole prior to all division,
which, as we have said, remains such as it is, without being confumed in the production of
the parts: for to be willing to dissolve that which is well harmonized is the province
of an evil artificer. He would however dissolve it, if he confumed the whole in the
parts. But Plato infinuates that wholeness which consists from parts, when he repre­
sents the demiurgus confuming the whole mixture in the section of the essence of the soul,
and renovating the whole of it through the harmony of its parts; this whole receiving
its completion from all according parts. And a little further on he will teach us that
wholeness which subsists in each of its parts, when he divides the whole soul into certain
circles, and attributes all the above-mentioned ratios to them, which he has already ren­
dered apparent; for he says that the three are in each of the parts, in the same manner as
in the whole. Every part, therefore, is in a certain respect a triadic whole, after the same
manner as the whole. Hence it is necessary that the soul should have three wholenesses,
because it animates the universe, which is a whole of wholes, each of which is a whole
as in a part. As it therefore animates in a two-fold respect, viz. both that which is a
whole, and those wholes which are as parts, it requires two wholenesses; and it transcends the natures which are animated, possessing something external to them, so as, in
the language of Timæus, to surround the universe as with a veil. Hence by the whole­
eness prior to parts it entirely runs above the universe, and by the other two connects it,
and the natures which it contains; these also subsisting as wholes.

In the next place, we must observe that Plato, proceeding from the beginning to the
end, preserves that which is monadic and also that which is dyadic in the soul: for he
reduces its hyparxis into essence, sameness, and difference, and bisects number, beginning
from one part, into the double and triple; and contemplating the media, he comprehends two in one, and according to each of these unfolds two-fold ratios, the sesqui­
alter and sesquiterian, and again cuts these into sesquioctaves and remainders (λέιψματα).
In what follows also, he divides one length into two, and one figure of the soul into two
periods; and, in short, he very properly never separates the dyadic from the monadic;
for to intellect the monadic alone is adapted, on which account it is also impartible, but
to body the dyadic; and hence, in the generation of a corporeal nature, he begins from
the duad of fire and earth, and arranges two other genera of elements between these.
But soul subsisting between body and intellect is at the same time a monad and a duad;
and this because in a certain respect it equally participates of bound and infinity; just as
intellect is allied to bound, but body more accords with infinity, through its subject
matter, and its division ad infinitum. And if after this manner some have referred the
impartible and partible to the monad and indefinite duad, they have spoken agreeably
to things themselves; but if they have considered the soul to be number in no respect
differing from monadic numbers, their assertions have been utterly discordant with the
essence of the soul. It is therefore at the same time both a monad and duad, resembling
by the monadic, intellectual bound, and by the dyadic, infinity; or by the former being
the image of the impartible, and by the latter the paradigm of partible natures. This
also should be considered, that Timaeus here speaks of a two-fold work of the demiurgus:
for he divides the soul into parts, and harmonizes the divided portions, and renders
them accordant with each other. But in so doing he at the same time energizes both
Dionyshacally and Apolloniacally. For to divide and produce wholes into parts, and
to preside over the distribution of species, is Dionysiacal; but to perfect all things har-
moniously is Apolloniacal. As the demiurgus, therefore, comprehends in himself the
cause of both these gods, he divides and harmonizes the soul: for the hebdomad is a
number common to both these divinities; since theologists say that Bacchus was divided
into seven parts, and they ascribe the heptad to Apollo, as the power that connects all sym-
phonies; for in the monad, duad, and tetrad, from which the hebdomad is composed,
the disdiapason first conffits. Hence they call the god, the leader of the hebdomad,
and assert that the seventh day is sacred to him: for they say that on that day Apollo was
born from Latona, in the same manner as Diana on the sixth day. This number, there-
fore, in the same manner as the triad, accedes to the soul from superior causes; the triad
indeed from intelligible, but the hebdomad from intellectual* causes. But the heb-

* The number 7, according to the Pythagoreans, is the image of intellectual light; and hence the intel-
lectual order is hebdomadic, consisting of two triads, viz. Saturn, Rhea, Jupiter, and the three Curetes,
and a separating monad which is called by ancient theologists Ocean. See the fifth book of Proclus on
Plato's Theology, and the Introduction and Notes to the Parmenides.
domad is derived from these gods, that the division into seven parts may be a sign of the Dionysiacal series, and of that dilaceration which is celebrated in fables. For it is requisite that the soul participating a Dionysiacal intellect, and, as Orpheus says, carrying the god on her head, should be divided after the same manner as he is divided; and that the harmony which she poifejjs in these parts should be a symbol of the Apollonianal order. For in the fables respecting this god, it is Apollo who collects and unites the lacerated members of Bacchus, according to the will of his father.

In the next place, three middles are assumed, which not only in the soul, but also everywhere shadow forth the daughters of Themis, who are three, as well as these middles: for the geometrical middle is the image of Eunomia; and hence in the Laws Plato says, that he governs polities, and is the judgment of Jupiter, adorning the universe, and comprehending in himself the truly political science. But the harmonic middle is the image of Justice, which distributes a greater ratio to greater, and a lesser to lesser terms, this being the employment of Justice. And the arithmetical middle is the image of Peace: for it is she, as he also says in the Laws, who attributes to all things the equal according to quantity, and makes people preserve peace with people, for the solid proportion prior to these is sacred to their mother Themis, who comprehends all the powers of these. And thus much generally respecting these three middles.

That we may, however, speak of them more particularly, it is requisite to observe that they are unific and connective of the essence of the soul, viz. they are unions, analogies, and bonds. Hence Timaeus also calls them bonds. For above, he says, that the geometrical middle is the most beautiful of bonds, and that the others are contained in this; but every bond is a certain union. If, therefore, these middles are bonds, and bonds are unions of the things bound, the consequence is evident. These therefore pervade through the whole essence of the soul, and cause it to be one from many wholes, as they are allotted a power which can bind various forms. But these being three, the geometric binds every thing which is essential in souls: for essence is one reason which pervades through all things, and connects things first, middle, and last, in the same manner.

* See my Dissertation on the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries.
† Thus in 6, 4, 3, which are in harmonic proportion, the ratio of 6 to 4 is greater than that of 4 to 3.
‡ Reason must here be considered as signifying a productive and connective principle of things, to which ratio in quantity is analogous.
as in the geometric middle there is one and the same ratio which perfectly pervades through three terms. The harmonic middle connects all the divided fameness of souls, imparting a communion of reasons to the extremes, and a kindred conjunction; this fameness which it connects being more apparent in more total, but less apparent in more partial souls. And the arithmetic middle binds the all-various difference of the progression of the soul, and is less inherent in things greater according to order, but more in such as are lesser. For difference has dominion in more partial natures, just as fameness has in such as are more total and more excellent. These middles also may be compared with each other, in the same manner as fameness and difference: and as essence is the monad of these, so the geometric middle of those. The geometric middle therefore is the union of all the essences which are comprehended in the thirty-four terms. The harmonic is the union of equally numerous identities, and the arithmetic of differences; all these middles at the same time being extended through all the terms. For how could a certain whole be produced from them, unless they were as much as possible united with each other, essentially indeed by one of these, but variously by the other two? Hence these two become the supplement of the geometric middle, just as fameness and difference contribute to the consummation of essence; for in consequence of their possessing contrariety to each other, the geometric middle conciliates their dissension, and unites their interval. For the harmonic middle, as we have said, distributes greater ratios to greater, and lesser to lesser terms: since it evinces that things greater and more total according to essence are more comprehensive, and transcend in power subject natures. But the arithmetic middle, on the contrary, distributes lesser ratios to greater terms, and greater ratios to lesser terms. For difference prevails more in subordinate natures, as, on the contrary, the dominion of fameness is more apparent in superior than in inferior natures. And the geometric middle extends the same ratio to all the terms, illuminating union to things first, middle, and last, through the presence of essence to all things. The demiurgus, therefore, imparts to the soul three connective unions, which Plato calls middles, because they appear to bind the middle order of the universe. For the geometric collects the multitude of essences, and unites essential progressions; since one

* Thus, in the numbers 6, 4, 2, which are in arithmetic proportion, the ratio of 6 to 4, i.e. the ratio of the greater terms is less than the ratio of 4 to 2, the ratio of the lesser terms: for the ratio of 6 to 4 is 1, but that of 4 to 2 is 2.
ratio is an image of union. But the harmonic binds total identities and their hyparxes into one communion; and the arithmetic conjoins first, middle, and last differences. For, in short, difference is the mother of numbers, as we learn in the Parmenides. But in every part there were these three, viz. essence, sameness, and difference; and it is requisite that all these should be conjoined with each other through a medium, and binding reasons.

In the next place, we say that the soul is a plenitude of reasons, being more simple indeed than sensibles, but more composite than intelligibles. Hence Timaeus assumes seven ratios in it, viz. the ratio of equality, multiple, submultiple, superparticular, and superpartient, and the opposites of these, the subsuperparticular and subsuperpartient ratios*: but he does not assume the ratios which are composed from these; since they are adapted to corporeal natures, which are composite and divisible; while on the contrary the ratios in the soul proceed indeed into multitude and division, but at the same time, together with multitude, exhibit simplicity, and the uniform together with division. Neither therefore like intellect is it allotted an essence in the monad and the impartible (for intellect is alone monadic and impartible); nor is it multitude and division alone.

Again, it is requisite to understand that numbers which are more simple and nearer to the monad have a more principal subsistence than such as are more composite; since Plato also establishes one part prior to all those that follow, refers all of them to this, and ends in those which are especially composite and solid. This then being admitted, I say that equality, and the ratio of equality, have the ratio of a monad to all ratios; and what the monad is in essential quantity, that the equal is in relative quantity. Hence, according to this reasoning, the soul introduces a common measure to all things which subsist according to the same ratios, and one idea bearing an image of sameness; but according to the multiple

* For an account of these ratios, see the Note to the 8th Book of the Republic on the Geometric Number, vol. i.

† That all the species of inequality of ratio proceed from equality of ratio may be shown as follows:—Let there be any three equal terms, as, for instance, three unities, 1, 1, 1. Let the first therefore be placed equal to the first, viz. 1; the second to the first and second added together, viz. to 2; and let the third be equal to the first, twice the second, and the third added together, viz. to 1, 2, 1, or 4. This will
ple and submultiple ratio, it governs all series, connects wholes themselves, and exhibits every whole form of mundane natures often produced by it in all things. Thus, for instance, it exhibits the solar and lunar form in divine, daemonical, and human souls, in irrational animals, in plants, and in stones themselves. It possesses therefore the series as one according to multiple ratio, the whole of which repeatedly appears in the same series, and adorns the most universal genera by more partial series. But by superparticular and subsuperparticular ratios it governs things which subsist as wholes in their participants, and are participated according to one of the things which they contain. And, according to superpartient and subsuperpartient ratios, it governs such things as are participated wholly indeed by secondary natures, but in conjunction with a division, into multitude. Thus, for instance, man participates of animal, and the whole form is in him, yet, not alone, but at the same time, the whole is according to one thing, viz. the human form; so that, together with the whole, and one certain thing which is a part of it, it is present to its participant. But things which are called common genera, participate indeed of one genus, yet do not participate of this alone, but together with this of many other genera which are parts, and not a part of that one genus. Thus, for instance, a mule participates of the species, from which it has a mixt generation. Each species therefore either participates of one genus according to one thing, and imitates the superparticular

will produce duple proportion, viz. 1, 2, 4. By the same process with 1, 2, 4, triple proportion will arise, viz. 1, 3, 9; and by a like process with this again, quadruple proportion, and so on. Multiple proportion being thus produced from equal terms, by inverting the order of these terms, and adopting the same process, sesquialter will be produced from duple proportion, sesquitertian from triple, &c. Thus, for instance, let the three terms 4, 2, 1, be given, which form a duple proportion: let the first be placed equal to the first, viz. to 4; the second to the first and second, viz. to 6; and the third to the first, twice the second, and the third, viz. to 4, 4, 1, or 9, and we shall have 4, 6, 9, which form a sesquialter proportion; for \( \frac{9}{6} = 1 \frac{1}{2} \). By a like process with 9, 3, 1, which form a triple proportion, a sesquitertian proportion will arise, viz. 9, 12, 16; and so of other species of superparticular proportion. In like manner, by inverting the terms which compose superparticular proportion, all the species of superpartient proportions will arise. And hence it appears that equality is the principle of all inequalities, in the same manner as the monad of all numbers.

* Thus in the superparticular ratio of 3 to 2, 2 is contained in 3, and together with it one part of 2, viz. the \( \frac{2}{3} \) of it.

† Thus in the superpartient ratio of 10 to 6, 6 is contained in 10, and together with it two parts of 6, viz. 4, which is two-thirds of 6.
ratio, which contains the whole, and one part of the whole; or it participates of one common genus, and which is extended to many species, and thus imitates the superpartient ratio, which, together with the whole, contains more parts of it than one: and there is not any participation of forms besides these. Looking therefore to these things, we can easily assign the cause of those things which subsist according to one species, as for instance of the sun, the moon, and man; and also of those which subsist according to many species in conjunction with that which is common. For there are many such like natures both in the earth and sea, as, for instance, satyrs and marine nymphs, the upper parts of which resemble the human form, and the lower the extremities of goats and fishes. There is also said to be a species of dragons with the faces of lions, such as these possefling an essence mingled from many things. All these ratios therefore are very properly presumed in the soul, because they bound all the participations of forms in the universe; nor can there be any other ratios of communion besides these, since all things are deduced into species according to these.

Again, therefore, a hebdomad of ratios corresponds to a hebdomad of parts; and the whole soul through the whole of it is hebdomadic in its parts, in its ratios, and in its circles, being characterized by the number seven. For if the demiurgic intellect is a monad, but soul primarily proceeds from intellect, it will subsist as the hebdomad with respect to it: for the hebdomad is paternal and motherless*. And perhaps equality imports a communion equally to all the ratios of the soul, that all may communicate with all. But multiple ratio indicates the manner in which natures that have more of the nature of unity measure such as are multiplied, wholly pervading through the whole of them; and also the manner in which impartible natures measure such as are more distributed. Superparticular and subsuperparticular ratio appears to signify the differences according to which total reasons do not wholly communicate with each other, but possess indeed a partial habitude, yet are conjoined according to one particular thing belonging to them which is most principal. And the superpartient and subsuperpartient ratio indicates the last nature, according to which the communion of the reasons of the soul is divisible, and multiplied through subjection. For the more sublime reasons are wholly united to the whole of themselves; but those of a middle subsistence are not

* The hebdomad is said to be motherless, because in monadic numbers 7 is not produced by the multiplication of any two numbers between 1 and 10.
united to the whole of themselves, but are conjoined according to their highest part; and those that rank in the third degree are divisibly connascent according to multitude. Thus, for instance, essence communicates with all reasons, measuring all their progressions; for there is nothing in them unessential; but sameness being itself a genus, especially collects into one communion the summits of these; and difference in a particular manner measures their progressions and divisions. The communion therefore of the ratios of the soul is everywhere exhibited: for it is either all-perfect, or it alone subsists according to summits, or according to extensions into multitude.

Again, therefore, let us in the next place attend to the manner in which the seven parts subsist*. The first part, indeed, is most intellectual and the summit of the soul, being conjoined with the one, and the hyparxis of its whole essence. Hence it is called one, as being uniform; its number is comprehended in union, and it is analogous to the cause and the center of the soul. For the soul abides according to this, and subsists in unproceeding union with wholes. And the tetrad indeed is in the first monads, on account of its stability, and its rejoicing in equality and sameness. But the number 8 is in the monads of the second order, through its subjection, and that providence of the soul which extends itself from its supreme part, as far as to the last of things. The triad is in the monads of the third order, through the circular progression of the multitude in it, to the all-perfect. And at the same time it is manifest from these things as images, that the summit of the soul, though it is uniform, is not purely one, but that this also is united multitude, just as the monad † is not without multitude, but is at the same time monad; but the one of the gods is alone one. And the one of intellect is indeed more one than multitude, though this also is multiplied; but the one of the soul is similarly one and multitude, just as the one of the natures posterior to soul, and which are divided about bodies, is more multitude than one. And the one of bodies is not simply one, but a phantasm and image of the one. Hence the Elean guest in the Sophista says, that every thing corporeal is broken in pieces, as having an adventitious one, and never ceasing to be divided. The second part multiplies the part prior to it by generative progressions, which

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* Let it be remembered that the first numbers of the soul are, as we have observed in the Introduction to this Dialogue, 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27.

† In the dissertation on nullities, at the end of my translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics, I have demonstratively shown that infinite multitude is contained causally in the monad.
the duad indicates, and unfolds all the progressions of essence. Hence also it is said to be double of the first, as imitating the indefinite duad and intelligible infinity. But the third part converts the whole soul again to its principle: and it is the third part of it which is convolved to the principles, and which indeed is measured by the first part, as being filled with union from it, but is more partially conjoined to the second part. Hence it is said to be triple of that, but sesquialter of this: for it is indeed contained from the half by the second part, as not possessing an equal power, but is perfectly contained by the first. Again the fourth, and also the fifth part, peculiarly evince that the soul presides over secondary natures: for these parts are intellectual causes of those incorporeals which are divided about bodies, since they are superficies and tetragonic; this being derived from the second, but that from the third part; for the fourth part is the source of progression and generation, and the fifth of conversion and perfection. For both are superficies; but the one subsists twice from the second, and the other proceeds thrice from the third. And it appears that the one, imitating the procession about body, is productive of generative powers, but that the other is productive of intellectual regressions: for all knowledge converts that which knows to the thing known; just as every nature wishes to generate, and to make a progression downwards. The sixth and seventh parts insert in the soul the primary causes of bodies, and of solid bulks: for these numbers are solid; and the one is derived from the second part, and the other from the third. But Timaeus, in what he here says, converting things last to such as are first, and the terminations of the soul to its summit, establishes this to be octuple, and that twenty-seven times, the first. And thus the essence of the soul consists of seven parts, as abiding, proceeding, and returning, and as the cause of the progression and conversion, both of essences divisible about bodies, and of bodies themselves.

If you please you may also say, because the soul is allotted an hypostasis between impartible and partible essences, that it imitates the former through the triad, and presumes the latter from the tetract. But every soul is from all these terms, because every rational soul is the centre of wholes. The harmonic and arithmetic middles, therefore, fill these intervals, which have an essential subsistence, and are considered

* Viz. 4.  † Viz. 9.  ‡ Viz. 8 is derived from 2.  § Viz. 27 is derived from 3.
according to essence, these as we have said collecting their sameness, and those their differences.

We may likewise, approaching nearer to things themselves, say, that the soul, according to one part, viz. its summit, is united to natures prior to itself; but that, according to the double and triple parts, it proceeds from intellect and returns to it; and that, according to the double of the double, and the triple of the triple, it proceeds from itself, and is again converted to itself; and through its own middle to the principles of its essence; for abiding according to them, it is filled from them with every thing of a secondary nature. And as the progression from itself is suspended from the progression prior to itself, so the conversion to itself depends on that which is prior to itself. But the last parts, according to which the soul gives subsistence to things posterior to itself, are referred to the first part, that a circle may be exhibited without a beginning, the end being conjoined with the beginning, and that the universe may be generated animated and intellectual, solid numbers being coördinated with the first part. From these middles, also, Timaeus says that sesquialter, sesquitertian, and sesquioctave ratios result. What else then does he wish to indicate by these things, than the more partial differences of the ratios of the soul? For the sesquialter ratios present us with an image of divisible communion indeed, but according to the first of the parts; but the sesquitertian of communion according to the parts in the middle; and the sesquioctave of that which subsists according to the extremes. Hence the middles are conjoined with each other according to the sesquioctave ratio. For when they are beheld according to opposite genera, they possess the least communion: but each is appropriately conjoined with the extremes. Timaeus also adds, that all the sesquitertian ratios are filled with the interval of the sesquioctave together with the leimma, or remainder; indicating by this that the terminations of all these ratios end in more partial hypostases, until the soul has comprehended the causes of things last in the world, and which are every way divisible. For soul has previously established in herself, according to the demiurgic will, the principles of the order and harmony of these. Soul, therefore, contains the principles of harmonious progression and conversion, and of division into things first, middle, and last; and she is one intellectual reason, which is at the same time filled with all reasons.
With these things also accord what we have before asserted, that all its harmony consists from a quadruple diapason, with the diapente and tone. For harmony subsists in the world, in intellect, and in soul; on which account also Timaeus says that soul participates of and is harmony. But the world participates of harmony decadically, soul tetradically, and intellect monadically. And as the monad is the cause of the tetrad, and the tetrad of the decad, so also intellectual harmony is the supplier of that which pertains to the soul, and that of the soul is the source of sensible harmony: for soul is the proximate paradigm of the harmony in the sensible world. Since, however, there are five figures* and centers† in the universe which give completion to the whole; hence the harmony diapente is the source of symphony according to parts to the world. Again, because the universe is divided into nine ‡ parts, the sesquioctave ratio makes its communion commensurate with soul. And here you may see that soul comprehends the world according to cause, and renders it a whole, harmonizing it considered as one, as consisting of four, and of five parts, and as divided into nine parts. For the monad, tetrad, pentad, and ennead, comprehend the whole number according to which all the parts of the world are divided. Hence the antients considered the Muses, and Apollo the leader of the Muses, as presiding over the universe, the latter supplying the one union of the whole harmony, and the former connecting its divided progression: and the eight Syrens mentioned in the Republic appear to give completion to the same numbers. Thus then, in the middle of the monad and ennead, the world is adorned tetradically and pentadically; tetradically indeed, according to the four ideas of animals which its paradigm comprehends, but pentadically according to the five figures through which the demiurgus adorned all things, introducing as Timaeus says a fifth idea, and arranging this harmonically in the universe.

* Proclus here means the five regular bodies, viz. the dodecahedron, the pyramid, the octahedron, the icosahedron, and the cube. It is a remarkable property of these figures, that the sum of their sides is the same as that of their angles, and that this sum is pentadic, for it is equal to 50. Thus the dodecahedron contains 12 sides, the pyramid 4, the octahedron 8, the icosahedron 20, and the cube 6; and $12 + 4 + 8 + 20 + 6 = 50$. In like manner, with respect to their angles, the dodecahedron has 20, the pyramid 4, the octahedron 6, the icosahedron 12, and the cube 8, and $20 + 4 + 6 + 12 + 8 = 50$.

† Viz. the northern, southern, eastern and western centers, and that which subsists between these.

‡ Viz. into the five centers and the four elements considered as subsisting everywhere.

Again,
Again, therefore, let us say from the beginning, that the demiurgus possessing two-fold powers, the one being productive of sameness, and the other of difference, as we learn in the Parmenides, he both divides and binds the soul. And he is indeed the final cause of these, that the soul may become the middle of wholes, being similarly united and divided; since two things are prior to it, the gods as unities, and beings as united natures; and two things are posterior to it, viz. those natures which are divided in conjunction with others* and those which are perfectly divisible†. You may also say that the one is prior to the former, viz. to the gods and beings, and that matter is posterior to the latter; that sameness and difference which are the idioms of the demiurgic order are effective; and that the sections and bonds of the father are paradigmatic. For he first among the gods cuts and binds with infrangible bonds; theologists obscurely signifying these things when they speak of Saturnian sections, and those bonds which the fabricator of the universe is said to hurl round himself, and of which Socrates reminds us in the Cratylus. We may also consider numbers as having a formal power with respect to divisions; for the parts of the soul are separated according to these. But the middles and the ratios which give completion to these are analogous to bonds: for it is impossible to consider concauses, which have the relation of matter, in souls which have an incorporeal essence. These things being premised, it is evident how the demiurgus of all division, energizing with two-fold powers, the dividing and the binding, divides from primary causes the triform nature and triple mixture of the soul, the whole soul at the same time remaining undiminished. For since he constituted the soul as a medium between an impartible essence, and that nature which is divided about bodies, and since an impartible essence is triple, abiding, proceeding and returning, hence he established a similitude of this in three parts; adumbrating its permanency by the first part, its progression by the second, and its conversion by the third. And perhaps on this account the second is said to be double of the first: for every thing which proceeds has also that which abides subsisting prior to its progression. But the third part is said to be triple of the first: for every thing which is converted proceeds also and abides. Since also soul produces the essence posterior to itself, it likewise contains in itself the whole of this essence. Hence it contains every incorporeal essence, but which is at

* Viz. corporeal forms and qualities. † Viz. bodies.
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the same time inseparable from bodies, according to the fourth and fifth parts; but every corporeal essence according to solid numbers, viz. the sixth and seventh parts. Or, it produces and converts itself to itself, according to square numbers, since it is self-subsistent* and self-energetic, but every divisible essence posterior to itself according to cube numbers. The one ratio of geometric analogy essentially binds these parts, divided as we have said into three and seven. But the harmonic middle binds them according to sameness, and the arithmetic according to difference. These two likewise lie between the geometric middle, and are said to fill the double and triple intervals, because all sameness and all difference are uniformly comprehended under essence and the harmony pertaining to it. But from these middles the multitude of sesquialter, sesquitertian, and sesquioctave ratios becomes apparent; which multitude is indeed binding and connective, as well as the middles, but is of a more partial nature, because each of these is a certain ratio; but each of the middles consists from many ratios, either the same or different. And as analogy or proportion is more comprehensive than ratio, so the above-mentioned middles afford a greater cause to the soul of connecting the multitude which it contains, this cause pervading intellectually through the whole of it. The sesquialter, sesquitertian, and sesquioctave ratios are, therefore, certain bonds of a more partial nature, and are comprehended in the middles, not according to different habits of them with respect to the extremes, for this is mathematical, but according to causal comprehension and a more total hypostasis.

Again, these bonds contain the second and third progressions of the ratios; the sesquialter comprizing through five centers the harmony of the ratios; the sesquitertian, through the four elements which subsist everywhere, evincing their power, and rendering all things known and allied to each other; and the sesquioctave harmonizing the division into nine and eight. Hence the ancients at one time, considering the parts of the world as eight, and at another as nine, placed over the universe eight Syrens, and

* Even square numbers are beautiful images of self-subsistence. For that which produces itself effects this by its hyparxis or summit, since the being of every thing depends on its principal part, and this is its summit. But the root of a number is evidently analogous to hyparxis; and consequently an even square number will be an image of a nature which produces itself. And hence self-production is nothing more than an involution of hyparxis.
nine Mufes, from whom harmony is derived to wholes. The sesquiquarter and sesqui-alter ratios, therefore, are more total than the sesquioctaves; and hence they are the suppliers of a more perfect symphony, and comprehend the harmonious section of the world in less numbers. Here therefore the divisions in the participants are distant from each other, but in the incorporeal ratios of the soul the more total comprehend the more partial. But since the sesquioctaves are the causes of a more partial symphony, hence that which is posterior to these is justly said to be thrust down into the extremity of the universe. Nor is it discordant to the whole of things, that divisible defluxions from each of the elements should be driven into the subterranean region. For since the elements subsist in many places, in the heavens, and in the regions under the moon, the ratio posterior to the sesquioctave collecting the last sediment of them in the subterranean region, conjoins them with wholes, that from the union of both the whole harmony of the universe may be complete. Hence we have said that the harmony of the soul is perfectly intellectual and essential, preceding according to cause sensible harmony, and that Timaeus, wishing to exhibit this through images, employed harmonic ratios, presupposing that there are certain causes in the soul more comprehensive than others, and which subsist prior to every form and to all the knowledge of the soul. On this account I think it is not fit to discourse things of this kind, by explaining the parts, or the ratios, or the analogies, but we should contemplate all things essentially, according to the first division and harmony of the soul, and refer all things to a demiurgic and intellectual cause. Hence we should comprehend the sesquioctaves and remainders (λειμματα) in the sesquiquarter and sesqui-alter ratios, these in the middles, and the middles in that one middle which is the most principal of all of them; and should refer more partial to more total causes, and consider the former as derived from the latter. And thus much concerning harmonic ratios.

P. 490. He at the same time formed an eternal image flowing according to number of eternity abiding in one.

That eternity then, says Proclus, is more venerable, has a more principal subsistence, and is as it were more stable than animal itself, though this is the most beautiful and perfect of intelligible animals, as Plato has informed us in the first part of this dialogue,
is entirely evident. For if the eternal is said to be and is eternal, as that which participates, but eternity is neither said to participate of animal itself, nor to receive its appellation from it, it is evident that the one is secondary, but the other more simple and primary. For neither does eternity participate of animal itself, because it is not an animal, nor is time a visible animal, nor any other animal. For it has been shown that animal itself is only-begotten and eternal; and hence eternity is more excellent than animal itself; since the eternal is neither that which eternity is, nor is better than eternity. But as we all acknowledge that what is endowed with intellect, and that which is animated, are posterior to intellect and soul, in like manner the eternal is secondary to eternity. But here some one may say, what can be more venerable than animal itself, since it is said by Plato to be the most beautiful of intelligibles, and according to all things perfect? We reply, that it is most beautiful from receiving the summit of beauty, through vehement participation of it, but not from its transcendent participation of the good. For it is not said to be the best of intelligibles. To which we may add, that it is not simply the most beautiful of all intelligibles, but of all intelligible animals. Eternity, therefore, is not any animal, but infinite life. In the next place, it is not necessary, that what is every way perfect should be the first. For the perfect possesses all things; so that it will contain things first, middle, and last. But that which is above this division will be super-perfect. Nothing therefore hinders, but that eternity may be superior to the most beautiful and in every respect perfect animal, since intelligible animals are many, if it is the best, and super-perfect.

If these things then are rightly asserted, eternity will neither be one certain genus of being, as some have thought it to be, such as essence, or permanency, or sameness: for all these are parts of animal itself, and each of these possesses as it were an opposition, viz. essence, non-being; permanency, motion; sameness, difference; but nothing is opposed to eternity. All these therefore are similarly eternal, viz. the same, the different, permanency, motion; but this would not be the case if eternity were one of these. Eternity, therefore, is not opposed to any thing either of these, or to any of the things posterior to itself: for time, which may seem to subsist dissimilarly to eternity, in the first place, does not revolve about the same things with it, but about things which do not receive their continuous coherence from eternity; and in the next place it is an image of, and is not opposed to eternity, as Plato now says, and as we shall.
all shortly demonstrate. Eternity, therefore, will not be any one genus, nor the whole collection of the genera of being: for again, there would be multitude in it, and it would require the union of that which abides in one. But it is itself that which abides in one; so that it would abide, and yet not abide in one. It would abide indeed as eternity, and as the cause of union to beings, but it would not abide as being composed from multitude. To all which we may add, that it is intellect which comprehends the genera of being, and that the conception of intellect is different from that of eternity, in the same manner as the conception of soul from that of time: for the energy of intellect is intransitive intelligence, but of eternity, impartible perpetuity.

What then will eternity be, if it is neither any one of the genera of being, nor that which is composed from the five, since all these are eternal, and eternity has a prior subsistence? What else than the monad* of the intelligible unities? But I mean by unities, the ideas of intelligible animals, and the genera of all these intelligible ideas. Eternity is the one comprehension, therefore, of the summit of the multitude of these, and the cause of the invariable permanency of all things, not subsisting in the multitude of intelligibles themselves, nor being a collection of them, but in an exempt manner being present to them, by itself disposing and as it were forming them, and making them to be wholes. For perfect multitude is not unfolded into light, nor is the all-various idea of intelligibles produced immediately after the good; but there are certain natures between, which are more united than all-perfect multitude, but indicate a parturiency and representation of the generation of wholes, and of connected comprehension in themselves. How many, and of what kind these are, the gods know divinely, but the mystic doctrine of Parmenides will inform us in a human and philosophic manner, to which dialogue we shall refer the reader for accurate instruction in these particulars. For we shall now show that eternity is above all-perfect animal, and that it is proximately above it, from the very words of the philosopher.

Because animal itself, therefore, is said to be eternal, it will be secondary to eternity; but because there is nothing eternal prior to it, it will be proximately posterior to eternity. Whence then is this evident? Because, I say, neither is there anything temporal prior to the world, the image of animal itself, but the world is the first participant of time, and animal itself of eternity. For if as eternity is to time, so is animal itself.

* Mono is omitted in the original; but the sense requires that either this word, or the word causa, cause, should be inserted.
itself to the world, then, as geometers would say, it will be alternately as eternity is to animal itself, so is time to the world. But time is first participated by the world; for it was not prior to the orderly distribution of the universe: and hence eternity is first participated by animal itself. And if time is not the whole sensible animal (i.e. the world), for it was generated together with it, and that which is generated with a thing is not that thing with which it is generated, if this be the case, neither will eternity be intelligible animal, so that neither will it be an animal, lest there should be two intelligible animals: for Plato has before shown that animal itself is only begotten (μονογενής). Hence we must not say that eternity is an animal, but different from animal itself. Neither, therefore, in short, is it an animal: for it is either an animal the same with or different from animal itself, neither of which, as we have shown, can be asserted. It is not the latter, because animal itself is only begotten, nor the former, because neither is time the same with that which is temporal. But if it is participated by and does not participate of intelligible animal, it will be a god prior to it, intelligible indeed, but not yet an animal. The order of eternity, therefore, with respect to animal itself, is apparent: for it is evident that it is higher, and proximately higher, and that it is the cause to intelligibles of a subsistence according to the same things, and after the same manner. It has indeed been said to be permanency, but this is a coordinate cause, and rather affords sameness of subsistence about energy; but eternity is an exempt cause. It is also evident that it is the comprehension and union of many intelligible unities; and hence it is called by the oracles father-begotten light*, because it illuminates all things with unific light. "For," says the Oracle, "this alone, by plucking abundantly from the strength of the father, the flower of intellect, is enabled by intellect to impart a paternal intellect to all the fountains and principles; together with intellectual energy and a perpetual permanency according to an unflagging revolution." For, being full

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* This is one of the Chaldaean Oracles, which, as I have shown in my collection of them in the Supplement to vol. iii. of the Monthly Magazine, were delivered by Chaldaean Theurgists under the reign of Marcus Antoninus. The original is as follows:

Πατριγενες φως· τολυ γαρ μονος
Εκ πατρις αλης δραιπενος νουν αυθος,
Εχει τω νουιν πατρικον νουν ενδεικας
Παναις πτυχαις τε και αρχαις
Και το νουιν, αει τε μεγαν αοκνυ συρησαλιγμ."
of paternal deity, which the Oracle calls the flower of intellect, it illuminates all things with intellect, together with an eternal fameness of intellection, and an amatory conversion and energy about the principle of all things. These things, however, I revolve in the inacceffible adyta of the dianoetic part.

Again, investigating on all sides the intellectual conception of the philosopher about eternity, let us consider what is the meaning of its abiding in one. For we inquire, in what one? Shall we say, in the good, as it has appeared to the most theological of the interpreters? But neither does the good abide in itself, through its simplicity, as we learn in the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, and therefore much less does any thing else abide in it. For, in short, nothing is in it, nor with it, in consequent of its being exempt from coordination with any thing. Hence it is not usually called good, or one, but the good and the one, that we may understand its monadic transcendency, and which is beyond every nature that is known. But now eternity is not said to abide in the one, but in one; so that neither does it abide in the good. Shall we say then, that by eternity abiding in one, its united nature as it were, its permanency in its own one, and its subsisting as one multitude, are implied? Or, in short, the number of that which does not proceed, that it may be the cause of union to the multitude of intelligibles? Shall we say that this also is true, that it may impart to itself the stable and the whole prior to things eternal? For to abide in one, is to have the whole and the same hyparxis invariably present at once. Every divine nature, therefore, begins its energy from itself, so that eternity also establishes itself in one prior to things eternal; and in a similar manner connects itself. Hence being is not the cause of permanency, as Strato* the natural philosopher says it is, but eternity†; and it is the cause of a permanency, not such as is always in generation, or becoming to be, but which, as Timaeus says, invariably subsists in one. But if eternity unfolds a duad, though we are often studious to conceal it; for the ever is conjoined with being, according to the same, and eternity is that which always is (οτιν αυτον, αυτον); if this be the case, it appears to have the monad of being prior to it, and the one being, viz. the highest being, and to abide in this one,

* Strato was a philosopher of Lampctac. He was the disciple and successor of Theophrastus; and flourished 298 years before Christ.

† For eternity is stability of being; and in like manner immortality is stability of life, and memory of knowledge.
agreeably to the doctrine of our preceptor, that the first being may be one prior to the
dual, as not departing from the one. And the dual indeed in eternity, which causally
unfolds multitude, is united to the first being in which eternity* abides; but the multi-
tude of intelligibles is united to eternity itself, which in a transcendent and united manner
comprehends and connects all their summits. For that the conception of the first being
is different from that of eternity is evident; since to be for ever is perfectly different from
simply to be. If therefore any thing is eternal, this also is; but the contrary does not
follow, that if any thing is, this also is eternal. Hence, to be is more total and generative
than to be for ever, and on this account is nearer to the cause of all beings, of the unities
in beings, of generation itself, of matter, and, in short, of all things. These three, there­
fore, orderly succeed each other; the one being†, as the monad of beings; eternity as
the dual, together with being possessing the ever; and the eternal, which participates
both of being and the ever, and is not primarily eternal being, like eternity. And the
one being is alone the cause of being to all things, whether they are truly or not truly
beings; but eternity is the cause of permanency in being. And this is what Strato
ought rather to have said, and not to have defined being to be the permanency of things,
as he writes in his book Concerning Being, transferring the idiom of eternity to being.

Let us now attend to the following admirable account of time, by Proclus.

How then is time said by Plato to be an image of eternity? Is it because eternity
abides in one, but time proceeds according to number? These things however rather
indicate their dissimilitude than similitude to each other. For Plato nearly opposes all
things to all, proceeding, to abiding, according to number, to one, the image to the thing
itself. It is better, therefore, to say, that divinity produced these two as the measures
of things, I mean eternity and time, the one of intelligible and the other of mundane
beings. As the world, therefore, is said to be the image of the intelligible, so also the
mundane measure is denominated the image of the intelligible measure. Eternity, how­
ever, is a measure as the one, but time as number: for each measures the former things

* As the intelligible triad, or the first procession from the ineffable cause of all, consists, as will be shown
in the Introduction to the Parmenides, of being, life, and intellect, eternity forms the middle of this triad,
being, as Plotinus divinely says, infinite life, at once total and full, and abides in the summit of this triad,
i.e. in being itself or the first and intelligible being.
† Τὸν ὅς, viz. being characterized by and wholly absorbed in the one; for such is the first being.

united,
united, and the latter things numbered: and the former measures the permanency of being, but the latter the extension of generated natures. But the apparent oppositions of these two, do not evince the diffimilitude of the measures, but that secondary are produced from more antient natures. For progression is from abiding, and number from the one. May we therefore say, that time is on this account an image of eternity, because it is productive of the perfection of mundane natures, just as eternity connectedly contains, and is the guardian of beings. For as those natures which are unable to live according to intellect, are led under the order of Fate, lest by flying from a divine nature they should become perfectly disordered; in like manner things which have proceeded from eternity, and are unable to participate of a perfection, the whole of which is established at once, and is always the same, end indeed in the government of time, but are excited by it to appropriate energies, through which they are enabled to receive the end adapted to their nature, from certain periods which restore them to their antient condition.

But how is time said to be a moveable image of eternity? Shall we say because the whole of it is in motion? Or is this indeed impossible? For nothing is moved according to the whole of itself, not even such things as are essentially changed: for the subject of these remains. Much more therefore must that which is moved, according to other motions, abide according to essence, and this if it be increased, and changed, and locally moved. For if it did not abide according to something, it would at the same time cause the motion to be evanescient; since all motion is in something. Nothing, therefore, is as we have said moved according to the whole of itself, and especially such perpetual natures as it is fit should be established in their proper principles, and abide in themselves, if they are to be continually preserved. But in a particular manner the image of eternity ought in a certain respect to possess perpetuity according to sameness, and stability; so that it is impossible that time should be moved according to the whole of itself, since neither is this possible to any thing else. Something of it, therefore, must necessarily remain, since every thing which is moved is moved in consequence of possessing something belonging to it which abides. The monad of time, therefore, abides suspended from the demiurgus; but being full of measuring power, and willing to measure the essential motions of the soul, together with physical and corporeal motion, and also being, energies and passions, it proceeds according to number. Hence time, abiding
abiding by its impartible and inward energy, and being participated by its external energy, and by the natures which are measured proceeds according to number; i.e. it proceeds according to a certain intellectual number, or rather according to the first number, which as Parmenides would say being analogous to the one being, or the first of beings, presides over intellectuels, in the same manner as the first being presides over intelligibles. Time, therefore, proceeds according to that number; and hence it distributes an accommodated measure to every mundane form.

You may also say still more appropriately, that time which is truly so called proceeds according to number, numbering the participants of itself, and being itself that intellectual number, which Socrates obscurely indicates when he says that swiftness itself and slowness itself are in true number, by which the things numbered by time differ, being moved swifter or slower. Hence Timaeus does not speak with prolixity about this true number, because Socrates had previously in the Republic perfectly unfolded it, but he speaks about that which proceeds from it. For that being true number, time, says he, proceeds according to number. Let then true time proceed according to intelligible number, but it proceeds so far as it measures its participants, just as the time of which Timaeus now speaks proceeds as that which is numerable, possessing yet an image of essential time, through which it numbers all things with greater or lesser numbers of their life, so that an ox lives for this and man for that period of time, and the sun and moon and the other stars accomplish their revolutions according to different measures. Time, therefore, is the measure of motion, not as that by which we measure, but as that which produces and bounds the being of life, and of every other motion of things in time, and as measuring them according to and assimilating them to paradigms. For as it refers itself to the sameness of eternity which comprehends paradigmatic causes, in like manner it sends back to a more venerable imitation of eternal principles things perfected by it, which are circularly convolved. Hence theurgists say that time is a god, and deliver to us a method by which we may excite this deity to render himself apparent. They also celebrate him as older and younger, and as a circulating and eternal God; not only as the image of eternity, but as eternally comprehending it prior to sensibles. They add further, that he intellectually perceives the whole number of all the natures that are moved in the world, according to which he leads round and

ON THE TIMEÆUS.
reflores to their antient condition in swifter and flower periods every thing that is moved. Besides all this, they celebrate him as interminable through power, in consequence of infinite circulation. And lastly, they add that 12 is of a spiral form, as measuring according to one power things which are moved in a right line, and those which are moved in a circle, just as the spiral uniformly comprehends the right line and the circle.

We must not, therefore, follow those who consider time as consisting in mere naked conceptions, or who make it to be a certain accident; nor yet must we assent to those who are more venerable than these, and who approach nearer to reality, and assert with them that the idiom of time is derived from the soul of the world energizing transitively. For Plato, with whom we all desire to accord respecting divine concerns, says that the demiurgus gave subsistence to time, the world being now arranged both according to soul and according to body, and that it was infused in the soul by him, in the same manner as harmonic reasons. Nor again, does he represent the god fashioning and generating time in the soul, in the same manner as he says the Divinity fabricated the whole of a corporeal nature within the soul, that the soul might be the despot and governor of it; but having discoursed concerning the essence, harmony, power, motions, and all various knowledges of the soul, he produces the essence of time, as the guardian and measurer of all these, and as that which assimilates them to paradigmatic principles. For what benefit would arise from all mundane natures being well-conditioned, without a perpetual permanency of subsistence; and in imitating after a manner the idea of their paradigm, but not evolving to the utmost of their power the whole of it, and in receiving partly impartible intelligence? Hence the philosopher places a demiurgic cause and not soul over the progression of time.

In the next place, looking to things themselves, you may say that if soul generated time, it would not thus participate as being perfected by it; for that soul is perfected by time, and also measured by it according to its energies, is not immane, since every thing which has not the whole of its energy collectively and at once, requires time to its perfection and restoration, through which it collects its proper good, which it was incapable of acquiring impartibly, and without the circulations of time. Hence, as we have before observed, eternity and time are the measures of the permanency and perfection of things; the former being the one simple comprehension of the intelligible unities,
and the other the boundary and demiurgic measure of the more or less extended permanency of the natures which proceed from thence. If, therefore, soul, after the same manner with intellect and the gods, apprehended every object of its knowledge by one projecting energy, and always the same understanding immutably, it might perhaps have generated time, but would not require time to its perfection. But since it understands transitively, and according to periods by which it becomes restored to its pristine state, it is evidently dependant on time for the perfection of its energy.

After this, it is requisite to understand that inanimate natures also participate of time, and that they do not then only participate of it when they are born, in the same manner as they participate of form and habit, but also when it appears that they are deprived of all life; and this not in the same manner, as they are even then said to live, because they are coordinated with wholes, and sympathize with the universe, but they also peculiarly and essentially participate of a certain time, so far as they are inanimate, continually dissolving as far as to perfect corruption. To which we may add, that since the mutations, motions and restes pertaining to souls and bodies, and, in short, all such things as rank among opposites in mundane affairs, are measured by time, it is requisite that time should be exempt from all these; for that which is participated by many things, and these dissimilar, being one and the same, and always subsisting by itself, is participated by them conformably to this mode of subsistence; and still further, being in all things, it is everywhere impartible, so that it is everywhere where one thing, impartible according to number, and the peculiarity of no one of the things which are said to subsist according to it. And this Aristotle also perceiving, demonstrates that there is something incorporeal and impartible in divisible natures, and which is everywhere where the same, meaning by this the same in time. Further still, time not being essence, but an accident, it would not thus indicate a demiurgic power, so as to produce some things perpetually in generation, or becoming to be, but others with a more temporal generated subsistence; and some things more slowly proceeding to being than these, but swifter than more imbecil natures; at the same time distributing to all things an accommodated and proper measure of permanency in beings. But if time is a demiurgic essence, it will not be the whole soul, nor a part of soul; for the conception of soul is different from that of time, and each is the cause of different and not of the same things. For soul imparts life, and moves all things, and hence the world, so far as it approaches to soul, is filled with life,
and participates of motion; but time excites fabrications to their perfection, and is the supplier of measure and a certain perpetuity to wholes. It will not, therefore, be subordinate to soul, since soul participates of it, if not essentially, yet according to its transitive energies. For the soul of the universe is said to energize incessantly, and to live intellectually through the whole of time. It remains, therefore, that time is an essence, and not secondary to that of soul. In short, if eternity were the progeny of intellect, or were a certain intellectual power, it would be necessary to say that time also is something of this kind pertaining to soul: but if eternity is the exempt measure of the multitude of intelligibles, and the comprehension of the perpetuity and perfection of all things, must not time also have the same relation to soul and the animastic order? So that time will differ from eternity, in the same manner as all proceeding natures from their abiding causes. For eternity exhibits more transcendency with respect to the things measured by it than time, since the former comprehends in an exempt manner the essences and the unities of intelligibles; but the latter does not measure the essences of the first souls, as being rather coordinated and generated together with them. Intelligibles also are more united with eternity than mundane natures with time. The union indeed of the former is so vehement, that some of the more contemplative philosophers have considered eternity to be nothing else than one total intellect; but no wise man would be willing to consider time as the same with the things existing in time, through the abundant separation and difference between the two.

If then time is neither any thing belonging to motion, nor an attendant on the energy of soul, nor, in short, the offspring of soul, what will it be? For perhaps it is not sufficient to say that it is the measure of mundane natures, nor to enumerate the goods of which it is the cause, but to the utmost of our power we should endeavour to apprehend its idiom. May we not therefore say, since its essence is most excellent, perfective of soul, and present to all things, that it is an intellect, not only abiding but also subsisting in motion? Abiding indeed according to its inward energy, and by which it is truly eternal, but being moved according to its externally proceeding energy, by which it becomes the boundary of all transition. For eternity possessing the abiding, both according to its inward energy, and that which it exerts to things eternal, time being assimilated to it according to the former of these energies, becomes separated from it according to the latter, abiding and being moved. And as with respect to the essence of
the soul, we say that it is intelligible, and at the same time generated, partible, and at the same time unpartible, and are no otherwise able perfectly to apprehend its middle nature than by employing after a manner opposite, what wonder is there if, perceiving the nature of time to be partly immovable and partly subsisting in motion, we, or rather not we, but prior to us, the philosopher, through the eternal, should indicate its intellectual monad abiding in sameness, and through the moveable its externally proceeding energy, which is participated by soul and the whole world? For we must not think that the expression the eternal simply indicates that time is the image of eternity, for if this were the case, what would have hindered Plato from directly saying that it is the image, and not the eternal image of eternity? But he was willing to indicate this very thing, that time has an eternal nature, but not in such a manner as animal itself is said to be eternal: for that is eternal both in essence and energy; but time is partly eternal, and partly, by its external gift, moveable. Hence theurgists call it eternal, and Plato very properly denominates it not only so; for one thing is alone moveable, both essentially and according to the participants of it, being alone the cause of motion, as soul, and hence it alone moves itself and other things: but another thing is alone immovable, preferring itself without transition, and being the cause to other things of a perpetual subsistence after the same manner, and to moveable natures through soul. It is necessary, therefore, that the medium between these two extremes should be that which, both according to its own nature, and the gifts which it imparts to others, is immovable and at the same time moveable, essentially immovable indeed, but moved in its participants. But a thing of this kind is time; hence time is truly, so far as it is considered in itself, immovable, but so far as it is in its participants, it is moveable, and subsists together with them, unfolding itself into them. It is therefore eternal, and a monad, and center essentially, and according to its own abiding energy; but it is, at the same time, continuous and number, and a circle, according to its proceeding and being participated. Hence it is a certain proceeding intellect, establisht indeed in eternity, and on this account is said to be eternal. For it would not otherwise contribute to the assimilation of mundane natures to more perfect paradigms, unless it were itself previously suspended from them. But it proceeds and abundantly flows into the things which are guarded by it. Whence I think the chief of theurgists celebrate time as a god, as Julian in the seventh of the Zones, and venerate it by these names, through which it is unfolded in its
its participants; causing some things to be older, and others to be younger, and leading all things in a circle. Time, therefore, possessing a certain intellectual nature, circularly leads according to number, both its other participants and souls. For time is eternal, not in essence only, but also in its inward energy; but so far as it is participated by externals, it is alone movable, coextending and harmonizing with them the gift which it imparts. But every soul is transitively moved, both according to its inward and external energies, by the latter of which it moves bodies. And it appears to me that those who thus denominated time ξενος, had this conception of its nature, and were therefore willing to call it as it were ξενοιωνον τον, an intellect moving in measure; but dividing the words perhaps for the sake of concealment, they called it ξενος. Perhaps too, they gave it this appellation because it abides, and is at the same time moved in measure; by one part of itself abiding, and by the other proceeding with measured motion. By the conjunction, therefore, of both these, they signify the wonderful and demiurgic nature of this god. And it appears, that as the demiurgus being intellectual began from intellect to adorn the universe, so time being itself supermundane, began from soul to impart perfection. For that time is not only mundane, but by a much greater priority supermundane, is evident; since as eternity is to animal itself, so is time to this world, which is animated and illuminated by intellect, and wholly an image of animal itself, in the same manner as time of eternity.

Time, therefore, while it abides, moves in measure; and through its abiding, its measured motions are infinite, and are restored to their pristine state. For moving in measure, the first of intellects about the whole fabrication of things, so far as it perpetually subsists after the same manner, and is intellect according to essence, it is said to be eternal; but so far as it moves in measure, it circularly leads souls, and natures, and bodies, and, in short, periodically restores them to their pristine condition. For the world is moved indeed, as participating of soul; but it is moved in an orderly manner, because it participates of intellect; and it is moved periodically with a motion from the same to the same, imitating the permanency of the intellect which it contains, through the resemblance of time to eternity. And this it is to make the world more similar to its paradigm; viz. by restoring it to one and the same condition, to assimilate it to that which abides in one, through the circulation according to time. From these things also, you have all the causes of time according to Plato; the demiurgus indeed,
as the fabricative cause; eternity as the paradigm; and the end the circulation of the things moved to that which is one, according to periods. For in consequence of not abiding in one, it aspires after that which is one, that it may partake of the one, which is the same with the good. For it is evident that the progression of things is not one, and in a right line, infinitely extended as it were both ways, but is bounded and circumscribed, moving in measure about the father of wholes, and the monad of time infinitely evolving all the strength of fabrication, and again returning to its pristine state. For whence are the participants of time enabled to return to their pristine condition, unless that which is participated possessed this power and peculiarity of motion? Time, therefore, the first of things which are moved, circulating according to an energy proceeding to externals, and returning to its pristine state, after all the evolution of its power, thus also restores the periods of other things to their former condition. By the whole progression of itself indeed, it circularly leads the soul which first participates of it; but by certain parts of itself, it leads round other souls and natures, the celestial revolutions, and among things last, the whole of generation: for in consequence of time circulating all things circulate; but the circles of different natures are shorter and longer. For again, if the demiurgus himself made time to be a moveable image of eternity, and gave it subsistence according to his intellecution about eternity, it is necessary that what is moveable in time, should be circular and moved in measure, that it may not apostatize from, and may evolve the intelligence of the father about eternity. For, in short, since that which is moveable in time is comprehensive of all motions, it is requisite that it should be bounded much prior to the things which are measured by it: for not that which is deprived of measure, but the first measure, measures things; as neither does infinity bound, but the first bound. But time is moved, neither according to soul, nor according to nature, nor according to that which is corporeal and apparent; since its motions would thus be divisible, and not comprehensive of wholes. It would likewise thus participate of irregularity, either more or less, and its motions would be indigent of time. For all of them are beheld in time, and not in progression, as those which are the measures of wholes, but in a certain quality of life, or lation, or passion. But the motion of time is a pure and invariable progression, equal and similar, and the same. For it is exempt both from regular and irregular motions, and is similarly present to both, not receiving any alteration through the motions themselves being changed, but remaining
ing the fame separate from all inequality, being energetic and restorative of whole motions according to nature, of which also it is the measure. It also subsists unmingled with the natures which it measures, according to the idiom of its intellectual energy, but proceeds transitively, and according to the peculiarity of self-motion. And in this respect, indeed, it accords with the order of soul, but is inherent in the things which are bounded and perfected by it according to a primary cause of nature. It is not however similar in all respects to any one thing. For in a certain respect it is necessary that the measure of wholes should be similar to all things, and be allied to all things, but yet not be the same with any one of the things measured.

The motion, therefore, of time proceeds evolving and dividing impartible and abiding power, and causing it to appear partible; being as it were a certain number, dividibly receiving all the forms of the monad, and reverting and circulating to itself. For thus the motion of time proceeding according to the measures in the temporal monad conjoins the end with the beginning, and this infinitely; possessing indeed itself a divine order, not arranged as the philosopher Jamblichus also says, but that which arranges; nor an order which is attendant on things precedent, but which is the primary leader of effects. This motion is also at the same time measured, not indeed from any thing endowed with interval, for it would be ridiculous to say that things which have a more ancient nature and dignity, are measured by things subordinate, but it is measured from the temporal monad alone, which its progression is said to evolve, and by a much greater priority from the demiurgus, and from eternity itself. With relation to eternity, therefore, which is perfectly immovable, time is said to be moveable; just as if some one should say that soul is divisible about bodies, when considered with relation to intellect, not that it is this alone, but that when compared with intellect, it may appear to be such, though when compared with a divisible essence, it is indivisible. Time, therefore, is moveable not in itself, but according to the participation from it which appears in motions, and by which they are measured and bounded; just as if it should be said that soul is divisible about bodies, so far as there is a certain divisible participation of it about these of which it comprehends the cause. For thus also time is moveable, as possessing the cause of the energy externally proceeding from it, and which is divisibly apparent in motions, and is separated together with them. As motions, therefore, become temporal through participation, so time is moveable, through being participated by motions.
ON THE TIMEÆUS.

P. 499. Whatever ideas, therefore, intellect perceived by the diænetic energy in animal itself, &c.

The demiurgic wholeness, says Proclus * (p. 266), weaves parts in conjunction with wholes, numbers with monads, and makes every part of the universe to be a world, and causes a whole and a universe to subsist in a part. For the world is allotted this from its similitude to animal itself, because animal itself is an entire monad and number, an all-perfect intelligible intellect, and a plenitude of intelligible causes, which it generated so as to abide eternally in itself. For there is one multitude which abides in causes, and another which proceeds and is distributed; since the demiurgus himself also gives subsistence to some genera of gods in himself, and produces others from himself, into secondary and third orders. His father Saturn likewise generates some deities as paradigmatic causes of fabrication abiding in himself, and others as demiurgic causes coordinated with wholes. And the grandfather of Jupiter, Heaven, contains some deities in, and separates others from himself. Theologists also manifest these things by mystic names, such as concealment, absorption, and the being educated by Fate. But by a great priority to these, intelligible intellect, the father of wholes, generates some causes, and unfolds them into light, in himself, but produces others from himself; containing within his own comprehensions, such as are uniform, whole, and all-perfect, but producing through difference into other orders such as are multiplied and divided. Since therefore every paternal order gives subsistence to things after this manner, this world, which is an imitation of the intelligible orders, and is elevated to them, very properly contains one allness prior to partial animals, and another, that which receives its completion from them, and together with the former receives the latter, that it may be most similar both to the demiurgic and paradigmatic cause.

With respect to animal itself, we have before said what it is according to our opinion, and we shall also now say, that of the intelligible extent, one thing is the highest, united

* The beginning of the Commentary on this part of the Timeæus is unfortunately wanting in the original; and by a strange confusion, the words κρίτες ταπεινές, which there form the beginning, are connected with the comment on the preceding text, which comment is also imperfect; and what is still more strange, the part which is wanting to the completion of this preceding comment is to be found in p. 270, beginning at the words το θέ & cætera, line 11.
and occult; another is the power of this, proceeding, and at the same time abiding; and another, that which unfolds itself through energy, and exhibits the intelligible multitude which it contains. Of these also, the first is intelligible being, the second intelligible life, and the third intelligible intellect. Animal itself, however, cannot be the first being: for multitude is not there, nor the tetrad of ideas, but through its singleness and ineffable union it is called one by Plato. And, in short, animal itself is said to participate of eternity, but the first being participates of nothing, unless some one should say it participates of the one, which is itself a thing in every respect deserving consideration. For may we not say that what is above being itself, is even more excellent than this appellation the one? But that is primarily one, which is not such according to participation. Animal itself, therefore, cannot be being itself, through the above-mentioned causes. Neither can it be intelligible life: for animal is secondary to life, and is said to be animal by a participation of life. In short, if animal itself were the second, eternity would be being; but this is impossible: for being itself is one thing, and eternal being another; the former being the monad of being, and the latter the duad, having the ever connected with being. Besides the former is the cause of being to all things, but the latter, of their permanency according to being. If therefore animal itself is neither the one being, nor being itself, nor that which is immediately posterior to this, for eternity is this, being intelligible power, infinite life, and wholeness itself, according to which every divine nature is at once a whole; since this is the case, animal itself must be the remaining third. For animal itself must necessarily in a certain respect be intellect, since the image of it entirely subsists with sense, but sense is the image of intellect; so that in that which is primarily animal, intellect will be primarily inherent. If therefore it is secondary to life, it must necessarily subsist according to intelligible intellect: for being intelligible, and an animal, as Plato says, the most beautiful of intelligibles, and only begotten, it will possess this order. Hence animal itself is intelligible intellect, comprehending the intellectual orders of the gods in itself, of which also it is collective, unitive, and perfective, being the most beautiful boundary of intelligibles, unfolding their united and unknown cause to intellectual natures, exciting itself to all various ideas and powers, and producing all the secondary orders of the gods. Hence also Orpheus calls it the god Phanes, as unfolding into light the intelligible unities, and ascribes to him the forms of animals, because the first cause of intelligible animals shines forth in him; and multiform ideas,
ON THE TIMÆUS.

ideæ, because he primarily comprehends intelligible ideas. He also calls him the key of intellect, because he bounds the whole of an intelligible essence, and consequently contains intellectual life. To this mighty divinity the demiurgus of the universe is elevated, being himself, indeed, as we have before said, intellect, but an intellectual intellect, and particularly the cause of intellect. Hence he is said to behold animal itself: for to behold is the peculiarity of the intellectual gods; since the theologus also denominates intelligible intellect eyeless. Concerning this intellect therefore he says,

Love, eyeless, rapid, feeding in his breast.

For the object of his energy is intelligible. But the demiurgus being intellect, is not a participated intellect†, that he may be the demiurgus of wholes, and that he may be able to look to animal itself. But being imparticipable, he is truly intellectual intellect. And, indeed, through simple intelligence, he is conjoined with the intelligible, but through various intelligence, he hastens to the generation of secondary natures. Plato, therefore, calls his intelligence vision, as being without multitude, and as shining with intelligible light; but he denominates his second energy dianoetic, as proceeding through simple intelligence to the generation of demiurgic works. And Plato indeed says, that he looks to animal itself; but Orpheus, that he leaps to and absorbs it, Night‡ pointing it out to him: for through this goddess, who is both intelligible and intellectual, intellectual intellect is conjoined with the intelligible. You must not however on this account say, that the demiurgus looks to that which is external to himself: for this is not lawful to him; but that being converted to himself, and to the fountain of ideas which he contains, he is also conjoined with the monad of the all-various orders of forms. For since we say that our soul by looking to itself knows all things, and that things prior are not external to it, how is it possible that the demiurgic intellect, by understanding itself, should not in a far greater degree survey the intelligible world? For animal itself is also contained in him, though not monadically, but according to a certain divine number. Hence he is said by theologists, as we have observed, to absorb the intelligible

* Viz. Orpheus.
† Viz. he is not an intellect consubsistent with soul.
‡ Night subsists at the summit of that divine order which is denominates intelligible, and at the same time intellectual.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

god, being himself intellectual, in consequence of containing the whole of an intelligible essence, formal divisions, and the intelligible number, which Plato indicating denominates the ideas of the demiurgus, such and so many, by the former of these appellations manifesting the idioms of causes, and by the latter, separation according to number.

If these things then subsist after this manner, it is not proper to place an infinity of forms in intelligibles: for that which is definite is more allied to principles than the indefinite; and first natures are always more contracted in quantity, but transcend in power natures posterior to and proceeding from them. Nor must we say with some, that animal itself is separate from the demiurgus, thus making the intelligible to be external to intellect: for we do not make that which is seen subordinate to that which sees, that it may be external, but we assert that it is prior to it: and more divine intelligibles are understood by such as are more various, as being contained in them; since our soul also entering into itself, is said to discover all things, divinity and wisdom, as Socrates asserts. Animal itself therefore is prior and not external to the demiurgus. And there indeed all things subsist totally and intelligibly, but in the demiurgus intellectually and separately: for in him the definite causes of the sun and moon presubsist, and not one idea alone of the celestial gods, which gives subsistence to all the celestial genera. Hence the Oracles assert *, that his demiurgic energies burst about the bodies of the world like swarms of bees: for a divine intellect evolves into every demiurgic multitude the total separation of these energies in intellect.

P. 499.—But these ideas are four, &c.

As with respect to demiurgic intelligence, a monad is the leader of intellectual multitude, and as with respect to paradigm, unical form subsists prior to number, in like manner discourse, the interpreter of divine concerns, shadowing forth the nature of the things of which it is the messenger, first receives the whole of the thing known collectively, and according to enthusiastic projection, but afterwards expands that which is convolved, unfolds the one intelligence through arguments, and divides that which is united; conformably to the nature of things, at one time interpreting their union, and at another their separation, since it is neither naturally adapted, nor is able to comprehend both

* Viz. The Chaldæan Oracles. See the Parmenides.
these at once. Agreeably to this, the discourse of Plato first divinely unfolds the whole number of intelligible ideas, and afterwards distributes into parts the progressions which this number contains: for there intelligible multitude is apparent, where the first monads of ideas subsist. And that this is usual with Plato we have before abundantly shown. Descending therefore from words to things, let us in the first place see what this tetrad itself of ideas is, and whence this number originates, and in the next place what the four ideas are, and how they subsist in animal itself, whether so as that its all perfect nature receives its completion from these, or after some other manner, for by thus proceeding we shall discover the divinely intellectual conception of Plato. It is necessary, however, again to recur to the above-mentioned demonstrations, in which we said that the first, united, and most simple intelligible essence of the gods, proceeding supernally from the unity of unities, but according to a certain mode which is ineffable and incomprehensible by all things, one part of this essence ranks as the first, is occult and paternal; but another part ranks as the second, and is the one power, and incomprehensible measure of wholes; and the third part is that which has proceeded into energy and all various powers, and is at the same time both paternal and fabricative. The first of these also is a monad, because it is the summit of the whole intelligible extent, and the fountain and cause of divine numbers; but the second is a duad, for it both abides and proceeds as in intelligible genera, and has the ever connected with being, and the third is the tetrad which is now investigated, which receives all the occult cause of the monad, and unfolds in itself its unproceeding power. For such things as subsist in the monad primarily, and with unproceeding union, the tetrad exhibits in a divided manner, now separated according to number, and a production into secondary natures. But since the third posesses an order adapted to it, yet also entirely participates of the causes prior to itself, it is not only the tetrad, but besides this which is still greater, as a monad it is allotted a paternal, and as a duad a fabricative and prolific transcendency. So far therefore as it is called animal itself, it is the monad of the nature of all animals, intellectual, vital, and corporeal; but so far as it comprehends at the same time the male and female nature, it is a duad; for these subsist in an appropriate manner in all the orders of animals, in one way in the gods, in another in daemons, and in another in mortals; but so far as from this duad, it gives subsistence to the four ideas of animals in itself, it is a tetrad; for the fourfold fabrication of things proceeds according to these ideas, and the first productive cause.
cause of wholes is the tetrad. Plato therefore teaching this tetradic power of the para-
digm, and the most unical ideas of mundane natures, says, that they are four, compre-
hended in one animal itself. For there is one idea there, animal itself; and there is also
a duad, viz. the female and the male, or, according to Plato, possessing genera and species:
for he calls two of the ideas genera, viz. the intellectual and the air-wandering, but the
other two species, as being subordinate to these. There is also a tetrad; and as far as to
this, intelligible forms proceed into other productive principles according to a different
number. For according to every order there is an appropriate number, the lesser com-
prehending more total ideas, but the more multiplied number such as are more partial;
since more divine natures being contracted in quantity, possess a transcendency of power;
and the forms of second natures are more multiplied than those prior to them; such as
are intellectual more than intelligibles, supermundane than intellectual, and mundane
than supermundane forms. These then are the forms which proceed to an ultimate distri-
bution, just as intelligibles receive the highest union: for all progression diminishes power
and increases multitude. If therefore Timaeus discoursed about a certain intellectual or-
der, he would have mentioned another number, as for instance the hebdomadic or deca-
dic; but since he speaks about the intelligible cause of ideas, and which comprehends
all such animals as are intelligible, he says that the first ideas are four. For there the
tetrad subsists proceeding from the intelligible monad, and filling the demiurgic decad.
For " divine number, according to the Pythagorean hymn upon it, proceeds from the
retreats of the undecaying monad, till it arrives at the divine tetrad, which produces the
mother of all things, the universal recipient, venerable, placing a boundary about all things,
undeviating and unwearied, which both immortal gods and earth-born men call the
sacred decad. Here the uniform and occult cause of being is called the undecaying
monad, and the retreats of the monad: but the manifestation of intelligible multitude,
which the duad subsisting between the monad and tetrad unfolds, is denominated the
divine tetrad; and the world itself receiving images of all the divine numbers, supernally
imparted to it, is the decad: for thus we may understand these verses looking to the
fabrication of the world. And thus much concerning this tetrad.

* The last line of these verses, viz. ἁθανατος τε θεοι, και γυναικεις ανθρωποι, is not in Proclus, but is added
from the Commentaries of Syrianus on Aristotle's Metaphysics, where alone it is to be found.

† Viz. The summit of the intelligible triad, or superessential being.
In the next place, let us consider what the four ideas are, and what are the things to which they give subsistence: for there are different opinions concerning this, some especially regarding the words of Plato, asserting that the progression is into gods, and the mortal genera, but others looking to things, that it is into gods, and the genera superior to man, because these subsist prior to mortals, and it is necessary that the demiurgus should not immediately produce mortals from divine natures. Others again conjoin both these, and follow what is written in the Epinomis, that gods subsist in the heavens, daemons in the air, demigods in water, and men and other mortal animals in the earth. Such then being the diversity of opinion among the interpreters, we admire indeed the lovers of things, but we shall endeavour to follow our leader*.

Hence we say that the celestial genus of gods comprehends all the celestial genera, whether they are divine, angelic, or daemonic; but the air-wandering, all such as are arranged in the air, whether gods, or their attendant daemons, or mortal animals that live in the air. Again, that the aquatic comprehends all the genera that are allotted water, and those natures that are nourished in water; and the pedestrail, the animals that are distributed about the earth, and that subsist and grow in the earth. For the demiurgus is at once the cause of all mundane natures, and the common father of all things, generating the divine and daemonic genera by and through himself alone, but delivering mortals to the junior gods, as they are able proximately to generate them. The paradigm also is not the cause of some, but by no means of other animals, but it possesses the most total causes of all things.

It is also requisite to consider the proposed words in an appropriate manner, according to every order; as, for instance, the genus of gods arranged in the heavens, in one way, in those that are properly called gods, and in another, in the genera more excellent than man. For we say that there are celestial angels, daemons, and heroes, and that all these are called gods, because the divine idiom has dominion over their essential peculiarity. Again, we must consider the winged and air-wandering in one way in the aerial gods, in another in daemons, and in another in mortals. For that which is intellectual in the gods, is denominated winged; that which is providential, air-wandering, as pervading through all the sphere of the air, and consequently containing the whole of it. But in daemons, the winged signifies rapidity of energy; and the air-wandering indicates their being everywhere present, and proceeding through all things without impediment.

* Viz. Syrianus, the preceptor of Proclus.
And in mortals, the winged manifests the motion through one organ of those naturesthat alone employ the circular motion; but the air-wandering, the all-various motion through bodies: for nothing hinders partial souls that live in the air from pervading through it. Again, the aquatic in divine natures, indicates a government inseparable from water: and hence the oracle calls these gods water-walkers*; but in the genera attendant on the gods, it signifies that which is connotative of a moist nature. And indeed the pedestrian, in one place, signifies that which connectively contains the last feat of things, and proceeds through it, in the same manner as the terrestrial, that which stably rules over this feat, and is perfective of it through all-various powers and lives; but in another place it signifies the government at different times of different parts of the earth, through an appropriate motion. And thus much concerning the names.

But from these things it may be inferred that intelligible animal itself is entirely different from animal itself in the demiurgus; since the former has not definite ideas of mortal animals. For the demiurgus wishing to assimilate what the world contains to every thing in himself, produced mortal animals, that he might make the world all-perfect; but he comprehends the definite ideas of these, producing them from the immortal genera. He knows therefore mortal animals, and it is evident that he knows them formally; and he thinks fit that the junior gods, looking to him, and not to animal itself, should fabricate them, in consequence of containing in himself separately the ideas of mortals and immortals. In animal itself, therefore, with respect to the aerial, or aquatic, or terrestrial, there was one idea of each of these, the cause of all aerial, aquatic, or terrestrial animals, but they are divided in the demiurgus; and some are formal comprehensions of immortal aerial, and others of mortal aerial animals; and after the same manner with respect to the aquatic and terrestrial genera. The formal multitude therefore in animal itself, is not the same with that in the demiurgus, as may be inferred from these arguments.

We may also see that Plato makes a division of these genera into monad and triad, (opposing the summit of the celestial genus to the total genera,) and into two duads. For he denominates the celestial and winged, genus, but the aquatic and pedesial, species; the

* Here, also by an unaccountable mistake, all that follows after the word ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν σπερμάτων, &c.
latter possessing an order subordinate to the former, in the same manner as species to genus. It is likewise requisite to observe that he omits the region of fire in these, because the divine genus comprehends the summit of fire. For of sublunar bodies, fire has not any proper region, but subsists according to mutation alone, always requiring the nourishment of air and water. For its proper place, as fire, is on high: but neither is it there, since it would be seen, being naturally visible; nor can it arrive thither, being extinguished by the surrounding air, which is dissimilar to it. If, therefore, it is requisite that there should be a wholeness of fire, and that possessing a form it should be somewhere, and not alone consist in being generated, and if there is no such fire under the moon, fire will alone subsist in the heavens, abiding such as it is, and always possessing its proper place. For a motion upwards is not the property of fire when subsisting according to nature, but is alone peculiar to fire when subsisting contrary to nature. Thus also the SACRED DISCOURSE of the Chaldaeans conjoins things aerial with the lunar ratings, attributing to fire the celestial region, according to a division of the elements in the world. For the fire in generation is a certain defluxion of the celestial fire, and is in the cavities of the other elements. There is not however a sphere of fire by itself, but the summit of air imitates the purity of supernal fire. And we denominate this sublunar fire, and call the region under the heavens the place of fire: for this is most similar to the celestial profundity, as the termination of air is to water, which is gross and dark. But you should not wonder if the most attenuated and pure fire will be in the summits of air, as the most gross and turbid is in the bosom of the earth; not making this pure fire to be a wholeness different from the whole air, but considering it, being most attenuated, as carried in the pores of the air, which are most narrow. Hence it is not seen through two causes; from not being distinct from the air, and from consisting of the smallest parts: so that it does not resist our sight in the same manner as the light of visible objects. True fire, therefore, subsists in the heavens; but of sublunar fire, that which is most pure, is in the air proximate to the celestial regions, which Plato in the course of this Dialogue calls aether; and that which is most gross, is contained in the recesses of the earth.

* Agreeably to this, Plotinus observes, that every body, when in its proper place, is either at rest, or moves circularly.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.