ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE CRATYLUS,

EXTRACTED FROM THE MS. SCHOLIA OF PROCLUS ON
THAT DIALOGUE.
ON THE CRATYLUS.

The scope of the Cratylus is to exhibit in things left the prolific energy of souls, and the assimilative power, which, essentially receiving, they evince through the rectitude of names. But since the partial energy of souls frequently fails of its proper ends, just in the same manner as a partial nature, hence names indefinite, and which are casually circulated, naturally take place, and all of them are not the offspring of intellectual science, nor do they all regard an alliance with things themselves. Again, the Cratylus is logical and dialectical, not, however, according to the mere dialectic methods of the Peripatetics, but according to the scientific dialectic of the great Plato, which is only adapted to those whose dianoetic power is perfectly purified, who have been instructed from their youth in disciplines, have purified the juvenile condition of their manners through the virtues; and, in short, have genuinely philosophized. This dialectic also is the defensive enclosure of disciplines, leads us up to the good, the one.

* The extracts with which the reader is here presented, comprehend nearly the whole of the Scholia of Proclus on the Cratylus. They may be justly called an incomparable treasury of theological information, since they are replete with the most mystic wisdom, and many of the most abstruse dogmas of ancient theology are here most satisfactorily and perspicuously unfolded. To him also who is desirous of penetrating the depths of Grecian mythology, they will be inestimable; and genuine elucidations of many parts of Homer, of the Hymns of Orpheus, and of the Theogony of Hesiod, can alone be obtained from these Scholia. And in addition to all this, these Scholia are no less rare than valuable, since a copy of them is not to be found either in the university of Oxford or Cambridge, or in the British Museum, or in any of the universities of Scotland or Ireland; and it is seldom to be met with in the universities on the continent. My copy is a transcript of the manuscript now in the possession of Mr. Heber, of Brazen-nose college, Oxford.

† For an account of this dialectic, see the Parmenides, and particularly the introduction to it.
cause of all things, and was imparted to men through Prometheus, together with a most splendid fire* from the gods. For the analytics of the Peripatetics, and demonstration, which is the summit of this, may be comprehended by all who are not entirely involved in mental darkness, and who have not drank abundantly of the water of oblivion.

Again, intellect is the producer (προσεόλευς) of dialectic, from the whole of itself generating the whole of it; according to the progression of all things from the one, giving subsistence to the divisive method; but according to the collective comprehension of every thing in one idiom, to the definitive method; and according to the presence of forms with each other, though which each is what it is, and participates of other forms, the demonstrative method; and generating the analytic method, according to the conversion of all things to the one, and their proper principles.

Again, according to Aristotle, there is one rhetoric, and one dialectic, which are able to persuade or confute on both sides; but Plato says it is better to give a two-fold distribution to each. For one species of rhetoric is flattery, and without art, which he repudiates in the Gorgias; but the other is the science of things good and just, which he celebrates in the Phædrus. And again, he dismisses the dialectic of Aristotle as contentious, but embraces the dialectic, which surveys the principles of things, as a part of philosophy.

The present dialogue makes us to be scientifically knowing in the rectitude of names; and it is necessary that he who intends to be skilled in dialectic should begin from this theory.

As Plato, in the Parmenides, delivers the whole of dialectic, but not merely so, but together with the theory of beings, so now he delivers the rectitude of names, together with the science of things.

Plato now wishes to deliver the principles of things and of dialectic, since he delivers names in conjunction with the things of which they are names.

Why is it that Plato says, that by despising names we shall become, in old age, more rich in prudence, and yet now makes the investigation of them the leading object? May we not say, that he considers them, not so far as they are appellations, but so far as they are images of things? For the definitive art is triple; since either beginning from the highest genus, it proceeds through all the media, to the last differences, which the

* See the notes on the Philebus.
Elean guest does*, when defining a sophist and politician; or receiving the genus which is near and known, it proceeds through the following differences, such as in this instance, man is an animal pedestrian, biped, and the like; or it uses name alone, such as the becoming is beautiful, and soul is ἐνεργεῖν νοστός, and the like. For if he who at first established names possessed science, he who uses an established name must necessarily fall upon definition. Hence Plato now makes the investigation about such like names his principal design, and through these as media is extended to things themselves. This inquiry also contributes to demonstration. Thus, in the Phaedrus, Plato endeavours to show, that the divining art is better than that pertaining to augury, from the name. It likewise contributes to analysis. Thus, in the Phaedrus, Plato calls the love which is participated by mortals flying, but that which is imparticipable and divine winged, through the essence and the energy of the god conspiring into one; and thus he appears to ascend and analyze. Frequently also, this is necessary to division. Thus Socrates shows, by division, that the pleasant is one thing, and the good another, because the names also are two.

That† the persons of the dialogue are Cratylus the Heraclitean, of whom Plato was an auditor, who said that all names are from nature, and that such as are not from nature are not names, just as we say, that he who falsely denominates things says nothing; and Hermogenes, the Socratic, who on the contrary said that there was no name from nature, but that all names are from position; and the third is Socrates, who distinguishing says, that some names are from nature, and others from position; such as are those which are casually made. For the names which belong to things perpetual, rather participate of a subsistence from nature, but those which belong to things corruptible, rather partake of the casual. For he who calls his son Athanasius‡, manifests the confusion of names about things of this kind.

Further still, since names have both form and matter, according to form they rather participate of a subsistence from nature, but according to matter of a subsistence from position. And Socrates indeed, addressing himself to Hermogenes, separates names firmly established in the gods, such as μοίης, and the like, from those which subsist in

---

* In the Sophista and Politicus.
† Almost all the paragraphs of these Scholia begin with the word *φανερωθείναι, that.
‡ That is, Immortal.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

souls, such as ἔσχης. But, addressing himself to Cratylus, he admits, indeed, the
to the relation of names to things, but shows that there is much of the casual in names, and
at the same time that all things are not moved.

That the heavens, which partake more of motion, have also permanency after a cer-
tain manner, as in the poles, and things of this kind. But the earth, which partakes
more of permanency, has also motion through its internal change.

That names which subsist from nature partake also of a subsistence from position, and
those which subsist from position partake of a subsistence from nature.

That Cratylus being scientific, and employing the greatest brevity of diction, which
was the peculiarity of the Heraclitics, in consequence of enunciations not being able to
keep pace with the flowing nature of things, appears to answer, through the whole of
the dialogue, from the fewest syllables and words. Hence the most imitative Plato, in
the very beginning, represents him as saying βουλεῖ. But Hermogenes being doxastic,
and venerating the opinions of the many, conformably to his doctrine, that names sub-
sist from position, says, ιί σαί δόξαι, &c. For δόξας frequently belongs to things inel-
gible, and also to such as are eligible, just as will is of things good alone.

That the whole Apolloniacal series is suspended from the government of Jupiter.

That Pythagoras and Epicurus were of the opinion of Cratylus; but Democritus and
Aristotle of Hermogenes. Pythagoras therefore being asked what was the wisest of
things, said it was number; and being asked what was the next in wisdom said, he who
gave names to things. But by number, he obscurely signified the intelligible order,
which comprehends the multitude of intellectual forms: for there that which is the
first and properly number* subsists after the supereffential one. This likewise supplies
the measures of essence to all beings, in which also true wisdom, and knowledge which
is of itself, and which is converted to and perfects itself, subsists. And as there the in-
telligible, intellect, and intelligence are the same, so there also number and wisdom are
the same. But by the founder of names, he obscurely signified the soul, which indeed
subsists from intellect, and is not things themselves like the first intellect, but possesse-
the images, and essential transitive reasons of them, as statues of beings. Being
therefore is imparted to all things from intellect, which knows itself and is replete with

* That is, number according to cause, which subsists at the extremity of the intelligible order. For num-
der, according to hyparxis, subsists at the summit of the intelligible, and at the same time intellectual order.

wisdom;
ON THE CRATYLUS.

45

wisdom; but that they are denominated is from soul, which imitates intellect. Pythagoras therefore said, that it was not the business of any casual person to fabricate names, but of one looking to intellect and the nature of things. Names therefore are from nature.

But Democritus, who said that names subsist from position, inferred this from four arguments: First, From sameness of appellation; for different things are called by the same name. Names therefore are not from nature. 2d, From the variety of names, for if different names are adapted to one and the same thing, they are also adapted to each other, which is impossible. 3d, From the change of names: for why was Aristocles called Plato, but Turtanus Theophrastus. 4th, If names are from nature, but yet from a defect of similars, why do we say φπονει from φπονεις, but from δικαιοντη (ἐν ὕπτι παρασταθέν) we do not derive a word which alludes to this? Names therefore are casual and not from nature. But he calls the first argument πελωτής, (i.e. having a manifold signification); the second, μεταφρος, (i.e. equivalent, or equiponderant); and the fourth, ναιμικης, (i.e. nameless). In answer to the first of these arguments, some say, that it is nothing wonderful, if one name shadows forth many things, as φιλος, love, &from ρομη, strength, and from νεκτηµεν, a wing, manifests different things. In answer to the second, it is said, nothing hinders that different names, in a different respect, may manifest the same thing. Thus, for instance, in the words μερος and man, the same thing may be called by the former of these words, according to the possession of a distributed life, and by the latter according to ἰξωσίαν α οπωσιν, considering what he has seen. In answer to the third, it is said, that this very thing signifies that names are by nature, viz. that we transfer those that are not properly established, and which are contrary to nature, to a position according to nature. And in answer to the fourth, that it is nothing wonderful, if names which were established at first should fail through a great length of time.

That a subsistence according to nature is four-fold. For it is either as the essences of plants and animals, as well the wholes as the parts; or it is as the energies and powers of these, such as the levity and heat of fire; or it is as shadows and appearances in mirrors; or as artificial images are assimilated to their archetypes. Epicurus therefore thought that names had a subsistence from nature according to the first signification, as works precedaneous by nature, such as voice and sight. And as to see and to hear
ADDITIONAL NOTES

That the name Cratylus appears to have been assigned παρεξηγηθησαν αρχηγοις των προπλαστων δογματων, from firmly obtaining the dogmas of Heraclitus, and that on this account he deposed flowing things, as not properly having a subsistence. But the name Socrates is παρα τω σωτηρω επου του κρατους της Ψυχης, from being the saviour of the strength of his soul, that is of his reason, and from not being drawn down under the senses.

That things eternal receive their denomination from powers or energies, but things generated from use and communion.

That he who wishes to imitate any thing, ought to be scientifically knowing in two things, viz. the archetype, and demiurgic art.

That the Heraclitics are accused as arrogant, as dissemblers, and as despisers, by Theodorus in the Theætetus, and now by Hermogenes. It must be observed, however, that these two are not philosophers; for the former was a geometrician, and the latter a youth. And a true philosopher has not leisure to consume his time in things of this kind.

That Socrates did not think that the speculation about the rectitude of names was to be despised, but according to the proverb he considered fine things to be difficult.

That investigation is imparted to souls from Maia the mother of Hermes; but invention is from the Hermaic series. For the more total genera of the gods energize prior to, together with, and posterior to, such as are more partial. Hence we see that investigation is
ON THE CRATYLUS.

is imperfect, and is as matter previously prepared, from the donation of more elevated causes to their participants, such as form supervening from things inferior.

That sophists rejoice in indicative assertions, but philosophers in such as are dialectic. And again, the sophists, as framers of images, assume the person of one skilled in dialectic; and thus their contentious molestation is produced.

That of the Hermaic gift, some things are intellectual and first goods; but others are secondary, and perfective of the dianoetic power; and others rank in the third degree, purify the irrational nature, and in a particular manner measure the phantastick motions. Others again give subsistence to the reasons of nature; and others are the suppliers of externally proceeding powers, and of gain. For these are the last and the material gifts of the god, which, as astrologers say, the god imparts in ignoble dispositions (ἀδικής διαθέσεως).

That it very little belongs to a philosopher, says Plato, to speak about particulars; for it is his business to ascend to the speculation of wholes, and things common.

The reasoning of Hermogenes is as follows: If there is a transposition of names, names are from position, and are the symbols of things. But the first is true, and therefore the second. But the reasoning of Proclus is this: If names are symbols of things, and are from position, we have no longer any occasion for the transposition of names. The first is true, and therefore the second. The followers of Hermogenes therefore speak erroneously; for they look to particulars only, and not also to things eternal. For the names of things eternal are divine and venerable, as being sacred to the gods, whose powers and energies they express. These Socrates, in the Philebus venerates, and says, that his caution about them is attended with the greatest dread.

That the truth of an enunciative sentence (ὅπου ὁπόθων οὐκ ἴσθι), means one thing with Aristotle, and another with Plato in the present place, in which he says, that names essentially predicated (καθ' εὐθανα λογομεθά) are true. For that of Aristotle speaks of the composition and division of that which is predicated, and has for its subject both the false and the true. But the great Plato knew how to use the significant of truth and falsehood in a fourfold respect. For he uses it either according to the hyparxes themselves of things, as when he says that real beings truly are, but that unreal beings have a false subsistence. Or he uses it according to the passions which are consequent to.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

to preceding motions, as when Socrates, in the Philebus, divides pleasure into the true and false. Or according to knowledge, as when he defines false opinions according to the true. Or according to the instruments of the gnostic life, as, for instance, assertions, names, and elements. For in these the true and the false are seen, according to their adaptation and symmetry with things. Rhetoricians also have a certain form of diction which they call truth.

That Antisthenes said, that nothing could be contradicted; for according to him every assertion is true. For he who speaks says something. He who says something, speaks of that which has a being. And he who speaks of that which has a being, speaks the truth. In answer to this we must say, that there is also that which is false, and that nothing hinders but that the man who speaks of being may speak falsely. For he who speaks, speaks about something, and does not speak something.

That bad are more known by good men, than the virtue of good men is by the bad. For vice is blind; and in the first place is ignorant of itself, and in the next place of others.

That the dogma of Protagoras is different from that of Euthydemus. For the former says, that though the subject has no existence, yet it appears to beholders to possess a particular quality, through the commixture of the agent and patient. But the dogma of Euthydemus makes every thing to be all things, and afferts that all things are at the same time always true. As he that says, that a piece of wood is white and black, small and great, moist and dry, and likewise, that all the negations of these are true. Hence beginning from different principles, those sophists end in the same thing.

That the power of the first infinity imparts from itself progression to all things whatever which are capable of subsistence; but bound, limits and circumscribes every thing, and establishes it in its proper boundaries. Thus in numbers form pervades to all things from the monad and bound; but the never-failing according to progression from the prolific duad; so that every being has a certain nature, bound, idiom, and proper order, through the first bound. There is therefore contradiction in words, which definitely exhibits the false and the true.

That the word πρατειν, to aflert, is afferted of those only who energize according to the dianoetic power, but the word ποιειν, to do, is afferted of those who energize in a different
different manner from this. *Actions* therefore and *makings* have their proper boundaries, instruments, and times; nor does any casual thing do or act any casual thing.

That speech is under action, may be shown from the following division: Every energy of the soul is either effected without body, and this energy is phantasy, opinion, intelligence; or it is effected with body, and this is two-fold. For it is either unattended with free will, and this is sense and involuntary motion, or it is attended with free will, and this is action, under which is discourse.

That Plato coarranges Minerva, Vulcan, and Mars, through that which is common with respect to warlike concerns; through Minerva possessing a kindred art with each of the others; through each of the others being the lover of Venus; and because each was produced from Juno and Jupiter.

That the soul of the world imparts life to alter-motive natures: for to these it is the fountain and principle of motion, as Plato says in the *Phædrus* and in the *Laws*. But the demiurgus imparts life simply to all things, life, divine, intellectual, phsyical, and that which is divisible about bodies.

If names, according to Aristotle *, are from position, and are symbols of things and conceptions, it is necessary that the sentences composed from them, being enunciative from position, should not be said, from this very circumstance, to be assimilated to composite conceptions, nor that they are of themselves the recipients of truth or falsehood. But indeed enunciative sentences (οἱ ἀποφαντικοὶ λόγοι), possessing essentially the speaking falsely or truly, do not posefjs this from position. Names therefore are not from position.

If every one who gives a name performs a certain action, but he who performs a certain action, performs it through an instrument; hence he who gives a name, since he gives it through an instrument, uses a name as an instrument. But of instruments some are from nature, as the hand and foot; others from position, as a bridle and a name. And of these artificial instruments, some effect something which is subservient to subsistence, as an ax; but others effect that which contributes to signifying and teaching. A name therefore is a thing of this kind: for it is an instrument which teaches and unfolds into light the essence of things; the teaching being assumed from him who uses the instrument, but the unfolding into light from the paradigm. But a

* See the Introduction to this Dialogue.
name requires, as an instrument, him who uses it, but as an image it requires a reference to its paradigm. So that it is evident from these things, that a name is not a symbol, nor the work of any casual position, but is allied to things, and adapted to them by nature. For every instrument is coordinated to a proper work, and cannot be adapted to any thing else than to that for which it was made. A name therefore, as being an instrument, has a certain connate power, and which coharmonizes with the things signified. As likewise, it is that which teaches, it possesses an order which unfolds conceptions into light; and as giving distinction to essence, it produces in us a knowledge of things.

Again, a name is not the effect of physical instruments: for every name, so far as a name, is significant of something; since voice is not the same with name. Physical instruments therefore, such as the tongue, the arteries, and the lungs, give perfection to voice; and though these cooperate in producing a name, through matter, yet the conception of the founder of names, especially gives completion to it, which conception coharmonizes, in a becoming manner, matter to form and paradigm. But he who discourses, uses a name when established: for every instrument has both one who uses it, and one who makes it. Every thing too which is used has a producing cause; and every thing having a producing cause, is ministerial to something with respect to energy.

A name is said to be from nature, both as an effect, and as an instrument; for it becomes by its formation an image of things, and announces them through conceptions as media. Very properly therefore is a name said to be a doctrinal instrument, ἐποίησις λόγιου δικαίου; but shortly after it is called the effect of the legislator. And this is for the sake of him who discourses: for it is both an end and good to unfold things. Hence Socrates says, it is rather an instrument, considering it according to its more excellent subsistence. Hence too this instrument is a medium between the teacher and the learner.

That a shuttle and an augur are paradigms adapted to a name. For a name separates things from each other, and enters into the learner, through the depth of his conceptions.

That as Socrates, in the Gorgias, demonstrates to Calicles, who divides that which is just by law, oppositely to that which is just by nature, that law and nature in that which is just concur with each other, in like manner it is necessary to conceive that names
names subsist both from law and nature; not however from casual law, but from that which is eternal, and which consists according to eternal reasons. A name therefore, through its producing cause, which is scientific, is both from law and position; but through its paradigmatic cause is from nature.

But if this be the case, how does Socrates afterwards show to Cratylus, that it is not only necessary to call that a name which is rightly framed, but that also which is erroneously established. In answer to this, we must say, that law is contemplative of that which is universal. Such names therefore as are given to things perpetual, are founded by law. But since there are also names of things corruptible, it is by no means wonderfull if law, which regards universal, has not dominion over these, and that there should be much of the casual in them, as in the names Ambrosius, Athanasius, Polychronius*, and the like. But what the art is which produces names we will concisely relate; for not every thing in it is a species of the legislative art. That there is then in the soul an assimilative power is evident; for painting and things of this kind are suspended from this power, which assimilates subordinate to superior natures, and things which subsist in composition to such as are more simple. And again, according to the same power, the soul is able to assimilate herself to natures superior to her own essence, viz. to gods, angels, and demons. She also, through the same power, assimilates to herself things subordinate to her own nature; and also assimilates them to things superior to herself. Hence she fabricates statues of gods and demons. But wishing to give subsistence after a manner to immaterial similitudes of things, which are alone the progeny of the rational essence, employing from herself the cooperation of fancy adapted to speech (λεκτικής φαντασίας), she produces the essence of names. And as the teleptic art, through certain symbols, and arcane signatures, assimilates statues of the gods, and makes them adapted to the reception of divine illuminations, so the legislative art, according to the same assimilative power, gives subsistence to names, the statues of things; through such and such sounds shadowing forth the nature of things, and having given subsistence to them, delivers them to the use of mankind. Hence the legislator is said to be the lord of the generation of names. And as it is not holy to behave in a disorderly manner towards the statues of the gods, so neither is it becoming to err

* The first and second of these words signify immortal; the third, having an extended duration.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

about names. For a legislative intellect is the artificer of these, inserting in them images of paradigms; and it is proper to venerate them, through their alliance to the gods.

It also appears to me that Plato establishes the legislator analogous to the demiurgus of the universe: for he it is, according to the Timæus, who establishes the laws of fate, and who governs all things conformably to law. According to Plato too, he is the first fabricator of names: for as we learn from the Timæus, he denominated one of the circulations of the universe same, and the other different. If therefore the legislator is analogous to the demiurgus, must he not necessarily be the lord of the position of names? Hence in this Dialogue Plato calls the legislator, demiurgus, and the most rare of demiurgi. Thus also Socrates, in the Phædrus, says, that the name μῆνες was given by Jupiter. Of names therefore, some are the progeny of the gods, extending also as far as to the soul; but others are the offspring of partial souls, who are able to frame them through intellect and science; and others again subsist through the middle genera. For some meeting with δαμνος and angels, have been taught by them names better adapted to things than such as men have established. It is requisite likewise to know the differences of names arising from their producing causes, and to refer all of them to the one demiurgus, a divinity of an intellectual characteristic. Whence also a name has two-fold powers, the one, that which teaches conceptions, and is the cause of communion; but the other, that which gives distinction to essence; since the demiurgus likewise possesses two-fold powers, the one productive of sameness, the other of difference.

That the assimilative energy of the demiurgic intellect is two-fold; the one, that according to which he gives subsistence to the whole world, looking to an intelligible paradigm; the other, that according to which he promulgates names adapted to things; concerning which Timæus briefly indicates, but theurgists teach more clearly, and oracles* from the gods themselves: "There is a venerable name with a sleepless revolution, leaping into the worlds through the rapid reproofs of the father." And another oracle says, "The paternal intellect disseminated symbols through the world." Thus therefore the legislator also, looking to the whole world, delivers the most excellent polity, and imposes names assimilated to things.

* See my collection of these Oracles in the third volume of the Monthly Magazine.
That of things artificial there are no definite causes and paradigms, because the effects of such causes and paradigms are essences, and proper measures, have a reference to the universe, and proceed through nature. But every thing artificial is unessential, and is all-variably changed in accommodation to our uses and circumstances, and is separated from things which have a natural subsistence. If, however, some one should call the producing and prolific powers of the gods, which proceed into the universe, demiurgic, intellectual, generative, and perfective arts, we shall not reject a nomination of this kind; since we also find theologists indicating through these divine productions. Hence they call the Cyclops the causes of all artificial production, who also taught Jupiter, Minerva, and Vulcan. But they celebrate Minerva as presiding over other arts, and particularly that of weaving, and Vulcan as the inspective guardian of another art. According to Orpheus, however, the weaving art originates from Minerva, but proceeds into the vivific series of Proserpine: for this goddess and all her choir, abiding on high, are said to weave the order of life, which is participated by all the mundane gods. For the one demiurgus excites all the junior demiurgi to weave together the mortal with the immortal form of life. But the order of life thus woven ends in the gods who preside over generation, among whom is the Homeric Circe, who weaves all the life in the four elements, and at the same time with her song harmonizes the sublunary realms. Circe therefore is ranked by theologists among these weaving powers. Her shuttle too, as they say, is golden, by this indicating her essence to be intellectual and pure, immaterial and unmingled with generation, and that her employment consists in separating things flable from such as are in motion, according to divine diversity. If therefore, as I have said, some one recurring to these analogies, calls the powers of the gods the causes of these arts, but their effects the illuminations of these powers pervading through the whole world, he will speak with rectitude. For it is necessary not only to suspend from Minerva the weaving art which is with us, but prior to this, that which energizes through nature, and connects generated with eternal, mortal with immortal, corporeal with incorporeal, and sensible with intellectual natures. In like manner we must survey the whole of the tectonic, and each of the other arts, as first subsisting in nature. So that the shuttle will everywhere have an analogous subsistence, separating the genera which con-

* This is asserted in the Timaeus.
stitute beings, that, together with the connection of them, division may remain, and genuinely preserve their hyparxis. Hence the artists that are with us act under presiding and inspecting gods. They do not however in consequence of this contemplate intelligibles; for they do not operate looking to these, but to the forms which are with themselves, and the reasons of things artificial which they contain; and this by either inventing these, or receiving them from others. For the first artificer of a shuttle conceived in his own mind what kind of a thing a shuttle ought to be, looking to its use, and being led by this, produced in himself that form of a shuttle according to which others are made. But others learning from him, have acquired a knowledge of the form, and conformably to it make the resemblance of the shuttle.

And here we may see how these things are imitations of the demiurgic art, and of intellectual forms: for these forms being always established according to invariable permanency, things corruptible in the world are preserved, and are again renovated through their stable sameness. And the corruption indeed is derived from matter, but the stable sameness from an eternal form. Just as in the shuttles which are here, the corruption is from the matter, but the regeneration from the reason or productive principle in the artist. What the shuttle, therefore, is to the artificer by whom it is made, that are names to the legislator, and all mundane natures to the demiurgus. Hence as forms have a three-fold subsistence, viz. intellectual, scientific, doxastic; all sensible natures are derived from intellectual, names from scientific, and shuttles from doxastic forms.

That the fabrication of the universe is two-fold: for the one gives subsistence to reasons which extend to all things, and to forms which have an invariable subsistence, and sustain no mutation; but the other inserts divisible differences in generated natures. Thus, for instance, the human form pervades supernally from the one and whole intellectual fabrication, through the stars as media. Hence this form has a perpetual subsistence, as originating from an immovable cause. But since men differ from each other in magnitude and colour, and things of this kind, these differences arise from the secondary fabrication of the junior gods, and are convergent with much mutability, through being the production of moveable causes. This however takes place, in order that the variety of things may abound, and that the perpetual generation of particulars may be multiplied. For different celestial periods give completion to, and at different times generate different things,
things, and produce one connection from all things which contributes to the completion of the universe.

That the shuttle is an image of the separating power of the gods, both of those that preside over wholes, and those that preside over parts; for its operation in woofs represents the energy of this power, and exhibits a symbol of the order of the separating gods. Hence when theologists speak of shuttles as belonging to these gods, they do not speak of the idea of a shuttle, but only symbolically use the name. For why do they rather speak of the shuttle, and not of something else? And is it not absurd that science should casually use names, and these when applied to the gods? But they appear to me to assume things of this kind according to analogy. For what a shuttle is in the weaving art, that separation is in the fabrication of forms. But analogy is not the habitude of idea to an image, nor is it from position alone. Thus Plato calls certain powers of the soul horses; neither thus denominating them casually, nor meaning that these powers are the ideas of sensible horses, but merely employing analogy. Hence initiators into the mysteries through an alliance of this kind, causing sensibles to sympathize with the gods, use these instruments as signatures of divine powers; the shuttle as a signature of separating, a cup of vivific, a sceptre of ruling, and a key of guardian power. And thus they denominate other powers of the gods, using analogy in a similar manner.

That as things are to each other, so also are their names analogously to each other, according to honour and power. Hence the names of the gods are honourable and venerable, and worthy of the greatest fear to the wise. On this account they say it is not proper that the Greeks should use the Egyptian, Scythian, or Persian names of the gods, but such as are Grecian. For the gods who preside over climates rejoice when they are denominated in the dialects of their proper regions.

If he who uses an instrument is better than him who fabricates it as being more architectonic, how does a partial soul use the irrational nature, and the flabby body, which were fabricated by the junior gods? Or does not the soul also contribute to the fabrication of these? And do not the junior gods use these as instruments? And it is necessary to consider these with reference to each other; the whole fabrication, as they say, to the use of the whole, but the divisible to the divisible.

* See p. 495.  
† See the Phaedrus.
If he who is skilled in dialectic uses the work of the legislator as a more excellent character, but the judge as one subordinate, it appears to be absurd. May we not say that the one uses it as an instrument, the other as a principle? for a partial soul uses a daemon as a governor and an inspective guardian, but the body as an instrument. For in the paradigms of these, the father of Jupiter is Saturn, but the daughter is Justice. Hence the legislator is analogous to the demiurgus Jupiter, inferting the laws of fate in souls, and promulgating names to the whole circulations. But he who is skilled in dialectic, is analogous to the Saturnian monad. For the mighty Saturn supernally imparted the principles of intelligence to the demiurgus, and presides over the whole fabrication of the univerfe. Whence also Jupiter in Orpheus calls him a daemon:

Орфео д' ηιμετερόν γενέμν ομιδικέ δαισιν.

i. e. O illustrious daemon, direct our offspring.

And Saturn it seems posseffes with himself the highest causes of things collected and separated; through the celestial sections* producing into parts the intellectual whole-ness, and becoming the cause of generative progressions and multiplications, and, in short, being the leader of the Tittanic race, from which the division of things originates. Through absorptions too, he again collects his own progeny, unites them to himself, and resolves them into his own uniform and impartible cause; since also the demiurgus Jupiter receives proximately from him the truth of things, and primarily understands the ideas which he contains: for Night also delivers oracles to Jupiter. But the father Saturn proximately imparts to him all the measures of the whole fabrication of things.

That with respect to intellect, the essential contains in itself the whole true knowledge of things at once in energy; but the intellect of the philosopher not being essential, but an illumination, and, in short, an image of intellect, understands divisibly, and sometimes only touches on the truth.

That there are five habits of men with respect to knowledge, viz. two-fold ignorance, simple ignorance, desire, invetigation, invention.

* i. e. Through the sections of that order of gods which is denominated intelligible and at the same time intellectual.
That he who has a scientific knowledge of the methods of invention interprets to the learner, imitating the leading Hermes.

That Socrates is analogous to intellect; but Hermogenes to irrational opinion, aspiring after good; and Cratylus is analogous to the corporeal and material phantasm, on which account he is deceived by the sophists as a slave. But opinion and the phantasm are nearly sisters, as being neighbours (ὡς ἡμοὶ).

Why does Plato eject from his Republic the poets about Homer, as imitators, but now* introduces them as divine leaders of the rectitude of names? May we not say, that there the variety of imitation is unadapted to simple and unperverted manners; but that here and every where he admires and embraces their divinely-inspired conceptions? Since however the present discourse is about divine names, it is necessary to speak a little concerning them. And in the first place, let us speak concerning the names which are occultly established in the gods themselves; since some of the antients said that these originated from the more excellent genera†, but that the gods are established beyond a signification of this kind; but others admitted that names are in the gods themselves, and in those gods that are allotted the highest order.

The gods therefore possess an hyparxis uniform and ineffable, a power generative of wholes, and an intellect perfect and full of conceptions; and they give subsistence to all things according to this triad. Hence it is necessary that the participations of those divinities who are of a more elevated order, and who are arranged nearer to the good, should proceed triadically through all things to which they give subsistence. It is also necessary that among these, those participations should be more ineffable, which are defined according to the hyparxes of the first gods; but that these should be more apparent, and more divided, which are illuminated according to the intellect of exempt causes; and that those participations which are between these, should be such as are the effusions of prolific powers. For the fathers of wholes giving subsistence to all things, have diffeminated in all things vestiges, and impressions, of their own triadic hypothesis; since nature also infers in bodies an exciting principle (ἐνεργεία) derived from her proper idioms, through which she moves bodies, and governs them as by a rudder. And the demiurgus has established in the universe an image of his own monadic transeendence, through which

* See p. 500, Viz. angels, demons, and heroes.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

he governs the world, holding a rudder, as Plato says, like a pilot. It is proper to think therefore, that these rudders, and this helm of the universe, in which the demiurgus being seated orderly disposes the world, are nothing else than a symbol of the whole fabrication of things, to us indeed difficult of comprehension, but to the gods themselves known and manifest. And why is it requisite to speak concerning these things, since, of the ineffable cause of all, who is beyond intelligibles, there is an impression in every being, and even as far as to the last of things, through which all things are suspended from him, some more remotely, and others more near, according to the clearness and obscurity of the impression which they contain? This it is which moves all things to the desire of good, and imparts to beings this inextinguishable love. And this impression is indeed unknown: for it pervades as far as to things which are incapable of knowledge. It is also more excellent than life; for it is present with things inanimate; and has not an intellectual power; since it lies in things destitute of intellectual energy. As nature therefore, the demiurgic monad, and the father himself who is exempt from all things, have disseminated in things posterior, impressions of their respective idioms, and through these convert all things to themselves, in like manner all the gods impart to their progeny symbols of their cause, and through these establish all things in themselves. The impressions therefore of the hyparxis of the higher order of gods, which are disseminated in secondary natures, are ineffable and unknown, and their efficacious and motive energy surpasses all intelligence. And of this kind are the characters of light, through which the gods unfold themselves to their progeny; these characters subsisting unically in the gods themselves, but shining forth to the view in the genera more excellent than man, and presenting themselves to us divisibly, and accompanied with form. Hence the gods* exhort "To understand the forerunning form of light." For subsisting on high without form, it becomes invested with form through its progression; and there being established occultly and uniformly, it becomes apparent to us through motion, from the gods themselves; possessing indeed an efficacious energy, through a divine cause, but becoming figured, through the essence by which it is received.

Again, the impressions which are illuminated from powers, are in a certain respect

* Proclus here alludes to one of the Chaldean oracles.
media between things ineffable and effable, and pervade through all the middle genera. For it is not possible for the primary gifts of the gods to arrive to us, without the more excellent genera (i.e. angels, demons, and heroes,) previously participating the illuminations which thence proceed. But these illuminations subsisting appropriately in each of their participants, and coordinate in all things, unfold the powers that give them subsistence. Of this kind are the symbols of the gods, which are indeed uniform in the more elevated orders, but multiform in those that are subordinate; and which the theurgic art imitating exhibits through inarticulate evocations (αἰνηθεῖσαν ἐναρμ executed).

The impressions which rank as the third in order, which pervade from intellectual essences to all idioms, and proceed as far as to us, are divine names, through which the gods are invoked, and by which they are celebrated, being unfolded into light by the gods themselves, and reverting to them, and producing to human knowledge as much of the gods as is apparent. For through these we are able to signify something to each other, and to converse with ourselves about the gods. Different nations however participate differently of these, as, for instance, the Egyptians, according to their native tongue, receiving names of this kind from the gods; but the Chaldaeans and Indians in a different manner, according to their proper tongue; and in a similar manner the Greeks, according to their dialect. Though a certain divinity therefore may be called by the Greeks Briareus, but differently by the Chaldaeans, we must nevertheless admit, that each of these names is the progeny of the gods, and that it signifies the same essence. But if some names are more and others less efficacious, it is not wonderful; since of things which are known to us, such as are daemoniacal and angelic are more efficacious; and, in short, of things denominated, the names of such as are nearer are more perfect than the names of those that are more remote.

Not every genus of the gods however can be denominated: for Parmenides evinces that the god who is beyond all things is ineffable. "For," says he, "he can neither be denominated, nor spoken of." And of the intelligible gods, the first genera, which are conjoined with the one itself, and are called occult, have much of the unknown and ineffable. For that which is perfectly apparent and effable, cannot be conjoined with the perfectly ineffable, but it is requisite that the progression of intelligibles should be terminated* in this order; in which there is the first effable, and that which is called by

* The first effable subsists in the god Phanes, or the extremity of the intelligible order.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

proper names. For the first forms are there, and the intellectual nature of intelligibles there shines forth to the view. But all the natures prior to this being silent and occult, are only known by intelligence*. Hence the whole of the telestic art energizing theoretically ascends as far as to this order. Orpheus also says, that this is first called by a name by the other gods: for the light proceeding from it is known to and denominated by the intellectual orders. But he thus speaks,

Μητὶν ὑπὲρειμαι πηγονα Θεὸν κλησιν οτι φάνητα,
Πρωτογοιοι μακαρίς καθέν κατὰ μακρον ολυμπόν.

i.e. “Metis bearing the seed of the gods, whom the gods about lofty Olympus call the illustrious Phanes Protogonus.” In the gods however nomination is united with intellectual conception, and both are present with them through the participation of the light which the mighty Phanes emits to all things. But in our soul these two are divided from each other; and intellectual conception is one thing, and name another: and the one has the order of an image, but the other of a paradigm. In the middle genera there is indeed a separation, but there is also a union of the intellective and onomatific energy. The transportive name (διασπαρμενον σημα) of ὕλης † (εγγυων), which is said to sustain all the fountains, appears to me to signify a thing of this kind. Such also is the appellation τελεταρχίς (το τελεταρχικὼν), which some one of the gods ‡ says, “leaps into the worlds, through the radic reproof of the father,” κοιμουσ εὐρωσκειν κραυτήν διω πατρες ἐνπῃ. For all these things are occultly with the gods, but are unfolded according to second and third progressions, and to men that are allied to the gods.

There is therefore a certain abiding name in the gods, through which the subordinate invoke the superior, as Orpheus says of Phanes, or through which the superior denominate the subordinate, as Jupiter, in Plato, gives names to the unapparent periods of souls$. For fathers define the energies of their offspring, and the offspring know their

* See this explained in the notes on the Parmenides.
† The ὕλη, Συνοχή, and Τελεταρχεὶ of the Chaldeans, compose that divine order, which is called by the Platonists intelligible, and at the same time intellectual. This order is celebrated by Plato in the Phaedrus under the names of the supercelestial place, Heaven, and the subcelestial arch.
‡ This is one of the Chaldean oracles.
§ See the Timæus.
producing causes, through the intellectual impressions which they bear. Such then are the first names which are unfolded from the gods, and which through the middle genera end in the rational essence.

There are however other names of a second and third rank; and these are such as partial souls have produced, at one time energizing enthusiastically about the gods, and at another time energizing according to science; either conjoining their own intelligence with divine light, and thence deriving perfection; or committing the fabrication of names to the rational power. For thus artists, such as geometricals, physicians, and rhetoricians, give names to the things the idioms of which they understand. Thus too poets inspired by Phoebus (τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ φοβοληττοί) ascribe many names to the gods, and to human names give a division opposite to these; receiving the former from enthusiastic energy, and the latter from sense and opinion; concerning which Socrates now says Homer indicates, referring some names to the gods, and others to men.

That the names which are assigned to things by the gods are smooth, well-sounding, and of fewer syllables, than those which are assigned by men, as, for instance, Xanthus than Scamander, Chalceis than Cymindis, and Myrine than Batieia. And it seems that the first of these names manifests how the gods comprehend and denominate according to a definite cause the whole of a flowing essence; but the second, how the gods bound in intellectual measures a life convergent with generation; and the third, how they divide and permit in a separate manner a life separate from generation. And with respect to Xanthus, Aristotle relates, that the skin of the cattle that drank out of it was yellower than before; and on this account perhaps the gods, who both produce and know the causes of all things, thus denominate it. But the apparent cause of its appellation perhaps was this, that its water passes through a drain made by the hand (ότι διὰ τῶν χειροποιητῶν σκαφής διαδρόται το άδρο αυτοῦ); and thus by men of superficial conceptions was called Scamander. Chalceis, perhaps, was so called from the thrill and canorous, like sharp sounding brahs; for thus certainly the Chaldæans call it, having heard this name from the gods. But Cymindis is from the leaping of the bird (παρά τοι της σκεπτόντα να ορέων); and Myrine, from the soul allotted that place from the gods. Lastly, Batieia perhaps was thus called, through the plant which abounds in it. In these too, we have the three-fold differences of divine and human knowledge; the effi-

- See p. 500.
cacious and passive, in Xanthus and Scamander; the logical and physical, in Myrine and Batieia; and the enharmonic and unharmonic, in Chalcis and Cymindis.

That if the nature of the gods is unfigured, uncoloured, and unapparent, the dialectic work is not in them, but a thing of this kind is conversant with things that subsist in these inferior realms and about generation.

That of the gods, some are incorporeal, but others use bodies, and these such as are spherical: for the spherical figure is peculiarly adapted to things which are converted to themselves. But of daemons some are good and divine, and have spheric vehicles; and others are material, and their vehicles are rectilinear.

With respect to our prayers, they are heard both by gods and daemons, not externally; but both these comprehend in themselves causally our deliberative tendency to things in our power, and have a causal knowledge of our energies.

That there are Pans with the feet of goats, such as was that which appeared to the courier Philippides, as he was passing over the mountain Parthenion; and also Minerval souls using various forms, and proximately ruling above men; such as was the Minerva which appeared to Ulysses and Telemachus. But Panic and Minerval daemons, and much more the gods themselves, are exempt from all such variety.

That it is not because daemons are allotted certain forms, that the men who are under their guardian protection are allotted, both in common and peculiarly, different characteristic properties, as, for instance, the Scythians properties different from the Æthiopians, and one individual from another. But daemons that preside over men comprehend all the variety of manners in simplicity, the mutation of figures in sameness, and the difference of motions in stable power.

That the names delivered by theologists by which the gods call things, are from the gods, and not from daemons only. For the things performed in the mysteries, are performed to the gods themselves, and not to the daemons suspended from them.

That the gods signify things to men, not requiring for this purpose corporeal organs, but fashioning the air according to their will: for the air being far more plastic than wax, receives the impressions of divine intelligence; which proceeds indeed from the gods with-

* After essential heroes, there is an order of souls who proximately govern the affairs of men, and are daemonical κατὰ σχέσιν, according to habit, or alliance, but not essentially. Of this kind are the nymphs that sympathize with water, and the Pans now mentioned by Proclus.
out motion, but arrives to us through found and mutation. For thus we say, that oracles are given by the gods, they not speaking, but using us as instruments, and filling the auditory sense with appropriate knowledge, without percussion and without contact. For they associate with each other through intellectual conceptions, and know what pertains to each other intelleetually, but not sensibly.

That, as Homer says, the sun sees and hears all things, and the apparent gods have both a visible and auditory sense, but not externally: for they contain in themselves, prior to wholes, the roots and the causes of all things.

That knowledge does not descend from on high without a medium, but through certain media. For, as in Homer, the knowledge of the conversation between Jupiter and the Sun, descended to Ulysses through the archangelic Hermes and Calypso as media, so Helenus the prophet perceived the will of Apollo and Minerva, not indeed of the divinities who stand at the head of the Apollonianal and Minerval series, but of those powers of this series that were proximate to him, and of a daemoniacal characteristic.

That with respect to the names Astyanax and Hector, the philosopher, looking to the form and the thing signified, calls them similar; but grammarians, directing their attention to the matter and the syllables, will say that they are dissimilar.

That it is necessary the founder of names should establish names looking to the forms of the things denominated. But this will become evident to him who looks to the universe. For as there are many psychical descents to this terrestrial abode, and different souls are disseminated according to different allotments, and engaged in different lives, and since among these some choose lives corresponding to those of their preceeding and leading gods; hence souls of this kind especially appear to venerate the names of their leaders. My meaning is this: souls that proceed from the Minerval series, and preceede unchangeable the form of life adapted to this order, at the same time exhibit themselves by an energy and appellation corresponding to the idiom of the gods. But souls that descend indeed from this order, and yet choose a life by no means adapted to it, employ likewise foreign and casual names. Hence, as it appears to me, Bacchus, Eiculapius, Mercures, and Herculefes, having the same names with their preceeding gods, have pro-

* See the twelfth book of the Odyssey.  
† See p. 501.
ceeded into these terrestrial places, accompanied with the inspiring influence of the gods, neither changing the form of the life, nor the appellation of their proper leaders. They say then, that Hercules, who was called Alcides by his mortal parents, was called Hercules by the Pythian deity, through his alliance to the Herculean order and divinity. For deity gives an appropriate name to man, looking to his whole series and life, which he produces into energy.

That it is requisite to consider the names of things borne along in generation, either by looking to all causes, as well such as are total, as those that are partial, as well those that are remote, as those that are proximate to generated natures; as, for instance, horse considered as a whole, and that which is proximate and corruptible; or it is necessary to consider them looking only to more excellent and perfect natures, which possess invariable rectitude, and which entirely rule over matter; and of this kind are universals. For when an ox is generated from an horse, the partial nature is subdued, and on this account a horse is not generated; but whole nature vanquishes, and on this account an ox is generated. For whence is the form of the ox derived, unless nature simply considered subdued. Hence Plato does not now simply call things of this kind, περετα, but as it were τερετα, as not being entirely contrary to nature.

That he who intends to etymologize ought to know, in the first place, the differences of dialects; and, in the second place, the use of the poets. In the third place, he must distinguish simple from compound names. In the fourth place, he must unfold names in a manner accommodated to things themselves. In the fifth place, it is necessary that he should observe the different use of names. In the sixth place, he ought to know the properties of words, such as apocopies, syncopies, ellipses, pleonasm, and the like. In the seventh place, he ought to know the idioms of the elements; for from these, as extremes, the rectitude of names and their alliance to things is demonstrated. In the eighth place, it is necessary that he should distinguish ambiguities, and such names as are homonymous; for the truth of names is retained through these. Further still, it is necessary to know names which deviate from their origin. And such is the critical knowledge which he who etymologizes ought to possess.

That Socrates now appropriately introduces the words Σοφίαν and μετοί, i.e. dear

* See p. 504.
ON THE CRATYLUS.

665
to divinity, and mindful of divinity; for the alliance of souls to divinity is effected through the love of a divine nature, and the recollection of the hyparxis of deity; and to souls of this kind only does it belong to have paternal and intellectual names. But names, which are the offspring of generation, belong to those who embrace an indefinite and material life.

That names being two-fold, one kind belonging to things perpetual, which are established according to science, and another to things corruptible, and which are the subjects of doubt, it is not likely that fathers should have given their sons inauspicious names, such as Orestes, Atreus, Tantalus, nor is it probable that they foreknew what would be the life of their children in future: for the physiognomic art is attended with great obscurity, and especially when exercised on those that are just born. Of all these doubts, therefore, Socrates delivers to us most clear rules of solution: for men are acquainted with the unapparent periods of souls, and the appetites (οργαί) which they possessed prior to generation, in which nearly the whole of actions is comprehended. Hence they are not judges of the rectitude of names coordinate to every form of life. Gods therefore and demons, who causally comprehend the powers and energies of souls, clearly know how to impose names adapted to the respective lives of souls. And as they distribute every other allotment to them according to their desert, so also their names. But since we everywhere consider fortune as the cause of the coordination of things which appear to be disordered, here also this is to be considered as the most proper principle. For fathers, looking to memory or hope, or something of this kind, give names to their children; but fortune gives them names after another manner, through a symphony with their lives. Agamemnon therefore called his son Orestes, not through rusticity of manners, but through impulse (διὰ τὴν οργήν) and facility of motion (προκείμενον), πρόκειται to οργήν from rushing, or rather from seeing (ὁπώς) in him such-like marks or tokens of nature; or from willing that he might become a character of this kind. Fortune, however, after another manner, and more truly, allotted him this name: for it unfolds his whole life. Hence Socrates, from this cause, thinks fit to etymologize his name, but not from a mere human cause; for he saw that this accorded better with the thing. Much more therefore is fortune productive of the proximate cause of the rectitude of names; and when this proximate cause errs, nothing hinders the whole cause, which belongs to fortune, from acting rightly; since the same thing takes place.
takes place in nature. For when a partial nature acts rightly, whole nature much more acts with rectitude; but when a partial nature wanders from the mark, whole nature is nevertheless able to act with rectitude. Nor let any one think that this fortune is an irrational and indefinite cause: for its work looks to intellect. And a divine, or demoniacal power, leaves nothing destitute of its proper superintendence, but directs all, and the very last of our energies, to a good purpose, and to the order of the universe. For we are supernally moved from more excellent causes, who are able, from our essence, as if from the stern of a ship, to pilot all our concerns. Plato therefore introduces this as one cause of the right position of names; but he considers as another cause poets acting under the influence of divine inspiration, looking to the accidental actions of men, and through these as it were magaciously analyzing and discovering their proper names. What then hinders but that poets, looking to the bold deed of Orestes towards his mother, may have called him Orestes, as ὕπστως, mountainous, and savage (ἀγρησ劳动), and without fruit (ἀμακρην), as having cut off the principle of his proper generation; and that they should have delivered this name to the Greeks?

That Plato, in etymologizing, always first indicates by itself the thing signified; and afterwards that which is assimilated to the thing, and which subsists as a vestige of it in the syllables of the name. Thus in the name of Orestes* he first says, that it signifies the savage and the rustic (τὸ Σώματος, καὶ τὸ ἁγιωτάτος), and afterwards he adds, τὸ ὅπως, the mountainous, which subsists in the syllables. And in the name of Agamemnon, having first said that it signifies to labour and endure, he adds, he was therefore a good man, διὰ τὸν εὐμηνήν. And this he does in all the other names.

That Plato, in his etymologies, despising the matter, but being especially attentive to the form of names, says that the name Agamemnon† was composed from the admirable (παρὰ τὸ ἄγιοντάτος), and not from the too much (οὐ παρὰ τὸ ἄγιον). But grammarians, as paying attention mostly to the matter, and not seeing the form of life, very properly etymologize this name from the contrary.

That Plato indicates that our very being is in soul, and not in body, by looking to names from phychical idioms, and not from such as are corporeal.

That the divine Plato in what is here said afflicts us with respect to our morals, since

* See p. 504.          † See p. 505.
he delivers to us Orestes, Agamemnon, and Atreus, as men vehement, irascible, and avengers. But since the first of these sinned against his mother, and the last towards his children, hence they are very properly blamed. But Agamemnon is called by him admirable and praiseworthy, because he exerted his vehemence on the naturally hostile race of the Barbarians.

That the particulars respecting Pelops teach us, first, to despise appearances, and to look at the whole periods of souls; and to be remiss with respect to human affairs, but strenuous with respect to virtue and things divine. And, in the second place, they teach us that children partake of the punishment belonging to the crimes of their ancestors. For souls, through their coordination* with the unjust, become partakers of injustice; their bodies also consist from base seed; and their external concerns receive their beginning from crimes. Socrates in the Phaedrus says, that the telestic art is able to purify these, liberating them from their present evils through the worship of divinity.

That the narration concerning Tantalus† obscurely signifies a soul elevated through contemplation to the intelligible (for the intelligible is the nutriment of the gods); but falling from the intelligible place to earth, and communicating his intellectual life which remains recently perfected (neoitedes) with the multitude of the irrational nature. Hence he is said to be the son of Jupiter. For every recently-perfected soul falls from the court of Jupiter into generation; and on this account, Jupiter is the father of gods and men. Such a soul too, being enfolded with the evils which are here, and associating with images instead of realities, is said to suffer punishment in Hades; having much of the terrestrial, stony, and material suspended from its nature, through which its intellectual part is buried. It is likewise in want of all divine fruits, possessing the mere imaginations of them, and falling from the true and clear apprehension of them.

That the allotment of a certain name to a certain life is the work of the soul, but the general adoption of this name is from Fame. For Fame, according to Homer, is the angel of Jupiter.

That Socrates from divine names, which are statues of the gods, recurs analytically to

* The souls of such children, therefore, as are punished for the crimes of their parents, are, from their coordination, naturally allied to the disposition of their parents; and through this alliance become just objects of punishment.
† See p. 505.
the powers and energies of the gods: for he leaves their essences, as being ineffable and unknown, to be alone surveyed by the flower of intellect.*

That Jupiter is not said to be, but is the father of those who genuinely preserve the proper form of life, such as Hercules and the Dioscuri; but of those who are never at any time able to convert themselves to a divine nature, he never is nor is said to be the father. Such therefore as having been partakers of a certain energy above human nature, have again fallen into the sea of dissimilitude†, and for honour among men have embraced error towards the gods,—of these Jupiter is said to be the father.

That the paternal cause originates supernally from the intelligible and occult gods; for there the first fathers of wholes subsist; but it proceeds through all the intellectual gods into the demiurgic order. For Timæus celebrates this order, as at the same time fabricative and paternal; since he calls Jupiter the demiurgus and father. The fathers however who are superior to the one fabrication are called gods of gods, but the demiurgus is the father of gods and men. Further still, Jupiter is said to be peculiarly the father of some, as of Hercules, who immutably preserve a Jovian and ruling life during their converse with the realms of generation. Jupiter therefore is triply father, of gods, partial souls, and of souls that embrace an intellectual and Jovian life. The intellectual order of the gods, therefore, is supernally bounded by the king ‡ of the total divine genera, and who has a paternal transcendency with respect to all the intellectual gods. This king, according to Orpheus, is called by the blessed immortals that dwell on lofty Olympus, Phanes Protogonus. But this order proceeds through the three Nights, and the celestial orders into the Titannic or Saturnian series, where it first separates itself from the fathers, and changes the kingdom of the Synoche§, for a distributive government of wholes, and unfolds every demiurgic genus of the gods, from all the above-mentioned ruling and royal causes, but proximately from Saturn the leader of the Titannic orders. Prior however to other fabricators (διούσαγας) it unfolds Jupiter, who is allotted the unical strength of the whole demiurgic series, and who produces and gives subsistence to

* That is, by the summit, or one of our nature, through which we become united with divinity.
† Plato, in the Politicus, thus calls the realms of generation, i.e. the whole of a visible nature.
‡ That is, intelligible intellect, the extremity of the intelligible order.
§ That is, the divinities who compose the middle of that order of gods, which is denominated intelligible and at the same time intellectual.
all unapparent and apparent natures. And he is indeed intellectual according to the
order in which he ranks, but he produces the species and the genera of beings into the
order of sensibles. He is likewise filled with the gods above himself, but imparts from
himself a progression into being to all mundane natures. Hence Orpheus* represents him
fabricating every celestial race, making the sun and moon, and the other starry gods,
together with the sublunary elements, and diversifying the latter with forms, which
before had a disordered subsistence. He likewise represents him presiding over the gods
who are distributed about the whole world, and who are suspended from him; and in
the character of a legislator assigning distributions of providence in the universe, according
to desert, to all the mundane gods. Homer too, following Orpheus, celebrates him as
the common father of gods and men, as leader and king, and as the supreme of rulers.
He also says that all the multitude of mundane gods is collected about him, abides in and
is perfected by him. For all the mundane gods are converted to Jupiter through Themis,

\[ \text{Zeus de Themata keleus Theus, agorah de kalosvai} \]

\[ \text{Fouitosa kalos Theos prods dalma keleus} \]
i.e. “But Jupiter orders Themis to call the gods to council; and directing her course
everywhere, commands them to go to the house of Jupiter†.” All of them therefore are
excited according to the one will of Jupiter, and become \( \text{deos eido} \), \text{within Jupiter}, as the
poet says. Jupiter too, again separates them within himself, according to two coordinations,
and excites them to providential energies about secondary natures; he at the same
time, as Timaeus says, abiding after his accustomed manner,

\[ \text{Ocis efato krodiqos polemon \& alastos eyeris} \]
i.e. “Thus spoke Saturnian Jupiter, and excited inevitable war.” Jupiter however is

* As what is here said from Orpheus concerning Jupiter is very remarkable, and is nowhere else to be
found, I give the original for the sake of the learned reader.

† Iliad, xx. v. 4. †† See the 14th line. § Ibid. v. 32. separate
ADDITIONAL NOTES

separate and exempt from all mundane natures; whence also the most total and leading of the other gods, though they appear to have in a certain respect equal authority with Jupiter, through a progression from the same causes, yet call him father. For both Neptune and Juno celebrate him by this appellation. And though Juno speaks to him as one who is of the same order,

\[\text{Καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἂν ἐγὼ ἡμι' ἡμῶς δὲ μοι εὐθὺς οἶχεν σοι}
\[\text{Καὶ με πρεσβύτερην τωστὸ κραῖνον αγαλλιματὶς}\]

i. e. "For I also am a divinity, and Saturn of inflected council endowed me with the greatest dignity, when he begat me." And though Neptune says,

\[\text{Τριᾶς γὰρ τ' ἐκ κρῶνων εἰμιν αὐθαίρετοι, οὐς τεκνὰ Ρεῃ,}
\[\text{Ζεὺς καὶ ἐγώ, τριάς τ' Ἰάθης ἐνφύοσων αἰωνῶν}\]

i. e. "For we are three brothers from Saturn, whom Rhea bore, Jupiter and I, and the third is Pluto, who governs the infernal realms." Yet Jupiter is called father by both these divinities; and this because he comprehends in himself the one and inimical cause of all fabrication; is prior to the Saturnian triad; connectedly contains the three fathers; and comprehends on all sides the vivification of Juno. Hence, at the same time that this goddess gives animation to the universe, he also together with other gods gives subsistence to souls. Very properly therefore do we say that the demiurgus in the Timæus is the mighty Jupiter. For he it is who produces mundane intellects and souls, who adorns all bodies with figures and numbers, and inserts in them one union, and an indissoluble friendship and bond. For Night also in Orpheus advises Jupiter to employ things of this kind in the fabrication of the universe,

\[\text{Αὐτὸς ἐπὶν διὰμον κραῖρεον πεὶς πᾶσι τοῖς ἐκς τοὐτοῦς}\]

i. e. But when your power around the whole has spread

A strong coercive bond.

The proximate bond indeed of mundane natures, is that which subsists through analogy;
but the more perfect bond is derived from intellect and soul. Hence Timæus calls the communion of the elements through analogy, and the indissoluble union from life, a bond: for he says animals were generated bound with animated bonds. But a more venerable bond than these subsists from the demiurgic will. "For my will," says Jupiter in the Timæus, "is a greater and more principle bond," &c.

Firmly adhering, therefore, to this conception respecting the mighty Jupiter, viz. that he is the demiurgus and father of the universe, that he is an all-perfect imparticipable* intellect, and that he fills all things both with other goods, and with life, let us survey how from names Socrates unfolds the mystic truth concerning this divinity. Timæus then says that it is difficult to know the essence of the demiurgus, and Socrates now says, that it is not easy to understand his name, which manifests his power and energy.

That our soul knows partibly, the impartible nature of the energy of the gods, and that which is characterized by unity in this energy, in a multiplied manner: and this especially takes place about the demiurgus, who expands intellectual forms, and calls forth intelligible causes, and evolves them to the fabrication of the universe. For Parmenides characterizes him by similitude and difference. According to Homer two tubs are placed near him; and the most mystic tradition, and the oracles of the gods, say that the duad is seated with him. For thus they speak: "He possesses both; containing intelligibles in intellect, but introducing sense to the worlds." These oracles likewise call him twice beyond, and twice there (ὅς ἐπισκέπτεται ὁ ἰδιός ἐκεῖ), and, in short, they celebrate him through the duad. For the demiurgus comprehends in himself unitedly every thing prolific†, and which gives subsistence to mundane natures. Very properly therefore is his name two-fold, of which ἰδιός manifests the cause through which, and this is paternal goodness; but ἰδιός signifies vivification, the first causes of which in the universe the demiurgus unically comprehends. The former, too, is a symbol of the Saturnian and paternal series; but the latter of the vivific and maternal Rhea. So far likewise as Jupiter receives the whole of Saturn, he gives subsistence to a triple essence, the impartible, the partible, and that which subsists between these; but according to the Rhea which he contains in himself, he scatters, as from a fountain, intellectual, phyletical, and corporeal life. But by his demiurgic powers and energies, he

* That is, he is not an intellect consubsistent with soul.
† And the duad, considered as a divine form or idea, is the source of fecundity.
gives a formal subsistence to these and separates them from forms of a prior order, and from each other. He is also the ruler and king of all things; and is exempt from the three demiurgi. For they, as Socrates says in the Gorgias, divide the kingdom of their father; but Jupiter, the demiurgus, at once without division reigns over the three, and unically governs them.

He is therefore the cause of the paternal triad, and of all fabrication; but he connectedly contains the three demiurgi. And he is a king indeed, as being coordinated with the fathers; but a ruler, as being proximately established above the demiurgic triad, and comprehending the uniform cause of it. Plato, therefore, by considering his name in two ways, evinces that images receive particily the unical causes of paradigms, and that this is adapted to him who establishes the intellectual duad in himself. For he gives subsistence to two-fold orders, the celestial and the supercelestial; whence also the theologian Orpheus says, that his sceptre consists of four and twenty measures, as ruling over a two-fold twelve.

That the soul of the world gives life to altermotive natures; for to these it becomes the fountain and principle of motion, as Plato says in the Phaedrus and Laws. But the demiurgus simply imparts to all things life divine, intellectual, psychical, and that which is divisible about bodies. No one however should think that the gods in their generations of secondary natures are diminished; or that they sustain a division of their proper essence in giving subsistence to things subordinate; or that they expose their progeny to the view, externally to themselves in the same manner as the causes of mortal offspring. Nor, in short, must we suppose that they generate with motion or mutation, but that, abiding in themselves, they produce by their very essence posterior natures, comprehend on all sides their progeny, and supernally perfect the productions and energies of their offspring. Nor again, when it is said that gods are the sons of more total gods, must it be supposed that they are disjoined from more antient causes, and are cut off from a union with them; or that they receive the idiom of their hyparxis through motion, and an indefiniteness converting itself to bound. For there is nothing irrational and without

* The twelve gods who first subsist in the liberated or supercelestial order, and who are divided into four triads, are Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan; Vesta, Minerva, Mars; Ceres, Juno, Diana; and Mercury, Venus, Apollo. The first of these triads is fabricative; the second, defensive; the third, virile; and the fourth, magic.
measure, in the natures superior to us. But we must conceive that their progressions are effected through similitude; and that there is one communion of essence, and an indivisible continuity of powers and energies between the sons of gods and their fathers; all those gods that rank in the second order being established in such as are more antient; and the more antient imparting much of perfection, vigour, and efficacious production to the subordinate. And after this manner we must understand that Jupiter is said to be the son of Saturn. For Jupiter being the demiurgic intellect, proceeds from another intellect, superior and more uniform, which increases indeed its proper intellecions, but converts the multitude of them to union; and multiplies its intellectual powers, but elevates their all-various evolutions to impartible sameness. Jupiter, therefore, proximately establishing a communion with this divinity, and being filled from him with total intellectual good, is very properly said to be the son of Saturn, both in hymns and invocations, as unfolding into light that which is occult, expanding that which is contracted, and dividing that which is impartible in the Saturnian monad; and as emitting a second more partial kingdom, instead of that which is more total, a demiurgic instead of a paternal dominion, and an empire which proceeds every where instead of that which stably abides in itself.

Why does Socrates apprehend the name of king Saturn* to be virtuous, insolent, and looking to what does he assert this? We reply, that according to the poets satiety (μαισα) is the cause of insolence; for they thus denominate immoderation and repletion; and they say that Satiety brought forth Insolence (ἐπιχύτω τικτι καρα). He, therefore, who looks without attention to the name of Saturn, will consider it as signifying insolence. For to him who suddenly hears it, it manifests satiety and repletion. Why, therefore, since a name of this kind is expressive of insolence, do we not pass it over in silence, as not being auspicious and adapted to the gods? May we not say that the royal series†

* See p. 506.
† This royal series consists of Phanes, Night, Heaven, Saturn, Jupiter, Bacchus. "Antient theologians," says Syrianus (in his Commentary on the 14th book of Aristotle's Metaphysics), "assert that Night and Heaven reigned, and prior to these the mighty father of Night and Heaven, who distributed the world to gods and mortals, and who first possessed royal authority, the illustrious Ericapexus:

Τόνως θαν δινόημεν Σίων, θυσιαν ηε μοίραν
Οὔ προτός βασιλείς περιδοτές ερικαπεύον.

VOL. V. 4 R

Night
of the gods, beginning from Phanes, and ending in Bacchus, and producing the fame sceptre supernally, as far as to the last kingdom; Saturn being allotted the fourth royal order, appears, according to the fabulous pretext, differently from the other kings, to have received the sceptre insolently from Heaven, and to have given it to Jupiter? For Night receives the sceptre from Phanes; Heaven derives from Night the dominion over wholes; and Bacchus, who is the last king of the gods, receives the kingdom from Jupiter. For the father (Jupiter) establishes him in the royal throne, puts into his hand the sceptre, and makes him the king of all the mundane gods. "Hear me, ye gods, I place over you a king."

Καλείς δὲ τὸν βασιλέα τῆς σκηνῆς

fays Jupiter to the junior gods. But Saturn alone, perfectly deprives Heaven of the kingdom, and conceives dominion to Jupiter, cutting and being cut off as the fable says. Plato, therefore, seeing this succession, which in Saturn is called by theologists insolent (ινσουλείν), thought it worth while to mention the appearance of insolence in the name; that from this he might evince the name is adapted to the god, and that it bears an image of the insolence which is ascribed to him in fables. At the same time he teaches us to refer mythical devices to the truth concerning the gods, and the apparent absurdity which they contain, to scientific conceptions.

That the great, when ascribed to the gods, must not be considered as belonging to

Night succeeded Ericapaeus, in the hands of whom she has a sceptre:

Σκεπτρον εἵπερ' εν χερειν πρινεπαίου.

To Night, Heaven succeeded, who first reigned over the gods after mother Night:

Ος πρῶτος βασιλεας ουν μετα μητερο νυκτες.

Chaos transcends the habitue of sovereign dominion: and, with respect to Jupiter, the Oracles given to him by Night manifestly call him not the first, but the fifth immortal king of the gods:

Αδαναιον βασιλεα ουν πεμπτον γενοει.

According to these theologists, therefore, that principle which is most eminently the first, is the one or the good, after which, according to Pythagoras, are those two principles Ether and Chaos, which are superior to the possession of sovereign dominion. In the next place succeed the first and occult genera of the gods, in which first shines forth the father and king of all wholes, and whom, on this account, they call Phanes."
interval, but as subsisting intellecually, and according to the power of cause, but not according to partible transcendency. But why does Plato now call Saturn διανοητικός, the dianoetic part of the soul? May we not say, that it is because he looks to the multitude of intellectual conceptions in him, the orders of intelligibles, and the evolution of forms which he contains; since also in the Timaeus he represents the demiurgic intellect as reasoning, and making the world, dianoetically energizing; and this in consequence of looking to his partible and divided intellects, according to which he fabricates not only wholes but parts? When Saturn however is called intellect, Jupiter has the order of the dianoetic part: and when again, Saturn is called the dianoetic part, we must say that he is so called according to analogy with reference to a certain other intellect of a higher order. Whether therefore you are willing to speak of intelligible and occult intellect, or of that which unfolds into light (ἐκφαντασμονας νοι), or of that which connectedly contains (συνεκτικὸς νοι), or of that which imparts perfection* (τελειομορφος νοι), Saturn will be as the dianoetic part to all these: for he produces united intellect into multitude, and fills himself wholly with excited intelligibles. Whence also he is said to be the leader of the Titanic race, and the source of all-various separation and diversifying power. And perhaps Plato here primarily delivers two-fold interpretations of the name of the Titans, which Jamblichus and Amelius afterwards adopted. For the one interprets this name from the Titans extending their powers to all things; but the other from something inessential (παρα το τι ατομον), because the division and separation of wholes into parts receives its beginning from the Titans. Socrates, therefore, now indicates both these interpretations, by affenting of the king of the Titans, that he is a certain great dianoetic power. For the term great is a symbol of power pervading to all things; but the term a certain, of power proceeding to the most partial natures.

That the name Saturn is now triply analyzed, of which the first asserting this god to be the plenitude of intellectual good, and to be the satiety of a divine intellect, from its conveying an image of the satiety and repletion which are reprobated by the many, is ejected as insolent. The second also, which exhibits the imperfect and the puerile, is in

* Of these intellects, the first is Phanes, the second Heaven, the third Earth, and the fourth the Sub-celestial Arch, which is celebrated in the Phaedrus, viz. νους νοητος ο φανερος, εκφαντασμονας νοι o αφανος, συνεκτικος νοι η γη, τελειομορφος δε νοι η τε αφανος αφες.
like manner rejected. But the third, which celebrates this god as full of purity, and as the leader of undefiled intelligence, and an undeviating life, is approved. For king Saturn is intellect, and the supplier of all intellectual life; but he is an intellect exempt from coordination with sensibles, immaterial and separate, and converted to himself. He likewise converts his progeny, and after producing them into light, again embosoms and firmly establishes them in himself. For the demiurgus of the universe, though he is a divine intellect, yet he orderly arranges sensibles, and provides for subordinate natures. But the mighty Saturn is essentialized in separate intellect, and which transcend wholes. “For the fire which is beyond the first,” says the Oracle, “does not incline its power downwards.” But the demiurgus is suspended and proceeds from Saturn, being himself an intellect sublifying about an immaterial intellect, energizing about it as the intelligible, and producing that which is occult in it, into the apparent. For the maker of the world is an intellect of intellect. And it appears to me, that as Saturn is the summit of those gods that are properly called intellectual, he is intellect as with reference to the intelligible genus of gods. For all the intellectual adhere to the intelligible genus of gods, and are conjoined with them through intellecions. “Ye who understand the supermundane paternal profundity,” says the Hymn to them. But Saturn is intelligible, with reference to all the intellectual gods. Purity, therefore, indicates this impartible and imparticipable transcendency of Saturn. For the not coming into contact with matter, the impartible, and an exemption from habitude, are signified by purity. Such indeed is the transcendency of this god with respect to all coordination with things subordinate, and such his undefiled union with the intelligible, that he does not require a Curetic guard, like Rhea, Jupiter, and Proserpine. For all these, through their progressions into secondary natures, require the immutable defence of the Curetes. But Saturn being firmly established in himself, and hastily withdrawing himself from all subordinate natures, is established above the guardianship of the Curetes. He contains however the cause of these uniformly in himself: for this purity, and the undefiled which he possessest, give subsistence to all the progressions of the Curetes. Hence, in the Oracles, he is said to comprehend the first fountain of the Amilicti, and to ride on all the others. “The intellect of the father riding on attenuated rulers, they become refulgent with the furrows of inflexible and implacable fire.”
ON THE CRATYLUS.

He is therefore pure intellect, as giving subsistence to the undefiled order, and as being the leader of the whole intellectual series.

i. e. "From him leap forth the implacable thunders, and the preter-capacious bosoms of the all-plendid strength of the father-begotten Hecate, together with the environed flower of fire, and the strong spirit which is beyond the fiery poles."

That every intellect either abides, and is then intelligible, as being better than motion; or it is moved, and is then intellectual; or it is both, and is then intelligible, and at the same time intellectual. The first of these is Phanes; the second, which is alone moved, is Saturn; and the third, which is both moved and permanent, is Heaven.

That Saturn, from his impartible, unical, paternal, and beneficent subsistence in the intellectual orders, has been considered by some as the same with the one cause of all things. He is however only analogous to this cause, just as Orpheus calls the first cause Time (χρόνος), nearly homonymously with Saturn (χρόνος). But the oracles of the gods

* That is, of the whole intellectual order, which consists of Saturn, Rhea, Jupiter, the three Curetes, and the separating monad Ocean.
characterize this deity by the epithet of the one (τῷ ἀνώτάτῳ); calling him one beyond (ἄνωτατος ἀνωτέρων). For the one is allied to the one.

That Heaven*, the father of Saturn, is an intellect, understanding himself indeed, but united to the first intelligibles; in which he is also firmly established; and consequently contains all the intellectual orders, by abiding in intelligible union. This god too is connexive, just as Saturn is of a separating idiom; and on this account he is father. For connecting precede separating causes; and the intelligible and at the same time intellectual, such as are intellectual only. Whence also Heaven being the Synocheys (συνοχεῖς) of wholes, according to one union, gives subsistence to the Titanic series, and prior to this, to other orders of the gods; some of which abide only in him, which he retains in himself, but others both abide and proceed, which he is said to have concealed, after they were unfolded into light. And after all these, he gives subsistence to those divine orders, which proceed into the universe, and are separated from their father. For he produces two-fold monads, and triads, and hebdomads, equal in number to the monads. These things however will be investigated more fully elsewhere. But this deity is denominated according to the similitude of the apparent Heaven. For each of them compresses and connects all the multitude which it contains, and causes the sympathy and connection of the whole world to be one. For connection is second to unifying power, and proceeds from it. In the Phædrus therefore Plato delivers to us the production of all secondary natures by Heaven, and shows us how this divinity leads upwards and convolves all things to the intelligible. He likewise teaches us what its summit is, what the profundity of its whole order, and what the boundary of the whole of its progression. Here therefore, investigating the truth of things from names, he declares its energy with respect to things more elevated and simple, and which are arranged nearer to the one. He also clearly appears here to consider the order of Heaven as intelligible, and at the same time intellectual. For if it sees things on high, it energizes intellectually, and there is prior to it the intelligible genus of gods, to which looking it is intellectual; just as it is intelligible to the natures which proceed from it. What then are the things on high which it beholds? Is it not evident that they are the supercelestial place, an essence without colour, without figure, and without

* See p. 507.
the touch, and all the intelligible extent? An extent comprehending, as Plato would say, intelligible animals, the one cause of all eternal natures, and the occult principles of these; but as the followers of Orpheus would say, bounded by Ether upwards, and by Phanes downward. For all between these two gives completion to the intelligible order. But Plato now calls this both singularly and-plurally; since all things are there united, and at the same time each is separated peculiarly; and this according to the highest union and separation.

With respect to the term μετώπολογος, i.e. those who discourse on sublime affairs *, we must now consider it in a manner adapted to those who choose an anagogic life, who live intellectually, and who do not gravitate to earth, but sublimely tend to a theoretic life. For that which is called Earth there, maternally gives subsistence to such things as Heaven, which is coordinate to that Earth, produces paternally. And he who energizes there, may be properly called μετώπολογος, or, one who discourses about things on high. Heaven therefore being of a connective nature, is expanded above the Saturnian orders, and all the intellectual series; and produces from himself all the Titanic race; and prior to this, the perfective and defensive orders; and, in short, is the leader of every good to the intellectual gods. Plato therefore having celebrated Saturn for his intelligence, which is without habitue to mundane natures, and for his life which is converted to his own exalted place of survey, now celebrates Heaven for another more perfect energy: for to be conjoined to more elevated natures, is a greater good than to be converted to oneself. Let no one, however, think that, on this account, the above-mentioned energies are distributed in the gods; as, for instance, that there is providence alone in Jupiter, a conversion alone to himself in Saturn, and an elevation alone to the intelligible in Heaven. For Jupiter no otherwise provides for mundane natures than by looking to the intelligible; since, as Plato says in the Timaeus, intellect understanding ideas in animal itself, thought it requisite that as many, and such as it there perceived, should be contained in the universe; but, as Orpheus † says, with a divinely inspired mouth, "Jupiter swallows his progenitor Phanes, embosoms all his powers, and becomes

* See p. 507.
† Ως ơ' Ορφεος εὑρη στοματι λυεις και καταγει την προγονον αυτον την Φανης, και ενοπλισται πανα αυτο της δύνας ο Ζευς, και γινεται παντα νοερης θεσπις η εικος ρουτος.
all things intellectually which Phanes is intelligibly." Saturn also imparts to Jupiter the principles of fabrication, and of providential attention to sensibles, and understanding himself, he becomes united to first intelligibles, and is filled with the goods which are thence derived. Hence also the theologian (Orpheus) says, "that he was nurtured by Night." If therefore the intelligible is nutriment, Saturn is replete not only with the intelligibles coordinated with him, but also with the highest and occult intellects. Heaven himself also fills all secondary natures with his proper goods, but guards all things by his own most vigorous powers; and the father supernally committed to him the connecting and guarding the causes of eternal animal. But he intellectually perceives himself, and is converted to the intelligibles which he contains; and this his intelligence, Plato, in the Phaedrus, calls circulation. For as that which is moved in a circle is moved about its own centre, so Heaven energizes about its own intelligible, according to intellectual circulation. But all the gods subsisting in all, and each possessing all energies, one transcends more in this, and another in a different energy, and each is particularly characterized according to that in which it transcends. Thus Jupiter is characterized by providence, and hence his name is now thus analyzed; but Saturn, by a conversion to himself, whence also he is inflected counsel, archelogenes; and Heaven by habit to things more excellent, from which also he receives his appellation. For his giving subsistence to a pure and the Saturnian intellect, represents his energy to the other part. But as there are many powers in Heaven, such as the connective, guardian, and convertive, you will find that this name is appropriately adapted to all these. For the connective is signified through bounding the intellectual gods; since the connective bounds the multitude which he contains. The power which guards wholes subsists through the termination and security of an intellectual essence. And the convertive power subsists through converting, seeing, and intellectually energizing natures, to things on high. But all these are adapted to Heaven. For there is no fear that the gods will be dissipated, and that on this account they require connective causes, or that they will sustain mutation, and that on this account they stand in need of the saving aid of guardian causes; but now Socrates at once manifests all the powers of Heaven, through convertive energy. For this is to behold things on high, to be con-
verted to them, and through this to be connected and defended. And it appears to me that Heaven possesses this idiom according to analogy to the intelligible eternity, and the intelligible wholeness. For Timæus particularly characterizes eternity by this, viz. by abiding in the one prior to it, and by being established in the summit of intelligibles; and Socrates says, that Heaven surveys things on high, viz. the supercelestial place, and such things as are comprehended in the god-nourished silence of the fathers (και ουξ τις διαθαμμα συγγε τριελεται των πατερων). As therefore Parmenides signifies each of these orders through wholeness, the one through intelligible, and the other through intellectual wholeness; in like manner both Timæus and Socrates characterize them by a conversion to more excellent natures. But the conversion as well as the wholeness is different. For that of eternity is intelligible, on which account Timæus does not say that it looks to its intelligible, but only that it stably abides. But the conversion of Heaven is intellectual, and on this account Socrates says, that it sees things on high, and through this converts, guards, and connects all things posterior to itself. Whence also, in the Phædrus, it is said, by the circulation of itself, to lead all things to the supercelestial place, and the summit of the first intelligibles.

That there being three fathers and kings of which Socrates here makes mention, Saturn alone appears to have received the government from his father, and to have transmitted it to Jupiter by violence. Mythologists therefore celebrate the seictions of Heaven and Saturn. But the cause of this is, that Heaven is of the connective, Saturn of the Titannic, and Jupiter of the demiurgic order. Again, the Titannic genus rejoices in separations and differences, progressions and multiplications of powers. Saturn therefore, as a dividing god, separates his kingdom from that of Heaven; but as a pure intellect, he is exempt from a fabricative energy proceeding into matter. Hence also the demiurgic genus is again separated from him. Section therefore is on both sides of him. For so far as he is a Titan, he is cut off from the connective causes, but so far as he does not give himself to material fabrication, he is cut off from the demiurgus Jupiter.

That with respect to the supercelestial place, to which Heaven extends his intellectual life, some characterize it by ineffable symbols; but others, after giving it a name, celebrate it as unknown, neither being able to speak of its form or figure. And proceeding...
ing somewhat higher than this, they have been able to manifest the boundary * of the intelligible gods by name alone. But the natures which are beyond this, they signify through analogy alone, these natures being ineffable and incomprehensible. Since that god who closes the paternal order, is said by the wife to be the only deity among the intelligible gods, that is denominated: and theurgy ascends as far as to this order. Since therefore the natures prior to Heaven, are allotted such a transcendency of uniform subsistence, that some of them are said to be effable, and at the same time ineffable; known, and at the same time unknown, through their alliance to the one, Socrates very properly restrains the discourse about them, in consequence of names not being able to represent their hyparxes; and, in short, because it requires a certain wonderful employment, to separate the effable and ineffable, of their hyparxis and power. He accuses therefore his memory, not as disbelieving in the fables, which assert, that there are certain more antient causes beyond Heaven, nor as not thinking it worth while to mention them. For in the Phædrus he himself celebrates the supercelestial place. But he says this, because the first of beings cannot become known by the exercise of memory, and through phantasy, or opinion, or the dianoetic part. For we are alone naturally adapted to be conjoined to them, with the flower of intellect and the hyparxis of our essence; and through these we receive the sensation of their unknown nature. Socrates therefore says, that what in them is exempt, both from our gnostic and recollective life, is the cause of our inability to give them a name; for they are not naturally adapted to be known through names. Theologists likewise would not remotely signify them, and through the analogy of things apparent to them, if they could be named, and apprehended by knowledge.

That Homer † does not ascend beyond the Saturnian order, but evincing that Saturn is the proximate cause of the demiurgus, he calls Jupiter, who is the demiurgus, the son of Saturn. He also calls the divinities coordinate with him, Juno, Neptune, and Mars; and he designates Jupiter the father of men and gods. But he does not in-

* That is Phanes, intelligible intellect, or in the language of Plato, ἀντροτεσσαρα, animal itself.
† Homer however appears to have ascended as far as to the goddess Night, or the summit of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order. See the extracts from Damascius, in the additional notes to the Parmenides.
troduce Saturn, as either energizing, or saying any thing, but as truly ὄγκολεμένις, in consequence of being converted to himself.

That Orpheus greatly availed himself of the license of fables, and manifests every thing prior to Heaven by names, as far as to the first cause. He also denominates the ineffable, who transcends the intelligible unities, Time; whether because Time presub-sists as the cause of all generation, or because, as delivering the generation of true beings, he thus denominates the ineffable, that he may indicate the order of true beings, and the transcendency of the more total to the more partial; that a subsistence according to Time may be the same with a subsistence according to cause; in the same manner as generation with an arranged progression. But Hesiod venerates many of the divine natures in silence, and does not, in short, name the first. For that what is posterior to the first proceeds from something else, is evident from the verse,

"Chaos of all things was the first produced."

For it is perfectly impossible that it could be produced without a cause; but he does not say what that is which gave subsistence to Chaos. He is silent indeed with respect to both the fathers* of intelligibles, the exempt, and the coordinate; for they are perfectly ineffable. And with respect to the two coordinations, the natures which are coordinate with the one, he passes by in silence, but those alone which are coordinate with the indefinite duad, he unfolds through genealogy. And on this account Plato now thinks Hesiod deserves to be mentioned, for passing by the natures prior to Heaven, as being ineffable. For this also is indicated concerning them by the Oracles, which likewise add, "they possess mystic silence," ὁρὺ ὑψι μυστίων. And Socrates himself, in the Phædrus, calls the intellectual perception of them, μνησις and εὐπορία, in which nearly the whole business is ineffable and unknown.

That, as a discourse concerning the gods is triple, viz. phantastic, like that of Euthyphro, who irrationally imagined battles and stratagems among the gods; scientific, like that of Socrates; and doxastic, which subsists between these, and which, from the opinion of the founder of names, scientifically rises to the essence of the gods;—hence Socrates, perceiving that the conceptions of the multitude about the gods were equally

* That is to say, the first cause, and bound, which is called by Orpheus, Ἄθερ.

† For the character of Euthyphro, see the dialogue which bears his name. See also p. 507 of the Cratylus.
depraved with those of Euthyphro, descends from a scientific energy to inferior concerns, but at the same time elevates those who are detained by phantasy to a middle habit of apprehension concerning the gods. Hence, he ascribes the cause of this descent in speculation to Euthyphro; not considering him as the leader of this knowledge, but as one who, through the phantastically prodigious nature of his discourse, excites to the scientific investigation of truth.

That everywhere, the extremities of a prior, are conjoined with the summits of a secondary order. Thus, for instance, our master Hermes (Διονυσίους έκατόν θεον), being an archangelic monad, is celebrated as a god. But Plato calls the whole extent between gods and men, deities; and they indeed are deities by nature. Those deities however that are now* mentioned, together with the demigods heroes, are not deities and heroes by nature, for they do not always follow the gods; but they are only so from habit, being souls who naturally deliver themselves to generation, such as was the great Hercules, and others of the like kind. But the peculiarity of heroic souls is magnitude of operation, the elevated and the magnificent; and such heroes it is necessary to honour, and to perform funeral rites to their memory, conformably to the exhortation of the Athenian guest. This heroic genus of souls therefore does not always follow the gods, but is undefiled and more intellectual than other souls. And it descends indeed for the benefit of the life of men, as partaking of a destiny inclining downwards; but it has much of an elevated nature, and which is properly liberated from matter. Hence souls of this kind are easily led back to the intelligible world, in which they live for many periods; while, on the contrary, the more irrational kind of souls are either never led back, or this is accomplished with great difficulty, or continues for a very inconsiderable period of time.

That each of the gods is perfectly exempt from secondary natures, and the first, and more total of deities are likewise established above a habit of this kind. They employ however terrestrial and partial spirits† in the generations of some of the human race; not

* See p. 508.
† Some of these spirits, according to Porphyry, are subject to the power of evil deities, as is evident from the following passage, preserved by Augustin:

"Sunt spiritus terreni minimi loco terreno quodam malorum daemonum potestati subjecti. Ab his sapientes Hebraorum ——— * * (vid. August.) sicut audiisti divina Apollonis oracula quae superius dicta
not physically mingling with mortals, but moving nature, perfecting its power, expanding the path of generation, and removing all impediments. Fables therefore, through the similitude of appellation, conceal the things themselves. For spirits of this kind are similarly denominated with the gods, the leading causes of their series. Hence they say, either that gods have connexion with women, or men with goddesses. But if they were willing to speak plainly and clearly, they would say that Venus, Mars, Thetis, and the other divinities, produce their respective series, beginning from on high, as far as to the last of things; each of which series comprehends in itself many essences differing from each other; such as the angelical, demoniacal, heroical, nymphical, and the like. The lowest powers therefore of these orders, have much communion with the human race:

dicta sunt. Ab his ergo Hebraei daemonibus pessimis et minoribus spiritibus vetabant religiosos, et ipsis vacare prohibebant: venerari autem magis celestes deos, amplius autem venerari deum patrem. Hoc autem et dixi praecipient, et in superioribus ostendimus, quenamodum animadvertere ad deum moment, et illum colere ubique imperant. Verum indocti et impiae nature, quibus vere fatum non concessit a diis obtinente, nec habere Jovis immortalis notionem, non audientes deos et divinos viros; deos quidem omnes recusaverunt, prohibitos autem daemones non solum odios odiorne, sed etiam revereri delegerunt. Deum autem simulantes se colere, ea sola per quos deus adoratur, non agunt. Nam deus quidem utpote omnium pater nullius indiget: sed nobis est bene, cum eum per justitiam et castitatem, aliasque virtutes adoramus, ipsam vitam precem ad ipsum facientes, per imitationem et inquisitionem de ipso. Inquisitio enim purget, imitatio deificat affectionem ad ipsum operando." Porphyr. ap. August, de Civit. Dei. lib. xix. cap. 23.

i.e. "There are terrene spirits of the lowest order, who in a certain terrene place are subject to the power of evil demons. From these were the wise men of the Hebrews — (see Augustin), as you have heard the divine oracles of Apollo above mentioned assert. From these worst of demons therefore and lesser spirits of the Hebrew, the Oracles forbid the religious, and prohibit from paying attention to them; but exhort them rather to venerate the celestial gods, and still more the father of the gods. And we have above shown how the gods admonish us to look to divinity, and everywhere command us to worship him. But the unlearned, and impious natures, to whom Fate has not granted truly to obtain gifts from the gods, and to have a knowledge of the immortal Jupiter,—these not attending to the gods and divine men, reject indeed all the gods, and are so far from hating prohibited demons, that they even choose to reverence them. But pretending that they worship god, they do not perform those things through which alone god is adored. For god indeed, as being the father of all things, is not in want of any thing; but it is well with us, when we adore him through justice and continence, and the other virtues, making our life a prayer to him, through the imitation and investigation of him. For investigation purifies, but imitation deifies the affection by energizing about divinity."
for the extremities of first, are connascent with the summits of secondary natures. And they contribute to our other natural operations, and to the production of our species. On this account, it frequently is seen that from the mixture of these powers with men heroes are generated, who appear to possess a certain prerogative above human nature. But not only a demoniacal genus of this kind, physically sympathizes with men, but a different genus sympathizes with other animals, as Nymphs with trees, others with fountains, and others with fags, or serpents.

But how is it that at one time the gods are said to have connexion with mortal females, and at another time mortal females with the gods. We reply that the communion of gods with goddesses gives subsistence to gods, or demons eternally; but heroic souls having a two-fold form of life, viz. doxastic and dianoetic, the former of which is called by Plato in the Timeus the circle of difference, and the latter, the circle of samenes, and which are characterized by the properties of male and female;—hence these souls at one time exhibit a deiform power, by energizing according to the masculine prerogative of their nature, or the circle of samenes, and at another time according to their feminine prerogative, or the circle of difference; yet so, as that according to both these energies they act with rectitude, and without merging themselves in the darkness of body. They likewise know the natures prior to their own, and exercise a providential care over inferior concerns, without at the same time having that propensity to such concerns which is found in the bulk of mankind. But the souls which act erroneously according to the energies of both these circles, or which, in other words, neither exhibit accurate specimens of practical or intellectual virtue—these differ in no respect from gregarious souls, or the herd of mankind, with whom the circle of samenes is fettered, and the circle of difference sustains all various fractures and distortions.

As it is impossible, therefore, that these heroic souls can act with equal vigour and perfection, according to both these circles at once, since this is the province of natures more divine than the human, it is necessary that they should sometimes descend and energize principally according to their doxastic part, and sometimes according to their more intellectual part. Hence, one of these circles must energize naturally, and the other be hindered from its proper energy. On this account heroes are called demigods (ἡμιγόδοι), as having only one of their circles illuminated by the gods. Such of these therefore as have the circle of samenes unfettered, as are excited to an intellectual life,
and are moved about it according to a deific energy,—these are said to have a god for their father, and a mortal for their mother, through a defect with respect to the doxastic form of life. But such, on the contrary, as energize without impediment according to the circle of difference, who act with becoming rectitude in practical affairs, and at the same time enthusiastically, or, in other words, under the inspiring influence of divinity,—these are said to have a mortal for their father, and a goddess for their mother. In short, rectitude of energy in each of these circles is to be ascribed to a divine cause*. Hence, when the circle of sameness has dominion, the divine cause of illumination is said to be masculine and paternal; but when the circle of difference predominates, it is said to be maternal. Hence too, Achilles in Homer acts with rectitude in practical affairs, and at the same time exhibits specimens of magnificent, vehement, and divinely-inspired energy, as being the son of a goddess. And such is his attachment to practical virtue, that even, when in Hades, he defires a union with body, that he may assist his father. While, on the contrary, Minos and Rhadamanthus, who were heroes illuminated by Jupiter, raised themselves from generation to true being, and meddled with mortal concerns no further than absolute necessity required.

That heroes are very properly denominated from Love, since Love is a great daemon†: and from the cooperation of daemons, heroes are produced. To which we may add that Love originated from Plenty as the more excellent cause, and from Poverty as the recipient and the worse cause; and heroes are analogously produced from different genera.

That according to Plato τὸ κομφὸς signifies both the elegant and the appropriate (τὸς κομφὸς καὶ ὑπόκομος); and again it signifies the persuasive and the deceitful (τὸ περαφευς καὶ ἀπατητικὸς): but τὸ κομφαθήματος signifies μεταφαθήμαν.

That as in the universe angels purify souls, freeing them from the stains produced by generation, and elevating them to the gods; and as certain material daemons also purify by chastising souls looking to matter, tearing them on thorns, as in the Republic they are represented doing to Aridæus;—so indeed the ministers of sacred rites, angelically

* Let it however be carefully observed, that this divine cause illuminates, invigorates, and excites these circles in the most unrestrained and impassive manner, without destroying freedom of energy in the circles themselves, or causing any partial affection, sympathy or tendency in illuminating deity.

† See the speech of Diotima in the Banquet.
remove from us every thing which impedes our perception of more excellent nature; but sophists, through exercising us daemoniacally by arguments on both sides, cut off the injury which we sustain from false opinion; not doing this that they may benefit through doubting those who are confuted, but for the sake of a life phantastic, and conversant with the imitation of opinion. For sophists assume the character of those that are truly scientific and skilled in dialectic. And in like manner the last of daemons afflict souls, not that they may make them lovers of real being, but because they are allotted a nature defensive of material and image-producing bosoms, but punishing the souls that fall into that place.

That many daemons have thought fit to unfold the nature of the gods, and have also delivered names adapted to the gods. Thus*, too, the gods themselves not only unfolded the intelligible and intellectual orders to the theurgists under the reign of Marcus Antoninus, but also delivered names of the divine orders declarative of their characteristic properties, by which theurgists invoking the gods in the worship adapted to them, were favourably heard by the divinities. Many daemons also, in appearing to men of a more fortunate destiny, have unfolded to them names connascent with things themselves, through which they have rendered the truth about beings more conspicuous.

That of names some belong to perpetual, and others to corruptible things. And of those which belong to things perpetual, some are devised by men, but others by more divine causes. And of those which are the production of more divine causes than men, some are established by the gods themselves, but others by daemons. And of those which are devised by men, some are the offspring of science, but others are effected without science. Again, of names which belong to things corruptible, some are produced according to, but others without art; and of those produced without art, and the dianoetic energy, some subsist according to an unknown divine cause, such for instance

* Οὗτω καὶ τοις επὶ ΜΑΡΚΟΤ γενειαντὶς θεοιργοῖς, εἰ θεοὶ ὡς νοτας καὶ νεαρας ταξις καταδιδοντες, εὐκατὰ των δεων διακοσμων ἐξαργητικα της ἱδιοτης αυτων παραδειγματιν, εἰς καλουτες εκεινου τους θεους εν ταις προσκουναις Θεοπαις της παρ' αυτων ευκοιας επιγγανον. This is a very remarkable passage, from which the antiquity of the greater part of the Chaldaean Oracles that are now extant may be ascertained. See my collection of those Oracles, in the Supplement to the 3d volume of the Monthly Magazine.
as the name Orestes; but others without such a cause. And of those without a cause, some
subsist according to hope, others according to memory, and others according to neither
of these. But of those which are denominated according to art, some subsist according
to things present, others according to things past, and others according to things future.
Thus according to things present Aristocles was called Plato; but according to things
past Antilochus was denominated Philopater, through having encountered danger for the
sake of his father. And names subsist according to things future, as when some one fore­
knowing through skill in astrology that his son will become renowned, calls him Pericles.
There is also a kind of names mixed from fortune and art, and which through this is two­
fold. One division of this takes place, when some one knows the power of a name, but
is ignorant of the nature of the thing of which it is the name. Thus Xanthippus knew
that the name Pericles signifies renown, but he did not know that his son Pericles would
be most renowned, and therefore did not in consequence of this knowledge thus name him.
On the contrary, another division of this happens, when some one is ignorant of the power
of the name, but knows the essence of the thing, as in the instance of him who denomi­
nated Theseus, Hercules: for he knew that Theseus resembled Hercules, but he was
ignorant* that the name Hercules was alone adapted to Hercules, in consequence of Juno
becoming the cause to him of so many labours, and of the renown which he afterwards
acquired through those labours.

That with respect to the intellecions of the soul, some abide in wholes, and com­
prehend these; but others alone energize on more partial genera; and others are busily
employed about the divine conceptions of eternal individuals. Those who contemplate
the Saturnian and defensive series are the paradigm of the first of these; those whose
conceptions are employed about supercelestial natures, and him who there drives his
winged chariot, are the paradigm of the second; and those who diligently observe and
judge of the effects proceeding into generation from the sun and moon, of the third.

That it is the peculiarity of the strange inhabitants of Greece of the present time,

* Προτει δὲ τι κελευθέρως, ετοιμότερον ἐμπέδον τοις κελευθέρως, διὰ τοῦτο ἐπειδὰν γενέσαι αυτῶν τινων
πρὸς ταῦτα ἀγάπη, καὶ τοὺς δὶ τοῖς ἀγάπην ἅπαν τοῖς.†
† Βίον. Jupiter. See the Nuxbra.

VOL. V. 4 T neither
ADDITIONAL NOTES

neither to consider the sun nor moon as gods*, nor to worship the other celestials, though they are our favours and guides, leading upwards immortal, and fabricating and giving subsistence to mortal souls. I should say however that those who have the hardihood to entertain such an audacious and absurd opinion concerning the celestial gods, belong to souls who are hastening to Tartarus, and to that which is most dark and disordered in the universe†. Let these however remain where they are ranked by justice.

That the name God‡ is rationally ascribed not only to the apparent, but also to the supercelestial, intellectual, and intelligible causes. For Socrates in the Republic speaks of swiftness itself and slowness itself in intelligible numbers, on which account also the liberated rulers of wholes, who are supercelestial, are celebrated in the Phædrus as driving winged chariots. And theologists say that prior to these the intellectual gods ride in chariots of this kind; that Heaven itself, which connectedly comprehends the intellectual gods, possestits intelligence in circulation; and that the intelligible causes prior to this, though these are ineffable, have a rapid motion, and unattended with time. For the Oracles§ also call these swift, and say that “proceeding from the father they run to him.” But Orpheus thus speaks about the occult order of the gods:

“Unwearied, in a boundless orb it moves.”

This name may also be interpreted after another manner; since it manifests the producing and fabricative causes of all things: for Æneas and Ægina are assumed for το ποιη.

* This also has been the peculiarity of what are called the civilized nations of the earth for upwards of a thousand years!
† Φυχομαν εναγα βασις εις αυτω τον ταρταρον, και την αφληγεσιαν του παιτες, και απακερετου επεξεργασιας, την τουαυτην τιλμαν, και την παραλογιαν ταυτην οιραν προς τους ουρανους υποδοκομενον Άιδος αλλ’ ευτο μεν εστων και περιταχθησαν και της διως. Proclus in saying this will doubtless appear in the light of a most uncharitable bigot, to most readers. It must however be observed that the doctrine of eternal punishment has no place in the Pagan creed; and that, according to the same creed, divinity benevolently punishes the offending soul, in order to purify it from guilt.
‡ See page 508.
§ Θεος γας αυτος και τα λογια καλας και προσευμα απε του πατρος Θειν εν αυτον. By the Oracles, Proclus means the Chaldean.

That
ON THE CRATYLUS.

That there is nothing debile, nothing inefficacious in the gods, but all things there are energies and lives, fervid, and eternally energizing. Of the genera, therefore, posterior to the gods, and which are indeed their perpetual attendants, but produce in conjunction with them mundane fabrications from on high, as far as to the last of things,—of these genera some unfold generation into light; others are transporters of union; others of power; and others call forth the knowledge of the gods and an intellectual essence. But of these, some are called angelic, by those that are skilled in divine concerns, in consequence of being established according to the hyparxis itself of the gods, and making that which is uniform in their nature commensurate with things of a secondary rank. Hence the angelic tribe is bonifom, as unfolding into light the occult good works of the gods. Others among these are called by theologists daemoniacal, as binding the middle of all things, and as distributing divine power, and producing it as far as to the last of things: for δαιμόνια is τὸ μέφορον. But this genus possesses abundance of power, and is multifarious, as giving subsistence to those last daemons who are material, who draw down souls, and proceed to the most partial and material form of energy. Others again are denominated by them heroic, who lead human souls on high through love, and who are the suppliers of an intellectual life, of magnitude of operation, and magnitude of wisdom. In short, they are allotted a convervative order and providence, and an alliance to a divine intellect, to which they also convert secondary natures. Hence they are allotted this appellation as being able to raise and extend souls to the gods (ὡς αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνατείνουσιν τὸς θεοῦ εἰς ἑαυτὸν διονύσιον). These triple genera posterior to, are indeed always suspended from the gods, but they are divided from each other. And some of them are essentially intellectual; others are essentialized in rational souls; and others subsist in irrational and phantastic lives. It is also evident, that such of them as are intellectual, are allotted a prudence transcending that of human nature, and which is eternally conjoined with the objects of their intellect. But such of them as are rational, energize discursively according to prudence: and the irrational kind are destitute of prudence; for they dwell in matter, and the darkest parts of the universe. They also bind souls to shadow-producing bofoms (καὶ στοιχεῖ τῶν ψυχῶν τῶν ἐκδοξοῦσαν καλὰς), and strangle such as are brought into that region, until they have suffered the punishment which is their due. These three genera, therefore, which are more excellent than us, Socrates now calls daemons. But if he displeases the material
ADDITIONAL NOTES

material tribe of daemons by this etymology, you must not wonder. For the etymology is transcendent, and perhaps το μετέχον is παρά το δαιμόνιον, as rejoicing in division.

That the hyparxis of the more excellent genera being triple, viz. intellectual, logical, phantastic, the golden* age is analogous to the intellectual genus. For gold, as theologists say is referred to the first of the worlds, the empyrean † and intellectual. But the silver age is analogous to the rational genus: for silver is referred to the middle and ethereal world. And the brazen age is analogous to the irrational and phantastic genus. For the phantasy is a figured, but not a pure intellect; just as brass appears to have the colour of gold, but possesses much of the terrestrial and resisting, and a great alliance with things solid and sensible. Hence this age is analogous to the solid and brazen heaven, or, in other words, to the sensible world, the proximate demiurgus ‡ of which is represented as fabricating it from brass. But the fourth and heroic genus, is subordinate to some of those natures who belong to the above-mentioned three genera, but is superior to others. For the heroic genus touches upon action, and a providential attention to secondary natures, and is inferior to a life which is void of habit. But it possesses magnitude of operation, and exhibits the magnificence of its proper virtue. And the fifth and very passive human age, is that which is assimilated to much-laboured and black iron, through the material and dark condition of its life. It also exhibits erroneous actions, and such as are distorted and irrational.

That Plato now speculates § about daemons and heroes, not those which subsist according to habit, but those which are beyond our essence. He recurs however, through analogy, from those which subsist according to habit, to those of a more elevated order. But he passes by the material genus of daemons.

That in the ancient tongue daemons were called damons, is evident from a being then used instead of au.||

* See p. 510.
† According to the Chaldeans there are seven worlds, one empyrean and the first; after this three ethereal; and then three material worlds, which consist of the inerratic sphere, the seven planetary spheres, and the sublunary region. This last is called by them the hater of life, containing likewise in itself matter, which they call a profundity.
‡ Viz. Vulcan.
§ See p. 510.
|| Οτι το ει τη αρχαιοτάτη τοις δαίμονεσι δαμονεσι, λεγομενι ποσι τη τη α, απε της αι εξαποστο.
That syllables and letters appear to have the relation of essence in names, but acute and grave accents are certain powers of names.

That the intellect in us is Dionysiacal, and is the true image of Bacchus. He therefore who acts erroneously with respect to it, and Titanically divulges its impartible nature through manifold falsehood, certainly sins against Bacchus himself, and more than those who sin against the external statues of the god, because intellect is more than anything else allied to the gods.

That we are more able to understand the more total genera of the gods, than such as are more partial. For in the leading and ruling gods, we can obtain a clearer knowledge of that which is total in their subsistence, and extends to all things, than in the liberated order of gods. And we more easily learn that the mighty Jupiter is the supplier of life to all things, and that he is the demiurgus, than we learn the nature of that Jupiter who imparts life to things celestial alone. And that there is one whole demiurgus is evident to all; but that there are three demiurgi more partial than this, it is difficult to understand.

That each of the gods, so far as he knows himself, and all the other divine genera, and participates of all things, and is bounded according to his proper hyparxis, so far he gives subsistence to divine names which are to us unknown and ineffable; since all intellectual and divine natures subsist in us psychically. But if conceptions do not subsist in the soul coordinately to intellect, but after the manner of an image, and in subjection, much more must the soul become perfectly giddy in energizing intellectually about the gods. For it can only receive conceptions about the essence and the nomination of divinity, after the manner of an image (ἐνανταχθείς).

That as he who supplies all mundane light from himself is called the sun, so the divinity who supplies truth from himself is called Apollo.

That according to the analogous of essences and knowledges in the gods, angels, daemons, and souls, the mutation also of divine names subsists. For the more subordinate natures of daemons, or heroes, or souls, do not call the gods and themselves in a superior and more intellectual manner, as angels do. "Youths celebrate Vesta as the oldest of the gods."

Πρὸς ένανταχθείς ἔναν τάξιν νυμφών κατὰ νυμφών.

For in prayers they are called upon to celebrate Vesta * before the other gods.

* See p. 515.
That Saturn, in conjunction with Rhea, produced Vefta and Juno, who are coordinate to the demiurgic causes. For Vefta imparts from herself to the gods an uninclining permanency, and seat in themselves, and an indissoluble essence. But Juno imparts progression, and a multiplication into things secondary. She is also the vivifying fountain of wholes, and the mother of prolific powers; and on this account she is said to have proceeded together with Jupiter the demiurgus; and through this communion she generates maternally, such things as Jupiter generates paternally. But Vefta abides in herself, possessing an undefiled virginity, and being the cause of sameness to all things. Each of these divinities however, together with her own proper perfection, possesses, according to participation, the power of the other. Hence, some say that Vefta is denominated from essence \((\omega \nu \tau \kappa \sigma \tau \iota \nu \tau \iota \varepsilon \varsigma)\), looking to her proper hyparxis. But others looking to her vivific and motive power, which she derives from Juno, say that she is thus denominated, \(\epsilon \omega \zeta \alpha \omega \prime \iota \alpha \alpha \nu \tau o \nu \iota \alpha \iota \tau o \nu \iota \kappa \iota \varepsilon \) as being the cause of impulsion. For all divine natures are in all, and particularly such as are coordinate with each other, participate of, and subsist in each other. Each therefore of the demiurgic and vivific orders, participates the form by which it is characterized, from Vefta. The orbs of the planets likewise possess the sameness of their revolutions from her; and the poles and centres are always allotted from her their rest.

That Vefta does not manifest essence, but the abiding and firm establishment of essence in itself; and hence this goddess proceeds into light after the mighty Saturn. For the divinities prior to Saturn have not a subsistence in themselves and in another*, but this originates from Saturn. And a subsistence in self is the idiom of Vefta, but in another of Juno.

That the theology of Hesiod from the monad Rhea produces, according to things which are more excellent in the coordination, Vefta; but, according to those which are subordinate, Juno; and according to those which subsist between, Ceres. But according to Orpheus, Ceres is in a certain respect the same with the whole of vivification, and in a certain respect is not the same. For on high she is Rhea, but below, in conjunction with Jupiter, she is Ceres: for here the things begotten are similar to the begetters, and are nearly the same.

* See this explained in the notes on the Parmenides.
That we ought to receive with caution what is now said concerning effluxions and motions. For Socrates does not descend to the material flowing of Heraclitus; for this is false, and unworthy the dianoetic conceptions of Plato. But since it is lawful to interpret things divine analogously, through appropriate images, Socrates very properly assimilates fidal and Saturnian deities to streams; in so doing jeering, and at the same time acting seriously, because good is always derived, as it were, in streams from on high, to things below. Hence, according to the image of rivers, after the foidal deities, who eternally devolve streams of good, the deities, who sublitt as principles, are celebrated. For after the fountain of a river, the place where it begins to flow is surveyed.

That those divinities who are peculiarly denominated total intellectual gods, of whom the great Saturn is the father, are properly called soidal. For "from him leap forth the implacable thunders," says the Oracle concerning Saturn. But concerning the vivific fountain Rhea, from which all life, divine, intellectual, psychical, and mundane, is generated, the Chaldæan Oracles thus speak:

\[ \text{Περὶ τοῦ νεφῶν μεσοροῦ πυγῆ τε φοντ.} \]
\[ \text{Ποιοτῶν γὰρ πρώτη δυνάμεις κολπεύων αφροτοῖς} \]
\[ \text{Διζαμινὶ, γινομεν επί παν προχει τρόχασινων.} \]

i. c. "Rhea is the fountain and river of the blessed intellectual gods. For first receiving the powers of all things in her ineffable bosoms, she pours running generation into every thing."

For this divinity gives subsistence to the infinite diffusion of all life, and to all never-failing powers. She likewise moves all things according to the measures of divine motions, and converts them to herself; establishing all things in herself, as being coordinate to Saturn. Rhea therefore is so called from causing a perpetual influx of good, and through being the cause of divine facility, since the life of the gods is attended with esse (ἔσει ὀνα ἑπερ.).

* See p. 517.
† That is to say, it is false to assert of intellectual and divine natures, that they are in a perpetual flux; for they are eternally stable themselves, and are sources of stability to other things.
§ Gesner, misled by Patricius, has inserted these lines among the Orphic fragments, in his edition of the works of Orpheus. That
That Ocean * is the cause to all the gods of acute and vigorous energy, and bounds the separations of the first, middle, and last orders; converting himself to himself, and to his proper principles, through swiftness of intellect, but moving all things from himself, to energies accommodated to their natures; perfecting their powers, and causing them to have a never-failing subsistence. But Tethys imparts permanency to the natures which are moved by Ocean, and stability to the beings which are excited by him to the generation of secondary natures. She is also the source of purity of essence to those beings who perpetually desire to produce all things: as sustaining every thing in the divine essences which, as it were, leaps forth and percolates. For each of first causes, though it imparts to secondary natures a participation of good, yet, at the same time, retains with itself that which is undefiled, unmixed, and pure from participation. Thus, for instance, intellect is filled with life, being, and intelligence, with which also it fills soul; but establishing in itself that which in each of these is genuine and exempt, it also illuminates from itself to beings of a subordinate rank, inferior measures of these goods. And vigour of energy indeed is present with more ancient natures, through Ocean; but the leaping forth and percolating through Tethys. For every thing which is imparted from superior to subordinate natures, whether it be essence, life, or intelligence, is percolated. And such of these as are primary, are established in themselves; but such as are more imperfect, are transferred to things of a subject order. Just as with respect to streams of water, such of them as are nearer their source are purer, but the more remote are more turbid. Both Ocean and Tethys therefore are fontal gods, according to their first subsistence. Hence Socrates now calls them the fathers of streams. But they also proceed into other orders of gods, exhibiting the same powers among the gods who rank as principles or rulers, among those of a liberated, and those of a celestial characteristic; and appropriately in each of these. Timaeus however celebrates their sublunary orders, calling them fathers of Saturn and Rhea, but the progeny of Heaven and Earth. But their last processions are their divisible allotments about the earth; both those which are apparent on its surface, and those which, under the earth, separate the kingdom of Hades from the dominion of Neptune.

* See p. 517.
That Saturn is conjoined both to Rhea and Jupiter, but to the former as father to prolific power, and to the latter, as father to intelligible * intellect.

That Ocean is said to have married Tethys, and Jupiter Juno, and the like, as establishing a communion with her, conformably to the generation of subordinate natures. For an according coarrangement of the gods, and a connascent cooperation in their productions, is called by theologists marriage.

That Tethys is denominated from leaping forth and straining or cleansing, being as it were Diadethys, and by taking away the first two syllables, Tethys †.

That Saturn is the monad of the Titanic order of the gods, but Jupiter of the demiurgic. This last divinity however is two-fold, the one exempt and coordinated with Saturn, being a fotal god, and, in short, ranking with the intellectual fathers, and convolving the extremity of them; but the other being connumerated with the sons of Saturn, and allotted a Saturnian summit and dominion in this triad; concerning which also the Homeric Neptune says,

\[
\text{Tres vox ter Krono eimus adelphoi oue tene Peus.}\]

As brother gods we three from Saturn came,
And Rhea bore us.

And the first Jupiter indeed, as being the demiurgus of wholes, is the king of things first, middle, and last, concerning whom Socrates also had just said, that he is the ruler and king of all things; and life and salvation are imparted to all things through him. But the ruling Jupiter, who ranks as a principle, and who is coordinate with the three sons of Saturn, governs the third part of the whole of things, according to that of Homer

\[
\text{Tres vox de ponta dedicata.}\]

A triple distribution all things own.

He is also the summit of the three, has the same name with the fotal Jupiter, is

* Proclus here means that there is the same analogy between Saturn, Rhea, and Jupiter, as in the intelligible triad, between father, power, and intellect.

† Τι σαίται η Σιθίς παρα το διατροφευθη και θυσιάζων, ου τον Διατροφη, και αφαιρεσι των πρωτων δυσσυλλατικων Σιθις.

† Iliad xv. ver. 187.

§ Iliad. 189.

VOL. V. 4 u united
united to him, and is monadically called Jupiter. But the second is called, dyadically, marine Jupiter and Neptune. And the third is triadically denominated, terrestrial Jupiter, Pluto and Hades. The first of these also preserves, fabricates, and vivifies summits, but the second, things of a second rank, and the third those of a third order. Hence this last is said to have ravished Proserpine, that together with her he might animate the extremities of the universe.

That the Titanic order dividing itself from the connecting order of Heaven, but having also something in itself abiding, and connascent with that order, Saturn is the head of the separation, and on this account he both arms others against his father, and receives the scythe* from his mother, through which he divides his own kingdom from that of Heaven. But Ocean is coordinated with those that abide in the manners of the father, and guards the middle of the two orders; so far as a Titan being connumerated with the gods that subsist with Saturn; but so far as rejoicing in coordination with Heaven conjoining himself with the Synoches. For it is fit that he who bounds the first and second orders, should be arranged in the middle of the natures that are bounded. But every where this god is allotted a power of this kind, and separates the genera of the gods, the Titanic from the connecting (τῶν συνοχῶν), and the vivific from the demiurgic. Whence also antient rumour calls Ocean the god who separates the apparent part of Heaven from the unapparent; and on this

* See the Theogony of Hesiod, v. 176, &c.
† Proclus here alludes to the following Orphic verses cited by him in his Commentary on the Timaeus, lib. v. p. 296.

Ευθ' ουν τ' ἀκαπνόσις μεν, εις μεγαράςιν εὑμαρτέν
Οἰμασίων ποτερούς νους τραπεί, μη πατέρα
Οι γνώσει τής χορικες και οικεθεώς λαμπρατίο
Συν κρίνομη, ἀλλ' αλλος αδελφος, εις πενθέντα
Μητρὶ φίλον, η τους γη λείπων, μενε ηδον εὐχήν
Πλανὰ δὲ περφίπτω, μενε χαμερες εν μεγαρασι
Συνορείας τη μητρί, κασισντέως δε μαλλον.

I. e. “But Ocean remained within the ample house, considering how he should act, whether he should deprive his father of his strength, and basely injure him, together with Saturn and the rest of his brethren, who were obedient to their dear mother; or, whether leaving these, he should stay quietly at home. After much deliberation, he remained quietly at home, being angry with his mother, but more so with his brothers.”
account poets say, that the sun and the other stars rise from the ocean. What is now
said, therefore, by Plato, comprehends all the Titanic order through these two con-
junctions; this order abiding and at the same time proceeding. And through the
Saturnian order indeed, it comprehends every thing separated from the fathers; but
through that of Ocean, every thing conjoined with the connecting gods. Or, if you
had rather so speak, through the Saturnian order, he comprehends every maternal
cause, but through the other, every thing subservient to the paternal cause. For
the female is the cause of progression and separation, but the male of union and stable
permanency.

That of the demiurgic triad* which divides the whole world, and distributes the indi-
visible, one, and whole fabrication of the first Jupiter, the summit, and which has the
relation of father, is Jupiter, who through union with the whole demiurgic intellect,
having the same appellation with it, is for this reason not mentioned here by Plato.
But Neptune † is allotted the middle, and that which binds together both the extremes;
being filled indeed from the essence of Jupiter, but filling Pluto. For of the whole of
this triad, Jupiter indeed is the father, but Neptune the power, and Pluto the intellect.
And all indeed are in all; but each receives a different character of subsistence.
Thus Jupiter subsists according to being; but Neptune according to power, and Pluto
according to intellect. And though all these divinities are the causes of the life of all
things, yet one is so essentially, another vitally, and another intellectually. Whence
also the theologian Orpheus says, that the extremes fabricate in conjunction with
Proserpine things first and last; the middle being coarranged with generative cause
from his own allotment, without Proserpine. Hence violence is said to have been
offered to Proserpine by Jupiter; but she is said to have been ravished by Pluto
(δι' ὧν θυμέει τῇ χερσὶν ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ διὸς βιονείαν, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ πλατύνων αὐτοικτού). But
the middle is said to be the cause of motion to all things. Hence also, he is called
earth-shaker, as being the origin of motion. And among those who are allotted the
kingdom of Saturn, the middle allotment, and the agile sea (ἡ σκαλαφτος Ἑλαστου) are
assigned to him. According to every division, therefore, the summits are

* That is, of the first triad of the supermundane, which subsists immediately after the intellectual
order.
† See p. 518.
Jovian, the middles belong to Neptune, and the extremes to Pluto. And, if you look to the centres, such as the east, that of mid-heaven, and the west; if also you divide the whole world, as for instance into the inerratic, planetary, and sublunary spheres; or again, if you divide that which is generated into the fiery, terrestrial, and that which subsists between; or the earth into its summits, middle and hollow, and subterranean parts, this triad everywhere distributes the first, middle, and last differences of things fabricated in demiurgic boundaries.

That the name Neptune is now triply analyzed. For Neptune is the trident-bearer, and the Tritons and Amphitrite are the familiars of this god. And the first analysis of his name is from the allotment over which he presides, and from souls coming into generation, in whom the circle of sameness is fettered; since the sea is analogous to generation. But the second is from communion with the first:

\[ \text{Ἀλλὰ ζεύς πετριτέσ γεγονος, και πλατύς ἡμί*}. \]

But Jove was born the first, and more he knew.

For a Jupiter of this kind, is the proximate intelligible of Neptune. But the third analysis of his name, is from his energy in externals. For he is motive of nature, and vivific of things last. He is also the guardian of the earth, and excites it to generations.

That Neptune is an intellectual demiurgic god, who receives souls descending into generation; but Hades is an intellectual demiurgic god, who frees souls from generation. For as our whole period receives a triple division, into a life prior to generation, which is Jovian, into a life in generation which is Neptunian, and into a life posterior to generation which is Plutonian; Pluto, who is characterized by intellect, very properly converts ends to beginnings, effecting a circle without a beginning, and without an end, not only in souls, but also in every fabrication of bodies, and, in short, of all periods;—which circle also he perpetually convolves. Thus, for instance, he converts the ends to the beginnings of the souls of the stars, and the convolutions of souls about generation, and the like. And hence Jupiter is the guardian of the life of souls prior to generation.

* Hom. Iliad.
ON THE CRATYLUS.

That some badly analyze the name of Pluto into wealth from the earth, through fruits and metals; but Hades into the invisible, dark, and dreadful. These Socrates now reprobates*, bringing the two names to the same signification; referring the name of Pluto, as intellect, to the wealth of prudence, but that of Hades to an intellect knowing all things. For this god is a sophist, who purifying souls after death, frees them from generation. For Hades is not, as some improperly explain it, evil: for neither is death evil; though Hades to some appears to be attended with perturbations (ἐπιμαγών); but it is invisible, and better than the apparent; such as is every thing intelligible. Intellect, therefore, in every triad of beings, convolves itself to being, and the paternal cause, imitating in its energy the circle.

That men who are lovers of body, badly refer to themselves the passions of the animated nature, and on this account consider death to be dreadful, as being the cause of corruption. The truth however is, that it is much better for man to die, and live in Hades a life according to nature, since a life in conjunction with body is contrary to nature, and is an impediment to intellectual energy. Hence it is necessary to divest ourselves of the fleshly garments with which we are clothed, as Ulysses did his ragged vestments, and no longer like a wretched mendicant, together with the indigence of body, put on our rags. For as the Chaldaean oracle says, “Things divine cannot be obtained by those whose intellectual eye is directed to body; but those only can arrive at the possession of them, who, stript of their garments, hasten to the summit.”

That Plato contemplates desire †, according to each part of the soul. For the irascible part aspires after honour or victory, and the rational after virtue. In like manner he wishes to survey confidence, good hope, pleasure, and the contraries of these, about each part of the soul.

That with the love and will of the gods, the necessity which is with them concurs, against which no god contends.

That the divine Plato knew that there are three kinds of Sirens ‡: the celestial, which is under the government of Jupiter; that which is productive of generation (γενομένοις), and is under the government of Neptune; and that which is cathartic, and is under the government of Pluto. It is common to all these, to incline all things through an

* See p. 519. † Ibid. 519. ‡ Ibid. 520.
harmonic motion to their ruling gods. Hence, when the soul is in the Heavens, the Sirens are desirous of uniting it to the divine life which flourishes there. But it is proper that souls living in generation should fail beyond them, like the Homeric Ulysses, that they may not be allured by generation, of which the sea is an image. And when souls are in Hades, the Sirens are desirous of uniting them through intellectual conceptions to Pluto. So that Plato knew that in the kingdom of Hades there are gods, daemons, and souls, who dance as it were round Pluto, allured by the Sirens that dwell there.

That Plato knew how to attribute the name Ἰππόβιζ* to a venerable thing: for he thus denominates him who is able to convert other things to himself, such as Jupiter, Hades, and Love.

That not all souls, after being liberated from the body, are thought worthy to associate with Pluto, but such only as are of superior worth: for those that are more corporeal are liberated from vice, by certain cathartic daemons or angels, laboriously, and accompanied with pain.

That the demiurgic Jupiter, and who is also the ruler of all the demiurgi, wishing to suspend all the series of fabricators from the Titannic series, is very properly said to bind Saturn, as being converted to this divinity, and depending from him; and as surveying the length and breadth of the Saturnian place of survey (πειραμα), and establishing in a Jovian manner Saturn in himself. Jupiter therefore binds Saturn in himself firmly and stably; and Jupiter is in a similar manner bound in Saturn.

That the ascent of the soul is two-fold †; the one according to an elevation to true being, and a purification from things connoted with generation, which the bonds of Pluto afford after death; but the other according to the soul having now arrived at the intelligible, through the purification of Hades, and revolving according to the life and transition of intellections which are there, and which the bonds of Saturn effect through a conjunction with Jupiter. For the soul, placing as it were a vestige of her feet in the intelligible, passes through the extent of intelligibles which is there, and

* See p. 520.
† That is, the ascent of the soul may either be considered as taking place while she is ascending to true being, or as that superior energy which she exerts after she has ascended.

surveys
furneys those blessed spectacles, as Socrates teaches us in the Phædrus. And this is a posterior ascent, greater and more perfect than the former. Not only the bonds of Hades therefore are incapable of holding and elevating to the dominion of Jupiter, souls that are astonished about body, but neither can the bonds of Saturn effect this, though these as being of the father are evidently stronger.

That Neptune when compared with Jupiter is said to know many things; but Hades compared with souls to whom he imparts knowledge is said to know all things; though Neptune is more total than Hades.

That as it is necessary to analyze Pluto, not only into the obvious wealth from the earth, but also into the wealth of wisdom, so likewise Ceres must be analyzed not only into corporeal nutriment; but, beginning from the gods themselves, it is requisite to conceive her to be the supplier of aliment, first to the gods themselves, afterwards to the natures posterior to the gods; and, in the last place, that the series of this beneficent energy extends as far as to corporeal nutriment. For the characteristic of love shines forth first of all in the gods: and this is the case with the medicinal and prophetic powers of Apollo, and with those of every other divinity. But nutriment, when considered with reference to the gods, is the communication of intellectual plenitude from more exalted natures to those of an inferior rank. Gods therefore are nourished, when they view with the eye of intellect gods prior to themselves; and when they are perfected and view intelligible beauties, such as justice itself, temperance itself, and the like, as it is said in the Phædrus.

That the design of the great Plato, in the Cratylus, is not to celebrate the first, middle, and last orders of the gods, but only those idioms which are apparent in their names.

That, according to Orpheus, Ceres is the same with Rhea: for Orpheus says, that subsisting on high in unproceeding union with Saturn, she is Rhea, but that by emitting and generating Jupiter, she is Ceres. For thus he speaks,

\[ \text{Pelis to πρω λύουσ, επει διος επέλευε μητης} \]
\[ \text{Γεσιν διαμηνη.} \]

i. e: The goddess who was Rhea, when she bore
Jove, became Ceres.

* This Orphic fragment is not to be found in Gesner's collection of the Orphic remains.
But Hesiod says that Ceres is the daughter of Rhea. It is however evident, that these theologians harmonize: for whether this goddess proceeds from union with Saturn to a secondary order, or whether she is the first progeny of Rhea, she is still the same. Ceres therefore thus subsisting, and receiving the most antient and ruling order from the whole vivific Rhea (της ἀλης ζωογονου φεας), and comprehending the middle centres of whole vivification (της ἀλης ζωογονως), she fills all supermundane natures with the rivers of all perfect life, pouring upon all things vitally, indivisibly, and uniformly.

Prior however to all this, she unfolds to us the demiurgic intellect (Jupiter), and imparts to him the power of vivifying wholes: for, as Saturn supplies her from on high with the cause of being; so Ceres from on high, and from her own prolific bosoms, pours forth vivification to the demiurgus. But possessing herself the middle of all vivific deity, she governs the whole fountains which she contains, and comprehends the one bond of the first and last powers of life. She stably convolves too, and contains all secondary fountains. But she leads forth the uniform causes of prior natures to the generation of others. This goddess too comprehends Vesta and Juno: in her right hand parts Juno, who pours forth the whole order of souls; but in her left hand parts Vesta, who leads forth all the light of virtue. Hence, Ceres is with great propriety called by Plato*, mother, and at the same time the supplier of aliment: for, so far as she comprehends in herself the cause of Juno, she is a mother; but as containing Vesta in her essence, she is the supplier of aliment. But the paradigm of this goddess is Night: for immortal Night is called the nurse of the gods. Night however is the cause of aliment intelligibly†: for that which is intelligible is, according to the Oracle‡, the aliment of the intellectual orders of gods. But Ceres first of all separates the two kinds of aliment in the gods, as Orpheus says:

Μηπατο γορ προποδευεις, και αμφιποδευε, και οπαδος
Μηπατο δ' αμφεροκην, και ερχου πικταρες αρθην
Μηπατο δ' εναλλα εγγα μελασων ερημημων

* See page 521.
† Because Night subsists at the summit of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order, and is wholly absorbed in the intelligible.
‡ That is, according to one of the Chaldean Oracles.
§ These verses likewise are not in Gesner's collection.
ON THE CRATYLUS.

i.e. She cares for pow'rs miniftrant, whether they
Or gods precede, or follow, or surround:
Ambrosia, and tenacious nectar red,
Are too the objects of her bounteous care.
Left to the bee her providence extends,
Who gathers honey with refounding hum.

Ceres, therefore, our sovereign mistress (διστάτωρ) not only generates life, but that which
gives perfection to life; and this from supernal natures to such as are left: for virtue is
the perfection of souls. Hence mothers, who are connected with the circulations of time,
bring forth their offspring in imitation of this two-fold and eternal generation of Ceres.
For, at the same time that they send forth their young into the light, they extend to
them milk naturally produced as their food.

That the conjunction of the demiurgic intellect with the vivific causes is triple: for it
is conjoined with the fountains prior to itself; is present with its kindred coordinate
natures; and coenergizes with the orders posterior to itself. For it is present with the
mother prior to itself, convertively (συνεπεξεργάσεις); with Proserpine posterior to itself,
providentially (προφθαλμός); and with Juno coordinate to itself with an amatory energy
(ερωμος). Hence Jupiter is said to be enamoured of Juno,

Οὐ σε οὐν ερωμοι—

As now I love thee—

And this love indeed is legal, but the other two appear to be illegal. This goddess,
therefore, produces from herself, in conjunction with the demiurgus and father, all the
genera of souls, the supermundane and mundane, the celestial and sublunary, the divine,
angelic, daemoniacal, and partial. After a certain manner too, she is divided from the
demiurgus, but in a certain respect she is united to him: for Jupiter is said, in the
Philebus, to contain a royal intellect and a royal soul. For he contains uniformly the
paternal and maternal cause of the world; and the fountain of souls is said to be in
Jupiter; just as again the intelligence of Jupiter is said to be first participated by Juno.
For no other divinity, says Jupiter in Homer, knows my mind prior to Juno. Through

* Iliad. xiv. ver. 328.
this ineffable union, therefore, of these divinities, the world participates of intellectual souls. They also give subsistence to intellects who are carried in souls, and who together with them give completion to the whole fabrication of things.

That the series of our sovereign mistress Juno* beginning from on high pervades to the last of things; and her allotment in the sublunary region is the air. For air is a symbol of soul, according to which also soul is called a spirit (σνεμα); just as fire is an image of intellect, but water of nature, by which the world is nourished (της κορμοτεθαι φυσιος), and through which all nutriment and increase are produced. But earth is the image of body, through its gross and material nature. Hence Homer, obscurely signifying this, represents Juno suspended with two anvils under her feet: for the air is allotted two heavy elements beneath itself. For

\[ \text{Hlias } \delta' \text{ οκταμαντα βουτις ποτιω κηρ} \]
\[ \text{Πεμα'ν ς' οκτανου γοης———†} \]

i. e. "Fair-eyed venerable Juno sent the sun to the streams of the ocean,"—is from the same conception: for he calls the thick cloud produced by Juno, the setting of the sun. The assertion likewise that the end of this name will be conjoined with the beginning, if any one frequently repeats the name of the goddess, evinces the conversion of rational souls to her which proceed from her; and that voice is struck air. On this account also the voice of rational animals is especially dedicated to this goddess, who made the horse of Achilles to become vocal. But Socrates now delivers these three vivific monads in a consequent order; viz. Ceres, Juno, Proserpine; calling the first the mother, the second the sister, and the third the daughter of the demiurgus. All of them however are partakers of the whole of fabrication; the first in an exempt manner and intellectually; the second in a fontal manner and at the same time in a way adapted to a principle (αρχιος); and the third in a manner adapted to a principle and leader (αρχιος και πραγματον).

Of these goddesses the last is allotted triple powers, and impartibly and uniformly comprehends three monads of gods. But she is called Core (κορη) through the purity of her essence, and her undefiled transcendency in her generations. She also possesses a first, middle, and last empire. And according to her summit indeed she is called Diana by

* See p. 521.  
† lines. xviii. ver. 240.

Orpheus;
Orpheus; but according to her middle, Proserpine; and according to the extremity of the order, Minerva. Likewise, according to an hyparxis transcending the other powers of this triple vivific order, the dominion of Hecate is established; but according to a middle power, and which is generative of wholes, that of Soul; and according to intellectual conversion, that of Virtue*. Core, therefore, subsisting on high, and among the supermundane gods, uniformly extends this triple order of divinities; and together with Jupiter generates Bacchus, who impartibly presides over partible fabrication. But beneath, in conjunction with Pluto, she is particularly beheld according to the middle idiom: for it is this which, proceeding every where, imparts vivification to the last of things. Hence she is called Proserpine, because she especially associates with Pluto, and together with him orderly distributes the extremities of the universe. And according to her extremities indeed she is said to be a virgin, and to remain undefiled; but according to her middle, to be conjoined with Hades, and to beget the Furies in the subterranean regions. She therefore is also called Core, but after another manner than the supermundane and ruling Core. For the one is the connective unity of the three vivific principles; but the other is the middle of them, in herself possessing the idioms of the extremes. Hence in the Proserpine conjoined with Pluto you will find the idioms of Hecate and Minerva; but these extremes subsist in her occultly, while the idiom of the middle shines forth, and that which is characteristic of ruling soul, which in the supermundane Core was of a ruling nature, but here subsists according to a mundane idiom.

That a lover of piety to the gods ought earnestly to embrace the rectitude of divine names, lest, like those who err concerning Proserpine and Apollo, being ignorant of the analysis of names, he should be subject to the same reproof from Socrates.

That Proserpine is denominated either through judging of forms and separating them from each other, thus obscurely signifying the ablation of slaughter (διὰ τοῦ κρίνειν τὰ εἰδη καὶ καταφέρειν εἰκόνας αὐτῷ τὸ θανάτου τὴν ανακοίνωσιν αὐτοποιημένην), or through separating souls perfectly from bodies, through a conversion to things on high, which is the most fortu-

* Proclus says this conformably to the theology of the Chaldeans: for he informs us in his 6th book on the Theology of Plato, p. 372, that, according to that theology, the first monad of the vivific triad is Hecate, the second Soul, and the third Virtue.

† That is, of a supermundane nature; for the ruling are the supermundane gods.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

slate slaughter and death, to such as are worthy of it (ἡ διὰ τοῦ ἐμφυτεύματος τῶν πυρὸς τῶν σωμάτων διὰ τὴς πρὸς τα ἐπιστροφής, ἐπεὶ οὖν εὐφυσίωτος φως καὶ Ζωοτός τοῦ ἀξίομαν τοῦ). But the name Φερέπαττα, Pherephatta, according to a contact with generation, is adapted to Proserpine; but according to wisdom and counsel, to Minerva. At the same time however all the appellations by which she is distinguished are adapted to the perfection of soul. On this account also she is called Proserpine, and not by the names of the extremes; since that which was ravished by Pluto is this middle; the extremes at the same time being firmly established in themselves, according to which Core is said to remain a virgin.

That very rationally after Proserpine, Plato* now analyzes Apollo: for there is a great communion between the Cthic and the Apolloniacal series; since the former is the unity of the middle triad of rulers (i.e. of the supermundane gods), and emits from herself vivific powers; but the latter converts the solar principles to one union: and the solar principles are allotted a subsistence immediately after the vivific. Hence, according to Orpheus, when Ceres delivered up the government of Proserpine, she thus admonished her:

Αὐτὰρ Ἀπελλάαν Ἀπόλλων λέγεται εὐσκέδονι,
Τεῖζεῖν αὐλάκα τεκνα πυρίλεγοντα προσωπου.†

That is,

But next Apollo’s florid bed ascend;
For thus the god fam’d offspring shall beget,
Refulgent with the beams of glowing fire.

But how could this be the case, unless there was a considerable degree of communion between these divinities?

It is necessary, however, to know thus much concerning Apollo, that, according to the first and most natural conception, his name signifies the cause of union, and that power which collects multitude into one; and this mode of speculation concerning his name harmonizes with all the orders of the god. But Socrates alone considers his more partial powers: for the multitude of the powers of Apollo are not to be

* See p. 522.
† These verses are not in Gesner’s collection of the Orphic fragments.
comprehended, nor described by us. For when will man, who is merely rational, be able to comprehend not only all the idioms of Apollo, but all those of any other god? Theologists indeed deliver to us a great multitude of Apollonian idioms; but Socrates now only mentions four of them. For the world is as it were a decad, being filled from all productive principles, receiving all things into itself, and being converted to the proper principle of the decad, of which the tetrad proximately contains the cause, but in an exempt manner, the monad. And the former without separation and occultly, but the latter with separation; just as Apollo proximately unites the multitude of mundane natures, but the demiurgic intellect exemptly. Why then does Socrates use an order of this kind? For, beginning from the medicinal power of the god, and proceeding through his prophetic and arrow-darting powers, he ends in his harmonic power. We reply, that all the energies of this god are in all the orders of beings, beginning from on high and proceeding as far as to the last of things; but different energies appear to have more or less dominion in different orders. Thus, for instance, the medicinal power of Apollo is most apparent in the subterranean region; for there (laughter, rage, and countless ills besides, disease, decay, and rottenness reside.

And as these are moved in an inordinate manner, they require to be restored from a condition contrary, into one agreeable to nature, and from incommensuration and manifold division, into symmetry and union.

But the prophetic energy of the god is most apparent in the heavens; for there his enunciative power shines forth, unfolding intelligible good to celestial natures, and on this account he revolves together with the sun, with whom he participates the same intellect in common; since the sun also illuminates whatever the heavens contain, and extends a unifying power to all their parts. But his arrow-darting energy mostly prevails among the liberated gods; for there, ruling over the wholes which the universe
contains, he excites their motions by his rays, which are always assimilated to arrows, extirpates every thing inordinate, and fills all things with demiurgic gifts. And though he has a separate and exempt subsistence; he reaches all things by his energies.

Again, his harmonic power is more predominant in the ruling supermundane order; for it is this divinity who, harmonizing the universe, establishes about himself according to one union the choir of the Muses, and produces by this mean, as a certain theurgist says, "the harmony of exulting light." Apollo therefore, as we have shown, is harmonic, and this is likewise the case with the other Apollos* which are contained in the earth and the other spheres; but this power appears in some places more, and in others less. These powers too subsist in the god himself in an united manner, and exempt from other natures, but in those attendants of the gods who are superior to us, divisibly, and according to participation; for there is a great multitude of medicinal, prophetic, harmonic, and arrow-darting angels, daemons, and heroes, suspended from Apollo, who distribute in a partial manner the uniform powers of the god.

But it is necessary to consider each of these powers according to one definite characteristic; as, for instance, his harmonic power, according to its binding together separated multitude; his prophetic power, according to the enunicative; his arrow-darting power, according to its being subvertive of an inordinate nature; and his medicinal power, according to its perfective energy. We should likewise speculate these characteristics differently in gods, angels, daemons, heroes, men, animals, and plants; for the powers of the gods extend from on high to the last of things, and at the same time appear in an accommodated manner in each; and the telestic (i.e. mystic) art endeavours through sympathy to conjoin these ultimate participants with the gods. But in all these orders we must carefully observe, that this god is the cause of union to multiplied natures: for his medicinal power, which takes away the multiform nature of disease, imparts uniform health; since health is symmetry and a subsistence according to nature, but that which is contrary to nature is multifarious. Thus too, his prophetic power, which unfolds the simplicity of truth, takes away the variety of that which is false; but his arrow-darting power, which exterminates every thing furious and wild, but prepares that which is or-

* See the Introduction to the Timæus.
derly and gentle to exercise dominion, vindicates to itself unity, and exterminates a disordered nature tending to multitude; and his musical power, through rhythm and harmony, places a bond, friendship, and union in wholes, and subdues the contraries to these.

And all these powers indeed subsist primarily, in an exempt manner, and uniformly in Jupiter the demiurgus of wholes, but secondarily and separately in Apollo. Hence Apollo is not the same with the demiurgic intellect; for this comprehends these powers totally and paternally, but Apollo with subjection, imitating his father; since all the energies and powers of secondary gods are comprehended in the demiurgus according to cause. And the demiurgus fabricates and adorns the universe according to all these powers, and in a collected manner; but the other deities which proceed from him cooperate with their father according to different powers.

That purification being seen not only in the medicinal, but also in the prophetic art, evinces, that the cathartic power of Apollo comprehends the two powers: for it illustrates the world with the glittering splendors of light, and purifies all material immoderation by Pæonian energies; which physicians and prophets among us imitating, the former purify bodies, and the latter through sulphureous preparations render themselves and their associates pure. For, as Timæus says, the gods purify the universe, either by fire or water; and prophets also in this respect imitate the gods. In the most sacred of the mysteries too, purifications are employed prior to initiation into them, in order to take away every thing foreign from the proposed sacred mystery. We may likewise add, that the referring multiform purifications to the one cathartic power of the gods is adapted to him. For Apollo everywhere unites and elevates multitude to the one, and uniformly comprehends all the modes of purification, purifying all heaven, generation, and all mundane lives, and separating partial souls from the grossness of matter. Hence the theurgist, who is the leader of the mysteries of this god, begins from purifications and sprinklings:

\[\text{Αυτὸς ἃν ἔπετεὶς ἑαυτὸς πυρας ἔργα καθίσθων,} \\
\text{Κυματι πεπεθὺς παγέρῳ ἐκαραγγεῖς αἰμὸς.}\]

i. e. “The priest in the first place governing the works of fire, must sprinkle with the cold water of the loud-sounding sea,” as the Oracle says concerning him. But the allusion that the god presides over simplicity according to knowledge, and unfolds truth
ADDITIONAL NOTES

truth into light, presents him to our view as analogous to the good, which Socrates celebrates in the Republic; in which place he calls the fun the progeny of the good, and says that the former is analogous to the latter. Apollo therefore being the source of union, and this to the mundane gods, is arranged analogous to the good; and through truth, he unfolds to us his similitude to it, if it be lawful so to speak. For the simple is a manifestation of the one, and the truth which subsists according to knowledge is a luminous representation of supereffential truth, which first proceeds from the good. But the perpetually prevailing might of the god in the ejaculating of arrows, evinces his dominion, which vanquishes every thing in the world. For on high, from the supercelestial order, he scatters the rivers of Jupiter, and pours his rays on the whole world: for his arrows obscurely signify his rays. Again, the assertion that he presides over music, represents to us that this god is the cause of all harmony, both unapparent and apparent, through his ruling supermundane powers, according to which he generates, together with Mnemofyne and Jupiter, the Muses. But he orderly disposes every thing sensible by his demiurgic powers, which the sons of theurgists denominate hands; since the energy of the harmony of sounds is suspended from the motion of the hands. He likewise orderly disposes souls and bodies through harmonic reasons, using their different powers as if they were sounds; and he moves all things harmoniously and rhythmically by his demiurgic motions. The whole of this celestial order too, and motion, exhibit the harmonious work of the god; on which account also partial souls are no otherwise perfected than through an harmonic similitude to the universe, and abandoning the dissonance arising from generation; for then they obtain the most excellent life, which is proposed to them by the god.

From discoursing about king Apollo, Plato proceeds to the Muses*, and the name of music: for Apollo is celebrated as Mufagetes; and he indeed is a monad with respect to the harmony in the world, but the choir of the Muses is the monad of all the number of the heunead (i.e. nine). From both likewise the whole world is bound in indissoluble bonds, and is one and all-perfect, through the communications of these divinities; possessing the former through the Apolloniacal monad, but its all-perfect sufficiency through the number of the Muses. For the number nine, which is generated from the first perfect number (that is 3), is, through similitude and sameness, accom-
modated to the multiform causes of the mundane order and harmony; all these causes at the same time being collected into one summit for the purpose of producing one consummate perfection. For the Muses generate the variety of reasons with which the world is replete; but Apollo comprehends in union all the multitude of these. And the Muses give subsistence to the harmony of soul; but Apollo is the leader of intellectual and impartible harmony. The Muses distribute the phenomena according to harmonical reasons; but Apollo comprehends unapparent and separate harmony. And though both give subsistence to the same things, yet the Muses effect this according to number, but Apollo according to union. And the Muses indeed distribute the unity of Apollo; but Apollo unities harmonic multitude, which he also converts and comprehends. For the multitude of the Muses proceeds from the essence of Mufagetes, which is both separate, and subsists according to the nature of the one; and their number evolves the one and primary cause of the harmony of the universe.

That such being the etymology of the name of the Muses, since Plato calls philosophy the greatest music, as causing our psychical powers to be moved harmoniously, in symphony with real beings, and in conformity to the orderly motions of the celestial orbs; and since the investigation of our own essence and that of the universe leads us to this harmony, through a conversion to ourselves and more excellent natures,—hence also we denominate the Muses from investigation. For Mufagetes himself unfolds truth to souls according to one intellectual simplicity; but the Muses perfect our various energies, elevating them to an intellectual unity. For investigations have the relation of matter, with reference to the end from invention; just as multitude with respect to the one, and variety with respect to simplicity. We know, therefore, that the Muses impart to souls the investigation of truth, to bodies the multitude of powers, and that they are everywhere the sources of the variety of harmonies.

That Latona* is a vivific fountain comprehended in Ceres: and hence, according to the Grecian rites, she is worshipped as the same with Ceres, these rites evincing by this the union of the goddesses. But this goddes emits the whole of vivific light, illuminating the intellectual essences of the gods, and the orders of souls: and lastly, she illuminates

* See p. 527.
the whole sensible heaven, generating mundane light, and establishing the cause of this light in her offspring, Apollo and Diana; and causes all things to glitter with intellectual and vivific light. She imparts likewise to souls the consummation of virtue, and an illumination which leads them back to the intellectual port of their father (Jupiter), hastily withdrawing them from the winding paths* of matter, the entanglements of vice, and the roughness of the passage over the sea of generation. It appears to me indeed that theologists, considering this, denominated her Λετο, Latona, on account of her extending to souls smoothness of manners, a voluntary life, and divine gentleness and ease. For to such as raise themselves to her divinity, she imparts an ineffable energy, a blameless life, gentleness of manners, serenity, and intellectual tranquillity. Whether, therefore, she is called Λετο, from a voluntary life; for λαός signifies το σωφρονείν, I am willing; or from το ξένος, the smooth; her name will perfectly evince, through both these, the powers which she possesses. For the compelled energies of the soul take place through material roughness; and the obliquity of a life in generation diminishes the soul's voluntary life. But an ascent to the gods imparts a smooth and gentle, instead of a hard and rough, and a voluntary, instead of a compelled life.

Why then is it necessary to call, as some do, Latona matter, as capable of being easily turned, and subsisting as an express resemblance of all forms, like a mirror receiving the representations of all things; and to say that she is the cause of oblivion to those that look into her? Why is it necessary to call Apollo harmony, as subsisting from Latona and Jupiter? For thus the god would be inseparable from matter, and not the cause of the harmony in the universe. It is better, therefore, to say, that Latona is not the receptacle of Apollo, but that she is the mother and fountain of all vivific light, which preserves all things by heat: but that Apollo, who is a separate divinity, is the supplier of all harmonic life, and of all those mundane reasons by which the universe is indissolubly bound. But you may say that Socrates derives her name from Ληθή, because she peculiarly causes in souls an oblivion of evils, and of the roughness and storms in generation; of which, while the soul retains the memory, she cannot possibly establish herself in intelligibles: for memory, says Plotinus, leads to the object of memory. And as Mnemosyne excites the memory of intelligibles, so Latona imparts an oblivion of material concerns.

* Of these winding paths the Delian labyrinth is an image.
That of our sovereign mistress Diana*, Plato delivers three idioms; the undefiled, the mundane, and the anagogic. And through the first of these indeed the goddess is said to be a lover of virginity; but through the second, according to which she is perfective of works (τελειωμενος), she is said to be the inspective guardian of virtue; and through the third she is said to hate the impulses arising from generation. Of these three likewise, the first is especially adapted to the progresision of the goddess, according to which she is allotted an hyparxis in the vivific triad of the supermundane gods; whether we call this deity Hecate, as theurgists say, or Diana with Orpheus. For there being established, she is filled with undefiled powers from the gods called Amulicti†. But she looks to the fountain of virtue, and embraces its virginity. For the virginity which is there does not proceed forth, as the Oracle says, but abiding gives subsistence to Diana, and to supermundane virtue, and is exempt from all communion, conjunction, and progression, according to generation. Hence Core also, according to the Diana and Minerva which she contains, is said to remain a virgin; but according to the prolific power of Proserpine, she is said to proceed forth, and to be conjoined with the third demiurgus, and to bring forth, as Orpheus says, “nine azure-eyed, flower-producing daughters.”

*See page 527.
†That is, the Corybantes.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

which it appears that Latona is comprehended in Ceres, and together with Jupiter gives subsistence to Core, and the mundane Hecate. To which we may also add that Orpheus calls Diana Hecate. So that it is nothing wonderful, if we should elsewhere call the Diana contained in Core, Hecate.

That Plato coarranges the mundane Bacchus with the mundane Venus, in consequence of her love of Bacchus, and her fashioning, as an image of him, Adonis much honoured in Cilicia and Cyprus. And it is evident that a love of this kind in Venus, which is thus beneficent and providential, must be considered as exerted by a superior to an inferior divinity.

That the young man appears to inquire about our sovereign master Bacchus, as if it were about things of small importance, and on this account he is silenced by Socrates. And he does not indeed hear concerning the occult, but only the last and mundane progressions of the gods. These indeed the wise man venerates, though, as he says, they are sports, through these gods being lovers of sport. For, as he says of the terminations of the other gods, that they are terrible, and that they avenge and punish, and thus give perfection to souls; as, for instance, that Justice follows Jupiter, the avenger of the divine law, and that this divinity is benevolent to those whose manners are orderly, and who live according to intellect, but that she is baneful to those who mingle their life with insolence and ignorance, until she has entirely subverted them, their houses, and cities; — in like manner, he venerates the terminations of Bacchus and Venus, which produce γλυκοσμία, sweetness of sensation; every where purifying our conceptions concerning the gods, and preparing us to understand that all things look to the best end, whatever it may be. For, because the terminations of these divinities strengthen the infirmity of the mortal nature, and recall corporeal molestation, on this account the gods, the causes of these things, are φιλοπαγμοι, lovers of sport. Hence, of statues, they make some of them laughing and dancing, and exhibiting relaxation, but others austerely, astonishing, and terrible to the view, analogously to the mundane allotments of the gods.

* Ἡ' ἀρχικά ταῖτες μελῆς αὐτή ὑποστά
Λητοὺς ἀπλικάμενον κρατὶ προσέγγισαι ὁλίγων.

† See p. 527.

‡ This is implied by Socrates telling him that he inquires about great things.
That theologists frequently call Bacchus wine, from the last of his gifts, as, for instance, Orpheus,

\[ \text{Οὐνοματα μὴν καρποὶ λαξῖν, καὶ μὴν νῦν}, \]

i.e. "Take all the members of wine (that are distributed) in the world, and bring them to me."

But if the god is thus denominated, certainly his first and middle energies will be thus called, as well as his last; so that Socrates, now looking to this, calls the god διδοὺς, beginning from wine, which, as we have said, manifests all the powers of the god. Thus also in the Phædrus, Socrates calls love in common great, both that which is divine, and that which is a lover of body. By this epithet wine therefore, we must understand that the idiom of a partial intellect is in common presented to our view. For the word ὦνομα, such as, is nothing else than intellectual form separated from a total intellect, and in consequence of this becoming participated, particular and alone. For an all-perfect intellect is all things, and energizes according to all things with invariable sameness; but a partial and participated intellect is indeed all things, but this according to one form, such as a solar, lunar, or mercurial form. This therefore, the idiom of which is to be separated from the rest, wine indicates, signifying an intellect such as, and particular (ὠνοματα τοῦ ὀνομα τοῦ νῦν). Since therefore every partial fabrication is suspended from the Dionysiacal monad, which distributes participated mundane intellects from total intellect *, many souls from one soul, and all sensible forms from their proper totalities; on this account theologists call both this god and all his fabrications wine: for all these are the progeny of intellect; and some things participate of the partial distribution of intellect in a more distant, but others in a nearer degree. Wine therefore energizes in things analogous to its subsistence in them: in body, indeed, after the manner of an image, according to a false opinion and imagination; but in intellectual natures, according to an intellectual energy and fabrication; since, in the laceration of Bacchus by the Titans, the heart of the god is said to have alone remained undistributed, i.e. the indivisible essence of intellect. Ὄτι τὸν δισποτὴν ἦλθαν Διόνυσον, οἱ διαλογίζει πολλάκις,

* With respect to intellect, it is necessary to inform the reader, that one kind is imparticipable and total, such as all intellects unconnected with soul; but another participable indeed, but essentially so, such as the mundane intellect; and the intellects of all the mundane gods and beneficent daemons; but a third is participable, and subsists as a habit; and to this class our intellects belong.
That from sportive conceptions about the gods it is possible for those to energize enth-
theistically, or according to a divinely inspired energy, who apply themselves to things in
a more intellectual manner. Thus, for instance, according to the material conceptions
of the multitude, Venus derives her origin from foam; and foam corresponds to seed.
Hence according to them the pleasure arising from this in coition is Venus. Who,
however, is so stupid *, as not to survey primary and eternal natures, prior to such as
are last and corruptible? I will therefore unfold the divine conception respecting
Venus.

They say then that the first Venus was produced from two-fold causes, the one as that
through which †, cooperating with her progression, as calling forth the prolific power
of the father, and imparting it to the intellectual orders; but Heaven as the maker and
cause unfolding the goddess into light, from his own generative abundance. For whence
could that which congregates different genera, according to one desire of beauty, receive

* A countless multitude we may say, O Proclus, of the present day are thus stupid; and few, very few
indeed, have entertained a different opinion for upwards of a thousand years.
† This cause is Saturn, who according to the fable cut off the genital parts of Heaven. See the Theogony
of Hesiod.
its subsistence except from the \textit{fynecibical} power of Heaven? From the foam therefore of his own prolific parts thrown into the sea, Heaven produced this goddes, as Orpheus says. But the second Venus Jupiter produces from his own generative powers, in conjunction with Dione: and this goddes likewise proceeds from foam, after the same manner with the more ancient Venus, as Orpheus evinces. These goddeffes therefore differ from each other, according to the causes of their production, their orders, and their powers. For the that proceeds from the genitals of Heaven is supermundane, leads upwards to intelligible beauty, is the supplier of an unpolluted life, and separates from generation. But the Venus that proceeds from Dione governs all the coordinations in the celestial world and the earth, binds them to each other, and perfects their generative progressions, through a kindred conjunction. These divinities too are united with each other through a similitude of subsistence: for they both proceed from generative powers; one from that of the connectedly containing power of Heaven, and the other from Jupiter the demiurgus. But the sea signifies an expanded and circumscribed life; its profundity, the universally extended progression of such a life; and its foam, the greatest purity of nature, that which is full of prolific light and power, and that which swims upon all life, and is as it were its highest flower.

That theologists especially celebrate two powers of our sovereign mistress Minerva *, the defensive and the perfective, the former preserving the order of wholes undefiled, and unvanquished by matter, and the other filling all things with intellectual light, and converting them to their cause; on which account Plato also in the \textit{Timaeus} analogously celebrates Minerva as \textit{philopolemic}, and \textit{philosophic}. But three orders of this goddes are delivered by theologists; the one fontal and intellectual, according to which she establishes herself in her father Jupiter, and subsists in unproceeding union with him; but the second ranks among the supermundane gods, according to which she is present with Core, and bounds and converts all the progression of that goddes to herself. And the third is liberated, according to which she perfects and guards the whole world, and circularly invests it with her powers, as with a veil; binding together all the mundane summits, and giving subsistence to all the allotments \textit{in the Heavens}, and to those which proceed into the sublunary region. Now therefore Socrates celebrates her guardian power, through the name of \textit{Pallas}; but her perfective power through that of Minerva. She

* See p. 539.
is the cause therefore of orderly and measured motion, which she first imparts to the Curetic order, and afterwards to the other gods. For Minerva, according to this power, is the leader of the Curetes, as Orpheus says, whence also, as well as those divinities, she is adorned with empyrean arms, through which she represses all disorder, preserves the demiurgic series immovable, and unfolds dancing through rhythmical motion. She also guards reason as it proceeds from intellect; through this power vanquishing matter. For the visible region, says Timeus, is mingled from intellect and necessity, the latter being obedient to the former, and all material causes being in subjection to the will of the father. It is this goddess therefore who arranges necessity under the productions of intellect, raises the universe to the participation of Jupiter, excites and establishes it in the port of its father, and eternally guards and defends it. Hence, if the universe is said to be indissoluble, it is this goddess who supplies its permanency; and if it moves in measured motion, through the whole of time, according to one reason and order, she is the source of this supply. She watchfully surveys therefore all the fabrication of her father, and connects and converts it to him; and vanquishes all material indefiniteness. Hence she is called Victory and Health; the former because she causes intellect to rule over necessity, and form over matter; and the latter, because she preserves the universe perpetually whole, perfect, exempt from age, and free from disease. It is the property therefore of this goddess to elevate and distribute, and through an intellectual dance, as it were, to connect, establish, and defend inferior natures in such as are more divine*.

* These admirable Scholia on the Cratylus end here; being unfortunately, like most both of the published and unpublished writings of Proclus, incomplete. These very Scholia too appear to be nothing more than extracts from a copious commentary of Proclus which is lost.