THE HIPPARCHUS:

A DIALOGUE

ON

THE LOVE OF GAIN.
INTRODUCTION

to

THE HIPPARCHUS.

The design of the Hipparchus is to show that all men naturally desire good, since even those who wander from it through avarice, wander through a desire of obtaining it; but they err in consequence of mistaking good, which is a mean, for ultimate good. For good is two-fold, one being the end, the other subsisting for the sake of the end. Hence the possession of the former is called beatitude, and of the latter gain. Hence too, gain is the acquisition of that good, which contributes to the possession of ultimate good. But that which does not contribute to this, is neither useful, nor is the acquisition of it gain. The desire therefore of gain thus defined, and which is naturally inherent in all men, is laudable; but the false opinion is to be reprobated, which, while it is ignorant of the truly useful and lucrative, dislofts to things adverse the natural appetite of man. Plato latently teaches this, while he confutes the false definitions which are introduced in this Dialogue, concerning the desire of gain. But he employs this proposition, that all men desire good as manifest, in order to conclude that all men naturally desire gain, and that this natural desire is laudable. And this is the conclusion which Socrates after a manner directly introduces by three modes of arguing, viz. by example, by induction, and by reasoning. But from the whole Dialogue we collect, that all men desire good; and this is its ultimate end. For its first end is to show that all men are desirous of gain, and that...
this desire is not to be blamed when directed to gain according to its true
definition.

It appears from Ælian (Var. Hist. viii. 2.) that it was dubious with some of
the antients, whether this Dialogue was in reality composed by Plato. If I
may be allowed to give my own opinion, I do not find anything, either in
its manner or matter, for which its authenticity deserves to be called in
question.
Socrates.

What is the love, and who are the lovers of gain?

Hip. It appears to me that those are lovers of gain, who think it worth while to acquire wealth from things of no worth.

Soc. Whether therefore do they appear to you to do this in consequence of knowing, or being ignorant that these are things of no worth? For if they do this through ignorance, you call the lovers of gain stupid.

Hip. But I do not call them stupid, but perfectly crafty and base; men who are vanquished by gain, who know that the things from which they have the boldness to acquire wealth, are of no worth, and yet at the same time, through their impudence, dare to love gain.

Soc. Do you, therefore, call a character of the following kind a lover of gain? I mean, as if a husbandman, planting a tree or herb, and knowing that it is of no worth, should nevertheless think it worth while to enrich himself from the cultivation of such a plant? Do you call such a one as this a lover of gain?

Hip. A lover of gain, Socrates, thinks he ought to enrich himself from every thing.

Soc. Do not thus rashly answer me, like a man who has been injured by someone; but, attending to what I say, answer me as if I should again interrogate you from the beginning. Do you agree with me, that a lover of gain
gain knows the value of that thing whence he thinks it worth while to
enrich himself?

HIP. I do.

Soc. Who then is he that has a knowledge of the worth of plants? and
who likewise knows in what region, and at what time of the year it is
worth while to plant them? that we also may adopt something from those
words of the wife, which lawyers employ for the sake of elegance.

HIP. A husbandman, I think.

Soc. Do you, therefore, say that the term, It is worth while to acquire
wealth, is anything else than to think that it is requisite to acquire wealth?

HIP. I say it is this very thing.

Soc. Do not therefore you, who are so young, endeavour to deceive me,
who am now an elderly man, by answering, as you do at present, what you by
no means think; but answer me truly, whether you think that the man who
is a husbandman, and who knows that it is not worth while to set a certain
plant, will yet expect to be enriched by such a plant?

HIP. By Jupiter, not I.

Soc. What then? Will a jockey who knows that the food which he gives
a horse is of no worth, be ignorant that by such food he will destroy the
horse?

HIP. I do not think he will.

Soc. He will not, therefore, think that from such aliment as this, which
is of no worth, he shall be enriched.

HIP. He will not.

Soc. What then? Do you think that a pilot who furnishes a ship with a
rudder and sails, which are of no value, can be ignorant that he shall sustain an
injury, be himself in danger of perishing, and both destroy the ship and all it
contains?

HIP. I do not.

Soc. He will not therefore think that he shall be enriched by furniture of
no value.

HIP. He will not.

Soc. Will the general of an army, likewise, when he knows that his
soldiers have arms which are of no value, think that he shall acquire wealth,
or that it is worth while to be enriched by these?
Hip. By no means.

Soc. In like manner, if a piper possesses a pipe of no value, a lyrist a lyre, an archer a bow, or in short if any other artist or skilful person possesses instruments, or any other apparatus of no value, will he think that he shall be enriched by these?

Hip. It appears he will not.

Soc. Who then do you call lovers of gain? For they are certainly not those whom we have already mentioned, who expect to be enriched from things which they know are of no value. And thus, O wonderful man, according to what you say, no one is a lover of gain.

Hip. But I, Socrates, wish to say, that those are lovers of gain, who, through insatiable avidity, transcendently aspire after things very small and trifling, and which are of no value, and this for the sake of gain.

Soc. But certainly, O best of men, they do not act in this manner, knowing that they are things of no worth; for we have granted that this is impossible.

Hip. So it appears to me.

Soc. If, therefore, they do not act in this manner knowingly, it is evident that their conduct must be the effect of ignorance; the consequence of thinking that things which are of no worth are highly valuable.

Hip. It appears so.

Soc. Do the lovers of gain, love any thing else than gain?

Hip. Nothing else.

Soc. But do you say that gain is contrary to loss?

Hip. I do.

Soc. Is it therefore good to any one to suffer a loss?

Hip. To no one.

Soc. Is it then an evil?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Are men, therefore, injured by loss?

Hip. They are injured.

Soc. Is then loss an evil?

Hip. It is.

Soc. And is gain contrary to loss?

Hip. Contrary.
Soc. Is gain therefore good?

Hip. It is.

Soc. Do you, therefore, call those that love good, lovers of gain?

Hip. So it seems.

Soc. You do not then, my friend, call the lovers of gain insane persons.

But with respect to yourself, whether do you love that which is good, or do not love it?

Hip. I love it.

Soc. Is there a certain good which you do not love, but a certain evil which you do?

Hip. By Jupiter, there is not.

Soc. But you love all good things equally.

Hip. I do.

Soc. Ask me, if I also do not. For I also shall acknowledge to you, that I love things good. But besides I and you, do not all other men appear to you to love things good, and hate such as are evil?

Hip. To me it appears so.

Soc. But have we not acknowledged that gain is good?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. After this manner, therefore, all lovers of gain appear; but according to that mode which we before mentioned, no one was a lover of gain. By employing which of these two, then, shall we not err?

Hip. If any one, Socrates, rightly apprehends what a lover of gain is, I think he will rightly consider him to be a character of this kind, who earnestly applies himself to the acquisition of wealth, and thinks it worth while to enrich himself from those things from which good men never dare to enrich themselves.

Soc. But do you not see, O sweetest of men, that we just now acknowledged that to be enriched is to be benefited?

Hip. But what then?

Soc. Because this also we previously admitted, that all men always aspired after things good.

Hip. We did.

Soc. Will not, therefore, good men wish to possess every thing lucrative, since every thing lucrative is good?
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Hip. But they will not, Socrates, desire things lucrative, by which they may be injured.

Soc. Do you say that to be injured, is to suffer a loss, or that it is something else?

Hip. I say it is no other than to suffer a loss.

Soc. Do you say that to be injured, is to suffer a loss, or that it is something else?

Hip. Through both. For they suffer a loss through loss, and through base gain.

Soc. Does it therefore appear to you that any thing useful and good is base?

Hip. It does not.

Soc. Did we not then, a little before this, acknowledge that gain is contrary to loss, which is an evil?

Hip. We did.

Soc. And that being contrary to evil, it is good?

Hip. We granted this.

Soc. You see therefore that you endeavour to deceive me, and that you designedly assert the contrary to that which we just now granted.

Hip. I do not, by Jupiter, Socrates: but, on the contrary, you deceive me; and I do not know how it is, but in your discourse you turn all things upwards and downwards.

Soc. Good words, I beseech you. For indeed I should not act well, if I were not persuaded by a good and wise man.

Hip. Who is he? and to what purpose is this?

Soc. My fellow citizen, and likewise yours, Hipparchus the son of the Philedenic Pisistratus, and the eldest and wisest of the sons of Pisistratus. This man, besides exhibiting many other illustrious works of wisdom, was the first that introduced into this land the writings of Homer, and compelled the rhapsodists to recite them in the Panathenaia, alternately, and in order, just as you know they do at present. He likewise brought back Anacreon, who was sent to Teium, in a ship of fifty oars: and always had about him Simonides of Chius; persuading him to reside with him, by great rewards and gifts. He did these things, wishing to persuade his citizens, that thus he might rule over the best of men; thinking, that it was not proper to

envy
envy any man the possession of wisdom, and this because he himself was a worthy and good man. As, therefore, his fellow citizens were well educated men, and admired him for his wisdom, he likewise endeavoured to instruct the husbandmen, and in order to this, placed Hermæ for them in the roads, in the middle of the city, and in each of the towns. Afterwards, from this wisdom of his, which he partly learned, and partly himself discovered, selecting such things as he thought were the wisest, he inscribed them in an elegy, and inscribed this work, his poems, and specimens of wisdom. This he did, in the first place, that his citizens might not admire those wise inscriptions in the temple of Delphi, “Know thyself,” “Nothing too much,” and the rest of this kind, but that they might think the words of Hipparchus were to be preferred for wisdom to these: and, in the next place, that by everywhere reading and receiving a taste of his wisdom, they might come from the fields, and be instructed in the other branches of learning. But there are two epigrams, one on the left hand part of each of the Hermæ, in which, according to the inscription, Hermes says, that the column should stand in the middle of the city, and the people; and the other on the right hand part; which was thus inscribed: “This monument was raised by Hipparchus—Persist in paying attention to justice.” There are also many other beautiful inscriptions, on other Hermæ; and the following is to be seen in the Stiriac road: “This monument was raised by Hipparchus—Do not deceive your friend.” Therefore, being your friend, dare not deceive you, and oppose the mandate of so great a man; after whose death, the Athenians were under tyrannic subjection to his brother Hippias. And you must have heard from all old men, that there never was a tyranny in Athens till these three years past, and that during every other time, the Athenians lived somewhat nearly after the same manner, as when Saturn reigned. But it is said by more elegant men, that he did not die in the way which the multitude report, viz. through the ignominy of his sister Canephoria; (for it is absurd to suppose that this was the case;) but that Harmodius was beloved and instructed by Aristogiton, who valued himself very highly on this account, and thought that Hipparchus would be his antagonist. But at that time it happened that Harmodius was the lover of a certain noble and beautiful youth, whose name I have heard, but do not at present remember. This young
young man then at first admired Harmodius and Aristogiton, as wise men, but afterwards associating with Hipparchus, he despised them; and they being very much afflicted with the disgrace, slew Hipparchus.

Hipparchus: You appear, therefore, Socrates, either not to consider me as a friend; or, if you do think me a friend, not to be persuaded by Hipparchus: for I do not know how to persuade myself that you have not deceived me in the preceding discourse.

Socrates: But indeed, just as in the game of chess, I am willing to retract whatever you please, that you may not think I have deceived you. Whether therefore shall I retract this assertion for you, that all men desire good?

Hipparchus: Not for me.

Socrates: Shall I retract this then, that neither to sustain a loss, nor a loss itself, is an evil?

Hipparchus: Not for me.

Socrates: Shall I retract this then, that gain, and to acquire gain, are contrary to loss, and to suffer a loss?

Hipparchus: Nor this neither.

Socrates: Shall I retract this assertion, that to acquire gain, as being contrary to evil, is good?

Hipparchus: You shall not retract any thing of this.

Socrates: It appears to you, therefore, as it seems, that of gain one part is good, and another part evil.

Hipparchus: To me it does appear so.

Socrates: I will therefore retract this for you. For let it be that one kind of gain is good, and another kind evil: but gain itself is not more good than evil. For is it?

Hipparchus: Why do you ask me?

Socrates: I will tell you. Is there good, and is there likewise bad, food?

Hipparchus: Yes.

Socrates: Is therefore one of them more food than the other? or are both of them similarly food? and does the one in no respect differ from the other, so far as each is food, but so far as one is good, and the other bad?

Hipparchus: Yes.

Socrates: And does it not likewise follow with respect to drink, and all other things which participate of the good and the bad, that they differ in no
respect from each other, in that in which they are the same? Just as with respect to our own species, one man is good, and another bad.

HIP. Yes.

Soc. But with respect to men, I think that one man is neither more nor less a man than another, neither the good than the bad, nor the bad than the good.

HIP. True.

Soc. Must we not therefore think in the same manner respecting gain, that both the good and the bad are similarly gain?

HIP. It is necessary.

Soc. He, therefore, who possefses good gain, is not in any respect more enriched than he who possefses bad gain: for we have granted that neither of these appears to be more gain than the other.

HIP. True.

Soc. For neither the more nor the less is present to either of these.

HIP. It is not.

Soc. But how can any one do, or suffer, more or less with respect to a thing to which neither of these pertains?

HIP. It is impossible.

Soc. Since, therefore, both are similarly gain and lucrative, it is requisite that we should still further consider this; on what account you call both of them gain, and what it is that you discover to be in both the same. Just as if you should ask me why I just now called both good and bad food similarly food, I should say, It is because each is a dry aliment of the body. And this you will also grant. Or will you not?

HIP. Yes.

Soc. And there will be the same mode of answering respecting drink, that we give this appellation to the moist aliment of the body, whether it is good or bad: and the reply in other things will be similar. Do you, therefore, endeavour to imitate me, by answering as follows. You say with respect to good and bad gain, that each of them is gain. What same thing is it then which, perceiving in these, you denominate gain? But if you are not able to answer me this question, attend to what I am now going to say. Do you then call every possession which any one obtains gain, when he either spends nothing, or receives more than he spends?
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**Hip.** It appears to me that this should be called gain.

**Soc.** Do you, therefore, thus denominate such things as follow: If any one at a feast should spend nothing, but when satiated should become diseased?

**Hip.** Not I, by Jupiter.

**Soc.** But if he should obtain health from feasting, would he acquire gain, or suffer a loss?

**Hip.** He would acquire gain.

**Soc.** This, therefore, is not gain, to acquire any kind of possession whatever.

**Hip.** It is not.

**Soc.** Does it therefore follow that gain is not to be acquired from every kind of possession, whether it be good or bad?

**Hip.** It appears so.

**Soc.** And does it likewise follow that loss will not be sustained from every thing, whether it be good or bad?

**Hip.** To me it appears so.

**Soc.** Do you, therefore, perceive how you again revolve to the same thing? For gain appears to be good, but loss evil.

**Hip.** I am dubious what to say.

**Soc.** And this not unjustly. But still further, answer me this: If any one obtains more than he spends, do you say that this is gain?

**Hip.** I do, if his gain is not base, but he receives more than he spends, either of gold or silver.

**Soc.** And I shall also ask you this: If any one, spending half a pound of gold, should receive double this weight of silver, would he be a gainer, or a loyer?

**Hip.** A loyer, certainly, Socrates: for he would only receive half the value of what he spent.

**Soc.** But yet he would receive more. Or is not double more than half?

**Hip.** But silver is not of the same value as gold.

**Soc.** It is requisite therefore, as it seems, to add value to gain: for in this case, though the silver is more than the gold, yet you say it is not of equal value.

**Hip.**
Hip. And very much so: for thus it is.

Soc. Value, therefore, is lucrative, whether it is small or great: but that which is without value is without gain.

Hip. It is.

Soc. Do you say that value is any other value than that which deserves to be acquired?

Hip. I do not.

Soc. But what do you call that which deserves to be acquired? The useless, or the useful.

Hip. The useful, certainly.

Soc. The useful, therefore, is good.

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Hence, O most virile of all men, have we not a third or a fourth time granted that the lucrative is good?

Hip. So it seems.

Soc. Do you remember, therefore, whence this discourse of ours originated?

Hip. I think I do.

Soc. If you do not, I will remind you. It originated from your denying that good men would be willing to acquire every kind of gain, but that they would wish to possess good, and not base gain.

Hip. It did originate from this.

Soc. But did not our discourse compel us to acknowledge, that all kinds of gain, both small and great, are good?

Hip. It did compel, Socrates, rather than persuade me.

Soc. But perhaps, after this, it will also persuade you. Now, however, whether you are persuaded, or in whatever manner you may be affected, do you agree with us, that all gain is good, both small and great?

Hip. I do.

Soc. And do you agree with me, or not, that all good men aspire after all things that are good?

Hip. I do.

Soc. But you said that bad men love gain of every kind, both small and great.
HIP. I did say so.
Soc. According to your assertion, therefore, all men will be lovers of gain, both good and bad men.
HIP. It appears so.
Soc. No one, therefore, who blames the love of gain will blame rightly, since he who does so is himself also a lover of gain.