

ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE PHÆDRUS.

Page 323: *It alone uses contemplative intellect, &c.*

BY the governor of the soul in this place a partial intellect is meant. For this intellect is proximately established above our essence, which it also elevates and perfects; and to which we convert ourselves, when we are purified through philosophy, and conjoin our intellectual power with its intelligence. This partial intellect is participated by all other proximate dæmoniacal souls, and illuminates ours, when we convert ourselves to it, and render our reason intellectual. In short, as every partial soul is essentially suspended from a certain dæmon, and every dæmon has a dæmoniacal intellect above itself, hence, every partial soul will have this intellect ranked prior to itself as an impartible essence. Of this intellect, therefore, the first participant will be a dæmoniacal soul, but the second, the partial souls under this, which also makes them to be partial. It also appears that the intellect immediately above every dæmon, so far as it is a whole and one, is the intellect of the dæmon which proximately participates it, but that it also comprehends the number of the souls which are under it, and the intellectual paradigms of these. Every partial soul, therefore, will have as an indivisible essence its proper paradigm, which this intellect contains, and not simply the whole intellect, in the same manner as the dæmon which is essentially its leader. Hence the impartible belonging to every partial soul may be accurately defined to be the idea of that soul, comprehended in the one intellect which is destined to be the leader of the dæmoniacal series under which every such soul is arranged. And thus it will be true, that the intellect of every partial soul is alone
supernally

supernally established among eternal entities, and that every such soul is a medium between the impartible above it, and the impartible nature below it. This, then, is the intelligence prior to the soul, and which the soul participates, when its intellectual part energizes intellectually. This also is the intellect which Plato in the *Timæus* indicates under the appellation of *intelligence*, when he says “ that true being is apprehended by *intelligence* in conjunction with reason ; and to which he likewise alludes in the latter part of the same dialogue, where he says, “ that this intelligence is in the Gods, but that it is participated by a few only of the human race.”

P. 322. *Likewise Jupiter the mighty leader, &c.*

IT is said by Plato* in the *Phædrus*, that there are twelve leaders who preside over the universe, who govern all the mundane Gods, and all the companies of dæmons, and who sublimely march to an intelligible nature. It is likewise asserted that Jupiter presides over these twelve Gods, who drives a winged chariot, who distributes all things in order, takes care of and leads all the attendant army, first to an *elevated place of speculation* within the heavens, and to those blessed contemplations and evolutions of intelligibles which it contains ; but afterwards to that *subcelestial arch* which proximately embraces the heavens, and which the heavens contain : and after this arch they proceed into heaven and to the *back of heaven*. And in this place divine souls are said to stand, and, whilst they are carried along with the heavens, to contemplate every superior essence. But prior to the heavens there is said to be a *place* which is called *supercelestial*, in which *true essence*, the *plain of truth*, the *kingdom of Adrastia*, and the *divine choir of virtues*, reside : and it is asserted that by the intelligence of these monads souls are nourished and benefited, while they follow the revolution of the heavens.

And thus much is asserted in the *Phædrus*, where Socrates clearly speaks, as one agitated by a divine impulse, and touches on mystical concerns. But it is requisite to consider, in the first place, what this *heaven* may be, which Socrates speaks of, and in what order of beings it is placed. For, having discovered this, we may then con-

* This account of that divine order which was denominated by ancient theologians *intelligible*, and at the same time *intellectual*, is extracted from the fourth book of Proclus on the *Theology of Plato*.

template the subcelestial arch, and the back of heaven; since each of these is assumed according to an habitude, or alliance to heaven; the one, indeed, being primarily situated above, and the other primarily placed under heaven.

What then is that heaven to which Jupiter brings the Gods? If we call it sensible, after the manner of some, it will be necessary that the more excellent genera should naturally be converted to things subordinate. For Jupiter, that great leader in the heavens, if he is himself carried to this sensible heaven, and leads to this all the attendant Gods, he must himself have a conversion to things inferior and posterior to himself. And this, together with Jupiter, must be the case with all the deities and dæmons that are suspended from him; though the same Socrates in the Phædrus asserts, that even a partial soul, when in a perfect state, revolves on high, and governs the universe. How, then, can the leaders of total souls be converted to this sensible heaven, and exchange their intelligible place of survey for a worse condition?—they, who through these souls preside over the universe, that they may illuminate mundane natures, with an absolute and liberated power! Besides, what blessed intellections can the Gods obtain by contemplating this sensible heaven? And what evolutions can there be there of the whole knowledge of sensible concerns? since on this hypothesis Plato must be condemned for producing a relation of no value with respect to the knowledge of the intelligible Gods. For the Gods perfectly know things subsisting in this sensible region, not by a conversion to them, but because they contain the causes of them in themselves. Hence, in consequence of knowing themselves, they likewise know in a causal manner and govern these sensible concerns, not surveying them, and verging to things which are governed, but through love converting subordinate natures to themselves. It is not, therefore, lawful for the Gods, by whom all heaven is governed, and who consider it as worthy their providential care, ever to subsist under its revolution. Nor, indeed, is there any beatitude in the contemplation of things situated under the heavens. Nor are the souls who are converted to a contemplation of this kind in the number of the blessed, and among such as follow the Gods; but they rank among those who exchange intelligible aliment for the food of opinion, and such as Socrates represents those lame souls, who have broken their wings, and are in a merged condition. Since, then, circumstances of this kind belong to partial souls, who do not rank in the number of the blessed, how can we refer a conversion

version to this sensible heaven to the leading Gods? Besides, Socrates asserts, that souls standing on the back of heaven are carried round by the celestial revolution. But Timæus and the Athenian guest say, that souls perform all things in the heavens from their own motions, and externally invest bodies by their powers; and that in consequence of living their own life, through the whole of time, they impart to bodies secondary powers of motion. How, then, can these things accord with those who consider this heaven as sensible? For souls do not contemplate, and, as it were, dance round intelligibles, in consequence of the revolution of the heavens: but, through the unapparent circumvolution of souls, bodies themselves are carried round in a circle, and about these perform their revolutions. If any one, therefore, should say that this is the sensible heaven, and that souls are at the same time carried round with its revolutions, and are distributed according to its back, profundity, and subcelestial arch, it is necessary to admit that many absurdities will ensue.

But if any one asserts, that the heaven to which Jupiter leads all his attendant Gods and dæmons is intelligible, he will unfold the divine narrations of Plato, in a manner agreeable to the nature of things, and will follow his most celebrated interpreters. For both Plotinus and Jamblichus consider this as a certain intelligible heaven. And prior to these, Plato himself in the Cratylus, following the Orphic theogony, calls Saturn indeed the father of Jupiter, and Heaven the father of Saturn. And he unfolds the Demiurgus of the universe by certain appellations, investigating the truth which names contain. And he denominates the Demiurgus as one who contains a divine intellect: but Heaven as the intelligence of first intelligibles. For Heaven, says he, is first looking to things on high. And hence, Heaven subsists prior to every divine intellect with which the mighty Saturn is said to be replete; but it understands superior natures, and whatever is situated beyond the celestial order. The mighty Heaven, therefore, is allotted a middle kingdom between intelligibles and intellects.

For, indeed, the celestial revolution in the Phædrus is *intelligence*, by which all the Gods, and their attendant souls, obtain the contemplation of intelligibles. For intelligence is between intellect and the intelligible. In this medium, therefore, we must establish the whole Heaven; and we must assert that it contains one bond of the divine orders; being, indeed, the father of the intellectual race, but generated by the

kings prior to itself, whom it is said to behold. We must also consider it as situated between the supercelestial place and subcelestial arch.

Again, therefore, if the supercelestial place is indeed that imparticipable and occult genus of the intelligible Gods, how can we establish there so great a divine multitude, and this separated, viz. truth, science, justice, temperance, the meadow, and Adraftia? For neither are the fountains of virtues proper to the intelligible Gods, nor separation and variety of forms. For such things as are first and most characterized by unity, extend the demiurgic intellect of wholes to an intelligible exemplar, and to the comprehension of forms which there subsist. But, in the Phædrus, Socrates asserts that a partial intellect contemplates the supercelestial place. For this (as it is beautifully said by our ancestors) is the governor of the soul. If, then, it is requisite to investigate the difference of intelligibles from this analogy, as the demiurgic intellect is imparticipable, but that which is partial is participable; so with respect to that which is intelligible, the intelligible of the demiurgus is the first paradigm of first intelligibles, but the intelligible of a partial intellect is the paradigm of secondary intelligibles, which are indeed intelligibles, but are allotted an intelligible supremacy as among intellectuals. But if the supercelestial place is situated above the celestial revolution, but is inferior to the intelligible triads, because it is more expanded; for it is the plain of truth, but is not unknown, and is divided according to a multitude of forms, and contains a variety of powers, and the meadow which is there nourishes souls, and is visible to their natures, the first intelligibles illuminating souls with an ineffable union, at the same time that they are not known by them, through intelligence:—if this be the case, it is necessary that the supercelestial place should be situated between the intelligible nature and the celestial revolution. But also, if Plato himself establishes true essence in this place, must he not consider this place as intelligible, and as participating first intelligibles? For, because it is essence, it is intelligible; but, because it is true essence, it participates of being. And if it contains in itself a multitude of intelligibles, it cannot be placed in the first triad. For *one being* is there, and not a multitude of beings. But if it possesses a various life, which the *meadow* evinces, it is inferior to the second triad. For intelligible life is one, and without separation. And from its shining with divided forms, all-various orders, and prolific powers, it is inferior to the third or all-perfect triad. If, therefore, the supercelestial place is posterior to these in

antiquity and power, but is placed above the celestial order, it is indeed intelligible, but is the summit of the intellectual Gods. And on this account aliment is thence derived to souls. For that which is intelligible is aliment, because first intelligibles are said to nourish souls; and these are the beautiful, the wise, and the good. For with these, according to Plato, the winged nature of the soul is nourished, but is corrupted, and perishes through things of a contrary nature. These things, however, subsist there in an exempt manner, and through union and silence. But the super-celestial place is said to nourish through intelligence and energy, and to fill the blessed choir of souls with intelligible light, and the prolific rivers of life.

But after the supercelestial place, and Heaven itself, the subcelestial arch is situated, which, as is evident to every one, is placed under, and not in the Heavens: for it is not called by Plato a *celestial*, but a *subcelestial* arch. And that it is likewise proximately situated under the celestial revolution, is evident from what is said concerning it. But if it is requisite that the subcelestial arch, thus subsisting, should be established as the same with the summit of intellectuals, and not as the same with the extremity of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, it will be necessary to contemplate what remains. For the intellectual summit separates itself from the celestial kingdom: but the extremity of the intelligible and intellectual Gods is conjoined, and every way surrounded with this kingdom. And this *summit* establishes the whole of intellect and intellectual multitude, and (as Socrates says) the blessed transitions of the Gods. But the *extremity* bounds alone the celestial series, and supplies to the Gods an ascent to Heaven. For when the Gods ascend to the banquet, and delicious food, and to the plenitude of intelligible good, then they proceed on high to the subcelestial arch, and through this to the celestial revolution. Hence, if you assert that the subcelestial arch perfects the Gods, and converts them to the whole of heaven, and to the supercelestial place, you will not wander from the conceptions of Plato. For the Gods are nourished with the intelligible, with the meadow, and the divine forms which the supercelestial place contains. But they are replenished with this aliment through the subcelestial arch: for through this they participate of the celestial revolution. They revolve, therefore, through the subcelestial arch; but they receive a vigorous intelligence from the celestial order, and they are replenished with intelligible goods from the supercelestial place. It is evident, therefore, that the supercelestial place

place is allotted an intelligible summit; but the celestial revolution obtains a middle extent, and the subcelestial arch possesses an intelligible extremity. For all things are contained in this. And intellect indeed is endued with a convertive power; but the intelligible is the object of desire. And divine intelligence fills up the middle; perfecting indeed the conversions of divine natures, and conjoining them with such as are first; but rendering the desires of intelligibles apparent, and replenishing secondary natures with preceding goods. And thus I think we have sufficiently treated concerning the order of these three.

Perhaps, however, some one may inquire, why we characterize according to this medium the whole progression of the intelligible, and at the same time intellectual Gods; and why of the extremes we call one supercelestial, but the other subcelestial, from its habitude to the middle; demonstrating of the one exempt transcendency, but of the other a proximate and conjoined hypobasis (i. e. subject basis, or foundation). To this then we shall briefly answer, that this whole genus of the intelligible and intellectual Gods is connective of both these extremes, to some things indeed being the cause of conversion, but to others of an unfolding into light, and a presence extended to secondary natures. As, therefore, we call all the intelligible Gods paternal and unical, characterizing them from the summit, and assert that they are the boundaries of wholes, the fabricators of essence, the causes of perpetuity, and the authors of the production of form; in the same manner we evince that these middle Gods, from the medium which they contain, are the leaders of the bonds of wholes. For this whole middle order is vivific, connective, and perfective. But its summit indeed unfolds the impressions of intelligibles, and their ineffable union. But its termination converts the intellectual Gods, and conjoins them with intelligibles. And its middle leads this order as to a centre, and establishes the total genera of the Gods. For, through a tendency to the middle, we attribute also to the extremes a habitude of transcendency and subjection; denominating the one above, and the other beneath the middle.

Let us now consider what the negations are by which Plato celebrates this middle order of Gods. Those sacred genera, therefore, the connective, the perfective, and the paternal, of those divine natures which are properly called intellectual, are proximately established after the intelligible summit of all intellectuals. For this summit,

being exempt from these, also transcends all the intellectual Gods. For what every genus of Gods is to *the one*, that the three orders posterior to, are to this summit. Plato, therefore, denominates the celestial order, which connects wholes, and illuminates them with intelligible light, *colour*; because this apparent beauty of the heavens is resplendent with all-various colours and light. Hence he calls *that* Heaven intellectual colour and light. For the light proceeding from *the good* is in the order superior to this unknown and occult, abiding in the adyta of the Gods; but it is unfolded in this order, and from the unapparent becomes apparent. And on this account it is assimilated to colour, the offspring of light. Further still: if Heaven is light looking to things on high, according to the definition of Socrates in the Cratylus, the intelligible of it is very properly called colour, which is conjoined with light.

The cause, therefore, of the intelligibles in *Heaven* is *without colour*, and is exempt from them. For sensible colour is the offspring of the solar light. But the sub-celestial arch, which proximately subsists after the celestial order, is called by Plato *figure*: for the arch itself is the name of a figure. And, in short, in this order Parmenides also places intellectual figure; but first attributes *contact* to the summit of intellectuals, as is evident from the conclusions of the Parmenides. For, in the first hypothesis, taking away *figure* from *the one*, he uses this as a medium, that *the one* does not *touch* itself. *Contact*, therefore, here first subsists, and is here according to cause. For of such things as the demiurgus is proximately the cause, of these the father prior to him is paradigmatically the cause. Hence *contact* here is the paradigm of the liberated Gods. These three orders, therefore, are successive, viz. *colour*, *figure*, and *contact*. And of these the supercelestial place is essentially exempt. Hence it is *without colour*, *without figure*, and *without contact*.

In the next place, let us consider the triad which is celebrated by Socrates as pre-subsisting in the supercelestial place, viz. *the plain of truth*, *the meadow*, and *the aliment of the Gods*. The *plain of truth*, therefore, is intellectually expanded to intelligible light, and is illuminated with the splendours which thence proceed. But *the meadow* is the prolific power of life, and of all-various reasons, and is the comprehension of the primary causes of life, and the cause of the variety and the procreation of forms. For meadows in this sensible region are fertile with forms and productive powers, and
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contain water, which is a symbol of vivific energy. But the nourishing cause of the Gods is a certain intelligible union, comprehending in itself the whole perfection of the Gods, and filling them with vigour and power, that they may provide for secondary natures, and possess an immutable intelligence of such as are first. The Gods, however, participate of these uniformly on high, but with separation in their progressions. Of the aliment, also, one kind is called by Plato ambrosia, and the other nectar. Here, too, we may observe, that the charioteer who is nourished with intelligibles participates of the perfection illuminated from the Gods unically, but the horses divisibly; first of ambrosia, and afterwards of nectar. For it is necessary that they should remain firmly and immovably in more excellent natures, from ambrosia; but that they should immutably provide for secondary natures, through nectar; since they say that ambrosia is a solid, but nectar a liquid nutriment. Hence, the nutriment of nectar signifies that in providence which is unrestrained, indissoluble, and which proceeds to all things with perfect purity. But the nutriment of ambrosia signifies that which is permanent, and which is firmly established in more excellent natures. But from both it is implied, that the Gods are permanent, and at the same time proceed to all things; and that neither their undeviating energy, and which is unconverted to subordinate natures, is unprolific, nor their prolific power and progression, without stability: but, being permanent, they proceed, and, being established in prior natures, provide for things secondary with consummate purity.

THE END OF THE THIRD VOLUME.