THE PROTAGORAS:

or,

THE SOPHISTS.
ASSOCIATE.

WHENCE come you, Socrates? or is it not evident that you come from hunting about the beauty of Alcibiades? For to me, as I lately beheld him, the man appeared to be beautiful. I say the man: for between ourselves, Socrates, he may be called so, since his beard begins now to make its appearance.

Soc. But what then? Do you not indeed praise Homer*, who says, that the age of a young man when he begins to have a beard is most agreeable? And this is now the age of Alcibiades.

* As the same question is discussed in this Dialogue, though not so fully as in the Meno, viz. Whether virtue can be taught, an introduction to it is unnecessary. I shall therefore only observe, that the liveliness and variety of the characters in it; the mirth and merriment of Socrates; the simplicity and nobleness of the narratives; and the knowledge of antiquities it displays, are beauties no less obvious than inimitable. For an account of Protagoras, that prince of sophists, see the Theaetetus.

† This sophist was of Cos, and flourished about 396 years before Christ. Among his pupils were Euripides, Socrates, Th extremely, and Ithocrates. He made his auditors pay to hear him harangue, which has given occasion to some of the ancients to speak of the orations of Prodicus, for 50 drachms. Among his numerous writings, he composed that beautiful epistle in which virtue and pleasure are introduced attempting to make Hercules one of their votaries.

‡ See the 10th Book of the Odyssey, where Homer represents Mercury as assuming the shape of a young man that begins to have a beard.
Assoc. But do you not at present come from him? And how is the young man disposed towards you?

Soc. He appears to be well affected towards me, and especially so to-day; for he said many things in defence of me; and I am just now come from him. However, I wish to tell you something very strange: though he was present I did not attend to him, and even forgot to look at him.

Assoc. What great affair then happened to both of you? for you could not meet with any other beautiful person in this city.

Soc. I did, however, and with one far more beautiful.

Assoc. What do you say? Was he a citizen or a stranger?

Soc. A stranger.

Assoc. Whence came he.

Soc. From Abdera.

Assoc. And did this stranger appear to you so beautiful as to surpass in beauty the son of Clinias?

Soc. How can it be otherwise, O blessed man, but that the wisest must appear to be the more beautiful person?

Assoc. Do you come to us then, Socrates, from a certain wise man?

Soc. I do, and from the wisest indeed of those that exist at present; if Protagoras appears to you to be most wise.

Assoc. What do you say? Is Protagoras arrived hither?

Soc. He has been here these three days.

Assoc. And have you then just now been with him?

Soc. I have; and I have also both spoken and heard many things.

Assoc. Will you not therefore relate this conversation to us? For if nothing hinders, you may sit here, since this boy will give you his place.

Soc. I will certainly relate it to you: and I shall also thank you for attending to it.

Assoc. And we shall all thank you for the narration.

Soc. There will then be reciprocal thanks. Hear therefore:—This morning, while it was yet dark, Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus and the brother of Phason, knocked very hard at my gate with his stick, and as soon as it was opened he hastily came to my bedchamber, crying with a loud voice, Socrates, are you asleep?—And I knowing his voice said, This is Hippocrates, do you bring any news?—None, he replied, but what is good.—You speak
fpeak well, said I, but what is it? and what brought you hither?—Prota-
agoras, said he, is come, and dwells near me.—He has been here, I replied, for
some time; and have you only just heard it?—I only heard it, by the gods,
said he, this evening; and at the same time, taking a couch, he sat down at
my feet, and said, I returned last night very late from the village of Oinoe;
for my boy Satyrus had made his escape from me, and being desirous to tell
you that I should pursue him, something else occurring, I forgot it. But after
I had returned, supped, and was going to bed, then my brother told me Pro-
tagoras was come. On hearing this, I immediately attempted to go to you;
but afterwards it appeared to me that the night was already far advanced.
Soon therefore falling asleep from weariness, when I awoke, I came hither.—
And I knowing the fortitude of Hippocrates, and seeing his astonishment,
said, What is this to you? Has Protagoras injured you in any respect?—By
the gods, said he laughing, he has, because he alone is wise, and has not
made me to be so.—But, by Jupiter, said I, if you had given him money, and
had persuaded him, he would have made you also wise.—O Jupiter, and the
other gods, he replied, I should neither spare my own property, nor that of
my friends, to accomplish this, and I now come to you, that you may speak
to him in my behalf. For I am younger than you, and at the same time I
never either saw or heard Protagoras; for I was a boy when he first came to
this place. However, Socrates, all men praise him, and say that his discourses
are most wise. But why do we not go to him that we may find him within?
And he resides, as I have heard, with Callias, the son of Hippocrates. Let
us then go.—To this I replied, We will not yet go thither, O good man, for
it is too early; but let us go into our court, where we will walk and con-
verse till it is light; and afterwards we will pay a visit to Protagoras.
For, as he stays very much at home, we shall most probably find him within.—
After this we rose and went into the court, and I, in order to try the strength
of Hippocrates, looked at him attentively, and said, Tell me, O Hippocrates,
do you now endeavour to go to Protagoras, that by giving him money he
may teach you something? What kind of man do you suppose him to be?
and what kind of a man would you wish him to make you? Just as if you

1 This Callias was one of the first citizens of Athens, and his father Hipponicus had been ge-
neral of the Athenians, together with Nicias, at the battle of Tanagre.
should go to your namefake, Hippocrates of Cos, who is a descendant of Esculapius, and should offer him money on your own account, if any one should ask you, O Hippocrates, to what kind of man do you give money, and on what account? what would you answer?—I should say, he replied, that I give it as to a physician.—And with what view would you give it?—That I might become a physician, said he.—But if you went to the Argive Polycletus, or the Athenian Phidias, and gave them a reward on your own account, should any one ask you to what kind of men, and for what purpose, you offered money to Polycletus and Phidias, what would you answer?—I should answer, said he, that I gave it as to statuaries, and in order that I myself might become a statuary.—Be it so, I replied. But we are now going, I and you, to Protagoras, and we are prepared to give him money on your account, if we have sufficient for this purpose, and can persuade him by this mean; but if it be not sufficient, we must borrow from our friends. If therefore some one, on perceiving our great eagerness about these particulars, should say, Tell me, O Socrates and Hippocrates, to what kind of man, and for what purpose do you intend to give money in offering it to Protagoras? what answer should we give him? What other appellation have we heard respecting Protagoras, as with respect to Phidias we have heard him called a statuary, and with respect to Homer, a poet? What thing of this kind have we heard concerning Protagoras?—They call this man, said he, a sophist, Socrates.—Shall we go thence, and offer money as to a sophist?—Certainly.—If then some one should ask you what do you design to become by going to Protagoras?—He replied, blushing (for there was now day-light sufficient for me to see him), from what we have already admitted, it is evident that my design is to become a sophist.—But, by the gods, said I, will you not be ashamed to proclaim yourself a sophist among the Greeks?—I shall, by Jupiter, if it is requisite to speak what I think.—Your design then, Hippocrates, in acquiring the discipline of Protagoras, is not to become a sophist, but you have the same intention as when you went to the school of a grammarian, or that of a musician, or of a master of gymnastic: for you went not to those masters to learn their art, that you might become a professor yourself, but for the sake of acquiring such instruction as becomes a private and a free man.—The discipline which I shall receive from Protagoras, said he, perfectly appears to me to be rather a thing of this kind.—Do you know therefore, I replied,
what you now intend to do? or is it concealed from you?—About what?

That you are about to commit your soul to the care of a man, who, as you say, is a sophist; and yet I should wonder if you know what a sophist is. Though if you are ignorant of this, neither do you know to whom you deliver your soul, nor if to a good or a bad thing.—But I think, said he, that I know.—Tell me then what you think a sophist is?—I think, said he, as the name implies, that he is one knowing in things pertaining to wisdom.—But, I replied, the same thing may also be said of painters and architects, that they also are knowing in things pertaining to wisdom. And if any one should ask us in what wise particulars painters are knowing, we should answer him, that their wisdom consisted in the production of images; and we should reply in a similar manner with respect to the rest. But if some one should ask in what particulars is a sophist wise; what should we answer? Of what art is he the master?—He is master, Socrates, of the art which enables men to speak eloquently.—Perhaps, said I, we speak the truth, yet we do not speak sufficiently. For this answer demands from us another interrogation, viz. in what a sophist renders men eloquent. For does not a harper also enable those that are instructed by him, to speak about that in which he is knowing, viz. the playing on the harp? Is it not so?—It is.—Be it so then. But about what does a sophist render men eloquent? For it is evident, that it must be about things of which he has a knowledge.—It is likely.—What then is that thing about which the sophist is knowing, and which he teaches to others?—By Jupiter, he replied, I can no longer tell you.—And I said after this, Do you know therefore to what danger you are going to expose your soul? or if you were going to subject your body to the hazard of becoming in a good or a bad condition, would you not diligently consider whether you should expose it to this danger or not? Would you not call your friends and relations to consult with them? And would you not take more than one day to deliberate on the affair? But though you esteem your soul far more than your body, and upon it depends your happiness or unhappiness, according as it is well or ill disposed, yet, concerning this, you neither ask advice of your father nor brother, nor of any one of us your associates, whether you should commit your soul to this stranger. But having heard of his arrival yesterday evening, you come next morning before break of day, without considering whether it is proper to commit yourself to him or not, and are prepared.
prepared to employ not only all your own riches for that purpose, but also
those of your friends, as if you already knew that you must by all means
associate with Protagoras, whom, as you say, you neither know nor have ever
spoken to. But you call him a sophist, though what a sophist is, to which
you are about to deliver yourself, you are evidently ignorant.—And he having
heard me, replied, What you say, Socrates, appears to be the truth.—Whether
or not, therefore, O Hippocrates, is a sophist a certain merchant and retailer
of things by which the soul is nourished?—He appears to me, Socrates, to be
a character of this kind; but with what is the soul nourished?—By discipli-
lines, I replied. But we must take care, my friend, lest the sophist, while
he praises what he sells, deceive us, just as those merchants and retailers do
respecting the food of the body. For they are ignorant whether the articles
of their traffic are salubrious or noxious to the body, but at the same time
they praise all that they sell. Those also that buy these articles are alike igno-
rant in this respect, unless the purchaser should happen to be a master of
gymnastic, or a physician. In like manner, those who carry about disciplines
in cities, and who hawk and sell them to those that desire to buy them, praise
indeed all that they sell, though perhaps some of these also, O most excellent
youth, may be ignorant whether what they sell is beneficial or noxious to
the soul. And this also may be the case with those that buy of them, unless
the purchaser should happen to be a physician of the soul. If therefore you
scientifically know what among these is good or bad, you may securely buy
disciplines from Protagoras, or any other; but if not, see, O blessed youth,
whether you will not be in extreme danger with respect to your dearest con-
cerns. For there is much greater danger in the buying of disciplines than in
that of food; since he who buys meats and drinks of a victualler or mer-
chant may take them away in other vessels, and, before he receives them into
his body, may place them in his house, and calling in some person skilled in
these things, may consult what should be eaten and drunk, and what should
not, and how much and when it is proper to eat and drink; so that there is
no great danger in buying provisions. Disciplines, however, cannot be taken
away in another vessel; but it is necessary that he who buys a discipline, re-
cieving and learning it in his soul, should depart either injured or benefited.
Let us therefore consider these things with those that are older than we are:
for we are too young to discuss an affair of such great importance. Let us
now,
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now, however, go whither we intended, and hear the man; and after we have heard him, let us also communicate with others. For not only Protagoras is there, but Hippias the Eleaon, and Prodicus too, I think, and many other wise men.

This being agreed upon by us, we go on; but when we entered the porch, we stop to discuss something which had occurred to us in the way. That it might not therefore be unfinished, but that being terminated we might thus enter the house, we stood discoursing in the porch, until we agreed with each other. It appears therefore to me that the porter, who was a eunuch, heard us; and that on account of the multitude of the sophists he was enraged with those that came to the house. When therefore we had knocked at the gate he opened it, and seeing us, Ha, ha, said he, certain sophists. He is not at leisure. And at the same time taking the gate with both his hands, he shut it with all his force. We then knocked again, and he, without opening the gate, said, Did not you hear me tell you that he is not at leisure?—But, my good man, said I, we are not come to Callias, nor are we sophists. Take courage, therefore, for we come requesting to see Protagoras. Announce this to him. Notwithstanding this the man would scarcely open the gate to us. However, he opened it at length, and when we entered, we met with Protagoras walking in the vestibule of the porch. Many followed him; on one side Callias the son of Hippocrates, and his brother by the mother; Paralus the son of Pericles; and Charmides the son of Glauco. On the other side of him were Xanthippus the other son of Pericles, and Philippides the son of Philomelus, and Antimocrus the Mendæan, who was the most illustrious of all the disciples of Protagoras, and who is instructed in his art that he may become a sophist. Of those behind these, who followed them listening to what was said, the greater part appeared to be strangers, whom Protagoras brings with him from the several cities through which he passes, and whom he charms by his voice like another Orpheus: and they, allured by voice, follow him. Some of our countrymen also were in the choir. On seeing this choir I was very much delighted in observing how well they took care not to be an impediment to Protagoras in walking before him; but when he turned, and his company with him, these his auditors that followed him opened to the right and left in a becoming and orderly manner, and always beautifully ranged themselves behind him. After Protagoras,
goras, as Homer\textsuperscript{1} says, I saw Hippias the Elean seated on a throne in the
opposite vestibule of the porch, and round him on benches sat Eryximachus,
the son of Acumenus, Phædrus the Myrrhinusian, Andron the son of Andron, and some others, partly strangers and partly his fellow citizens.
They appeared, too, to be interrogating Hippias concerning the sublime parts of nature, and certain astronomical particulars; but he, sitting on a throne, considered and resolved their questions. I likewise saw Tantalus: for Prod-icus the Cean was there; but he was in a certain building which Hipponicus had before used for an office, but which Callias, on account of the multitude that came to his house, had given to the strangers, after having prepared it for their reception. Prodicus therefore was still in bed wrapped up in skins and coverings, and Pausanius of Ceramis was seated by his bedside; and with Pau-
sanius there was a youth, who appeared to me to be of a beautiful and ex-
cellent disposition. His form indeed was perfectly beautiful; and his name, as I have heard, was Agatho. Nor did I wonder that he was beloved by Pau-
sanius. There were also the two Adimantes, the one the son of Cephis, and the other the son of Leucolophides, and many others. But as I was
without, I was not able to learn what was the subject of their discourse, though I very much desired to hear Prodicus: for he appears to me to be a
man perfectly wise and divine. But a certain humming sound being pro-
duced in the chamber through the grave tone of his voice, prevented me from hearing distinctly what he said. Just as we had entered, Alcibiades,
the beautiful as you say, and as I am persuaded he is, and Critias the son of
Callaischus, came after us.

After we had entered therefore, and had discoursed certain trifling particu-
lars, and considered what passed, we went to Protagoras; and I said, O Pro-
tagoras, I and Hippocrates are come to see you.—Would you wish, said he, to
speak with me alone, or in the presence of others?—It makes no difference, I
replied, to us; but when you hear on what account we come, you yourself
shall determine this.—What is it then, said he, that hath brought you?—Hip-
pocrates here is our countryman, the son of Apollodorus, and is of a great

\textsuperscript{1} See the 11th Book of the Odyssey, where Ulysses is represented conversing with the shades of
the dead in Hades. Plato, by alluding to this part of the Odyssey, doubtless intended to insinuate,
as Dacier well observes, that these sophists are not real men, but only the phantoms and shadows
of men.
and happy family, and seems to contend with his equals in age for natural endowments. But he desires to become illustrious in the city; and he thinks that he shall especially effect this if he associates with you. Consider, therefore, whether it is proper for him to converse alone with you about these particulars, or in conjunction with others.—Your forethought, said he, Socrates, with respect to me is right. For a stranger who goes to great cities, and persuades young people of the greatest quality to leave the associations both of their kindred and others, both the young and the old, and adhere to him alone, that they may become better men by his conversation, ought in doing this to be cautious. For things of this kind are attended with no small envy, together with much malevolence and many stratagems. I say indeed that the sophistic art is antient, but that those men who first professed it, fearing the hatred to which it would be exposed, sought to conceal it, some with the veil of poetry, as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, and others with that of the mysteries and prophecy, as Orpheus and Musæus, and their followers. I perceive also, that some have called this art gymnastic, as Icicus of Tarentum, and as a sophist at present does who is inferior to none, viz. Herodicus the Selymbrianian, who was originally of Megara. But your Agathocles, who was a great sophist, Pythoclides of Ceos, and many others, concealed it under the veil of music. All these, as I said, being afraid of envy, employed these arts as veils. I however, in this particular, do not accord with all these: for I think they did not effect any thing which they wished to accomplish; since these concealments are understood by men of great authority in cities. The vulgar indeed do not perceive them; but praise certain things which they hear from the sophists. This subterfuge therefore, not being attended with any effect, but becoming apparent, necessarily shows the great folly of him that attempts it, and makes men much more inimical: for they think that a man of this kind is crafty in every thing. I therefore have taken an opposite path: for I acknowledge myself to be a sophist, and a teacher of men: and I think that by this ingenuous confession I avoid envy more safely than by dissimulation. I also direct my attention to other things besides this: so that, as I may say, with the assistance of Divinity, I have suffered nothing dire through confessing that I am a sophist; though I have exercised this art many years: for my age is very great, and I am old enough to be the father of any one of you. So that it will be by far the most plea-
faint to me, if you discourse with me concerning these particulars in the presence of all those that are in the house.

I then, suspecting that he wished to exhibit himself to Prodicus and Hippias, and to boast that we came to him as being enamoured of his wisdom, said, Why may not Prodicus and Hippias be called, and those that are with him, that they may hear us?—By all means, said Protagoras, let them be called.—Callias therefore said, Shall we prepare seats for you, that you may discourse sitting?—It was agreed to be proper so to do. And at the same time all of us being pleased, as those that were to hear wise men converse, took hold of the benches and couches, and disposed them near to Hippias; for the benches had been there previously placed. In the interim came Callias and Alcibiades, bringing with them Prodicus, who had then risen from his bed, and those that were with him. When therefore we were all seated, Now, Socrates, said Protagoras, you may tell me before all this company what you a little before mentioned to me about this youth. And I said, My exordium, O Protagoras, is that which I employed before, viz. with what design we came to you. Hippocrates then, here, is desirous of your converse; and says he shall gladly hear what advantage he shall derive from associating with you. This is all we have to say to you.—Protagoras then said in reply, O young man, the advantage which you will derive from associating with me is this, that on the day in which you come to me you will go home better than you was before; you will also be more improved on the second than on the first day, and you will always find that you have every day advanced in improvement.—And I, hearing him, said, O Protagoras, this is by no means wonderful, but it is fit that it should be so; since you also, though so old and so wise, would become better, if any one should teach you what you do not know. But that is not what we require. But just as if Hippocrates here should immediately change his mind, and should desire to associate with the youth lately arrived at this place, Zeuxippus the son of Heracletus, and coming to him in the same manner as he is now come to you, should hear from him the same things as he has heard from you, that every day by associating with him he would become better, and advance in improvement; if he should ask him, In what do you say I shall become better, and advance in proficiency, Zeuxippus would answer him, In the art of painting. And if he were to associate with the Theban Orthagoras, and should hear from him the same things
things as he has heard from you, and should ask him in what he would daily become better by associating with him, he would reply, In the art of playing on the pipe. In like manner do you also reply to the youth, and to me asking for him: for you say that Hippocrates here, by associating with Protagoras, will daily become better and advance in improvement; tell us then, O Protagoras, in what he will make this proficiency?—Protagoras, on hearing me thus speak, said, You interrogate well, Socrates, and I rejoice to answer those who ask in a becoming manner. For Hippocrates, if he comes to me, will not suffer that which he would suffer by associating with any other of the sophists. Other sophists indeed injure youth: for they force them to apply to arts which they are unwilling to learn, by teaching them arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and music. And at the same time looking at Hippias *, he added, But he who comes to me, will not learn any thing else than that for the sake of which he came. The discipline too which he acquires from me is the ability of consulting well about his domestic affairs, so that he may govern his house in the best manner, and so that he may be capable of saying and doing all that is advantageous for his country.—I understand you, I replied: for you appear to me to speak of the political art, and to profess to make men good citizens.—This, said he, is the profession which I announce.—What a beautiful artifice, said I, you possess! if you do possess it. For nothing else is to be said to you than that which I conceive. For I, O Protagoras, do not think that this can be taught, and yet I cannot disbelieve what you say. It is just, however, that I should inform you whence I think it cannot be taught, nor by men be procured for men. For I, as well as the other Greeks, say that the Athenians are wise. I see, therefore, when we are collected in the assembly, and when it is necessary to do something respecting the building of houses, that the architects being sent for, are consulted about the business; but that when something is to be done concerning the building of ships, shipwrights are consulted; and in a similar manner with respect to other things which they think may be taught and learnt. But if any other person whom they do not think to be an artist attempts to give them advice in these particulars, though he may be very fine and rich and noble, they pay no more attention to him on this account, but

* Protagoras says this, because Hippias professed to be very skilful in these sciences.
laugh and make a noise, until he either desists from speaking through the disturbance, or till the archers, by order of the magistrates, lead or carry him out. In this manner therefore they act respecting things which pertain to art. But when it is requisite to consult about any thing which relates to the government of the city, then the builder, the brazier, the shoemaker, the merchant, and the sailor, the rich and the poor, the noble and the ignoble, rise, and similarly give their advice, and no one disturbs them, as was the case with the others, as persons who, though they have never learnt nor have had a preceptor, yet attempt to give advice. For it is evident that they do not think this can be taught. Nor does this take place only in public affairs, but in private concerns also; the wisest and best of the citizens are not able to impart to others the virtue which they possess. For Pericles, the father of these youths, has beautifully and well instructed them in those things which are taught by masters; but in those things in which he is wise, he has neither himself instructed them, nor has he sent them to another to be instructed; but they, feeding as it were without restraint, wander about, to see if they can casually meet with virtue. If you will too, this very same man Pericles, being the tutor of Clinias the younger brother of this Alcibiades, separated them, fearing the former should be corrupted by the latter, and sent Clinias to be educated by Ariphron. Before, however, six months had elapsed, Ariphron, not knowing what to do with him, returned him to Pericles. I could also mention many others to you, who being themselves good men, never made any other man better, neither of their kindred nor strangers. I therefore, O Protagoras, looking to these things, do not think that virtue can be taught. When, however, I hear you affirming these things, I waver, and am of opinion that you speak to the purpose, because I think that you are skilful in many things, and that you have learned many and discovered some things ourself. If, therefore, you can more clearly show us, that virtue may be taught, do not be envious, but demonstrate this to us.

Indeed, Socrates, said he, I shall not be envious. But whether shall I show you this by relating a fable, as an older to younger men, or shall I discuss it by argument? Many, therefore, of those that sat with him, left it to his choice. It appears, therefore, to me, said he, that it will be more agreeable to you to relate a fable.
"There was a time, then, when the gods were alone, but the mortal genera did not exist. But when the defined time of generation came to these, the gods fashioned them within the earth, by mixing earth and fire together; and such things as are mingled with these two elements. And when they were about to lead them into light, they commanded Prometheus and Epimetheus to distribute to and adorn each with those powers which were adapted to their nature. But Epimetheus requested Prometheus that he might distribute these powers: And, said he, do you attend to my distribution. And having thus persuaded him, he distributed. But in his distributing, he gave to some strength without swiftness, and adorned with swiftness the more imbecile. Some he also armed; but giving to others an unarmed nature, he devised a certain other power for their security. For those whom he had invested with a small body, he either enabled to fly away through wings, or distributed them in a subterranean habitation; but those whom he had increased in magnitude he preserved by their bulk. And thus equalizing, he distributed other things, taking care that no genus should be deprived of the means of preservation.

"After, then, he had secured them from mutual destruction, he took care to defend them against the injuries of the air and seasons, by clothing them with thick hairs and solid skins, so that they might be sufficiently protected in the winter frosts and summer heats; and so that these very things might become appropriate and spontaneous beds to each when they went to rest. Under their feet, likewise, he partly added arms, and partly hairs and solid and bloodless skins. He also imparted to different animals different nutriment; to some, indeed, herbs from the earth, to others the fruits of trees, and to others roots. There were some also whom he permitted to feed on the flesh of other animals: and to some, indeed, he gave the power of generating but a few of their own species, but to those that are devoured by these he imparted fecundity, thus extending safety to the race. However, as Epimetheus the beneficent guardian of the descent of the rational soul; and Epimetheus is the guardian of the irrational soul.

1 By this nothing more is meant than that a divine is prior to a mortal nature, according to casual, but not according to temporal, priority. For, whatever Divinity produces, it produces continually; and hence every effect proceeding from a divine cause is confubstantient with that cause, in the same manner as shadow with its forming substance.

2 Prometheus, as we have observed in the notes on the Gorgias, is the beneficent guardian of the descent of the rational soul; and Epimetheus is the guardian of the irrational soul.
metheus was not very wise, he ignorantly bestowed all his powers on irrational animals; but the human race still remained unadorned by him. Prometheus, therefore, came to him while he was doubting, and considered the distribution which he had made. And he saw that other animals were well provided for, but that man was naked, without shoes, without a bed, and unarmed. But now the fatal day was arrived, in which it was necessary that man should emerge from the earth into light. Prometheus, therefore, being dubious what safety he could find for man, stole the artificial wisdom of Vulcan and Minerva ¹, together with fire; since it was impossible that the possession of this wisdom could be useful without fire; and thus he imparted it to man. By these means, therefore, man possessed the wisdom pertaining to life. He had not, however, political wisdom. For this was with Jupiter; and Prometheus was no longer permitted to ascend to the citadel, the habitation of Jupiter. To which we may add, that the guards of Jupiter were terrible. Prometheus, therefore, secretly entered into the common habitation of Minerva and Vulcan, in which the arts were exercised; and stealing the fiery art from Vulcan, and the other from Minerva, he gave them to man: and from this arises the fertility of human life. But Prometheus afterwards, as it is said, through Epimetheus, was punished for his theft. Since, however, man became a partaker of a divine allotment, in the first place through this alliance with divinity, he alone of the other animals believed that there were gods, and endeavoured that the altars and statues of the gods should be established. In the next place he articulately distinguished by art, voice and

¹ In these two divinities the cause of all arts is primarily comprehended: the former of these first imparting the fabricative power which the arts possess; and the latter illuminating them with that which is gnostic and intellectual.

² Prometheus was not permitted to ascend to the citadel of Jupiter, with whom the political science first subsists, because the guards of Jupiter, i.e. the Curetes, who are of an unpolluted guardian characteristic, preserve him exempt from all partial causes, among which Prometheus ranks. Through these guardians also, being firmly established in himself, he pervades through all things without impediment, and being present to all his progeny, is expanded above wholes according to supreme transcendency. The citadel also of Jupiter (says Proclus, in Plat. Theol. p. 299), according to the rumours of theologists, is a symbol of intellectual circulation and of the highest summit of Olympus, which all the wise suspend from Jupiter's intellectual place of survey. To this place likewise (he adds) Jupiter extends all the mundane gods, thence imparting to them intellectual powers, divine light, and vivific illuminations.
names, and invented houses and garments, shoes and beds, and nourishment from the earth. But men, being thus provided for in the beginning, lived dispersed; for cities were not: hence they were destroyed by wild beasts, through being everywhere more imbecile than them; and the fabricating art was indeed a sufficient aid to them for nutriment, but was inadequate to the war with wild beasts: for they had not yet the political art, of which the military is a part. They sought therefore to collect themselves together, and to save themselves, building for this purpose cities. When, however, they were thus collected in a body, they injured each other, as not possessing the political art; so that, again being dispersed, they were destroyed by the beasts. Jupiter, therefore, fearing for our race, left it should entirely perish, sent Hermes, and ordered him to bring Shame and Justice to men, that these two might be the ornaments and the bonds of cities, and the conciliators of friendship. Hermes, therefore, asked after what manner he should give Shame and Justice to men. Whether, said he, as the arts are distributed, so also shall I distribute these? for they are distributed as follows:—One man who possesses the medicinal art is sufficient for many private persons; and in a similar manner other artificers. Shall I, therefore, thus insert Shame and Justice in men? or shall I distribute them to all?—To all, said Jupiter, and let all be partakers of them: for cities will not subsist, if a few only participate of these, as of the other arts. Publish also this law in my name, that he who is incapable of partaking of Shame and Justice shall be punished as the pest of the city."

Thus, Socrates, and on this account, both others and the Athenians, when they discourse concerning building, or any other fabricative art, think that a few only should be consulted; and if any one unskilled in these affairs offers to give advice, they do not allow him, as you say; and it is reasonable, as I say, that they should not. But when they proceed to a consultation concerning political virtue, the whole of which consists from justice and temperance, they very properly permit every man to speak; because it is fit that every one should partake of this virtue, or there can be no cities. This, Socrates, is the cause of that which was doubted. And that you may not think I deceive you in asserting that all men in reality think that every man participates of justice, and of the rest of politic virtue, take this as an argument: in other arts, as you say, if any one afferts that he is a good piper, or skilled in any other...
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other art of which he is ignorant, those that hear him either laugh at, or are
indignant with him, and his friends admonish him as one insane; but in ju-
stice and the other political virtue, though it be known that a certain person
is unjust, yet if he afferts the truth of himself before the multitude, they think
that he is insane, and that he should not unfold his iniquity; and they say
that all men should acknowledge themselves to be just, whether they are or
not; or that he who does not pretend that he is just must be mad; as if it
were necessary that every one should, in a certain respect, partake of justice,
or no longer be a man. I say these things, to show that every man is very
properly permitted to give his advice concerning this virtue, because every
one is thought to be a partaker of it. But that men do not think that it sub-
fists from nature, nor from chance, but that it may be taught and obtained
by study, this I will in the next place endeavour to show you. No one is
enraged with another on account of those evils which he thinks arise either
from nature or art; nor does he admonish, or teach, or punish the possessors
of these evils in order to make them otherwise than they are; but, on the con-
trary, he pities them. Thus, for instance, who would be so mad as to repre-
hend the deformed, or the little, or the diseased? For I think they know
that these things, viz. such as are beautiful and the contrary, happen to men
from nature and fortune. On the contrary, when they think that any one
possesses certain evils from study, custom, and learning, then they are indig-
nant, admonish, and punish; among the number of which evils are injustice
and impiety, and in short every thing which is contrary to political virtue.
And as this species of virtue is obtained by study and discipline, they are on
this account indignant with and admonish every one who neglects to ac-
quire it. For if you are willing, O Socrates, to consider what the pu-
nishment of the unjust is able to effect, this very thing will teach you that
men think virtue is to be acquired. For no one endued with intellect
punishes him who has acted unjustly, merely because he has so acted; for
he who acts in this manner punishes like a wild beast, irrationally. But he
who endeavours to punish with reason, does not punish for the sake of past
guilt (for that which has been done cannot be undone), but for the sake of
future injustice, that neither this offender himself, nor any other who sees
him punished, may again act unjustly. And he who has this conception must
be persuaded that virtue may be taught: for punishment is inflicted for the
fake of turning others from guilt. All, therefore, that punish, as well privately as publicly, have this opinion. And both other men, and especially the Athenians your fellow citizens, take vengeance on and punish those whom they think have acted unjustly; so that, according to this reasoning, the Athenians also are among the number of those who think that virtue may be acquired and taught. Very properly, therefore, do your fellow citizens admit the brazier and shoemaker to give advice in political concerns; and, as it appears to me, Socrates, it has been sufficiently demonstrated to you that they consider virtue as a thing which may be taught and acquired.

There still, however, remains the doubt which you introduced concerning illustrious men, viz. on what account they teach their sons, and make them wise in things which may be obtained from preceptors, but do not render them better than others in the virtue for which they themselves are renowned. In order to remove this doubt, Socrates, I shall no longer employ a fable, but argument. For thus conceive: whether is there any one thing or not, of which it is necessary all the citizens should partake, or a city cannot subsist? In this thing your doubt is solved, but by no means otherwise. For if there is this one thing, which is neither the art of the architect, nor of the brazier, nor potter, but is justice, and temperance, and holiness, and in short the virtue of man; if this be the thing, of which it is necessary all should partake, and together with which every man should learn and perform whatever else he wishes to learn or do, but by no means without this; or if he does not partake of it, that he should be taught and punished, whether boy, or man, or woman, till through punishment he becomes better; and he who is not obedient, when punished or taught, is banished from the city, or put to death as one incurable; if this then be the case, and those illustrious men teach their children other things, but not this, consider in how wonderful a manner they become excellent men: for we have shown that they think virtue may be taught both privately and publicly. But since it may be taught, do you think that fathers teach their children other things, the ignorance of which is neither attended with death nor a penalty; but that in other things in which a penalty, death, and exile are the punishments attendant on their children, when they are not instructed nor exercised in virtue, and besides death, the confiscation of their goods, and in short the ruin of their families, they neither teach them these things, nor...
nor use their utmost endeavours that they may acquire them? It is necessary to think, Socrates, that fathers, beginning with their children when they are very young, will teach and admonish them as long as they live. For as soon as a boy understands what is said to him, his nurse, mother, pedagogue, and the father himself, strive to the utmost that the boy may become a most excellent character; teaching and pointing out to him, in every word and deed, that this is just, and that unjust; that this is beautiful and that base; and that this is holy, and that unholy: likewise that he should do these things, and not those. And if the boy is willingly persuaded, they think they have done well; but if not, they form him to rectitude by threats and blows, as if he were a distorted and bent piece of wood. In the next place they send him to masters, and these they much more enjoin to pay attention to the morals of the boys, than to the teaching them to read and play on the harp. The preceptors likewise take care of the children; and when the boys have learnt their letters, and their attention is directed to the meaning of what they read, instead of oral precepts, the masters give them the compositions of the best poets to read, and compel them to commit them to memory; because in these there are many admonitions, and many transactions, and praises, and encomiums, of ancient illustrious men, that the boy may be zealous to imitate them, and may desire to become a similar character. The masters of the harp also do other things of a like kind; for they pay attention to temperance, and take care that the boys do not commit any vice. Besides this too, when they have learnt to play on the harp, they teach them the compositions of other good lyric poets, singing them to the harp; and they compel rhythms and harmonies to become familiar to the souls of the boys, that becoming milder, more orderly, and more harmonious, they may be more able both to speak and act; for every life of man requires rhythm and harmony. Further still, besides these things, they send them to masters of exercise, that their bodies being rendered better, may be usefully subservient to the rational part of the soul, and that they may not be compelled to cowardice, through the depravity of their bodies, in war and other actions. And these things are done by those who are most able to do them: but the most able are the most wealthy; and the sons of these begin their exercises the earliest, and continue them the longest. But when they leave their masters, the city compels them to learn the laws, and to live according to the paradigm of these, that they may not
act casually from themselves; but in reality, just as writing masters give their scholars, who have not yet learnt to write well, letters to be traced over by them which they have written, and thus compel them to write conformably to their copy; so the city prescribing laws which were the inventions of illustrious and ancient legislators, compels them to govern and to be governed according to these. But it punishes him who transgresses these; and the name which is given to this punishment, both by you, and in many other places, is 
\textit{corrections,} as if it were justice correcting depravity.

As so much attention therefore is paid, both privately and publicly, to virtue, can you still wonder and doubt, O Socrates, whether virtue may be taught? It is not, however, proper to wonder that it can be taught, but it would be much more wonderful if this were not the case. But why then are unworthy sons frequently the offspring of worthy fathers? Learn again the reason of this. For this is not wonderful, if what I have before said is true, that this thing virtue ought not to be peculiar to any one person, in order to the existence of a city. For if this be the case, as I say (and it is so the most of all things), consider and select any other study and discipline whatever. Thus, for instance, suppose that this city could not subsist unless we were all of us players on the pipe, should we not all apply ourselves to this instrument? and would not every one teach every one, both privately and publicly, to play on it? and would he not reprove him who played unskilfully, and this without any envy? Just as now, no one envies or conceals things just and legal, as is the case in other arts. For mutual justice and virtue are, I think, advantageous to us: and on this account every one most willingly discourses about and teaches things just and legal. If then in playing on the pipe we are thus disposed, with all alacrity and without reserve, to teach each other, do you think, Socrates, said he, that the sons of the most excellent players on the pipe would become good pipers, rather than the sons of bad players on this instrument? I indeed think not; but the boy most happily born for that art would be found to be him who made the greatest proficiency; and he who was not naturally adapted for it would pursue it without glory. And the son of an excellent piper would often be unskilled in that art; and again, a good piper would frequently be the offspring of a bad one. However, they would be all sufficiently excellent, if compared with the unskilful, and with those who know nothing of the piper's art. In like manner think that the man who
who appears to you to be the most unjust of those who are nurtured by the laws, and among men, is just and the artificer of this thing (justice), if he is compared with men, who have neither discipline, nor courts of justice, nor laws, nor any necessity which compels them to pay every attention to virtue, but are mere savages, such as those which Pherecrates the poet caused to be acted last year, during the festivals of Bacchus. And if you should chance to be among such men as the misanthropes in that play, you would rejoice if you met with Eurybates and Phrynendas, and deploring your fortune, you would desire the depravity of our men. But now you are delicate, Socrates, because all men are teachers of virtue to the utmost of their abilities, though no one appears to you to be so. For if you should search for the man who taught us to speak the Greek tongue, he would be no where to be found: nor, if you were to inquire who it is that can teach the sons of manual artificers this very art which they have learnt from their father, and which both the father and the fellow artificers his friends exercise, you would not, I think, O Socrates, easily find the preceptor of these; but it is every where easy to find teachers of the ignorant. And thus it is also with respect to virtue and every thing else. We should likewise rejoice, if he who surpasses us causes us to advance in virtue, though but in a small degree, among the number of which I think I am one, and that I know in a manner, superior to other men, what will contribute to the beautiful and the good, and that I am worthy of the reward which I receive for my instruction, and indeed of more than I receive, as is also the opinion of my disciples. Hence this is the bargain which I usually make: when any one has learnt from me, if he is willing, he pays me the sum of money which I require; but if not, going to a temple and swearing how much the disciplines which I teach are worth, he deposits the sum which he is to pay me. And thus much, said he, O Socrates, I, and the fable, and argument have asserted, to prove that virtue may be taught; and the Athenians also are of the same opinion. We have likewise shown that it is not in any respect wonderful that depraved sons should be the offspring of excellent fathers, since the sons of Polycletus, who are of the same age with Paralus and Xanthippus, are nothing when compared with their father;

1 These were two notorious profligates, who had given occasion for the proverbs, "An action of Eurybates: it is another Phrynendas."
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and in like manner with respect to the sons of other artists. These, however, are not yet to be condemned; for they are young, and hope may be yet entertained of their making a proficiency.

Protagoras therefore, having pointed out these and similar things, ceased to speak; and I having been for a long time charmed, looked still at him, as desiring to hear him still speak. But when I perceived that he had in reality finished his discourse, and when I had with difficulty collected myself, looking to Hippocrates I said, O son of Apollodorus, how much do I thank you for having brought me hither! For I make much of what I have heard from Protagoras; since before this, I thought that it was not human care by which worthy men become worthy, but now I am persuaded that it is. There is however a small impediment to my belief, which Protagoras will doubtless easily remove, since he has unfolded so much. For if some one should discourse with any one of the popular orators, perhaps he would hear arguments of this kind, such as Pericles delivered, or some other eloquent man; but if some one should ask them concerning any thing, they like a book would have nothing to reply, nor any thing to say. And if a man should ask them any trifling particular respecting what was said, they would resemble brass when struck, which keeps and extends its sound for a long time, unless some one lays hold of it. For thus rhetoricians, when asked some trifling thing, reply in an extended speech. But Protagoras here is sufficient to deliver both long and beautiful discourses, as he has just now made it appear; and he is also sufficient, when interrogated, to answer with brevity, and interrogating, to wait for and receive an answer; which can be asserted but of a few. Now then, O Protagoras, I am in want of a certain trifling particular, and if you answer me this, I shall have all that I want. You say that virtue may be taught; and I, if I could be persuaded by any man, should be persuaded by you. But I beseech you to remove the wonder which you excited in my mind while you were speaking. For you say that Jupiter sent justice and shame to men; and afterwards, in many parts of your discourse, you speak of justice, temperance, and sanctity, and of all these collectively, as if virtue were but one thing. Accurately explain to me, therefore, this very thing, whether virtue is one certain thing, but the parts of it are justice, temperance, and sanctity; or whether all these which I have just now mentioned are names of one and the same thing. This it is which
which I still desire to know.—But it is easy, said he, Socrates, to answer
this question, that virtue being one thing, the particulars which you have ad-
duced are the parts of it.—But whether, said I, are they parts, in the same
manner as the mouth, nostrils, eyes and ears are parts of the face? or are
they parts like the parts of gold, which do not differ from each other and
the whole, except in magnitude and parvitude?—It appears to me, Socrates,
that the parts of virtue have the same relation to the whole, as the parts of
the face to the whole face.—Whether then, said I, do different men receive
a different part of virtue? or is it necessary that he who receives one part
should possess all the parts of virtue?—By no means, said he; since many
men are brave, but unjust; and others again are just, but not wise.—But,
said I, are these parts of virtue, viz. wisdom and fortitude?—Certainly, the
most of all things, he replied; and the greatest of all the parts, is wisdom.—
But, said I, of these parts, is this one thing, and that another?—Yes—Has
each of them also its proper power; in the same manner as each of the parts
of the face? As for instance, the eye is not similar to the ears, nor is the
power of it the same; nor do any of the other parts resemble each other,
nor are their powers the same, nor are they mutually similar in any other
respect. Is it therefore thus also with the parts of virtue, so that the one
does not resemble the other, neither in itself, nor in its power? Or is it not
evident that it is so, since it is similar to the paradigm which we have intro-
duced?—But it does thus subdivide, Socrates, said he.—And I replied, no other
part of virtue therefore, is such as science, nor such as justice, nor such as
fortitude, nor such as temperance, nor such as sanctity.—It is not, said he.

But come, said I, let us consider in common what kind of a thing each of
these is. And, in the first place, is justice a certain thing, or is it nothing?
For to me it appears to be something. But what does it appear to you to
be?—That it is also something.—What then? If some one should ask you
and me, O Protagoras and Socrates, tell me with respect to this very thing
which you have just now named justice, whether it is just or unjust? I in-
deed should answer him that it is just. But what would you say? would
your answer be the same with mine or not?—The same, said he.—I there-
fore should say that justice is a thing similar to the being just, in reply to
the interrogator. And would not you also assert the same?—Yes, said he.—
If then, after this, he should ask us, Do you also say that sanctity is
something?
something? we should reply, I think, that we do.—We should, said he.—But whether do you say that this very thing sanctity is actually adapted to be unholy, or to be holy? For my part, I should be indignant with this question, and should say, Predict better things, O man: for by no means will any thing else be holy unless holiness itself be holy. But what do you say? would not you thus answer?—Entirely so, said he.—If then, after this he should say, asking us, How then have ye spoken a little before? Or have I not rightly understood you? For you appear to me to assert that the parts of virtue subsisted in such a manner with respect to each other, that one of them does not resemble the other; I should reply, that as to other things, you have understood rightly, but you are mistaken in thinking that I also have said this: for Protagoras gave this answer, but I interrogated him. If then he should say, he speaks the truth, Protagoras: for you say that one part of virtue does not resemble another. This is your assertion. What would be your answer to him?—It is necessary, said he, Socrates, to acknowledge it.—What then, O Protagoras, assenting to these things, shall we answer him, if he should add, holiness therefore is not of such a nature as to be a just thing, nor is justice such as a holy thing, but such as that which is not holy; and holiness is such as that which is not just. So that what is just is unholy. What shall we say to him in reply? For I, for my own part, should say that justice is holy, and that holiness is just. And for you, if you will permit me, I should reply this very thing, that either justice is the same with holiness, or that it is most similar to it; and that the most of all things, justice is such as holiness, and holiness such as justice. But see whether you hinder me from giving this answer; or does this also appear to you to be the case?—It does not entirely, said he, Socrates, appear to me to be simply thus, so as to grant that justice is holy, and holiness just; but there appears to me to be a certain difference between them. However, of what consequence is this? For, if you will, let justice be holy, and let holiness be just.—I have nothing to do, said I, with I will; and if it is agreeable to you, let it be reprobated. And let us also be persuaded that the subject of our conversation will be discussed in the best manner, when the particle if is removed from it.—But indeed, he replied, justice has something similar to holiness. For one thing always resembles another in a certain respect, contraries alone excepted: for white has no similitude to black, nor hard to soft; and so with respect to
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to other things which appear to be most contrary to each other, and which,
as we before observed, possess another power, and of which one does not re­semble the other. But there are other things, such as the parts of the face, in
which the one is similar to the other. So that although you should confute
these things after this manner, if you are of opinion that all things are
similar to each other, yet it is not just to call those things similar which pos­sesses a certain similitude to each other; as neither is it just to call those things
which possess a certain diffimilitude, dissimilar, though they have but very
little of the similar.—And I wondering, said to him, do the just and the
holy appear to you to be so mutually related, as to possess but a small degree
of similitude to each other?—Not entirely so, said he; nor yet again, do I
consider them in the same way as you appear to me to consider them.—But
I replied, Since these things do not seem to be agreeable to you, we will
dismiss them, and consider this other thing which you say. What do you
call folly? Do you not say that wisdom is perfectly contrary to it?—To
me it appears to be so, said he.—But when men act rightly and profitably,
do they then appear to you to act temperately; or when they act in a con­trary manner?—They appear to me, said he, to act temperately, when they
act rightly and profitably.—And do they not act temperately by temperance?
It is necessary.—Do not therefore those that act wrongly, act foolishly, and
thus acting, not act by temperance?—I agree with you, said he, that they do.—
The acting foolishly, therefore, is the contrary to acting temperately.—He
said it was.—Are not, therefore, things which are done foolishly, so done by
folly, but by temperance things which are done temperately?—He granted
it.—If then any thing is done by strength, is it not done strongly, and if by
weakness, weakly.—So it appears.—And if any thing is done with swiftness,
is it not done swiftly, and if with slowness, slowly?—He said it was.—And if
any thing is done after the same manner, is it not done by the same, and if
in a contrary manner by the contrary?—He granted it.—Come then, I re­plied, is there something beautiful?—He admitted there was.—And is any
thing contrary to this except the base?—There is not.—But what? Is there
something good? And is any thing contrary to this except evil?—There is
not.—Is there also something acute in voice?—He said there is.—And is any
thing contrary to this except the grave?—There is not, said he.—To every
one of contraries therefore, I replied, there is only one contrary, and not
many.
many.—He granted it.—Let us then, said I, repeat the particulars to which we have assented. We have acknowledged that there is only one contrary to one thing, but not more than one.—We have.—But that which is done contrarily is done by things contrary.—He admitted it.—We also granted that what is done foolishly is done in a manner contrary to that which is done temperately.—He said we did.—But that which is done temperately is done by temperance, and that which is done foolishly, by folly.—He granted it.—But if a thing is done contrarily, is it not done by a contrary?—Yes.—And the one is done by temperance, and the other by folly.—Yes.—And are they not done contrarily?—Entirely so.—Are they not therefore done by contraries?—Yes.—Folly therefore is contrary to temperance.—So it appears.—Do you remember, then, that it was before acknowledged by us, that folly is contrary to wisdom?—He agreed that it was.—And did we not also say, that there is only one contrary to one thing.—We did.—Which therefore of these positions, O Protagoras, shall we reject? That which says there is only one contrary to one thing, or that in which it is asserted, that wisdom is different from temperance? but that each is a part of virtue? And that besides being different, both they and their powers are dissimilar, in the same manner as the parts of the face? Which therefore of these shall we reject? for both of them are not very musically asserted; since they do not accord, nor coharmonize with each other. For how can they accord, if it be necessary that there should only be one contrary to one thing, but not to more than one? But to folly, which is one thing, wisdom and temperance have appeared to be contrary. Is it so, said I, O Protagoras, or not?—He acknowledged that it was so, but very unwillingly.—Will not, therefore, temperance and wisdom be one thing? And again, prior to this, it appeared to us that justice and sanctity were nearly the same thing. But come, said I, Protagoras, let us not be weary, but consider what remains. Does it then appear to you that a man who acts unjustly is wise, because he acts unjustly?—I, said he, Socrates, should be ashamed to acknowledge this, though it is asserted by many men.—Whether then shall we address ourselves to them, or to you?—If you are willing, said he, speak first to this assertion of the many.—But it makes no difference to me, if you only answer, whether these things appear to you or not; for I especially direct my attention to the assertion. It may, however, perhaps happen, that I shall both explore myself interrogating, and him who answers.
At first, therefore, Protagoras began to assume some consequence (for he was averse to discuss this affair, and said it was difficult); but afterwards he submitted to answer.—Come then, said I, answer me from the beginning: Do certain persons who act unjustly, appear to you to be wise?—Let them be so, said he.—And does not the being wise consist in consulting well, even when they act unjustly?—Be it so, said he.—But whether, I replied, does this take place if they do well, acting unjustly, or if they do ill?—If they do well.—Do you then say that certain things are good?—I do.—Whether, therefore, said I, are those things good which are advantageous to men?—By Jupiter, said he, they are; and I also call some things good, though they are not advantageous to men. And Protagoras, when he said this, appeared to me to be ruffled, afraid, and averse to answer. Seeing him, therefore, in this condition, I cautiously and gradually interrogated him; and I said, Whether, O Protagoras, do you speak of things which are advantageous to no man, or of those which are in no respect advantageous? And do you call such things as these good?—By no means, said he; but I know many things which are useless to men, meats and drinks, and medical potions, and ten thousand other things; and I also know some things which are advantageous to them. There are likewise some things which are by no means profitable to men, but are beneficial to horses; some which are advantageous to oxen only; and others to dogs: others again which are beneficial to no one of these, but to trees; and others which are good to the roots of trees, but pernicious to their blossoms. Thus, for instance, dung is beneficial to the roots of all trees when thrown upon them; but if you were to throw it on their branches and shoots, you would destroy them all. Thus too, oil is a very excellent thing for all plants: but is most hostile to the hairs of all animals except man. For it is beneficial to the hairs of man, and to the rest of his body. And so diversified and all-various a thing is good, that this very thing, oil, is good to the external parts of the body of man, but is most pernicious to his inward parts. And on this account all physicians forbid the use of oil; or at least only permit them to use it in a very small degree, and just sufficient to correct the bad smell of the food which they take.

Protagoras having thus spoken, those that were present loudly applauded him as one that had made a good speech. And I said, O Protagoras, I am a man naturally forgetful, and if any one makes a long discourse to me, I forget what
what was the subject of his discourse. As, therefore, if I were deaf, and you
intended to discourse with me, it would be necessary for you to speak a little
louder to me than to others; so now, since you happen to have met with a for­
getful man, cut your answers for me, and make them shorter, if you wish that
I should follow you.—How would you have me shorten my answers? Must
I answer you, said he, shorter than is necessary?—By no means, I replied.—
But as much as is proper, said he?—Yes, said I.—Whether, therefore, must
my reply be such as appears to me to be necessary, or such as appears to be
so to you?—I have heard, I replied, that you can both speak with prolixity
yourself about the same things, and teach another to do the same, so as
never to be in want of words; and again, that you can speak with brevity,
so that no one can deliver himself in fewer words than you. If, therefore,
you intend to discourse with me, use the other method, that of speaking with
brevity.—O Socrates, said he, I have had verbal contests with many men,
and if I had done this which you urge me to do, viz. if I had spoken as my
antagonist ordered me to speak, I should not have appeared to excel any one;
nor would the name of Protagoras have been celebrated in Greece.—And
I (for I knew that the former answers did not please him, and that he would
not be willing to answer my interrogations) thought that I had no longer
any business in the conference. I therefore said, O Protagoras, I do not
defire you to discourse with me contrary to your will; but if you are disposed
to converse so that I can follow you, then I will discourse with you. For
you, according to report, and as you yourself say, are able to speak both with
prolixity and brevity: for you are wise. But I am unable to make these
long speeches; though I wish that I had the ability. It is fit, however, that
you, who are capable of doing both, should yield to my inability, in order
that conversation may take place. But now, as you are not willing to do this,
and a certain business prevents me from staying to hear your long speeches,
I must depart whither it is requisite I should go; though perhaps it would not
be unpleasant to me to hear these things from you.—And at the same time
having thus spoken, I rose in order to go. But as I was rising, Callias taking
hold of me with his right hand, and of my cloak with his left, said, We shall
not dismiss you, Socrates: for if you depart, our conversation will be at an
end. I beseech you, therefore, stay with us: for there is not any one thing
which I would more willingly hear than you and Protagoras discoursing
together.
together. Gratify all of us therefore.—And I said (for I was now standing as being ready to go), O son of Hipponicus, I have always admired your philosophy; but I now both praise and love it; so that I should wish to gratify you, if you request of me possibilities. But at present, it is just as if you should desire me to run a race with Crisò the Himeraean, who is now in the vigour of youth, or with one of those who run and accomplish the longest course, or with some diurnal courier; I should say to you, that I wish more than you do that I could keep pace with these runners, but that I cannot. If, therefore, you would see me and Crisò running a race together, you must request him to keep pace with me: for I am not able to run swiftly, but he is able to run slowly. In like manner, if you desire to hear me and Protagoras, you must request him, that as he at first answered me with brevity the questions that were asked, he will now also answer me in the same manner: for if he does not, what will be the mode of our discourse? I indeed thought that it is one thing to converse together, and another to harangue.—But you see Socrates, said Callias, that Protagoras appears to speak justly, when he says that he ought to be permitted to speak as he pleases, and you as you please. Alcibiades, therefore, taking up the discourse, said, You do not speak well Callias: for Socrates here acknowledges that he cannot make a long speech, and in this yields to Protagoras. But in the ability of discourse, and knowing how to question and answer, I should wonder if he yielded to any man. If, therefore, Protagoras confesses that he is inferior to Socrates in disputation, it is sufficient for Socrates; but if he denies it, let him dispute, both by questioning and answering, without making a long speech to every interrogation, and without deviating from the subject so as to prevent another from speaking, and lengthening his discourse till the greater part of the auditors forget what was the subject of investigation. For as for Socrates, I will be security for him that he will not forget any thing: since he only Jeffrey when he says he is forgetful. To me, therefore, Socrates appears to be more reasonable in what he demands: for it is fit that every one should declare his own opinion. But after Alcibiades, it was Critias, I think, who said, O Prodicus and Hippias, Callias indeed appears to me to be very much for Protagoras; but Alcibiades is always fond of contention in every thing to which he applies himself. We, however, ought not to contend with each other, either for Socrates or Protagoras, but we should request both of them
in common not to dissolve the conference in the middle. But he having thus spoken, Prodicus said, You appear to me, Critias, to speak well: for it is requisite that those who are present at these conferences should be the common, but by no means equal auditors of both speakers. For these two are not the same: for it is requisite to hear both in common, but not to distribute equally to either; but to the wiser more, and to the more unlearned less. I indeed, O Protagoras and Socrates, think that you ought to concede something to each other, and to contend together, but not to quarrel: for friends contend with friends through benevolence; but adversaries and enemies quarrel with each other. And thus this conference will be conducted in the most beautiful manner. For you, the speakers, will be especially approved, I do not say praised, by us the hearers: for auditors approve from their soul without deception; but praise is frequently bestowed in words, falsely, contrary to the real opinion. And thus again, we, the hearers, shall be especially delighted, but not pleasurably affected: for he is delighted who learns any thing and participates of wisdom in his dianoetic part; but he is pleasurably affected who eats something, or is passive to some other pleasant sensation in his body.

Prodicus having thus spoken, many of those that were present approved what he said. But after Prodicus, Hippias the wise thus addressed them:—I consider all ye that are present as kinsmen, friends, and fellow-citizens by nature, and not by law: for the similar is naturally allied to the similar. But law being the tyrant of men, compels many things to be done contrary to nature. It would be disgraceful, therefore, if we who know the nature of things, who are the wisest of the Greeks, and who are now come for the purpose of displaying our knowledge into the very prytaneum itself of wisdom, and into this house, which is the greatest and most fortunate in the city, should exhibit nothing worthy of this dignity, but disagree with each other like the vilest of men. I therefore both request and advise you, O Protagoras and Socrates, to submit yourselves to us, as if we were arbitrators assembled for the purpose of bringing you to an agreement. Nor do you, Socrates, pursue this accurate form of dialogue, which is so very concise, unless it is agreeable to Protagoras; but give up the reins to discourse, that it may appear to us to be more magnificent and elegant. Nor do you, Protagoras, extending all your ropes, fly with swelling sails into the wide sea of discourse,
discourse, and lose sight of shore: but let both endeavour to preserve a middle course. Be persuaded also by me, and let some moderator and president be chosen, who shall oblige each of you to keep within bounds.—This expedient pleased those that were present, and all of them praised it. And Callicles said, that he would not suffer me to go, and required me to choose a moderator. I therefore said, that it would be disgraceful to select a judge of our discourses: for if he be our inferior, it will not be right that the subordinate should preside over the more excellent; and if he be our equal, neither thus will it be right. For he who is just such a one as we are, will act similarly to us; so that the choice will be vain. But to choose one better than we are, is, I think, in reality impossible: since one wiser than Protagoras here cannot be chosen. And if you should choose a man in no respect more able, but whom you assert however to be so, this also will be disgraceful to Protagoras, by subjecting him to a president, as if he were some contemptible person: for it makes no difference as to myself. I am willing, therefore, to act as follows, that conversation and dialogue may take place between us, which are the objects of your desire: If Protagoras is not willing to answer, let him interrogate, and I will answer; and at the same time I will endeavour to show him in what manner I say he who is interrogated ought to answer. But when I reply to that which he may be willing to ask, he again in a similar manner shall reply to me. If, therefore, he shall appear not to be cheerfully disposed to answer the interrogation, both you and I in common must demand of him, that which you now demand of me, not to dissolve the conversation. Nor for the sake of this is there any occasion to appoint a president: for all of you will be presidents in common.—It appeared to all that this was what ought to be done. And Protagoras, indeed, was not very willing to comply; but at the same time he was compelled to content to interrogate; and that when he had sufficiently interrogated, he would in his turn answer with brevity. He began therefore as follows:

I think, said he, O Socrates, that the greatest part of a man’s erudition consists in being skilful in poetical compositions. But this is the ability of knowing what is well or ill said by the poets, so as to be capable of assigning a reason when interrogated concerning their poems. And now indeed let the question be respecting virtue, the subject of our present discourse; differing only in this, that the disquisition is transferred to poetry. Simonides then says
says to Scopas, the son of Creon the Thessalian, "That it is difficult to become a truly good man, so as in hands, feet, and intellect, to be fashioned a blameless square." Do you know the verse, or shall I repeat the whole passage to you?—And I said, there is no necessity for this; for I know, and have paid great attention to the verse.—You speak well, said he. Whether, therefore, does Simonides appear to you to have done well and rightly, or not?—Very well, said I, and rightly.—But does the poet appear to you to have done well if he contradicts himself?—By no means, I replied.—Consider more attentively, said he.—But, my good man, I have sufficiently considered it.—You know therefore, said he, that in the course of the poem he says, "The assertion of Pittacus does not please me, though it was delivered by a wise man, viz. that it is difficult to continue to be a good man." Do you understand that the same person made this and the former assertion?—I do, I replied.—Does it therefore, said he, appear to you that these things accord with those?—To me they do appear to accord. And at the same time fearing lest he should say any thing in addition, I said, But do they not appear to do so to you?—How, he replied; can he who made both these assertions accord with himself, when he first says, that it is difficult to become a truly good man, and a little after, forgetting what he had asserted, he blames Pittacus for saying the same thing that he had said, viz. that it is difficult to continue to be a good man, though it is evident that in blaming him who said this, he also blames himself? So that either the former or the latter assertion is not right.—Protagoras having thus spoken, many of the auditors made a noise, and applauded him. And I indeed at first, as if I had been struck by a skilful pugilist, was incapable of seeing, and became giddy, on his saying these things, and the rest making a tumult; but afterwards (to tell you the truth), that I might have time to consider what the poet said, I turned myself to Prodicus, and calling him, I said, Simonides, O Prodicus, was your fellow-citizen, and it is just that you should assist the man. I appear therefore to myself to call upon you, in the same manner as Homer says Scamander called upon Simois when besieged by Achilles, "Dear brother, let us both join to repel the prowess of this man." For I say the same to you, let us take care that Simonides be not subdued by Protagoras. For in order to assist Simonides, that elegant device of yours is requisite, by which you distinguish between to will

1 Iliad xxii. v. 308.
and to desire, as not being the same, and by which you have just now said many and beautiful things. And now consider whether the same thing appears to you as to me: for I do not think that Simonides contradicts himself. But do you, Prodicus, first declare your opinion. Does it appear to you that to become is the same as to be, or that it is something different?—Something different, by Jupiter, said Prodicus.—Does not Simonides then, said I, in the first assertion, declare his own opinion, that it is difficult to become a truly good man?—You speak the truth, said Prodicus.—But he blames Pittacus, I replied, not as Protagoras thinks, for saying the same thing that he had said, but for asserting something different from it. For Pittacus does not say this, that it is difficult to become a good man, as Simonides does, but that it is difficult to continue to be so. But as Prodicus says, to be is not the same as to become. And if this be the case, Simonides does not contradict himself. And perhaps Prodicus here, and many others, may say with Hesiod, "It is difficult to become good: for the gods have placed sweat before virtue. But he who has arrived at the summit will find that to be easy, which it was difficult to acquire." Prodicus therefore having heard these things, praised me; but Protagoras said, your emendation, Socrates, is more erroneous than that which you correct.—And I said, Then I have done ill, as it seems, O Protagoras, and I am a ridiculous physician; since by attempting to cure, I increase the disease.—Thus however it is, said he.—But how? I replied.—The poet, said he, would have been very ignorant, if he had asserted that virtue is so vile a thing that it may be easily acquired, though, as it appears to all men, its possession is the most difficult of all things.—And I said, by Jupiter, Prodicus here, is opportunely present at our conference. For the wisdom of Prodicus appears, O Protagoras, to be of great antiquity, whether it originated from Simonides, or from a source still more antient. But you, who are skilled in many other things, appear to be unskilled in this, and not skilled in it as I am, in consequence of being the disciple of this Prodicus. And now you appear to me not to understand that this thing which is said to be difficult, was not perhaps so apprehended by Simonides, as you apprehend it; but it is with that as with the word deinos, concerning which Prodicus continually admonishes me, when in praising you, or any other, I say, that

1 Op. et Dier.
Protagoras is a wise and skilful (δισμος) man, by asking me if I am not ashamed to call things excellent. For to δεισις, says he, signifies something bad. Hence no one says dreadful riches, nor dreadful peace, nor dreadful health; but every one says dreadful disease, and dreadful war, and dreadful poverty, as if that which is (δεισις) deinon, is bad. Perhaps, therefore, the inhabitants of Ceos and Simonides apprehended by the word difficult (χρωμως) either that which is bad, or something different from what you conceive it to mean.

Let us therefore inquire of Prodicus (for it is just to ask him the signification of words employed by Simonides); What, O Prodicus, does Simonides mean by the word difficult?—He meant, said he, bad.—On this account, therefore, I replied, he blames Pittacus for saying that it is difficult to continue to be good, just as if he had heard him saying, that it is bad to continue to be good.—But what else, Socrates, said he, do you think Simonides intended, than to blame Pittacus because he did not know how to distinguish terms rightly, as being a Lesbian, and educated in a barbarous language?—Do you hear Prodicus, said I, O Protagoras? And have you any thing to say to these things?—This is very far, O Prodicus, said Protagoras, from being the case; for I well know that Simonides meant by the word difficult, not that which is bad, but that which we and others mean by it, viz. a thing which is not easy, but is accomplished through many labours.—But I also think, I replied, that Simonides meant this, and that Prodicus knows that he did; but he jests, and is willing to try whether you can defend your assertion. For that Simonides did not by the word difficult mean any thing bad, is very much confirmed by what he adds immediately after: for he says, that Divinity alone possesses this honourable gift. He does not indeed say, that it is bad to continue to be good, and afterwards add that Divinity alone possesses this, and attribute this honour to Divinity alone: for if this were the case, Prodicus should have called Simonides a profligate, and not a divine man. But I wish to tell you what Simonides appears to me to have understood in this verse, if you think proper to make trial of my poetical skill. Or, if it is agreeable to you, I will hear you.—Protagoras, therefore, hearing me thus speak, said, Do so, if you please, Socrates: but Prodicus, Hippias, and the rest, very much urged.

* Instead of εολαγων ειμι, as in the printed text, it is necessary to read, as in our version, εολαγων: 

κεις; as Dacier also well observes.
me to do it.—I will endeavour then, said I, to explain to you my conceptions respecting this verse.

Philosophy is very antient among the Greeks, and particularly in Crete and Lacedæmon; and there are more sophists there than in any other country. They dissemble, however, and pretend that they are unlearned, in order that it may not be manifest that they surpass the rest of the Greeks in wisdom (just as Protagoras has said respecting the sophists); but that they may appear to excel in military skill and fortitude; thinking if their real character were known, that all men would engage in the same pursuit. But now, concealing this, they deceive those who laconize in other cities. For there are some that in imitation of them cut their ears, have a cord for their girdle, are lovers of severe exercise, and use short garments, as if the Lacedæmonians surpassed in these things the other Greeks. But the Lacedæmonians, when they wish to speak freely with their own sophists, and are weary of conversing with them privately, expel these laconic imitators, and then discourse with their sophists, without admitting any strangers to be present at their conversations. Neither do they suffer any of their young men to travel into other cities, as neither do the Cretans, lest they should unlearn what they have learnt. But in these cities, there are not only men of profound erudition, but women also. And that I assert these things with truth, and that the Lacedæmonians are disciplined in the best manner in philosophy and discourse, you may know from the following circumstance: For if any one wishes to converse with the meanest of the Lacedæmonians, he will at first find him, for the most part apparently despicable in conversation, but afterwards, when a proper opportunity presents itself, this same mean person, like a skilful jaculator, will hurl a sentence worthy of attention, short, and contorted; so that he who converses with him will appear to be in no respect superior to a boy. That to laconize, therefore, consists much more in philosophising, than in the love of exercise, is understood by some of the present age, and was known to the antients; they being persuaded that the ability of uttering such sentences as these is the province of a man perfectly learned. Among the number of those who were thus persuaded, were Thales the Mileonian, Pittacus the Mitylenæan, Bias the Prienean, our Solon, Cleobulus the Lindian, Mifo the Chenean, and the seventh of these is said to be the Lacedæmonian Chilo. All these were emulators,
lators, lovers, and disciples of the Lacedæmonian erudition. And any one may learn that their wisdom was a thing of this kind, viz, short sentences uttered by each and worthy to be remembered. These men also assembling together, consecrated to Apollo the first fruits of their wisdom, writing in the Temple of Apollo at Delphi those sentences which are celebrated by all men, viz. "Know thyself," and "Nothing too much." But on what account do I mention these things? To show that the mode of philosophy among the antients was a certain laconic brevity of diction. But the sentence which is ascribed to Pittacus in particular, and which is celebrated by the wise, is this: "It is difficult to continue to be good." Simonides, therefore, as being ambitious of wisdom, knew that if he could overthow this sentence, and triumph over it like a renowned athletic, he himself would be celebrated by the men of his own time. In opposition to this sentence, therefore, and with a view to renown, he composed the whole of this poem, as it appears to me. Let all of us, however, in common, consider whether what I assert is true.

In the first place, then, the very beginning of the poem would indicate that its author was insane, if he, wishing to say that it is difficult to become a good man, had afterwards inserted the particle (μη) indeed. For this would appear to have been inserted for no purpose. Unless it should be said, that Simonides in what he says contends as it were against the sentence of Pittacus: and that Pittacus, having asserted that it is difficult to continue to be good, Simonides disputing this, says it is not difficult; but it is difficult indeed, O Pittacus, to become a good man, and to be truly good. For he does not use the word truly, as if there were some men that are truly good, and others that are good indeed, but not truly so (for this would have been stupid and unworthy of Simonides); but it is necessary to consider the word truly as an hyperbaton² in the verse; and we must suppose Pittacus speaking, as if there was a dialogue between him and Simonides, and saying, O men, it is difficult to continue to be good; but Simonides answering, O Pittacus, your assertion is not true: for it is not difficult to be truly good, but to become so, in hands and feet, and intellect, being fashioned a blameless square.

² An hyperbaton is a rhetorical figure, and signifies the transposition of words from their plain grammatical order.
And thus it appears that the particle indeed is introduced with reason, and that the word truly is rightly added in the last place. All that follows likewise testifies that this is the meaning of the passage. There are also many sentences in this poem, each of which might be proved to be well written; for it is very elegantly and accurately composed. To evince this, however, would take up too much time; but let us summarily consider the whole form and intention of the poem, that we may show that the design of it throughout is more than anything to confute that sentence of Pittacus. For a little after he says, as follows: "It is indeed truly difficult to become a good man; yet for a certain time it is possible to be so. But having become a good man, to continue in this habit, and to be a good man, (as you say¹, O Pittacus,) is impossible. For this is not human, but Divinity alone possesses this honourable gift. For man, who may be overwhelmed by unexpected calamity, cannot continue free from vice.

Whom, then, does an unexpected calamity overwhelm in the government of a ship? Evidently not an idiot; for the idiot is always overwhelmed. As therefore no one throws to the ground him who is lying on it, but sometimes he who stands upright is thrown down, so as to be prostrate; but this is never the case with him who is already prostrate; so an unexpected calamity may sometimes overwhelm a skilful man, but never him who is always unskilful. And a mighty storm bursting on the head of the pilot may render him unskilful; bad seasons may confound the husbandman; and things similar to these may be applied to the physician: for a good may indeed become a bad man. And this is also testified by another poet, who says, "A good man is sometimes bad, and sometimes worthy." But it is not possible for a bad man to become bad, but it is always necessary that he should be so. So that when an unexpected calamity overwhelms a skilful, wise, and good man, it is not possible for him not to be wicked. But you, O Pittacus, say, that it is difficult to continue to be good. The truth however is this, that it is difficult indeed, but possible, to become good; but impossible to continue to be good. For every man who acts well is good; but bad if he acts ill. What then is a good action with respect to literature? and what makes a man excellent in literature? Evidently the being disciplined in it. What

Meaning that it is impossible for man in the present life to continue invariably good.
good action likewise makes a good physician? Evidently the learning the art of curing the sick. For a good physician cures properly, but a bad one improperly. Who is it then that becomes a bad physician? Evidently the man to whom it belongs in the first place to be a physician, and in the next place to be a good physician; for he may become a bad physician. But we who are ignorant of the medicinal art, can never by acting ill become bad physicians; nor being ignorant of architecture can we become bad architects, or any thing else of this kind. But whoever does not become a physician by acting ill, it is evident that neither is he a bad physician. Thus also a good man may sometimes become a bad man, either from time, or labour, or disease, or from some other circumstance (for this alone is a bad action to be deprived of science); but a bad man can never become bad (for he is always to); but if he is to become bad, it is necessary that prior to this he should have been good. So that to this also the verses of Simonides tend, that it is not possible to be a good man, so as to be perseveringly good; but that it is possible to become a good man, and for this same good to become a bad man. And also that for the most part, those are the best men whom the gods love. All these things therefore are said against Pittacus, which the verses following these still more clearly evince. For he says, "Wherefore I shall not explore in vain and hope for that which cannot be found, viz. a man nourished by the fruits of the earth, who lives a blameless life and is perpetually good." Afterwards he adds, "I will tell you when I have found him." So vehemently, and through the whole of the poem, does he attack the saying of Pittacus. He also adds, "I willingly praise and love the man, who does nothing base; and the gods themselves are not able to contend with necessity." And this likewise is said in opposition to Pittacus. For Simonides was not so unlearned as to say that he praised him who willingly did nothing bad, as if there were some who committed base actions willingly. For I nearly think this, that no wise man considers any man as erring voluntarily, and as acting basely and wickedly with the concurrence of his will; but he well knows that all those who act basely and wickedly, do so involuntarily. But

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1 In the original here there is nothing more than κακοδ. δε κακος; but from the version of Ficinus, it appears that the words αγαθος γαρ ιητερος διστηντει κακος must be supplied as in our translation. The sense indeed evidently requires this addition.
Simonides does not speak as if he said, that he praises the man who does not unwillingly do wrong, but he says this word willingly of himself. For he thought that a worthy and good man is frequently compelled to love and praise a certain person. Thus, for instance, it often happens that a man has a monstrous father, or mother, or country, or something else of this kind. Depraved characters, therefore, when any thing of this nature happens to them, are in the first place glad to see it, and in the next place blame and every where divulge the depravity of their parents or country, that they may not be accused of having neglected these, nor fall into disgrace for their neglect. Hence they blame their parents or country in a still greater degree, and add voluntary to necessary enmity. But the worthy man conceals the faults of his parents or country, and if any unjust conduct has led him to be enraged with them, he is their mediator to himself, and compels them to love and praise their own offspring. I also think that Simonides himself frequently praised and was the encomiast of a tyrant, or some other character of this kind; and this not willingly, but by compulsion. This, then, is what he says to Pittacus; “I, O Pittacus, do not blame you, from being myself one who loves to blame: for I am satisfied if a man is not wicked, nor very indolent, as knowing that a sane man benefits his country. Nor will I find fault; since I am not a lover of detraction. For the race of fools is infinite; so that he who delights in blaming will be satiated with it. All things, indeed, are beautiful with which such as are base are not mingled.” His meaning however in this, is not as if he had said, all things are white with which black is not mingled (for this would be very ridiculous), but he intends to signify that he admits mediocrity, so as not to blame it. “And I do not seek,” says he, “a man perfectly blameless, or expect to find him among such as gather the fruits of the wide-bosomed earth: for I will tell you when I find such a one. So that on this account I shall praise no one as perfect. But I am satisfied with a man of moderate excellence, and who does no ill: and all such as these I both love and praise.” Here too he uses the language of the Mitylenæans as speaking to Pittacus, and saying, “I willingly praise and love all these.” But here it is necessary to consider the word willingly as connected with the words “Who does nothing base,” and to separate it from the verse in which he says, “There are also those whom I unwillingly praise and love. You therefore, O Pittacus, I should never have blamed,
blamed, if you had spoken of that equitable and true mediocrity; but now, though you are very much mistaken about things of the greatest moment, yet you appear to speak the truth, and on this account I blame you.”—It appears to me, said I, O Prodicus and Protagoras, that Simonides composed this poem in consequence of these conceptions.

Then Hippias answering said, You seem to me, Socrates, to have well explained these verses: and I also have something pertinent to say concerning them, which, if you please, I will point out to you.—Do so, O Hippias, said Alcibiades, but let it be at another time; for now it is just to attend to the coincidence in opinion of Protagoras and Socrates with each other. And indeed, if Protagoras wishes still to interrogate, Socrates should answer; but if he wishes to reply to Socrates, then Socrates should interrogate.—And I said, I leave it to Protagoras to do whichever of the two is more agreeable to him: but if he is willing, let us dismiss any further consideration about the verses. And I would gladly, O Protagoras, complete with you the discussion of those things, concerning which I at first interrogated you. For it appears to me, that a discourse about poetry is most similar to the banquets of vile and rustic men; since these, not being, able, through the want of education, to converse with each other while they are drinking, in their own language, and with their own words, introduce the players on the flute as honourable persons, hire at a great expense a foreign voice, viz. that of flutes, and through the sound of these associate with each other. But when worthy, good, and well-educated men feast together, you will see neither pipers, nor dancers, nor fingers, but they being sufficient to converse with themselves, without these trifles and sportive amusements, speak in their own language, and in a becoming manner reciprocally hear each other, even though they have drank a considerable quantity of wine. In like manner, such conversations as the present, when they are between men such as most of us assert ourselves to be, require no foreign voice, nor poets, of whom it is impossible to ask the meaning of what they say, and to whom most of those by whom they are cited attribute different conceptions, without being able to explain their real meaning. Wise men, therefore, bid farewell to such conferences as these, but converse with each other through themselves, and in their discourses make trial of each other's skill. It appears to me, that you and I ought rather to imitate conferences
conferences of this kind, laying aside the poets, and discoursing with each other through ourselves, make trial of the truth of ourselves. And if you wish still to interrogate, I am prepared to answer you; but if you do not wish it, impart yourself to me, and assist me in giving completion to those things, the discussion of which we left unfinished.—When I had said these and other such like things, Protagoras did not clearly signify what part he would take. Alcibiades, therefore, looking to Callias, said, Does Protagoras, O Callias, appear to you to do well, in not now being willing to say clearly, whether he will answer or not? For to me he does not; but let him say, whether he is willing or not willing to converse, that we may know this from him, and that Socrates may converse with some other person, or that some one of the company who is so disposed may discourse with some other.—And Protagoras, as it seemed to me, being ashamed in consequence of Alcibiades thus speaking, and Callias, and nearly all those that were present, soliciting him, scarcely at length agreed to dispute, and desired me to interrogate him that he might answer.

I then said to him, O Protagoras, do not think that I shall converse with you with any other design, than that those things may be discussed of which I am continually in doubt. For I think that Homer speaks very much to the purpose, when he says, “When two come together, the one apprehends prior to the other.” For with respect to us men, we are all of us more prompt in every deed, and word, and conception, when collected together. But he who thinks of any thing by himself alone, immediately searches for some one to whom he may communicate it, and from whom he may derive stability till he meets with the object of his search. Just as I, also, for the sake of this, more willingly converse with you than with any other, thinking that you discriminate the best of all men, both about other things which it is likely a worthy man would make the object of his consideration, and also concerning virtue. For what other person can do this besides you? Since you not only think yourself to be a worthy and good man, as some others also are indeed themselves worthy, but are not able to make others so; but you are both worthy yourself, and are able to make others good. And you have such confidence in yourself, that while others conceal this art, you openly proclaim yourself to all the Greeks to be a sophist, declare that you are a master of erudition and virtue, and you are the first that has thought
fit to set a price on his instructions. Is it not proper, therefore, to call upon you to the consideration of these things, and to interrogate and communicate with you concerning them?—There is no reason why this should not be done.—And now, with respect to those things which were the subject of my former interrogations, I again desire from the beginning, partly to be reminded of them by you, and partly to consider them in conjunction with you. But the question, I think, was this, whether wisdom, temperance, fortitude, justice, and sanctity, which are five names, belong to one thing, or whether a certain proper essence pertains to each of these names, so that each is a thing having a power of its own, and no one of them possesses a quality similar to the other. You said, therefore, that these were not names belonging to one thing, but that each of these names pertained to a proper thing. You likewise observed, that all these are parts of virtue, not in the same manner as the parts of gold are similar to each other, and to the whole of which they are parts, but just as the parts of the face are dissimilar to the whole of which they are parts, and to each other, and each possesses a proper power of its own. Inform me if these things still appear to you as they did then; or if you think otherwise concerning them. For I shall not accuse you, if you now speak differently; since I should not wonder if you said these things for the purpose of trying me.—But, Socrates, he replied, I say that all these are parts of virtue; and that four of them may justly be considered as similar to each other, but that fortitude very much differs from all these. By the following circumstance you may know that I speak the truth. You will find men who are most unjust, most unholy, most intemperate, and most unlearned, who are notwithstanding remarkably brave.—Stop, said I; for what you say deserves to be considered. Whether do you call brave men, daring men, or any thing else?—I do, he replied, and I likewise say that they rush headlong on things, which the multitude are afraid to approach.—Come then; Do you say, that virtue is something beautiful; and that you are a teacher of it, as of a thing beautiful?—Yes, said he, and a thing most beautiful, unless I am insane.—Whether then, said I, is one thing belonging to it base, and another beautiful? Or, is the whole beautiful?—The whole is as much as possible beautiful.—Do you not know, then, that there are some who boldly merge themselves in wells?—I know that divers do.—Whether do they do this in consequence of possessing knowledge, or on account of something
thing else?—In consequence of possessing knowledge.—But who are they that fight boldly on horseback? Are they horsemen, or those that are unskilled in horsemanship?—They are horsemen.—And who are they that fight boldly with short shields? Are they those that are skilled in the use of such shields, or those that are not skilled?—Those that are skilled. And in every thing else, said he, you will find that those who possess knowledge, are bolder than the ignorant; and the same men after they have been disciplined are bolder than they were before.—But did you ever see any, I said, who being ignorant of all these things, were yet daring with respect to each of these?—I have, he replied, and such as were very daring.—Are, therefore, those daring persons brave also?—If they were, said he, fortitude would be a base thing, since these men are insane.—What then, said I, have you asserted of the brave? Is it not that they are bold?—I have, said he, and now also I assert the same.—But, I replied, do not those who are thus bold appear, not to be brave, but insane? And again, did not the most wise appear to us to be also the most daring? And being most daring, were they not also most brave? And according to this reasoning, will not wisdom be fortitude?—You do not well remember, Socrates, said he, what I said, and what was my answer to you? For being asked by you if the brave were bold, I acknowledged that they were; but you did not also ask me if the bold were brave. For if you had asked me this, I should have said that all the bold were not brave. But you have by no means shewn that I was not right in granting that the brave are bold. In the next place, you shew that men, when they possess knowledge, are bolder than when they were ignorant, and than others who are ignorant; and in consequence of this, you think that fortitude and wisdom are the same. But from this mode of reasoning, you may also think that strength is wisdom. For in the first place, if you should in like manner inquire of me, if the strong are powerful, I should say that they are; and in the next place, if you should ask me, if those who know how to wrestle are more powerful than those who do not possess this knowledge, and if they are more powerful after they have learnt than before, I should say that they are. But from my acknowledging these things, it will be possible for you, by using the same arguments, to say that, by my own confession, wisdom is strength. I, however, shall by no means here acknowledge that the powerful are strong; but I shall admit, indeed,
THE PROTAGORAS.

indeed, that the strong are powerful; since power and strength are not the same. For, indeed, power may be produced from infancy, and from anger; but strength derives its subsistence from nature, and the proper nutrition of bodies. In like manner, boldness and fortitude are not the same; so that it will happen, that the brave are bold, but not that all the bold are brave. For boldness is produced in men from anger, and from infancy, in the same manner as we observed of power; but fortitude arises from nature, and the proper nutrition of souls.—But do you say, O Protagoras, that some men live well, and others ill?—I do, said he.—Does, therefore, a man appear to you to live well, if he lives in molestation and sorrow?—He does not, said he.—But what, if he has lived pleasantly to the end of life, will he not thus appear to you to have lived well?—To me he will, said he.—To live pleasantly, therefore, is a good, but unpleasantly a bad thing.—If, said he, he has lived delighted with worthy things.—But what, O Protagoras, do you, like the multitude, call certain things that are pleasant bad, and some things that are disagreeable good?—I do.—How do you say?—So far as they are agreeable, are these things according to this not good, unless something else happens from them?—And again, is this also the case with things disagreeable?—It is.—Are they not then bad so far as they are disagreeable?—I do not know, Socrates, said he, that all pleasant things are good, and all disagreeable things evil; but it appears to me to be more safe to answer, not only to the present question, but also to every other during the rest of my life, that there are some pleasant things which are not good, and again, that there are some disagreeable things which are not evil; and that there are also a third sort, which are neither good nor evil.—But do you not call, I said, those things pleasant, which either participate of pleasure, or produce pleasure?—Entirely so, said he.—I ask, therefore, whether they are not good, so far as they are pleasant; asking with respect to pleasure itself, if it is not good?—Just as you continually say, Socrates, he replied, we must examine it, and if it shall seem to be conformable to reason, and the same thing shall appear to be pleasant and good, we must acquiesce in it; but if not, we must controvert it.—Whether, therefore, said I, are you willing to be the leader of the inquiry? or shall I lead?—It is just, said he, that you should lead: for you began the conference.—Perhaps then, said I, that which we investigate will become manifest.
manifest after the following manner: for just as if any one, directing his attention to the form or health of a man, or any other of the works of his body, on beholding his countenance and his hands, should say, Come, strip yourself, and show me your breast and back, that I may see more clearly; I also desire something of this kind in the present inquiry, perceiving that you being so affected as you say you are, with respect to the good and the pleasant, it is requisite I should say to you some such thing as this, Come, Protagoras, lay your mind open to me, and inform me what are your conceptions with respect to science. Does the same thing appear to you concerning it as to other men, or not? But a thing of this kind appears to the many concerning science; that it is not strong, and that it neither possesses a leading nor a governing power; nor is it conceived to be a thing of this kind: but science being frequently inherent in man, they are of opinion, that it is not science that governs him, but something else; at one time anger, at another pleasure, and at another pain: and that he is sometimes governed by love, and frequently by fear. And, in short, their conceptions of science are, as if it were a slave dragged about by every thing else. Does, therefore, a thing of this kind appear to you also respecting it? Or do you think that science is something beautiful, and as it were the governor of man? And, that he who knows good and evil, will never be subdued by any thing, so as to act contrary to the mandates of science, but that intellectual prudence will be a sufficient aid to such a man?—It appears to me also, he replied, Socrates, as you say: and it would be base in me, if it ever were so in any man, not to assert that wisdom and science are the most powerful of all human affairs.—You speak well, and with truth, I said.—You know, therefore, that the multitude of men are not persuaded by you and me, but say that many who know what is best, are unwilling to do it, when they have the power of acting in the best manner, but do other things. And such as I have asked what is the cause of this, have replied, that being vanquished by pleasure or pain, or some one of the things which I have just now mentioned, they have acted in this manner. For I think, said he, Socrates, that men assert many other things erroneously.

Come then, said I, endeavour with me to persuade and teach men what this passion is, which they call the being vanquished by pleasures, and through which they do not perform the most excellent things, though they have a knowledge
knowledge of them. For, perhaps, if we should say, you speak erroneously, O men, and are deceived, they would ask us, O Protagoras and Socrates, if this passion is not the being vanquished by pleasure, but something else, tell us what you say it is?—But, why is it necessary, Socrates, that we should consider the opinion of the multitude, who speak that which casually presents itself?—But I think, I replied, that this will contribute to our discovering how fortitude is related to the other parts of virtue. If, therefore, you are willing to abide by that which was just now agreed upon by us, that I should be the leader, follow me in that in which I think this thing will become most beautifully apparent; but if you are not willing, dismiss it, if you think fit.—You speak well, said he; but proceed as you begun.—Again, therefore, said I, if the multitude should ask us, What then do you assert this thing to be, which we call the being vanquished by pleasures? I should answer them as follows: Hear then, for I and Protagoras shall endeavour to tell you, Do you, O men, say that anything else happens to you in this case, than that which often happens to those who are subdued by meats and drinks, and venereal pleasures; who, though they know that these things are baneful, yet at the same time they do them because they are pleasant? They will say, that nothing else happens. You and I, therefore, will again ask them, Do you say that these things are baneful? Whether, therefore, is it because they immediately impart pleasure, and each of them is pleasant? Or is it because that in some future time they produce diseases and poverty, and procure many other things of this kind? Or, though they should be followed by nothing of this kind, are they bad in consequence of causing men to rejoice? Shall we think, O Protagoras, that they will answer any thing else than that they are not evil from the immediate pleasure which they produce, but from the diseases and other things with which they are followed?—I indeed think, said Protagoras, that the multitude would thus answer. If they cause diseases, therefore, and poverty, do they not also cause sorrow?—I think they would acknowledge that they did.—Protagoras assented.—It appears, therefore, O men, as I and Protagoras say, that these things are bad, for no other reason than because they end in sorrow, and deprive their votaries of other pleasures.—It appeared to both of us, that they would acknowledge this to be the case.—Again, therefore, if, taking the contrary side, we should ask them, O men! ye who say that disagreeable things are good, do you not speak of such things?
things as gymnastic exercises, military labours, and things which are
effected through burnings, and incisions, and medicines, and fasting? And
do you not say, that these things are indeed good, but disagreeable? They
would say so.—It also appeared to Protagoras, that they would.—Whether,
therefore, do you call these things good, because they immediately impart
extreme pain and torment; or because they are followed by health, and a
good habit of body, together with the safety of cities, dominion and wealth?
They would say, because of the latter consequence.—And to this also Pro-
tagoras assented.—But are these things good through any thing else, than
because they end in pleasures, and liberations from pain? Or can you
mention any other end than pleasures and pains to which looking they call
these things good? They will say, I think, that they cannot.—So, likewise,
it appears to me, said Protagoras.—Do you, therefore, pursue pleasure as being
good, and avoid pain as an evil? They will say, that they do.—And to this
also Protagoras assented.—You, therefore, are of opinion, that this thing is
evil, viz. pain, and that pleasure is good; since delight also is then said to be
evil, when it deprives us of greater pleasures than it possesses, or when it
procures pains greater than the pleasures which it contains. For if you
call delight an evil on any other account, and look to any other end, you
would also be able to inform us; but you cannot.—Nor do they appear to
me, said Protagoras, to regard any other end.—Again, therefore, after the
same manner with respect to pain, do you not then call the being in pain a
good, when it liberates from pains greater than those which it contains, or
when it procures pleasures greater than the pains? For if you looked to
any other end, when you call the being in pain a good, than that which I
have mentioned, you would be able to inform us; but you cannot.—You
speak the truth, said Protagoras.—Again, therefore, said I, if you should ask
me, O men, on what account I speak so much and so frequently about this, I
should say, Pardon me. For, in the first place, it is not easy to show what
this thing is which you call the being subdued by pleasures; and, in the
next place, all demonstrations are contained in this. But now, also, you are
at liberty to inform me, if you have any thing else which you assert to be
good besides pleasure, or any thing else besides pain, which you call evil.
Or are you satisfied with passing your life pleasantly without pain? For if
you are satisfied with this, and if you cannot mention any good or evil which
does not end in these things, hear what follows: I say, then, that, if this be
the case, the assertion is ridiculous when you say that frequently, though a
man knows that evil things are evil, he at the same time does them (though
he has the power of not doing them), in consequence of being led and after-
niﬁed by pleasure: and again, when you say that a man, knowing what is
good, is not willing to do it, in consequence of being vanquished by imme-
diate pleasure. For it will be manifest that these things are ridiculous,
unless we employ a multitude of names; such as pleasant and disagreeable,
good and evil. But since it appears that there are these two things, we must
also call them by two names; in the ﬁrst place by good and evil, and in the
next place by pleasant and disagreeable. These things, therefore, being ad-
mitted, we will say that a man, knowing things evil to be evil, at the same
time does them. If, then, some one should ask us why he does them, we
must say, because he is vanquished. By what? he will say to us. But we
are no longer permitted to say, by pleasure; for it assumes another name in
the place of pleasure, viz. good. We must, however, answer him, and
say that he does it because he is vanquished. By what? he will say. By
good, we must say, by Jupiter. If it should happen, therefore, that he who
interrogates us is an inﬂuent man, he will laugh and say, You speak of a
ridiculous thing when you assert that any one does evil, knowing that it is
evil (and it is not proper to do it), in consequence of being vanquished by
good. For he will say, Is such a one vanquished because the good in him is
not worthy to vanquish the evil? Or is it because it is worthy? We shall
evidently say in reply, that it is because it is not worthy. For otherwise he
would not err whom we say is subdued by pleasure. But perhaps he will
say, Why is the good in such a one unworthy to vanquish the evil? Or the
evil to vanquish the good? Is it for any other reason than because the one is
greater, and the other lesser? or because the one is more, and the other
fewer in number? Have we any other cause to assign than this? It is evident,
therefore, he will say, that this thing which is called the being vanquished, is
to receive greater evils instead of lesser goods. And thus much for these
particulars.

Let us then again change the names, and introduce in these very same
things the pleasant and disagreeable, as follows: We formerly said that a
man does evil, let us now say that he does things disagreeable, knowing that
they are disagreeable, in consequence of being vanquished by pleasures, viz. by such as are unworthy to conquer. And what other unworthiness is there in pleasure with respect to pain, than the excess and defect of each other; that is, when they become greater and lesser, more or less numerous? For if any one should say, Immediate pleasure, O Socrates, very much differs from future pleasure and pain, I indeed should reply by asking, Whether it differs in any thing else than in pleasure and pain? For it cannot differ in any thing else. But it is just as if a man who is skilful in weighing, having collected together things pleasant and painful, and placed those which are near, and those which are remote, in the balance, should say which are the more numerous. For if you weigh pleasures with pleasures, the greater and more numerous must always be chosen; but, if you weigh pains with pains, the fewer and the smaller must be selected. If likewise you weigh pleasures with pains, if the disagreeables are surpassed by the pleasures, those that are near by those that are remote, or those that are remote by those that are near, we must yield to the more weighty; but if the pleasures are surpassed by the disagreeables, this conduct must not be adopted. Is it not so, O men, with respect to these things? I know that they will not be able to say otherwise. It also appeared to Protagoras that they would not. Since, therefore, this is the case, I will thus interrogate them. Do the same magnitudes appear to your sight greater when near, but lesser when at a distance? They will say, that they do. And is not this the case also with things bulky, and with things numerous? And are not equal voices greater when near, but lesser when at a distance? They will say that they are. If therefore our acting well consisted in this, viz. in making and receiving great masses, but rejecting and not making such as are small, what would appear to be the safety of our life? Would it be the art of measuring, or the power of sight which judges of that which is apparent? Or rather would not the latter deceive us, and involving us in error, often compel us to judge differently at different times of the same thing, and change our opinion in the actions and elections of things great and small? But the art of measuring would make this phantasm void, and manifesting the truth, would cause the soul, by abiding in reality, to be at rest, and would preserve our life. Would the men assent to these things, and acknowledge that the art of measuring preserves us, or that this is effected by any other art? They would acknowledge that we should be preserved
ferved by the measuring art. But what, if the safety of our life consisted in choosing the even and the odd, so as to know when more ought to be rightly chosen, and when less, either one of these with respect to itself, or one with respect to the other, whether they be near or at a distance, what is it that in this case would preserve our life? Is it not science? For it would no longer be the art of measuring, since this is the art of excess and defect. But since that of which we are speaking is the art of the even and the odd, is it any thing else than arithmetic? The men would acknowledge that it is nothing else: or would they not? It appeared also to Protagoras that they would. Be it so, O men; but since the safety of our life has appeared to consist in the right choice of pleasure and pain, and in the choice of the more and the less, of the greater and the smaller, of the more distant and the nearer; of these, in the first place, does not the art of measuring appear to be the consideration of the excess and defect, and also of the equality of these to each other? Necessarily so. But since it is conversant with measuring, it is necessary that it should be both an art and a science. They will agree to this. What then this art and science may be, we will consider hereafter; but that it is a science is sufficient to the demonstration which it is necessary that Protagoras and I should give to your question. And, if you remember, when we mutually agreed that nothing is superior to science, but that this always governs, wherever it may be, both pleasure and every thing else, then you said that pleasure frequently subdues a man, even though he possesses science. But as we did not agree with you, after this you asked us, O Protagoras and Socrates, if this passion is not to be vanquished by pleasure, tell us what it is, and what you assert it to be? If, therefore, we then had immediately said to you that it is ignorance, you would have deprived us. For ye have acknowledged that those that err in the choice of pleasures and pains (and these are things good and evil) err through the want of science; and not only through the want of science, but, ye have also added, of the science of measuring. But an erroneous action without science, is, as ye also know, performed through ignorance. So that to be vanquished by pleasure is the greatest ignorance; of which Protagoras here, Prodicus and Hippias, say they are the physician. But ye, because ye think this is something else than ignorance, neither go yourselves, nor send your children to the sophists, the teachers of these things, as if this science of measuring could not
not be taught: and by saving your money, and not giving it to these men, ye
act badly both in private and public. And in this manner we should answer
the multitude.

Together with Protagoras, however, I ask you, O Hippias, and you, O
Prodicus (for let my discourse be in common to you), whether I appear to
speak the truth, or that which is false?—It appeared to all that what had
been said was transcendentally true.—You confess, therefore, I said, that the
pleaunt is good, but the disagreeable evil. But I request Prodicus to excuse
my adopting his division of names. For whether you call it pleasant, or
delightful, or joyful, or in whatever way you may think fit to denominate
things of this kind, O most excellent Prodicus, only answer what I wish to
ask you.—Prodicus therefore laughing assented, and so likewise did the rest.—
I then said, But what, my friends, as to this particular, are not all actions
which contribute to the living well and pleasantly, beautiful and profitable?
And is not a beautiful deed good and profitable?—They granted this.—If,
therefore, I said, the pleasant is good, no one either knowing or thinking that
other things are better than those which he does, and is able to do, will
afterwards do these things, when he has the power of doing those that are
better. Nor when a man is inferior to himself, is it any thing else than igno-
nance; nor, when he is superior to himself, is it any thing else than wis-
dom.—To this all of them assented.—But what? Do you say that ignorance
is a thing of this kind, viz. to have a false opinion, and to be deceived about
things of great importance?—And to this, likewise, all of them assented.—
Does it not then follow, said I, that no one willingly betakes himself to
things evil, or to those things which he thinks are evil? For, as it appears,
it is not in the nature of man to betake himself to things which he confiders
as evil, instead of applying himself to such as are good. And when it is
necessary to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater if he has
it in his power to choose the lesser.—All these things were assented to by all
of us.—What then, said I, do you call dread and fear? Is it that which I lay it
is to you, O Prodicus, viz. a certain expectation of evil, whether you call it
fear or dread?—It appeared to Protagoras and Hippias that dread and fear
were this; but to Prodicus it appeared that dread was this, but not fear.—It
is, however, said I, O Prodicus, of no consequence; but this is of importance,
whether what has been formerly assented is true. Is, therefore, any man
willing
willing to betake himself to those things which he dreads, when he has the power of betaking himself to things which he does not dread? Or is not this impossible from what we have granted? For we have granted that he thinks those things to be evil which he dreads; and that no one betakes himself to, or willingly receives things which he considers as evil. These things, likewise, were assented to by all of them.—This, then, being admitted, said I, O Prodicus and Hippias, let Protagoras, here, defend to us the rectitude of his first answer. For then, there being five parts of virtue, he said that no one of them resembled the other, but that each had a peculiar power of its own. I do not, however, urge this at present, but I speak of that which he afterwards said, viz. that four of the parts might justly be considered as similar to each other, but that one of them, fortitude, very much differed from the rest. He also said that this might be known from the following circumstance. You will find, said he, Socrates, men that are most unholy, most unjust, most intemperate, and most undisciplined, but who are, at the same time, most brave; by which you may know that fortitude very much differs from the other parts of virtue. And I indeed, at that time, immediately very much wondered at the answer, and my surprise has been greatly increased since I have discussed these things with you. I therefore asked him this, If he called brave men bold men? He said he did, and likewise impetuous. Do you remember, Protagoras, that this was your answer?—I do, said he.—Tell us, then, said I, in what, according to you, the brave are impetuous? Is it in things which the timid attempt?—It is not, said he.—In other things, therefore.—Yes.—But whether do the timid engage in bold attempts, but the brave in such as are dreadful?—It is so, said Socrates, by the multitude. You speak the truth, I replied. I do not, however, ask this: but in what do you say the brave are impetuous? Is it in dreadful things, thinking that they are dreadful, or in things that are not dreadful?—But, said he, this, in what you just now said, has been shown to be impossible.—And in this, also, I replied, you speak the truth. So that if this is rightly demonstrated, no one betakes himself to things which he thinks are dreadful, since it has been found that it is ignorance for a man to be inferior to himself. He acknowledged it.—All men, however, both the timid and the brave, engage in things in which they boldly confide; and, in consequence of this, both the timid and the brave engage in the same things.—But indeed, Socrates, said he.
he, the things in which the timid and the brave engage are perfectly con-
trary to each other; for the latter wish, but the former are unwilling to
engage in war.—But whether, said I, is it a beautiful, or a base thing to
engage in war?—A beautiful thing, said he.—If, therefore, it is a beautiful
thing, we have above agreed that it is a good thing. For we have acknow-
ledged that all beautiful are good actions.—You speak the truth, and to me
this has always appeared to be the case.—Right, said I. But which of the
two do you say is unwilling to engage in war, though it is a beautiful and
good thing.—The timid, he replied.—If, therefore, said I, it be beautiful
and good, is it not also pleasant?—It is granted, said he.—Are the timid,
therefore, unwilling to proceed to that which is beautiful, better, and more
pleasant, knowing it to be such?—But, said he, if we assented to this, we
should destroy what we have before acknowledged.—But what with respect
to the brave man? Does he not engage in that which is more beautiful,
more excellent, and more pleasant?—It is necessary, said he, to acknowledge
that he does.—Hence, in short, the brave have not any base fears when they
are afraid; nor when they are bold, are they basely daring.—True, said he.—
But if they are not basely, does it not follow that they are beautifully daring?—
He assented.—And if their boldness is beautiful, is it not also good?—Yes.—
Are not, therefore, the timid, and the rash, and the insane, on the contrary,
basely afraid, and basely bold?—He agreed they were.—But are they basely
and wickedly bold, through any thing else than ignorance and the want of
discipline?—It is so, said he.—What then? Do you then call this thing,
through which the timid are timid, timidity or fortitude?—Timidity, said he.—But have not the timid appeared to be what they are, through the igno-
rance of things dreadful?— Entirely so, said he.—They are timid, therefore,
through this ignorance.—He acknowledged it.—But that through which
they are timid, you have granted to be timidity.—He said, he had.—Will
not, therefore, the ignorance of things dreadful, and not dreadful, be timi-
dity?—He assented.—But, said I, fortitude is contrary to timidity.—It is.—
Will not then the wisdom of things dreadful, and not dreadful, be contrary
to the ignorance of these things?—To this also he assented.—But is not the
ignorance of these things timidity?—He, with great difficulty, assented to
his.—The wisdom, therefore, of things dreadful, and not dreadful, is for-
titude, being contrary to the ignorance of these.—Here, however, he was no

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longer willing to assent, but was silent.—And I said, Why, O Protagoras, do
you neither assent to, nor deny what I say?—Come to a conclusion, said he.—
Immediately, said I; let me only first ask you, if it still appears to you as it
did before, that there are certain men who are most ignorant, and yet most
brave?—You still, Socrates, seem to be very anxious that I should answer you.
I will therefore gratify you; and I say, that from what has been granted, it
appears to me impossible that this should be the case.—But, said I, I do not
ask you all these particulars on any other account, than because I wish to
consider how the things pertaining to virtue subsist, and what virtue itself is.
For I know that this becoming apparent, that which has been the subject
of a long discussion to you and me will be made manifest; I indeed, asserting,
that virtue cannot be taught, but you that it can. And it seems to me,
that the conclusion of our arguments, as if it were a man, reviles and
derides us; and that if it had a voice, it would thus address us:—You are
absurd, O Socrates, and Protagoras; you indeed, in asserting in the former
part of your discourse, that virtue cannot be taught, and now, being
anxious to contradict yourself, by endeavouring to show that all these things,
viz. justice, temperance, and fortitude, are science; by which mode
of proceeding virtue will especially appear to be a thing which may be
taught. For if virtue were any thing else than science, as Protagoras
endeavours to evince it is, it clearly could not be taught; but now, if it
should appear that it is science, as you, Socrates, are anxious to infer, it will
be wonderful if it cannot be taught. Again, Protagoras at first admitted
that it could be taught, but now, on the contrary, he seems earnestly to
endeavour that virtue may appear to be any thing else rather than science;
and thus it will be a thing in the smallest degree capable of being taught.
I therefore, O Protagoras, seeing all these things agitated upwards and downwards
with such dire confusion, am in the highest degree anxious that they
may become apparent. And I could wish that we, in consequence of
discussing these things, might discover what virtue is: and again, that we
might speculate concerning it, whether it can be taught, or whether it can-

1 Instead of τι ἐνὶ αὐτῷ τι ἐνὶ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἢ ἀρετῇ, as in the printed text, the sense requires we
should read τι τοῦ ἐνὶ ἐνὶ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἢ ἀρετῇ. Ficinus in his version has adopted the error of the
original; for he renders this passage, "Si enim aliquid quiddam esse scientia quam virtus."
not. For I fear that your Epimetheus has frequently deceived us in our inquiry, just as you say he neglected us in the distribution which he made. I am more pleased, therefore, with Prometheus in the fable, than with Epimetheus. Hence, following his example, and paying a providential attention to the whole of my life, I diligently consider all these things. And if you are willing, as I said at the beginning, I would most gladly examine these particulars with you.—To this Protagoras said—I, O Socrates, praise your alacrity, and the evolution of your discourse. For I am not, in other respects, I think, a bad man, and I am envious the least of all men: indeed I have often said respecting you to many, that I admire you by far the most of those with whom I associate, and consider you as greatly surpassing your equals in age. And I say, that I shall not wonder if you rank among the men renowned for wisdom. And, with respect to these things, we will again discuss them when you please; but it is now time for me to betake myself to something else.—But, I replied, it is requisite so to do, if it seems fit to you. For I ought to have gone elsewhere some time ago; but I stayed in order to gratify the beautiful Callias.—Having spoken and heard these things, we departed.

THE END OF THE PROTAGORAS.