THE EUTHYDEMUS:

A DIALOGUE

EXPOSING

THE VAIN TRIFLING OF THE SOPHISTS.
INTRODUCTION

TO

THE EUTHYDEMUS.

PLATO, in the following Dialogue, has given an illustrious specimen of that philanthropy, which he often displays in his other dialogues. For he here studies to avert the reader from the vain trifles of the sophists, by showing that these men, even when they discuss the most weighty subjects, jest and delude the expectation of the hearers. Both in this Dialogue, however, and elsewhere, he describes these men to be curious and vain disputants in verbal altercation, and prompt to refute whatever may be said, whether it be true or false. And, in the first place, indeed, he shows how avaricious the genius of the sophists is, since the brother sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, are prepared to teach for money the military art, in which they boast, and which no one ever sold. In the next place, how ambitious, since they at the same time profess judicial together with military skill, and together with both the sophistic art, though all these widely differ from each other. In the third place, how vain; since, though now old men, they betake themselves from things to words, and from the study of truth to falsehood. And, in the fourth place, how despicable; since, in a short time, any one may become a proficient in this cavilling art.

In the course of this Dialogue, Soocrates, with a most facetious irony, beseeches the sophists, that after jesting they would come to serious concerns; and he proposes a certain formula, conformable to which, as a pattern, he hopes to receive from them an exhortation to philosophy. In this formula he first defines felicity, by a common conception, to be living well. Afterwards
wards he proves that this living well consists either in obtaining things agreeable to the will, or in the right use of the things themselves. And he concludes that wisdom alone renders its possessors blessed, since it alone obtains what is agreeable to the will, and rightly uses what it obtains. In the course of the argument an illustrious dogma presents itself to the view, and which afterwards became the foundation of the Stoic philosophy, viz. that things external and corporeal ought rather to be called indifferent and common, than good or evil; and that wisdom is properly good, and folly properly evil: since through the former we partake of every good, and through the latter of every evil. But that all the power of felicity consists in wisdom, the three appellations of felicity, instituted by the antient authors of the Greek language, sufficiently evince, viz. εὐδαιμονία, εὐτυχία, εὐπραγία, eudaimonia, eutuchia, eupragia. For the first of these appellations signifies the knowledge of good; the second, the attainment of it; and the third, the use of it; all which are accomplished for us by wisdom.

Near the conclusion of this Dialogue, the artificial, polite, facetious, and elegant irony of Socrates collects the reprehension of sophistick cavilling into three heads. First, that the most worthy men despise trifles of this kind. Secondly, that the sophisms confute themselves. And thirdly, that even boys might acquire this most trifling artifice in the space of two days. Soon after this, he descends from the sophist to the rhetorician, for each of these falsely professes political virtue, as we learn from the Gorgias. And he shows that rhetoricians, while they profess themselves to be both politicians and philosophers, are perfectly useless for the purposes of either.

I only add, that this Dialogue appears to have been justly ranked by the antients among those of the anatrepptic, or subversive character, and that it belongs to that energy of Plato's dialectic, which, as we have already observed in the Introduction to the Parmenides, consists in confuting false opinions.
THE EUTHYDEMUS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CRITO, || DIONYSODORUS,
SOCRATES, || CLINIAS,
[EUTHYDEMUS, || CTESSIPUS.]

Crito.

With whom, Socrates, did you yesterday converse in the Lyceum? For you were surrounded with so great a crowd, that though I approached, desirous to hear, yet I could not hear any thing clearly. I raised myself indeed on my feet that I might see more distinctly, and it appeared to me that it was a certain stranger with whom you were conversing. Who was this stranger?

Soc. You must ask, Crito, which of them it was; for not one only, but two were present.

Crito. He, of whom I speak, sat the third from your right hand; but in the middle of you was a lad, the son of Axiochus, who appeared to me, Socrates, to have made a great proficiency in learning, and who does not

1 I have followed Dr. Routh, in his excellent edition of this Dialogue, in including the names of Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Clinias, and Ctesippus, in brackets, because, as he justly observes, these persons do not speak, but the disputation is delivered, as if the thing were narrated, and not acted.

2 The name of this youth was Clinias, at whose request Socrates, together with Axiochus, in a dialogue of that name, which is generally ascribed to Eschines, disputes against the fear of death.
much differ in age from our Critobulus; though he indeed is very slender; but this lad looks older than he is, and is of a fair and engaging aspect.

Soc. It is Euthydemus, Socrates, of whom you inquire; but he who sat with me, on my left hand, was his brother Dionysodorus, who also partook of the discourse.

Crit. I know neither of them, Socrates.

Soc. They are recent sophists, as it appears.

Crit. Whence do they come; and what is the wisdom which they profess?

Soc. They are, I think, natives of Chius, but they migrated to the Thurians, and flying from thence, dwelt for many years about these places. But in answer to your inquiry respecting their wisdom, they are indeed very wise, Crito; but I have been hitherto ignorant that they were pancratists: for they are skilled in every kind of contest, not after the manner of those brother pancratists of Acarnania; since they are only able to contend with the body; but these, in the first place, are most powerful in body, and excel in that contest which consists in vanquishing all men. For they are very skilful in contending with arms, and they know how to impart this skill to another who gives them a reward for it. In the next place, they are most powerful in judicial contests, and are able both to contend themselves, and instruct others, to deliver and compose forensic orations. At first, therefore, they were only skilled in these things, but now they have carried the pancraticastic art to its utmost perfection: for they are now so skilled in that kind of contest, which it remained for them to acquire; that no one is able to resist them; so skilful are they become in verbal contention, and in always confusing whatever is said, whether it be true or false. I therefore, Crito,

1 Xenophon often makes mention of this person, and sometimes Plato. He was the friend of Clinias, and was a youth of admirable beauty. Vid. Xen. Sympof. p. 882. ed. Leunclav. See also more concerning this son of Crito near the end of the Dialogue.

2 Thurii, or Thurium, was a town of Magna Graecia, situated between the rivers Sybaris and Crathis.

3 Others of the ancient sophists also were banished from Grecian cities, as we learn from Philostratus and others who have written their lives.

4 These sophists were not in reality skilled in the pancratium; but Socrates says this ironically of them, because they pretended to possess universal skill in controversy.
intend to deliver myself to these men: for they say that, in a short time, they can render another person skilled in the same things.

Crito. But are you not afraid, Socrates, that you are too old for this purpose?

Soc. By no means, Crito, as I have a sufficient argument and remedy against fear: for these very men, as I may say, who are now old, have entered on the study of this wisdom, which I desire, viz. the art of contending. For last year, or the year before last, they were not in the least skilled in this art. But I am only afraid of one thing, lest I should be a disgrace to these strangers, in the same manner as I am to Connus the harper, the son of Metrobius, who even now teaches me to play on the harp. The boys, therefore, who are my fellow disciples, on seeing me, laugh, and call Connus the preceptor of old men. Left therefore some one should reproach these strangers with the same thing, and they dreading this should be unwilling to receive me, I have, Crito, persuaded other elderly men to attend me thither as my fellow disciples, and here also I am persuading others to accompany me. Do you also join us. Perhaps too, as an allurement, we may bring your sons to them: for, in consequence of desiring to have them as their pupils, I know that they will also instruct us.

Crito. Nothing hinders, Socrates, if you are so disposed. But, in the first place, tell me what this wisdom of these men is, that I may also know what it is which we shall learn.

Soc. You will be disappointed, if you think that I am not able to tell you as if I did not attend to them. For I paid great attention, and very well remember what they said: and I will endeavour to relate the whole to you from the beginning. For, by a certain divine allotment, I had seated myself where you saw me, alone, in the Apodyterium: and I then intended to have risen; but as I was about to rise, the daemon gave me the accustomed signal. I again therefore sat down, and soon after Euthydemus and Dionysodorus entered, and, together with these, many others, who appeared to me to be their disciples; and having entered, they walked in the covered porch of the Gymnasium. But they had not yet walked twice or thrice round this place, when Clinias entered, who you say has made a great proficiency, and

1 That part of the Gymnasium, in which those who washed or exercised put off their clothes.
2 In this place the athletes were exercised in the winter.
THE EUTHYDEMUS;

in so saying you speak the truth. Behind him there were many lovers and others, and besides these Ctesippus, a Pæanean youth, very beautiful and naturally very worthy, but wanton in consequence of his youth. Clinias, therefore, as soon as he entered, seeing me sitting alone, came towards me, and sat down on my right hand, as you say. Dionyfodorus and Euthydemus perceiving him, at first stopped and conversed with each other, occasionally looking at us: for I beheld them very attentively. Afterwards approaching nearer, they sat down, Euthydemus indeed by the lad, but Dionyfodorus by me, on my left hand. The rest seated themselves just as it happened. These therefore I saluted, because I had not seen them for some time. After this, I said to Clinias, These men, Euthydemus and Dionyfodorus, O Clinias, are not wise in small, but in great things. For they are skilled in every thing pertaining to war, in all that a good general ought to know, and in the arrangement and management of an army. They likewise know how to render a man able to defend himself in courts of justice, when he is injured by any one. For thus speaking however they despised me, and both of them laughed, looking at each other. And Euthydemus indeed said, We no longer engage in these matters seriously, Socrates, but incidentally. And I being surprised said, Your pursuit must indeed be beautiful, if such great affairs are with you incidental. And, by the gods, inform me, what this beautiful study is.—We are of opinion, said he, Socrates, that we are able to teach virtue in the best manner, and with the greatest celerity of all men. —O Jupiter! I replied, what a mighty thing do you announce. Whence was this gain derived? I indeed had hitherto conceived respecting you, as I just now said, that you were very skilful in military contests; and this I had asserted to others. For when you first came hither, I remember that you announced this. But now, if in reality you possess this science, be propitious. For indeed I invoke you, as if you were gods, entreat ing you to pardon what I have before said. But see, Euthydemus and Dionyfodorus, if you have spoken the truth: for it is by no means wonderful if the magnitude of the promise should occasion disbelief.—Be assured, Socrates, that it is so, was the answer.—I therefore consider you as much more blessed through this possession, than the great king through his dominion. Thus

* He was one of those that were present at the death of Socrates. See the Phaedo.
much however inform me, whether you intend to exhibit this wisdom, or how have you determined to act.—We came hither, Socrates, for this very purpose, to demonstrate and to teach, if any one is willing to learn.—But that all men who do not possess wisdom are willing to learn, I readily admit: for, in the first place, I myself am willing, and, in the next place, Clinas here; and besides these Ctesippus, and all the rest that you see, pointing out to him the lovers of Clinas, by whom we were then surrounded: for Ctesippus at that time happened to be sitting at a considerable distance from Clinas. And as it appeared to me, Euthydemus, while he was discoursing with me, prevented, by the inclination of his body, Ctesippus from seeing Clinas, who was seated in the middle of us. Ctesippus therefore wishing to see his familiar, and at the same time being anxious to hear what was said, was the first that rose, and stood opposite to me. Afterwards the rest seeing him, stood round us, viz. the lovers of Clinas, and the companions of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. I therefore introducing these to Euthydemus, informed him that they were all ready to learn. And Ctesippus indeed, and the rest, very readily assented; and all of them in common exhorted him to exhibit the power of his wisdom. I therefore said, O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, these persons must by all means be gratified, and you must exhibit your wisdom to them for my sake. And it is evident indeed, that to demonstrate most things pertaining to this subject will be no small labour; but inform me whether you are able to make him alone a good man, who is already persuaded that he ought to be instructed by you, or him also, who is not yet persuaded in consequence of not believing that virtue is a thing to be taught, or that you are the teachers of it: for, it is the business of the same art, to persuade a man thus affected, that virtue may be taught, and that you are capable of teaching it in the best manner. Or is it not?—It is the business, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, of the same art.—You therefore, I replied, O Dionysodorus, can in the best manner, of all the men that now exist, exhort to philosophy and the study of virtue. Is it not so?—We think we can, Socrates.—Of other things, therefore, I said, you will afterwards give us the demonstration, but of this now: and you will persuade this youth that he ought to philosophize, and study virtue; and in so doing you will oblige me, and all that are present: for it so happens that both I, and all these, are desirous that this lad may become the best of men. He is the son of
of Axiochus, who descended from the ancient Alcibiades, and the cousin of
the now-existing Alcibiades; and his name is Clinias. But he is young,
and we are fearful, as it is likely we should be concerning one of his age,
left some one previous to our endeavours should turn his dianoetic part to
another study, and thus corrupt it. You therefore are very opportunely
come: and if it is the same thing to you, make trial of the lad, and discourse
with him before us.—When I had thus nearly said these things, Euthydemus
boldly, and at the same time confidently, replied. It makes no difference,
Socrates, if the lad is but willing to answer.—But indeed, I replied, he is
accustomed to do this. For these frequently meeting together ask many
questions, and discourse much with each other; so that it is likely that he
will answer with confidence.

But how, O Crito, shall I disclose to you, in a proper manner, what
follows? For it is no trifling labour to narrate such immense wisdom. So
that I, after the manner of the poets, in beginning this narration, find it
necessary to invoke the Muses and Mnemosyne. Euthydemus, therefore,
as I think, began after this manner.—Whether, O Clinias, are those men
that learn, wise or unwise?—And the lad through the magnitude of the
question blushed, and being dubious, looked at me. But I, perceiving his
perturbation, said, Be confident, Clinias, and boldly answer what appears to
you to be the truth: for perhaps the greatest advantage will thence ensue.
Upon this Dionyiodorus whispering in my ear, and smiling, Indeed, Socrates,
said he, I predict that in whatever manner the lad may answer he will be
confuted. However, while he was thus speaking, Clinias happened to
answer, so that it was not possible for me to admonish the lad any further.
But he answered, that those that learnt were wise men. Euthydemus,
therefore, said, Do you admit that there are certain teachers, or not?—He
admitted that there are.—Are not therefore preceptors the preceptors of
those that learn? As, for instance, a harper and a grammarian, were the
preceptors of you and other boys, but you were their disciples.—He assented
to this.—When you learned, therefore, were you not ignorant of these things
which you learned?—Yes.—Were you, therefore, wise, when you were
ignorant of these things?—By no means.—If, therefore, you were not wise,
were you not ignorant?—Entirely so.—You therefore, when learning things
of which you had no knowledge, learned them being ignorant?—The lad
assented
affented to this.—The ignorant therefore learn, O Clinias, and not the wise, as you thought.—On his speaking in this manner, just like a choir, on a signal given by the master, the followers of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus loudly applauded what was said and laughed. And before the lad could well take breath, Dionysodorus said to him, But what, Clinias, when the grammarian recites, whether are the boys who learn what he recites, wise, or unwise?—They are wise, said Clinias.—The wise therefore learn, and not the ignorant; and consequently you did not rightly just now answer Euthydemus.—But on this, the lovers of these men more loudly laughed and applauded, admiring the wisdom of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus; but the rest of us being astonished were silent. Euthydemus, therefore, perceiving our astonishment, that we might yet still more admire him, did not dismiss the lad, but further interrogated him; and, after the manner of skilful dancers, turned twofold inquiries about the same thing. For, said he, whether do those who learn, learn the things which they know, or things which they do not know? And again Dionysodorus said to me whispering, This also, Socrates, is just such another question as the former.—By Jupiter, said I, the former question appeared to me to be beautiful.—We always ask, said he, Socrates, such like inevitable questions.—You appear therefore to me, said I, to possess a great reputation among your disciples. In the mean time Clinias answered, Euthydemus, that those who learn, learn that of which they are ignorant. And Euthydemus interrogated him as before—Do you not, said he, know your letters?—I do.—Do you not, therefore, know all of them?—He acknowledged that he did.—When therefore any one recites, does he not recite letters?—He confessed it.—Hence, said he, he recites things which you know, since you know all the letters.—This also he acknowledged.—What then? he replied, Do you not learn that which some one recites?—Yes.—But do you learn, not knowing your letters?—I do not, he replied, but I learn in consequence of knowing them.—Do you not therefore learn the things which you know, since you know all the letters?—He acknowledged that he did.—Hence, said he, you have not answered rightly.—Euthydemus had scarcely thus spoken, when Dionysodorus, taking up the discourse as if it had been a ball, again aimed at the lad as a mark, and said, Euthydemus deceives you, O Clinias. For tell me, is not to learn, to receive the science of that which any one learns?—Clinias assented.—But, he replied, is to know.
know scientifically any thing else than to possess science when thus knowing?—He granted it was nothing else.—Not to know scientifically, therefore, is not yet to possess science.—He assented to this.—Whether, therefore, are those that receive any thing, those who now possess it, or those who do not possess it?—Those who do not possess it.—Have you not then confessed that those who have not scientific knowledge, are among the number of those who do not possess?—He acknowledged that he had.—Those that learn, therefore, belong to those that receive, and not to those that possess.—He granted it.—Those therefore, said he, Clinias, learn who have not a scientific knowledge, and not those who have. After this, again wrestling as it were the third time, Euthydemus attacked the youth. But I, seeing the merged condition of the lad, and willing to give him some respite, lest he should be afraid of us, said, in order to console him, Do not wonder, Clinias, if these discourses appear to you to be unusual; for perhaps you do not perceive the intention of these strangers. They act however in the same manner as those in the mysteries of the Corybantes, when they place him whom they are about to initiate on a throne: for there also there are dancing and sports, as you know, if you have been initiated in these mysteries. And now they do nothing else than dance, and as it were sportively leap round, as if after this they would initiate you. Now therefore think that you have heard the first part of sophistical sacred rites. For, in the first place, as Prodicus says, it is necessary to learn the proper signification of names; which these strangers also have indicated to you, because you have not perceived that men employ the verb to learn in a thing of this kind, when any one, at first possessing no science concerning a certain thing, afterwards receives the science of that thing. They also employ this verb, when any one now possessing science, considers this very thing by this same science, either while the thing is effected or while it is enunciated. Or they rather call this to apprehend than to learn.

* The Curites are gods of an unpolluted guardian character, and first subsist in that order of gods which is called by the Chaldaean theologians ἱερός, intellectual. The Corybantes, who form the guardian triad of supermundane gods, are analogous to these. Those that were initiated in the mysteries of the Corybantes were insanely and enibysiastically moved, as we learn from the Lexicon of Timæus. When he who was about to be initiated in the mysteries of these, or any other gods, was invested with a sacred and mystic dress, he was placed in a solemn manner on a throne, while in the mean time the other mystics danced round him. This ceremony was called θησαυρός.
THE EUTHYDEMUS.

though sometimes they call it to learn. But of this, as they indicate, you are ignorant, viz. that the same name pertains to men affected in a contrary manner, viz. with respect to him who knows, and him who is ignorant. Similar to this is that which took place in the second question, in which they asked you, whether men learn things which they know, or things of which they are ignorant. These indeed are the sports of disciplines: on which account I say that these men play with you. But I use the word play on this account, because, though some one should learn many, or all such particulars as these, yet he would not be in any respect wiser with respect to the manner in which things subsist. However, he may sport with men, by supplanting and subverting what they assert, through the difference of names; just as they who draw away the seats from those that are going to sit down rejoice and laugh when they see him whom they have overturned supine. Consider therefore what has happened to you from these men as sport; but what follows will be exhibited to you by them as serious concerns: and I will show them the way that they may fulfill their promise to me. For they promise to exhibit their exhortatory wisdom: but now, as it appears to me, they have thought it was requisite first to sport with you.

Thus far therefore, O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, you have sported, and perhaps sufficiently: but in the next place show, exhorting the lad, in what manner it is requisite to pay attention to wisdom and virtue. First of all, however, I will indicate to you my conceptions on this affair, and what I desire to hear concerning it. If, therefore, I shall appear to you to do this, in a foolish and ridiculous manner, do not deride me: for, through a desire of hearing your wisdom, I will venture for a time to speak before you. Endure therefore to hear me, both you and your disciples, without laughing: but do you, O son of Axiochus, answer me.—Do we not all then wish to do well? Or is this question, of which we were just now afraid, one among those that are ridiculous? For indeed, it is stupid to ask questions of this kind. For who is there that does not wish to do well?—No one, said Clinias.—Be it so, said I.—But in the next place, since we wish to do well, in what manner shall we be able to accomplish this? Shall we say, by having many good things? Or is this answer still more stupid than the former? For it is evident that this also must be the case.—He assented.—But come, what are the things which are good to us? Or does it appear to be
be a thing neither difficult, nor the province of a venerable man, to discover this? For every one will tell us that it is good to be rich. Will they not?—Certainly, said he.—And is it not also good to be in health, to be beautiful, and to be sufficiently furnished with other things pertaining to the body?—So it appeared to him.—But nobility also, power, and honours, in one's own city, are also good.—He granted that they were.—What then, said I, yet remains for us among things good? What is it to be temperate, just, and brave? Whether, by Jupiter, Clinias, do you think that, if we consider these things as good, we shall consider them properly? Or that this will be the case if we consider them not as good? For perhaps this may be disputed by some one. But how does it appear to you?—That these things are good, said Clinias.—Be it so, said I; but in what choir shall we place wisdom? Among things good? Or how do you say?—Among things good.—But consider, left among things good, we should omit any one which is worthy to be related.—But, said Clinias, it appears to me that we have not omitted any one.—However, I then recollecting, said, But, by Jupiter, we appear to have omitted the greatest of goods.—What is that? said he.—Felicity, O Clinias, which all men, and even those that are perfectly depraved, assert to be the greatest of goods.—What you say is true, said he.—And I again, correcting myself, said, We have nearly, O son of Axiochus, rendered ourselves ridiculous to these strangers.—Why so? said he.—Because, having placed felicity in the things which we before enumerated, we now again speak concerning it.—But why is this improper?—Because it is certainly ridiculous again to adduce that which was formerly proposed, and to say the same things twice.—How do you mean? said he.—Wisdom, I replied, is certainly felicity: this even a boy knows.—He indeed wondered, so young and simple was he. And I perceiving his admiration, said, Do you not know, Clinias, that in performing well on the pipe, pipers are most happy?—He granted that they were.—Are not therefore, said I, grammarians also most happy in the writing and reading of letters?—Entirely so.—But what? In dangers of the sea, do you think that any in short are more happy than wise pilots?—Certainly not.—Again: In battle,
with which will you more pleasantly partake of danger and fortune? with a wife, or with an ignorant general?—With a wife general.—And when you are dangerously ill, with which will you be more pleasantly circumstanced? with a wife, or with an ignorant physician?—With a wife physician.—Is it not therefore, said I, because you think that you will act more prosperously, by acting with one wife, than with one unwife?—He granted it.—Wisdom, therefore, every where, renders men happy. For certainly no one can ever err through wisdom; but it is necessary that through this he should act rightly, and obtain his end: for otherwise it would not be wisdom.—At length, but I do not know how, we summarily agreed that this was the case; viz. that when wisdom is present, nothing of felicity is wanting.

After we had agreed in this particular, I again asked him how we should be affected with relation to the things which we had formerly granted. For, said I, we granted that if many good things were present with us we should be happy, and act well.—He assented to this.—Whether, therefore, should we be happy through present good, if it were of no advantage to us, or if it benefited us?—If it benefited us, said he.—Would then any thing benefit us, if we alone possessed it, but did not use it? As, for instance, if we possessed much food, but did not eat it, or drink, but did not drink it, should we in any respect be benefited by this?—Certainly not, said he.—But what? If all artificers had every thing requisite prepared for them, each for his own work, but did not use them when thus procured, would they act well through the possession of these, viz. merely because they possessed every thing which an artificer ought to possess? Thus, for instance, if a carpenter had all kinds of instruments and wood prepared for him sufficient for his purpose, but yet should fashion nothing, would he derive any advantage from this possession?—By no means, said he.—But what? If any one should possess riches, and all such things as we now denominate good, but should not use them, would he be happy through the possession of these goods?—He certainly would not, Socrates.—It is necessary therefore, said I, as it seems, that he who intends to be happy should not only possess good things of this kind, but should likewise use them.—What you say is true.—Is not therefore, O Clinias, the possession and the use of good, sufficient to make any one happy?—It appears so to me.—Whether, I replied, if any one uses good things properly, or if he does not?—If he uses them properly.—You speak well,
THE EUTHYDEMUS.

well, said I. For I think that the improper use of a thing is worse than the neglect of it. For the former is vicious, but the latter is neither good nor bad. Or do we not say so?—He assented.—What then? In the operation and use pertaining to wood, is there any thing else which produces a right use than the tectonic science?—Certainly not, said he.—Perhaps also, in producing proper apparatus, it is science which produces with readiness.—He granted that it was.—Whether therefore, said I, with respect to the use of those goods which we first mentioned, viz. riches, health, and beauty, is it science, leading and properly directing the practice, which enables us to use every thing of this kind properly, or is it any thing else?—It is science, said he.—Science, therefore, imparts to men in every possession and action, not only felicity, as it seems, but likewise success.—He confessed that it was so.

Is there then, said I, by Jupiter, any advantage to be derived from other possessions, without prudence and wisdom? Or will a man be benefited who possesses many things, and performs many actions, but without intellect? Or rather will not this be the case, if he possesses and performs but a few things, but is endued with intellect? However, consider thus. Will he not by doing less, err less? And erring less, will he not act less improperly? And acting less improperly, will he not be less miserable?—Entirely so, said he.—Whether, therefore, will he rather perform fewer things being poor, than being rich?—Being poor, said he.—But whether if he is weak or strong?—If he is weak.—Whether also, if he is honoured, or dishonoured?—If dishonoured.—But whether, if he is brave and temperate, will he do less, or if he is timid?—If he is timid.—Will not this then also be the case, if he is indolent rather than if he is active?—He granted that it would.—And if he is slow rather than if he is quick? And if his sight and hearing are blunt rather than if they are sharp?—In every thing of this kind we agreed with each other.—But in short, said I, O Clinias, it appears that, with respect to all those things which we first asserted to be good, the discourse about them is not that they are naturally essentially good, but, as it seems, that they subsist in the following manner; viz. that if they are under the guidance of ignorance, they are greater evils than their contraries, by how much the more capable they are of becoming subservient to that evil leader; but that if they are led by prudence and wisdom, they are greater goods; but that neither of them, when they are considered by themselves, is of any worth.—It appears, said he,
to be as you say.—What then happens to us, from what has been said? Is it any thing else than this, that no one of other things is either good or evil? But these being two, that wisdom is good, and ignorance evil?—He assented.

Further still then, said I, let us consider what remains. Since we all of us strive to be happy, and we appear to become such from using things, and from using them rightly, but science affords rectitude and success, it is requisite, as it seems, that every man should by all possible means endeavour to become most wise. Is it not so?—It is, said he.—And he should think that he ought to receive this from his father, his tutors, his friends, and from others who profess themselves to be his lovers, much more than wealth, and should request and suppliantly implore strangers and his fellow citizens to impart wisdom. Nor is it in any respect base or reprehensible, O Clinias, for the sake of this, to be obsequious and subservient both to a lover and to every man, willingly obeying him in worthy services, through an ardent desire of becoming wise. Or does it not appear so to you? said I.—You entirely, said he, appear to me to speak well.—If, said I, Clinias, wisdom can but be taught, and does not casually subsist among men. For this is yet to be considered by us, and has not yet been assented to by me and you.—But to me, said he, Socrates, it appears that it can be taught.—And I, being delighted, said, You speak beautifully, O best of men, and you have done well in liberating me from a long speculation about this very thing, whether wisdom can, or cannot be taught. Now, therefore, since it appears to you that it can be taught, and that it is the only thing which can make a man happy and prosperous, do you say any thing else than that it is necessary to philosophize? And is it your intention to do this?—Entirely so, said he, Socrates, as much as possible.—And I, rejoicing to hear these things, said, My example, O Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, of exhortatory discourses, such as I desired it to be, is of this kind; vulgar perhaps and scarcely unfolded by a multitude of words: but let whichever of you is willing, considering this very thing according to art, render it apparent to us. But if you are unwilling to do this, point out to the lad what follows, from that part in which my discourse ended, viz. whether he ought to procure for himself every science, or whether there is one particular science which, when he receives, he will necessarily be happy and a good man; and what that science is. For, as I said

THE EUTHYDEMUS.
in the beginning, it is of great consequence to us that this youth should become wise and good.

I therefore, Crito, said these things; but I paid very great attention to what followed, and considered after what manner they would discourse, and whence they would begin, while they were exhorting the youth to the study of wisdom and virtue. Dionysodorus then, who was the elder of them, first began the conference. And all of us beheld him, as those who were immediately to hear certain very wonderful discourses; which indeed was the case. For the man, O Crito, began a certain admirable discourse, which it is proper you should hear, because it exhorted to virtue.—Tell me, Socrates, said he, and the rest of you who express a desire that this youth should become wise, whether you are jesting when you make this assertion, or truly and seriously desire this?—Then I perceived that they were of opinion that we had, prior to this, been jesting, when we exhorted them to converse with the youth, and that on this account they also jeested and had not discoursed seriously with him. Perceiving this therefore to be the case, I further said, that we were serious in a wonderful degree. And Dionysodorus said, See, Socrates, that you do not hereafter deny what you now assert.—I have considered this, said I: for I shall never deny what I have asserted.—What is it then, said he, that you assert? Do you wish that he should become wise?—Entirely so.—But now, said he, whether is Clinias wise or not?—Not yet, according to his own confession: and he does not, said I, speak idly.—But do you, said he, wish that he should become wise, and not be unlearned?—We acknowledged that we did.—Do you not therefore wish him to become that which he is not; and no longer to be that which he now is?—And I, on hearing this, was disturbed. But he, taking advantage of my perturbation, Since, said he, you wish him to be no longer that which he now is, you wish, as it seems, that he may perish; though those friends and lovers would certainly be but of little worth, who should be desirous above all things that the objects of their love may be destroyed. Ctesippus on hearing this was indignant, on account of his attachment to the youth, and said, O Thurian stranger, if it were not more rustic than is becoming, I should call you to an account for this assertion, and should ask you why you falsely ascribe to me and the rest a thing of this kind, which I think it is not holy to assert, viz. that I should wish that this youth might perish.
THE EUTHYDEMUS.

But what? O Ctefippus, said Euthydemus, does it appear to you, that it is possible to speak falsely?—By Jupiter, said he, it does, unless I were insane.—But whether will this be the case, when asserting a thing which is the subject of discourse, or when not asserting it.—When asserting it.—When, therefore, he asserts that thing, is it not true, that he does not speak of any thing else than that which he asserts?—For how should he do otherwise, said Ctefippus?—But that is one of the things which exist, of which he speaks, separate from others.—Entirely so.—Does he not therefore, when he speaks of that thing, speak of that which has a being?—Yes.—But he who speaks of that which is, and of beings, speaks of things which are true. So that if Dionysodorus speaks of beings, he speaks of things which are true, and according to you utters nothing false.—He does so, said he.—But he who says these things, said Ctefippus, does not speak, O Euthydemus, of beings.—To this Euthydemus replied, Are non-beings any thing else than things which are not?—They are not.—By no means, therefore, are non-beings, beings.—By no means.—Can therefore any one perform any action about these non-beings, so as to make things which in no respect are?—It does not appear to me, said Ctefippus, that he can.—What then? Do rhetoricians, when they speak to the people, perform nothing?—They do something, he replied.—If, therefore, they do something, do they not also make something? To speak then is to do and to make.—He assented.—No one therefore, said he, speaks of non-entities: for if he did, he would make something. But you acknowledge that no one can make non-entities. So that, according to you, no one can assert things which are false; but if Dionysodorus speaks, he speaks things which are true, and he speaks of beings.—By Jupiter, said Ctefippus, it is so, Euthydemus: yet he speaks of beings after a certain manner, though not as they subsist.—How do you say, Ctefippus, said Dionysodorus? Are there some who speak of things as they are?—There are indeed, said he; and these are men worthy and good, and who assert things which are true.—What then? said he. Are not things good, well, and things evil, ill-conditioned?—He granted that they were.—And do you not acknowledge that the worthy and the good speak of things as they are?—I do.—The good therefore, said he, O Ctefippus, speak of evil things evily, if they speak of them as they are.—Truly, said he, by Jupiter, they do very much so of bad men, among which, if you are persuaded
persuaded by me, you will be careful that you may not be numbered, lest the
good should speak evil of you; because you well know that the good speak
evil of the bad.—Do they not also, said Euthydemus, speak magnificently
of great men, and warmly of those that are fervent?—Very much so indeed,
said Ctesippus.—Of cold men, therefore, they speak coldly, and affirm that
they speak frigidly.—You revile, O Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, you re-
vile.—Not I, by Jupiter, said he, Dionysodorus, for I love you; but I ad-
monish you as my companion, and I endeavour to persuade you, that you
should never in my presence make such a rustic assertion, as that I wish the
destruction of those whom I very much esteem.

I therefore, as they appeared to me to conduct themselves in a rustic man-
er towards each other, jeested with Ctesippus, and said, it appears to me,
Ctesippus, that we ought to receive what is asserted by the strangers, if we wish
to impart it to others, and not contend about words. For if they know how
to destroy men in such a manner as to make them, from being depraved and
unwise, worthy and wise, whether they have discovered this themselves, or
have learnt from some other, a corruption and destruction of this kind, so that
having destroyed him who is depraved, they afterwards render him worthy;
if they know how to effect this (but it is evident that they do possess this
knowledge; for they affirm that the art of making men worthy that were
depraved, is an art which they have recently invented;) we must therefore
permit them to destroy the lad, and to make him and all the rest of us wise.
But if you young men are afraid of me, make trial of me, as if, according to
the proverb, in Car¹, since, though an elderly man, I am prepared for dan-
ger: and I deliver myself to this Dionysodorus, as to Medea the Colchian.
Let him destroy me, and, if he will, boil me, or do whatever else he pleases
with me, if he does but render me worthy. And Ctesippus said, I also, Soc-
rates, am prepared to deliver myself to these strangers, though they should be
willing to exorcize more than they do at present, provided my skin does not
end in a bladder like that of Marsyas, but in virtue. Indeed Dionysodorus,
here, thinks that I am angry with him: I am not however angry, but I
contradict those things which, in my opinion, he has not well advanced

¹ That is to say, make trial of me as if I were some vile man or thing, in which, if the event is
not fortunate, not much loss will be sustained. See Erasimus in Chiliad. p. 227.
THE EUTHYDEMUS.

against me. But do not, said he, O Dionysodorus, call contradiction reviling; for reviling is a different thing.

To this Dionysodorus replied, Do not you, Ctesippus, discourse as if you contradicted?—Entirely, and very much so, said he.—Or do not you think that I speak as if I contradicted? You cannot therefore at any time demonstrate that, if you have heard no one contradicting another.—True, said he: but let us now hear whether I can demonstrate to you that Ctesippus contradicts Dionysodorus. Or can you bear a discourse of this kind?—By all means, said he.—What then? he replied; are there definitions of every thing which exists?—Entirely so, said he.—Whether, therefore, is there a definition of every thing, as it is, or as it is not?—As it is. For if you remember, said Ctesippus, we have just now shown that no one speaks of a thing as it is not. For no one appears to speak of that which is not. But why this? said Ctesippus. Shall you and I, on this account, contradict the less?—Whether therefore, he replied, shall we contradict, if we both of us know the definition of the same thing, or shall we indeed thus say the same things?—He granted that we should.—But, said he, when neither of us gives the definition of that thing, shall we not then contradict? Or, indeed, will it not follow, that thus no mention whatever of that thing will be made by either of us?—He granted this also.—When therefore, said he, I give the definition of that thing, but you of something else, do we then contradict each other? Or do I then speak of that thing, but you do not speak of it in any respect whatever? But how can he who does not speak of a thing contradict him who does?

Ctesippus indeed was then silent; but I, wondering at the discourse, said, How do you say, Dionysodorus? For, though I have heard this assertion often, and from many, yet I always wondered at it. For it was much used by Protagoras and his followers, and by others more ancient than these; but to me he always appears to be a wonderful person, who both subverts others and himself. I think, however, that I shall especially learn the truth of this assertion from you. Is the assertion then any other than this, that it is not possible to affirm things which are false? For this is the force of the argument. Is it not? And that he who speaks, affirms things which are true, or otherwise does not speak?—He granted that it was so.—Whether, therefore, is it not possible to affirm things which are false, but to form an opinion of
of them is possible?—It is not even possible, said he, to form an opinion of
them.—Neither therefore, said I, is there any such thing as false opinion.—
There is not, said he.—Neither therefore is there ignorance, nor are there
unlearned men. Or would not this be ignorance, if there were any such
thing, viz. to speak falsely of things?—Entirely so, said he.—But, I replied,
this is not possible.—It is not, said he.—Do you make this assertion, O Diony-
sodorus, for the sake of discourse, that you may speak that which is won-
derful; or does it truly appear to you that no man is unlearned?—Confute,
said he, the assertion. Or, according to your assertion, can confutation take
place, while no one speaks falsely?—It cannot, said Euthydemus.—Neither
therefore do I, said Dionysodorus, order you to confute. For how can any
one order that to be done which is not?—O Euthydemus, said I, I do not well
understand these wise and excellent assertions, but I halfly as it were con-
ceive them. Perhaps, therefore, I shall ask something which will be trouble-
some; but you will pardon me. See then. For if it is neither possible to
speak falsely, nor to entertain false opinions, nor to be unlearned, neither is
it possible for any one to err when he does any thing. For he who acts can-
not err in that which he does. Do you not say so?—Entirely so, said he.—
This, said I, is the troublesome question which I just now mentioned. For
if we do not err, neither acting nor speaking, nor thinking, if this be the case,
of what, by Jupiter, do you come as the teachers? Or did you not just now
say, that you could teach him virtue who was willing to learn it, the best of
all men?—Are you so dull, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, taking up the dis-
course, as that you now remember what we first said, and would even
now remember any thing which I may have said last year, yet do not
know how to use what has been said at present?—I replied, The things
which have been now asserted are difficult; and this very properly;
for they have been asserted by wise men. And likewise this last thing
which you said cannot be used without extreme difficulty: for what will
you say, Dionysodorus, is the meaning of this assertion, There is something
which I do not know how to use? Does it not mean this, that I do not
know how to confute it? Or tell me, what other conception you form of
these words, I do not know how to use these assertions?—Do you affirm,
said he, that they mean any thing else than this, that it is very difficult to
use them? Answer me.—Before you have answered, said I, Dionysodorus?
dorus?—Will you not answer, said he.—Is it just that I should?—If it is
certainly just, said he.—After what manner? I replied. Is it because you,
being a person very wise, have now entered into a discussion with us respecting
discourse, and because you know when it is proper to answer, and when not;
and now will not give any answer, because you know that it is not requisite?
—You babble, said he, neglecting when it is proper to answer, and when not.
But, good man, be obedient and answer; since you acknowledge that I am a
wise man.

We must obey, said I, and as it seems it is necessary: for you are the
ruler. Ask, then.—Whether therefore do those that understand, understand
having a soul? or do inanimate natures also understand?—They understand
having a soul.—Do you know, therefore, said he, any assertion which has a
soul?—Not I, by Jupiter.—Why, then, did you just now ask me what was
the meaning of my assertion?—For what other reason, I replied, than
that I have erred through indolence: or shall I say, that I have not erred,
but that I have also said this rightly, when I asserted that my words
understood? Whether will you say that I erred, or not? For if I have not
erred, neither do you confute though you are a wise man, nor have you any
thing to reply to my assertion: but if I have erred, neither thus do you
speak rightly, in saying that it is not possible to err. And I say these things,
not in opposition to what you have asserted last year. But this discourse,
said I, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, seems to remain in the same
condition, and even now as formerly, having thrown down others, to fall
itself; nor has your art discovered a method of preventing this, though it is
so wonderful with respect to accuracy of arguments.—Ctesippus then said,
You certainly speak wonderful things, O Thurian or Chian man, or by
whatever other name it may delight you to be called, as you are not in the
least concerned whether you are delirious or not.—And I, fearing left
defamation should take place, again appeased Ctesippus, and said, O Ctesippus;
and now indeed, O Ctesippus, what I have said to Clinias, I also say to you,
that you do not know that the wisdom of these strangers is admirable. They

1 In the original ἥ δὲ τι μοι νομιζεῖς προς ἀπειρίαν, which is literally "what my assertion understand for me." The
words of Socrates, therefore, are perverted by the sophist from their natural meaning, in order that he might play on the word understand.
are however, unwilling to exhibit it to us seriously, but imitate Proteus the Egyptian sophist, and deceive us by enchantments. Let us, therefore, imitate Menelaus, and not suffer the men to leave us, till they have unfolded to us what it is in which they are serious: for I think that something pertaining to them very beautiful will appear, when they begin to act seriously; but we request, we exhort, and we beseech them to unfold themselves.

I therefore again appear to myself to be about to relate in what manner I beseech them to unfold themselves to me: for I will endeavour to the best of my ability to discuss what I formerly left unfinished, if I can in a certain respect allure them, and induce them to pity and commiserate me thus strenuously and seriously acting, and to act seriously themselves. But do you, Clinias, said I, enable me to recollect whence we at that time discontinued our discourse: for I think we ended there, whence we acknowledged we should philosophize: did we not?—We did, he replied.—But philosophy is the possession of science: is it not so? said I.—It is, said he.—By the possession therefore, of what science shall we rightly possess? is not this indeed obvious, that it must be by the possession of that science which will benefit us?—Entirely so, said he.—Should we therefore be in any respect benefited, if we scientifiically knew, while travelling, in what part of the earth much gold is buried?—Perhaps so, said he.—But formerly, I replied, this was our decision, that we should gain nothing, even though without labour, and without digging the earth, all the gold that exists should be ours. So that neither if we knew how to make golden stones would this science be of any worth: for if we knew not how to use gold, no advantage would be apparent from the possession of it. Or do you not remember? said I.—I do very well remember it, he replied.—Nor, as it seems, will any advantage be derived from any other science, neither from that which is employed in the negotiation of money, nor from the medicinal science, nor from any other, which knows how to make any thing, but does not know how to use that which it makes. Is it not so?—He granted that it was.—Nor even, if there were a science by which men could be made immortal, but without knowing how to use immortality, neither from this does it appear that there would be any advantage, if it is proper to argue from what has been previously granted.—To all these particulars we mutually assented.

A certain science, therefore, is requisite for us, O beautiful boy, of such a kind,
kind, in which both to make, and to know how to use that which is made, may concur.—It appears so, said he.—It is of much consequence therefore, as it seems, whether we are skilful makers of the lyre, or in possession of a certain science of that kind: for here the art which makes is separated from the art which uses, about the same thing. For the lyre-making and the harp-making arts differ very much from each other. Is it not so?—He granted that it was.—Nor shall we indeed require the pipe-making art: for this is another such-like art.—He granted that it was.—But, by the gods, said I, if we should learn the art of composing orations, is this the art from the possession of which we should be happy?—I do not think it is, said Clinias.—What argument, said I, do you employ in thinking thus?—I see, he replied, certain framers of orations, who do not know how to use the very orations which they themselves have composed: just as the makers of lyres are unskilled in the use of the lyre; but here others are able to use the orations which these have framed, though they are incapable of framing orations themselves. It is evident, therefore, with respect to orations, that the art of making is separate from the art of using them.—You appear to me, said I, to adduce a sufficient argument that the art of composing orations is not that art by the acquisition of which any one will be happy; though I thought that here that science would be apparent which we some time since investigated: for to me those very men who compose orations appear, O Clinias, to be transcendently wise, when I am conversant with them; and this very art of theirs also appears to be something divine and elevated. This indeed is by no means wonderful: for it is a portion of the art of enchantments, to which it is but a little inferior; for the art of enchantments is that art by which vipers, spiders called phalangii, and scorpions, are allured; but this allures and soothes judges, those that frequent assemblies, and other tumultuous associations. Or are you of a different opinion?—I am not, said he; but it appears to me as you say.—Where then shall we yet further turn ourselves? and to what art?—I do not well know, said he.—But I think, said I, that I have discovered this art.—What is it? said Clinias.—The art of commanding an army, said I, appears to me, more than any other art, to be that which will confer felicity on its possessor.—It does not appear so to me.—Why not? said I.—This is certainly an art of hunting men.—What then?
then? said I.—No part, said he, of the hunting art extends beyond hunting and subjugating; but when they have subjugated that which they have hunted, they are not able to use it. But hunters and fishermen assign this to cocks; while, on the contrary, geometricians, astronomers, and those skilled in the logistic art (for these also are hunters) do not make diagrams, but investigate things themselves. As therefore they do not know how to use these, but are alone skilled in hunting, they deliver their inventions to be used by those who are expert in dialectic; I mean that this is done by such among these as are not entirely stupid.—Be it so, I replied, O most beautiful and wise Clinias.—After the same manner, said he, the commanders of armies also, when they have hunted any city or camp, deliver it to the care of politicians; for they know not how to use those things which they have hunted: just, I think, as the hunters of quails deliver them to those by whom quails are nurtured. If, therefore, he replied, we are in want of that art which its possessor, whether he makes or hunts it, will know how to use, and an art of this kind will render us blessed, some other art, said he, must be investigated instead of that of commanding an army.

CRITO. What do you say, Socrates? Did that lad assert things of this kind?

SOC. Do you not think he did, Crito?

CRITO. By Jupiter, I do not indeed. For I think if he had said these things, that he would not have required the assistance either of Euthydemus, or any other man, with respect to erudition.

SOC. But, by Jupiter, was it Ctesippus then that said these things? for I do not remember.

CRITO. What, Ctesippus?

SOC. This, indeed, I well know, that neither Euthydemus nor Dionysodorus said these things. But, O divine Crito, was it not some one of the beings more excellent than man, who being present said these things? For I well know that I heard them.

CRITO. It is so, by Jupiter, Socrates; and it appears to me, and indeed very much so, to have been some one of the more excellent order of beings. But after this, what art have you still investigated? And have you discovered that art for the sake of which you engaged in this investigation?

SOC. Whence, blessed man, should we have discovered it? But we were perfectly
perfectly ridiculous, just like boys that pursue larks; for we continually thought that we should immediately apprehend each of the sciences, but they always fled from our view. Why therefore should I speak to you concerning many sciences? But when we came to the royal art, and considered whether it is that art which imparts and produces felicity, here falling as it were into a labyrinth, when we thought that we had now arrived at the end, we again proceeded in a winding course, as if we appeared to be in the beginning of our inquiry, and were as much distant from the object of our search as when we began the investigation.

Crito. But how has this happened to you, Socrates?

Soc. I will tell you. For the political and the royal art appear to us to be the same.

Crito. But what then?

Soc. The art of commanding an army, and the other arts, appear to impart dominion over those works of which they are the artificers, as alone knowing how to use them. Hence it clearly appeared to us to be the art which we were investigating, and the cause of good conduct in a city, and, in short, according to the Iambic of Æschylus, that it alone is seated in the stern of the city, governing and ruling over all things, and rendering all things useful.

Crito. Does not this therefore appear to you to be well said respecting this art?

Soc. You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what after these things will happen to us. For again, let us nearly consider as follows. What work will that royal art which rules over all things produce for us? Shall we say none? But we have said to each other that it certainly will produce some work. For did not you assert this, Crito?

Crito. I did.

Soc. What then will you say is the work of it? Just as if I should ask you what work the medicinal art produces in all those things over which it rules? Would you not say it is health?

Crito. I should.

Soc. But what? With respect to your art, agriculture, what does it effect in all those things over which it rules? Would you not say that it affords us food from the earth?
CRITO. I should.
Soc. But what does the royal art effect while it governs every thing over
which it has dominion? Perhaps you do not clearly perceive this.
CRITO. I do not, by Jupiter, Socrates.
Soc. Nor do we, Crito. But thus much indeed you know, that if it is
that art which we investigate, it ought to be useful.
CRITO. Entirely so.
Soc. Ought it not, therefore, to impart to us a certain good?
CRITO. Necessarily so, Socrates.
Soc. But we have acknowledged to each other, I and Clinias, that good is
nothing else than a certain science.
CRITO. You did indeed say so.
Soc. Do not therefore other works, which may be said to belong to the
political art, (but these will be many, such as to render the citizens rich,
free, and without sedition,) do not all these appear to be neither evil nor
good? But it is necessary that this art should make men wise, and impart
wisdom, if it is to be that art which will benefit and render men happy.
CRITO. It is so: and thus you accord with each other conformably to
your narration.
Soc. Does therefore the royal art make men wise and good?
CRITO. What should hinder, Socrates?
Soc. Does it therefore make all men to be so, and to be entirely good?
And is it that art which imparts every science, that of the shoemaker, of
the smith, and of all other artificers?
CRITO. I do not think it is, Socrates.
Soc. But what science is it? Or to what purpose do we employ it?
For it is requisite that it should not be the artificer of any work which is
neither good nor evil, and that it should impart no other science than itself.
Let us therefore say what it is, or to what purpose we should use it. Are
you willing, Crito, we should say it is that by which we make others good?
CRITO. Entirely so.
Soc. But in what will these be good, and to what purpose will they be
useful? Or shall we also say that they will make others good, and that those
others will make others to be so? However, it will no where appear to us
in what they are good, because we have rejected the works which are said

THE EUTHYDEMUS.
to belong to the political science. But in reality, according to the proverb, Corinthian Jupiter is present; and as I have said, we are still equally, or more than equally, remote from knowing what that science is which will make us happy.

**Crito.** By Jupiter, Socrates, you have arrived as it seems at abundant doubting.

**Soc.** I myself, therefore, Crito, since I was fallen into this doubt, with every possible exertion of voice entreated the strangers, and called upon them as if they had been the Dioscuri† to save us, viz. me and the lad from the overwhelming billows of this discourse, to be by all means serious, and seriously to show us what that science is, by the possession of which we may pass through life in a becoming manner.

**Crito.** What then? was Euthydemus willing to unfold any thing to you?

**Soc.** How could he do otherwise? And he began, my friend, the discourse very magnificently thus: Whether, said he, Socrates, shall I teach you this science about which you formerly doubted, or evince that you possess it?—O blessed man, I replied, are you able to effect this?— Entirely so, said he.—Show me, therefore, by Jupiter, said I, that I possess it for this will be much easier than to instruct a man so far advanced in years.—Come then, said he, answer me. Is there any thing which you know?—Certainly, said I, there are many things which I know, and these of small importance.—It is sufficient, said he. Does it therefore appear to you to be possible, that any thing which exists should not be that thing which it is?—It does not, by Jupiter.—Do you not therefore, said he, know something?—I do.—Are you not therefore knowing, if you know?—Entirely so, in this very thing which I know.—It is of no consequence. Is it not then necessary that you should know all things, in consequence of possessing knowledge?—It is not, by Jupiter, said I, since there are many things which I do not know.—Will it not therefore follow, if there is any thing which you do not know, that you are not knowing?—

† A weariness from words repeated in vain, is signified by this adage. Concerning the origin of this proverb, which is obscure, see the Greek Scholia on Plato, p. 96. and Erasimus in Chilaid. p. 678.

‡ The Dioscuri are Castor and Pollux, the sons of Jupiter from Leda. These brother deities were invoked by sailors when in danger of shipwreck.
THE EUTHYDEMUS.

It will follow that I am not knowing in that thing, my friend, I replied.—
Will you then, said he, be less destitute of knowledge? For you just now said, that you were knowing: and thus you will be the same person, and again not the same person, according to the same, and at the same time.—
Be it so, I replied, Euthydemus: for, according to the proverb, you say all things well. How then do I know that science which we investigate? Since it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be: if knowing one thing, I know all things. For I cannot possess, and at the same time be destitute of knowledge. But if I know all things, I also possess that knowledge. Is this then what you say? And is this that wise thing?—You yourself, said he, Socrates, confute yourself.

But what? said I, O Euthydemus, does not the very same thing happen to you? For I, whatever I may suffer with you and this Dionysodorus, the beloved head, shall not be very indignant. Tell me, do you not know some things, and are you not ignorant of others?—By no means, Socrates, said Dionysodorus.—How do you say? I replied. Do you therefore know nothing?—Very far from it, said he.—Do you then know all things, said I, since you also know any thing?—All things, he replied. And you likewise, if you know one thing, know all things.—O Jupiter! I replied, what a wonderful thing you speak of: and a mighty good becomes apparent. But do all other men likewise know all things, or nothing?—They certainly, said he, do not know some things, but are ignorant of others; and are not at the same time scientifically knowing, and deprived of science.—But how is this? said I.—All men, he replied, know all things, if they know one thing.—O, by the gods! said I, Dionysodorus, (for it is now manifest to me that you are serious, though I with difficulty incited you to be so,) do you in reality know all things, such as the carpenter’s and the shoemaker’s art?—Entirely so, said he.—And are you also able to few shoes, in the same manner as shoemakers?—I am, by Jupiter, said he, and alfo to mend them.—Do you also know such things as these, viz. the number of the stars and the sands?—Perfectly so, he replied. Do you not think, we should confess that we do?—And Ctesippus then taking up the discourse, By Jupiter, said he, O Dionysodorus, exhibit to me such a proof of these things, that I may know that you speak the truth.—What shall I exhibit, said he.—Do you know how many teeth Euthydemus has, and does Euthydemus know how many you have?
THE EUTHYDEMUS.

have?—Is it not sufficient for you, said he, to have heard that we know all things?—By no means, said he; but only tell us this one thing more, and show that you speak the truth. And if you tell how many teeth each of you have, and you shall appear to know this on our counting them, we shall then also believe you in other things. Conceiving, therefore, that they were derided, they were unwilling to comply, but they acknowledged that they knew all things, while they were severally interrogated by Ctesippus. For there was not any thing at length, which Ctesippus did not ask them without any hesitation, and even asked them, if they knew the most indecent things. They however most bravely advanced to the interrogations, confessing that they knew, like wild boars rushing on the blow; so that I also myself, Crito, was at length compelled, through my incredulity, to ask Euthydemus, whether Dionyfodorus knew also how to dance? But he replied, Perfectly so.—However, said I, he certainly does not know how to precipitate himself upon swords, and to be whirled on a wheel, being so much advanced in years as he is. Or is he master of this piece of wisdom also?—There is nothing, said he, which he does not know.—But whether, said I, do you now only know all things, or has this always been the case?—Always, said he.—And when you were boys, and as soon as you were born, did you know all things?—All things, said both of them together.—And to us, indeed, the thing appeared to be incredible. But Euthydemus said, You do not believe, Socrates.—Except this one thing, I replied, that it is likely you are wise men.—But, said he, if you are willing to answer me, I will also show you, giving your assent to these wonderful things.—I replied, I shall most gladly be confused in these things. For if it is concealed from me that I am wise, and you demonstrate that I know all things, and that I have always possessed this knowledge, what greater gain than this shall I be able to discover through the whole of life?—Answer then, said he.—Ask me as one that will answer.

Whether, therefore, Socrates, said he, do you know any thing or not?—I do. Do you then know by that thing through which you are knowing, or by any thing else?—By that by which I am knowing; for I think that you speak of the soul. Or do you not speak of this?—Are you not ashamed, said he, Socrates, to interrogate when you are interrogated?—Be it so, said I; but what shall I do? Shall I do as you bid me, when I know not what it is.
is you ask me, though at the same time you order me to answer and not to interrogate?—You, doubtless, said he, apprehend what I say.—I do, I replied.—Now therefore answer to that which you apprehend.—What then? said I, if you indeed ask conceiving one thing, but I apprehend another, and afterwards I should answer to this, would it be sufficient for you if I answered nothing to the purpose?—To me it would, he replied, but not to you, as I think.—I will not therefore, by Jupiter, said I, answer, till I understand. —You will not answer, said he, to the things which you always apprehend, because you trifle, and are more simple than is becoming.—And I perceived that he was indignant with me for disputing what was said, he being desirous to catch me by enclosing me with words. I recollected, therefore, that Connus was always indignant with me, when I did not yield to him, and that afterwards he paid less attention to me, as one that was ignorant. As, therefore, I had formed the design of becoming instructed by these men, I thought it was necessary to submit to them, lest considering me as an illiterate person, they should reject me. Hence I said, If you are disposed to act in this manner, Euthydemus, let it be done: for you, in every respect, better know how to discourse than I do, you who possess art, than I who am a rude unlettered man. Again, therefore, interrogate from the beginning.—Answer then again, said he, whether you know those things which you know, by something or not.—I do, said I; for I know them, by my soul.—Again, said he, in his answer, he adds to what he is asked. For I did not ask by what you know, but if you know by any thing.—Again, said I, I have answered more than is sufficient, through my want of erudition; but pardon me. For I will now answer simply that I always know by a certain thing what I know. —But whether, said he, do you always know by this very same thing? Or do you at one time know by this, and at another by something else?—Always by this, said I, when I know.—Again, said he, you will not cease to speak superfluously. —But I am afraid lest this certain something always should deceive us.—It will not deceive us, said he; but if at all, it will deceive you. Answer me, however, whether you always know by this.—Always, I replied; since it is necessary to take away the when.—Do you therefore always know by this? And always knowing, whether do you know some things by this by which you know, but other things by something else? Or do you know all things by this?—All things by this, said I, which I do know.—This latter part of your answer,
answer, said he, is again superfluous.—But I take away, said I, the words
which I do know.—You should not, however, said he, take away even one
word; for I want none of your assistance. But answer me; would you
be able to know all things unless you could know all things?—This would
be a prodigy, I replied.—And he said, Add now whatever you please: for
you confess that you know all things.—I appear to have done so, said I, since
the words, the things which I know, possess no power whatever; but I know
all things.—Have you not therefore also confessed that you always know by
this thing by which you know? whether it be when you know, or in what­
ever way you please: for you have acknowledged that you always know,
and at the same time, that you know all things. It is evident therefore that
you knew when you was a boy, and when you was begot, and when you
was born. Hence, before you was born, and before heaven and earth were
produced, you knew all things, if you always possessed knowledge. And
by Jupiter, said he, you always will know, and will always know all things,
if I am willing that you should.—But be willing, I replied, O much-honour­
ed Euthydemus, if you speak the truth in reality. But I cannot entirely
believe that you are sufficient to accomplish this, unless this your brother
Dionysodorus assists you with his counsel: and thus perhaps what you say
may be accomplished.

But tell me, I said; for in other things I cannot contend with you, who
are endued with such portentous wisdom, nor deny that I know all things,
since you say that I do;—how shall I say that I know such things as the fol­
lowing, O Euthydemus, viz. that good men are unjust? Come, inform
me, do I know this, or do I not know it?—You certainly know it, said he.—
What, I replied, do I know?—That good men are not unjust.—This, said I,
I perfectly knew a long time ago. But I do not ask this; but where did I
learn that good men are unjust?—No where, said Dionysodorus.—I do not
therefore, said I, know this.—Euthydemus then said to Dionysodorus, You
destroy the conversation; and he will appear to be not knowing, and to pos­
sess, and at the same time to be deprived of knowledge. And Dionysodorus
blushed. But you, Euthydemus, said I, how do you say? Does not your
brother appear to you to speak rightly, who knows all things?—But am I
the brother of Euthydemus? said Dionysodorus, hastily replying.—And I said,
Excuse me from answering you, O good man, till Euthydemus has taught me

2 x 2

that
that I know that good men are unjust, and do not envy me the discipline.—
You fly, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, and are not willing to answer.—It is
reasonable that I should, said I: for I am inferior to either of you, so that
there is an abundant necessity that I should fly from two. For I am much
more imbecile than Hercules, who was not able to contend with the hydra
(a sophist, who, by her wisdom, if one head of the discourse was cut off, pre-
fented many instead of one), and at the same time with the crab, a certain
other sophist, who, as it appears to me, recently drove on shore from the sea;
and when Hercules had in a similar manner tormented the crab) by speak-
ing to and biting him on the left-hand side, he called upon Iolaus, the son of
his brother, to assist him: and he gave him sufficient aid. But my Iolaus
Patroclus, if he should come, would rather effect the very contrary.

Answer then, said Dionysodorus, since these things are celebrated by you,
whether Iolaus was more the nephew of Hercules than of you.—It is there-
fore best for me, O Dionysodorus, said I, to answer you. For you will not
deflect from interrogating, nearly envying (for this I well know), and hin-
dering Euthydemus from teaching me that wise thing.—Answer, however,
said he.—But I will answer, I said, that Iolaus was the son of the brother of
Hercules, but, as it appears to me, is by no means my nephew. For Pa-
 trocles, who is my brother, was not his father; but Iphicles, who resembles
him in name, was the brother of Hercules.—But is Patrocles, said he, your
brother?—Certainly, said I; for he had the same mother, though not the
same father with me.—He is your brother therefore, and not your brother.—
I said, He was not from the same father, O best of men: for his father was
Chæredemus, but mine Sophroniscus.—But the father, said he, was Sophro-
niscus and Chæredemus. Was he not?—Certainly, said I; the former
was my, and the latter his father.—Was not therefore, said he, Chæredemus
different from the father?—From my father, said I.—Was he therefore a father,
being different from a father? Or are you the same thing as a stone?—I am
afraid, said I, lest through you I should appear to be the same; but I do not ap-
ppear to myself to be the same.—Are you not therefore, said he, different from a
stone?—Different certainly.—Being different from a stone, therefore, you are
something else, and not a stone: and being different from gold, you are not
gold.—Granted.—Will not Chæredemus therefore, since he is different from
father, not be a father?—It seems, said I, he is not a father.—For certainly,
said Euthydemus, taking up the discourse, if Chæredemus is a father, again Sophronicus, on the contrary, being different from father, is not a father; so that you, O Socrates, are without a father.—And then Ctesippus, taking up the discourse, said, Does not your father suffer these very same things? for he is different from my father.—Very far from it, said Euthydemus.—Is he then the same? he replied.—The same, indeed.—I should not consent to this. But whether, O Euthydemus, is he alone my father, or is he the father also of other men?—Of other men also, said he.—Or do you think that the same person being father, is not father?—I should indeed think so, said Ctesippus.—But what? said he. A thing being gold, is it not gold? Or being man, is it not man?—You do not, said Ctesippus, according to the proverb, connect, O Euthydemus, thread with thread. For you speak of a dire thing, if your father is the father of all men.—But he is, said he.—Whether is he the father of men, said Ctesippus, or also of horses? Or likewise of all other animals?—Of all others animals, said he.—Is a mother also the mother of all animals? And a mother likewise.—Your mother therefore, said he, is also the mother of marine hedge-hogs.—And yours too, said he.—Hence then you are the brother of gudgeons, whelps, and pigs.—For you also are, said he.—And besides this, your father also is a dog.—For your father is likewise, said he.—But, said Dionysodorus, if you answer me, you will in a short time acknowledge these things. For tell me, have you a dog?—And a very bad one, said Ctesippus.—Has he therefore whelps?—He has indeed, said he, others very much like himself.—Is not the dog then the father of them?—I, said he, saw him having connection with a bitch.—What then? Is he not your dog?—Certainly, said he.—Being a father therefore, is he not yours? So that the dog becomes your father, and you are the brother of whelps.—And again, Dionysodorus hastily took up the discourse, that Ctesippus might not say any thing in reply prior to him; and still further, said he, answer me a trifling particular. Do you strike this dog?—And Ctesippus laughing, By the gods, said he, I do; for I cannot strike you.—Do you not therefore, said he, strike your father?—I should much more

This proverb, according to the Greek Scholia of Plato, is applied to those who say or do the same things through the same, or who connect similars into friendship. This proverb is also mentioned by Aristotle in the third book of his Physics.
justly, said he, strike your father, and ask him what he meant, by begetting such wise sons. But certainly, O Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, your father and the father of the whelps has obtained the possession of many good things from this your wisdom.

But he is not in want of many good things, O Ctesippus, neither he, nor you.—Nor are you, O Euthydemus, said he, in want of them.—Neither I nor any other man am in want of them. For tell me, O Ctesippus, whether you think it good for a sick man to drink a medicine, or does it appear to you to be not good, when it is requisite he should drink it; or when any one is going to a battle, ought he rather to go armed, or without arms?—To me, said he, it appears to be better to do the former of these; though I think that you are about to say something beautiful.—You understand most excellently, said he; but answer me. For since you acknowledge that it is good for a man to drink a medicine when it is requisite, it is also necessary to drink abundantly of this good, and it will in this case be well, if some one bruising it, should mingle with it a cart load of hellebore.—And Ctesippus said, This would be very proper indeed, O Euthydemus, if he who drank it were as large as the statue in Delphi.—As therefore, said he, it is also good to have arms in battle, is it not necessary to have a great number of shields and spears, since it is a good thing?—Very much so, said Ctesippus. But you are not of this opinion, O Euthydemus; for you think that one shield and one spear are sufficient. Or do you not?—I do.—Would you also, said he, arm Gorgon and Briareus after this manner? But I think that you are more skilful than to act in this manner, as being one who fights with military weapons, as is also the case with this your associate.—And Euthydemus indeed was silent; but Dionysodorus said, in reply to those things which had been before answered by Ctesippus, Does it not therefore also appear to you to be good to possess gold?—Certainly, said Ctesippus, and also to have a great quantity of it.—What then? Does it not appear to you to be a good thing always to possess riches, and everywhere?—Very much so, said he.—Do you not therefore also acknowledge gold to be a good thing?—We have acknowledged it, said he.—Is it not then necessary always to possess it, and everywhere, and especially in one's self? And would not a man be most happy, if he had three talents of gold in his belly, a talent in his skull, and a flater of gold in each of his eyes?—They say indeed, O Euthydemus, said Ctesippus,
Ctesippus, that those among the Scythians are the most happy and the best men, who have much gold in their skulls, just as you lately said, that a dog was your father: and, what is still more wonderful, they say, that they drink out of their own golden skulls, and view the gold within them, having their own head in their hands.

But whether, said Euthydemus, do the Scythians and other men see things which may be seen, or things which cannot be seen?—Things which can be seen, certainly.—Is this, therefore, also the case with you? said he.—It is.—Do you therefore see our garments?—Yes.—Are these then things which may be seen?—Transcendently so, said Ctesippus.—But what? said he.—Nothing. But you perhaps do not think that they are seen; so pleasant are you. To me however, Euthydemus, you appear, not sleeping to be asleep, and if it were possible for a man when speaking to say nothing, that you also do this.—Is it not therefore possible, said Dionysodorus, for him who is silent to speak?—By no means, said Ctesippus.—Is it also impossible for him who speaks to be silent?—This is still less possible, said he.—When therefore you speak of stones, and pieces of wood and iron, do you not speak of things silent?—I do not, said he, if I walk in braziers' shops; but the pieces of iron are called things which sound, and make the greatest noise, if any one meddles with them. So that in this particular, it is concealed from you through your wisdom, that you have said nothing. But further still, explain to me the other assertion, how it is possible for one who speaks to be silent.—And Ctesippus appeared to me to contend in a transcendent manner, on account of the youth, the object of his love.—When you are silent, said Euthydemus, are you not silent as to all things?—I am, said he.—Are you not therefore silent, as to things which are said, if things which are said are among the number of all things?—But what? said Ctesippus, are not all things silent?—Certainly not, said Euthydemus.—Do therefore, O best of men, all things speak?—Those things certainly do, which do speak.—But, said he, I do not ask this; but I ask whether all things are silent, or speak?—They do neither, and they do both, said Dionysodorus, hastily taking up the discourse. For I well know that you have not any thing to say to this answer.—And Ctesippus, as was usual with him, laughing very loudly, O Euthydemus, said he, your brother has lost his position in both cases, and his assertion perishes and is vanquished. And Clinias was very much delighted and laughed;
laughed; so that Ctesippus became ten times greater than he was. But Ctesippus, as being very crafty, appeared to me to have stolen these things from thefe very men. For a wisdom of this kind is not now possessed by any other persons.

And I said, Why do you laugh, O Clinias, at things so serious and beautiful?—Why have you now, Socrates, ever seen a beautiful thing? said Dionysodorus.—I have, said I, and many such, O Dionysodorus.—Were they therefore, said he, things different from the beautiful, or the same with the beautiful?—And I then became perfectly involved in doubt, and thought I had suffered justly for having granted. At the same time, however, I replied, They are different from the beautiful; but a certain beauty is present to each of them.—If, therefore, said he, an ox is present with you, you are an ox; and because I now am present with you, you are Dionysodorus.—Predict better things, said I.—But after what manner, said he, when one thing is present with another, will that which is different be different?—Are you then, said I, dubious respecting this? But I will now endeavour to imitate the wisdom of men, as being one who is desirous of it.—How should I not doubt, said he, both I and all other men, respecting that which is not?—What do you say? said I, O Dionysodorus. Is not the beautiful, beautiful, and the base, base?—If, said he, it appears to be so to me. —Does it not therefore appear to be so to you?—Entirely so, said he.—Is not therefore also the same, same? and is not the different, different? For certainly the different is not the same. But I should not think that even a boy would doubt this, that the different is not different. But, O Dionysodorus, this indeed you willingly pass by; since in other things you appear to me to resemble artists on whom it is incumbent to accomplish certain particulars; for it is proper that you should accomplish the business of discourse in an all-beautiful manner.—Do you know therefore, said he, what is proper to each of the artists? And, in the first place, do you know to whom it belongs to work in brass?—I know that this belongs to copper-smiths.—But to whom does it belong to fashion things from clay?—To a potter.—And whose business is it to cut throats, to excoriate, and cutting off small pieces of flesh to boil and roast them?—It is the business of a cook, said I.—If then, said he, a man does things which are proper, does he not act rightly?—Especially so. —But it is proper, as you say, that a cook should cut and excoriate. Have you
you assented to these things or not?—I have assented, I said; but pardon me.—It is evident, therefore, said he, that if any one, cutting the throat of a cook and chopping him into small pieces, should boil and roast him, he would do what is proper; and that if any one should work on a copper-smith himself after the manner of braziers, and on a potter after the manner of potters, he also would do what is proper.—O Neptune, said I, now you place a summit on your wisdom. Will it therefore ever be present with me, so as to become familiar to me?—You will know it, Socrates, said he, when it becomes familiar to you.—That is to say, said I, if you are willing that it should.

But what? said he, Do you think you know the things pertaining to yourself?—Unless you say anything to the contrary. For it is necessary to begin from you, but to end in Euthydemus here.—Whether therefore, said he, do you think these things to be yours, over which you have dominion, and which you can use as you please? As, for instance, with respect to oxen and sheep, do you think that such among these are yours as it is lawful for you to sell and give, and sacrifice to whatever god you please? And that those of them over which you have not this power, are not yours?—And I (for I knew that from those questions something beautiful would emerge, and at the same time being desirous to hear very quickly) said, it is perfectly so: things of this kind are alone mine.—But what? said he. Do you not call these things animals, which possess a soul?—Yes, I said.—Do you acknowledge then, that these alone among animals are yours respecting which you have the liberty of doing all these things which I have just now mentioned?—I acknowledge it.—And he pausing, very ironically, as if considering something of great consequence, Tell me, said he, Socrates, is Jupiter with you Patrius?—And I, suspecting that the discourse would come to that place, in which it would end, fled with a certain ambiguous craftiness, and now turned myself as if I had been caught in a net. And I said, He is not, O Dionysodorus.—You therefore are a miserable man; nor are you an Athenian, since you have neither gods called Patrius, nor sacred rights, nor any thing else beautiful and good.—Spare me, said I, O Dionysodorus, predict better things, and do not instruct me with severity. For

\[\text{This was usually said when the last hand was put to any thing, or when that was added without which a busines could not be finished. See Erasmus in Chilid. p. 570.}\]
I have altars, and domestic sacred concerns, and such as belong to my country, and whatever other things of this kind are possessed by the rest of the Athenians.—In the next place, said he, is not Jupiter Patrius to the rest of the Athenians?—That appellation, said I, does not belong to any one of the Ionians, nor to such as are colonized from this city, nor to us. But Apollo is Patrius 1, through the nativity of Ion. Jupiter, however, is not called by us Patrius, but Herceus 2 and Phratrius; and Minerva also is called Phratria.  

—This is sufficient, said Dionysodorus; for you have, as it seems, Apollo, Jupiter, and Minerva.—Entirely so, said I.—Will not these therefore, said he, be your gods?—My progenitors, said I, and masters.—They will be so then to you, said he. Or have you not confessed that they are yours?—I have confessed it, said I. For what can I do?—Are not therefore, said he, those gods also animals? For you have acknowledged that such things as have a soul are animals. Or have not those gods a soul?—They have 3, said I.—Are they not therefore also animals?—Animals, said I.—But of animals, said he, you have acknowledged these to be yours, which you can give and fell, and sacrifice to any god you please.—I have acknowledged it, said I. For I do not recant, O Euthydemus.—Come then, said he, tell me immediately, since you acknowledge that Jupiter is yours and the other gods, are you therefore permitted to sell them, or give them, or to use them in any other way you please, in the same manner as other animals?—I therefore, O Crito, as if struck by what he said, lay speechless; but Ctefippus coming as it were to my assistance, Pypax 4, or Herules, said he, a beautiful discourse!—And then Dionysodorus, Whether, said he, is Hercules Pypax, or Pypax Hercules?—And Ctefippus, O Neptune, said he, what weighty questions! I yield; the men are unconquerable.

1 Some, says the Greek scholiast on Plato, p. 98. say that the Greeks were indigenous, and that their parents were the earth and the sun who is the same with Apollo. But others assert that Apollo having connexion with Creusa, the daughter of Eretheus, begot Ion, from whom the Athenians were at one time called Ionians, and that on this account they have Apollo Patrius.

2 The Athenians called houses εἰκόνισι ἐκδύς; and hence Jupiter is with them Herceus, whom they establish in these for the sake of a guard. But Phratria is the third part of every tribe; and Minerva Phratria is the inspective guardian of these. Schol. in Plat. p. 98.

3 This passage, among numerous others that might be adduced, must convince the most careless reader that the gods of the antients were not considered by those that worshipped them to be nothing but rocks and stones, as some have stupidly pretended they were.

4 The Greek Scholiast on Plato informs us, that this word expresses both indignation and pride.
Here indeed, my dear Crito, there was not any one present, who did not in the highest degree praise what was said; and the men were almost ready to die with laughing, applauding, and exulting. For before this, the lovers alone of Euthydemus applauded every thing that was said in a very beautiful manner; but here, not far from the pillars in the Lyceum, they applauded the men, and were delighted with what they said. As to myself, my feelings were such, that I was forced to acknowledge that I had never at any time seen men so wise; and being perfectly enslaved by their wisdom, I applied myself to the praising and passing encomiums on them; and I said, O blessed ye for your admirable genius, who have so rapidly, and in a short time, accomplished a thing of such magnitude! Your arguments indeed, O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, contain many other beautiful things; but this is the most magnificent thing in them, that you pay no attention to the multitude of mankind, nor to things venerable, and which appear to be of some consequence, but only to those who are like yourselves. For I well know, that very few men, and those such as are similar to you, delight in these arguments; but others are so ignorant of them, that I well know, they would be more ashamed to confute others with such like arguments, than to be themselves confuted. This too again is another popular and mild thing in your arguments, that when you say there is nothing either beautiful, or good, or white, or any thing else of this kind, and, in short, that one thing is not different from another, you in reality few up the mouths of men, as you also acknowledge that you do; but that you not only few up the mouths of others, but appear also to few up your own, this is very polite, and removes that which is oppressive in your arguments. The greatest thing however is, that these arguments subfist in such a manner, and are so artificially invented by you, that any one may learn them in a very short time. This I have perceived, and I have noticed how rapidly, and indeed immediately, Ctefippus has been able to imitate you. This wisdom therefore of yours, with respect to its being rapidly imparted to another, is beautiful, but is not adapted to be discussed before men. But if you will be persuaded by me, be careful that you do not speake before many, lest rapidly learning, they should not thank you for your instruction. But especially discourse together by yourselves alone: if not, if you discourse before another, let it be before him alone, who gives you silver for what you say. These same things too if you are wise you will also admonish.
nigh your disciples, viz. That they never discourse with any man, unless with you and themselves. For that which is rare, O Euthydemus, is honourable; but water may he bought for a vile price, being the best of things, as Pindar says. But come, said I, make Clinias and me partakers of your discipline.

Having said these things, O Crito, and a few others, we departed. Consider therefore now, how you will accompany me to these men. For they say that they are able to teach any one who is willing to give them money; and that they do not exclude any genius or age. They likewise assert that which it is especially proper for you to hear, that an attention to gain does not hinder any one from easily receiving their wisdom.

Crito. And indeed, Socrates, I am desirous of hearing them, and would willingly learn something from them; though indeed I also appear to be among the number of those who do not resemble Euthydemus, but those whom, as you said, would more willingly be confuted by such like arguments, than confute them. It seems however to me to be ridiculous to admonish you, at the same time I wish to relate to you what I have heard. Do you not know, that among those that left you, a certain person came to me as I was walking, a man who thought himself to be very wise, and one of those who are skilful in forensic harangues, and that he said to me, O Crito, have you heard nothing of these wise men?—By Jupiter, I have, not said I. For I could not stand before others, so as to hear, on account of the crowd.—But, said he, it was worth while to have heard them.—Why? said I.—Because you would have heard men discoursing, who are the wisest of all those who at present engage in such like arguments.—And I said, What then do you think of their arguments?—What else, said he, than that they are such as you will always hear from such like triflers, who bestow vile attention on things of no worth. For these were his very words.—And I said, But certainly philosophy is an elegant thing.—How, elegant, said he, O blessed man! It is indeed a thing of no worth. But if you had been present just now, I think that you would have been very much ashamed on account of your associate, who was so absurd as willingly to put himself in the power of men, who pay no attention to what they say, but adhere to every word. And these men, as I just now said, are among the best of those that exist at present. But indeed, Crito, said he, both the thing itself, and the men who are conversant with it, are very vile and ridiculous.—But to me, Socrates,
THE EUTHYDEMUS.

fes, neither he appears rightly to blame the thing, nor any other who blames it. To be willing, however, to discourse with these men before many appears to me to be rightly blamed.

Soc. O Crito, men of this kind are wonderful. But I do not yet know what I am about to say. To what class of men did he belong who came to you, and blamed philosophy? Was he among the number of those who are skilful in contending in courts of justice, a certain orator; or was he one of those who introduce men of this description, a composer of the orations with which orators contend?

Crito. The least of all, by Jupiter, was he an orator; nor do I think that he ever went into a court of justice; but they say that he is knowing in the thing itself, by Jupiter, and likewise that he is skilful, and that he composes skilful orations.

Soc. I now understand: for I myself was just now about to speak concerning these men. For these are they, O Crito, whom Prodicus says exist in the confines of a philosopher and politician. But they think themselves to be the wisest of men; and besides being such in their own opinion, they also entirely appear to be so among the many. Hence, as they are celebrated by all men, no others are an impediment to them, than those who are conversant with philosophy. They think therefore, if they can establish an opinion, that philosophers are of no worth, they shall obtain the palm of wisdom without contention in the opinion of all men. For they consider themselves to be in reality most wise; but think that their authority is lessened by the followers of Euthydemus, when they are intercepted in their private discourses. But they are very reasonably thought to be wise men: for moderately to possess philosophy, and moderately to engage in political concerns, is very convenient; since this is to partake of both, as much as is requisite, and to enjoy the fruits of wisdom, secure from dangers and contests.

Crito. What then? Do they appear to you, O Socrates, to say anything of consequence?

Soc. They do not, indeed.

Crito. But the discourse of the men possesses a certain gracefulness.

Soc. For it has in reality, O Crito, gracefulness rather than truth. For it is not easy to persuade them, that men and all other things which subsist

between
between two certain things, and participate of both, viz. such particulars as consist from good and evil, become better than the one, and worse than the other; but that such things as consist from two goods, not tending to the fame, are worse than both with respect to that for which each of the things is useful from which they are composed; and that such things as are composed from two evils, not tending to the fame, and which are in the middle, are alone better than each of those things, a part of both of which they participate. If, therefore, philosophy and political action are good, but each tends to that which is different, and these men, while they participate of both, are situated in the middle, they say nothing to the purpose; for they are viler than both. But if philosophy and political action are both good and bad, these men are better than some and worse than others. And if both are bad, thus they will assert something which is true, but by no means otherwise. I do not therefore think they will acknowledge, either that both these are bad, or that the one is bad, and the other good; but they in reality partaking of both, are inferior to both with respect to the performing of either, with a view to which both the political science and philosophy are worthy of regard; and though in reality they rank as the third, they endeavour to appear to be the first. It is requisite, therefore, to pardon their desire, and not to be indignant with them. We should however consider them to be such as they are: for it is requisite to embrace every man who says any thing which adheres to intellect, and who valiantly labours in endeavouring to do so.

Crito. And indeed, Socrates, I also (as I always say to you) am dubious with respect to the management of my own children. For the youngest is yet but a little one; but Critobulus is now an adult, and requires the assistance of some one. I therefore, when I converse with you, am led to think that it is madness to be so much concerned about other things for the sake of children, such as about marriage, that they may be born from the most generous mother, and about riches, that they may become most wealthy, and yet neglect their education. But when I look at any one of those who profess to instruct men, I am struck with astonishment; and, to tell you the truth, every one of them appears to me to be unfit for the purpose; so that I cannot exhort the lad to philosophy.

Soc. O, my dear Crito, do you not know that in every pursuit, the many are vile, and of no worth, and that the few are worthy of all regard? For do
do not the gymnastic art, the art of acquiring money, rhetoric, and the art of commanding an army, appear to you to be beautiful?

Crito. To me they certainly do, in every respect.

Soc. What then? In each of these do you not see that the multitude are ridiculous with respect to the several employments of these arts?

Crito. Yes, by Jupiter; and you speak most truly.

Soc. Would you, therefore, on this account avoid all pursuits, and not suffer your son to engage in them?

Crito. This indeed, Socrates, would not be just.

Soc. You must not, therefore, O Crito, do that which ought not to be done; but bidding farewell to those who study philosophy, whether they are good or bad, explore the thing itself, well and properly; and if it should then appear to you to be a vile thing, dissuade every man from it, and not your sons only; but if it should appear to you such as I think it is, confidently pursue and cultivate it, as it is said, both you and your children.

THE END OF THE EUTHYDEMUS.