EARLY SAMKHYA

An Essay on its Historical Development according to the Texts

BY

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## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td></td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>ABBREVIATIONS</strong></td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 1</td>
<td><strong>Introductory. Sources and Methods</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 2</td>
<td><strong>Origins</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 3</td>
<td><strong>The avyakta and its three gunas</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 4</td>
<td><strong>Life and the Soul</strong></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 5</td>
<td><strong>Some Theoretical Principles</strong></td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§ 6</td>
<td><strong>Conclusions</strong></td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Index</strong></td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PREFACE

THE title for this study has been worded with the idea of giving some indication both of its purpose and of its limitations. The descriptions of Sāmkhya before the formulation of the classical system of Īśvarakṛṣṇa are contained in a large number of texts whose statements appear on the face of them to be so discrepant or vague that few methodical attempts have been made so far to bring them into relation with each other, it does not therefore seem out of place to publish an endeavour to sort out the evidence, so as to make clear the gradual evolution of ideas. To achieve this aim in a way that would bring conviction to Sanskritists, it is necessary to let the texts speak for themselves and to avoid any suspicion of having first formed a theory and of having then tried to read it into the authorities. Unless I have deceived myself, I started the inquiry with only two fixed points in mind, firstly that the texts deserved to be taken seriously, and secondly that development, when correctly traced, should be from the crude and primitive to the subtle and refined; every other view in the account that follows has arisen of itself from the confrontation of the various texts, and such working hypotheses as I formed from time to time during the accumulation and sifting of the material have frequently had to be modified or abandoned altogether. In principle my work has been confined to clearing a path through the texts by recording in their historical order those ideas for which there is a reasonable amount of substantial evidence. As a result, that was perhaps inevitable, the general basis of those ideas has received inadequate attention, and, if my views are found acceptable, it is best for me to leave it to other more competent hands to complete the inquiry by an assessment of the philosophical content and value of these early speculations.
The undertaking was originally prompted by a desire to understand the Sāmkhya system set out by Aśvaghōsa in canto xi of the Buddhacarita. The first fruit of the inquiry was embodied in a paper, published in JRAS., 1930, pp. 855–878, on the numerical riddle in Śvetāsvatara Upanisad, i, 4 and 5, as I have not repeated the contents of that article in this essay, I may remark that I there set out the evidence for holding that one early and important school of Sāmkhya divided the twenty-four physical ātāteya into two groups of eight primary constituents, prakṛti, and sixteen secondary ones, vikāra, and that the tanmātra group was a later invention, barely preceding Iśvarakṛṣṇa’s work, its place in all early formulations being taken by the group of five great elements, mahābhūtas, while the objects of the senses appear instead of the gross elements. Though these findings did not go very far in themselves and had been partly indicated by others, they at least showed that the problem of what really constituted early Sāmkhya still awaited solution. Further work on the subject was summarized, but with reference only to the data provided by Aśvaghōsa, in the introduction to part n of my edition of the Buddhacarita, and I then saw that it would be necessary to treat the subject as a whole and to explain in detail the evidence for my conclusions. To carry this out in a manner that would be coherent and readable has possibly proved beyond my powers; nevertheless, I hope that this essay will be found acceptable as a serious contribution towards the unravelling of a problem, the difficulties of which are notorious, but which is fundamental to the early history of Indian philosophy. It should be added that, while much of the contents has been written with an eye on the conclusions of previous workers in the field, I have deliberately eschewed polemics and a plethora of references to secondary authorities as likely to distract attention from the main point, the testimony of the primary texts.

1 I use the word “physical”, inadequate as it is, throughout this essay to denominate prakṛti and its twenty-three evolutes, as opposed to “soul”.
To the Royal Asiatic Society I am much indebted for accepting an essay, whose conclusions may not improbably evoke more criticism than agreement; and I wish to take this opportunity of expressing my gratitude to the Administrators of the Max Muller Fund at Oxford for a generous grant covering three-quarters of the cost of production, which has enabled publication to take place at a far earlier date than would otherwise have been possible. Dr. Betti Heumann kindly read through the draft before it went to the Press, and her acute criticisms have led me to modify the wording of several passages with a consequent increase in precision and accuracy.

E. H. Johnston.

Oxford.
February, 1937.
ABBREVIATIONS

*AK*  

*B*  
The *Buddhacarita* of Aśvaghosa  
(1) Sanskrit text. Panjab University Oriental Publications, No 31, 1935  
(2) Translation of cantos i–xiv, do., No 32, 1936  
(3) Translation of cantos xv–xxviii from the Tibetan, *Acta Orientalia*, XV  
All by E H Johnston

*BĀ’U*  
Bhādaranyaka *Upaniṣad*

*Car.*  
Carakavatihā, Śārīraśāhāna, ed Jivananda Vidyasagara, Calcutta, 1877

*ChU*  
Chāndogya *Upaniṣad*

*Mbh*  
Mahābhārata (Calcutta edition).

*S*  
The *Saundarananda* of Aśvaghosa, text and translation by  
E H Johnston, Panjab University Oriental Publications, 1928 and 1932

*SK*  
Sāmkhyakārikās, by Iśvarakṛṣṇa.

*Svet U’p*  
Svetātmanara *Upaniṣad* (ed. Hauschild, 1927)

*Up*  
*Upaniṣad*

*YS*  
Yogasūtras of Patañjali.
EARLY SĀMKHYA

§ 1. Introductory. Sources and Methods

HINDU philosophy was in the making for many centuries before any of the extant authoritative treatises on the various classical systems was composed. It is nevertheless clear that in this formative period all orthodox speculation, which travelled beyond the bounds of the later Vedic religion, was dominated by the principles laid down by the early teachers of the Sāmkhya school, so that it is only by understanding the course of the latter’s development that the true history of Indian philosophy in its infancy can be written. What that development was has not yet been determined with accuracy, and ideas on the subject are so generally lacking in clarity that scholars are still apt to say that such and such a conception found in early works is or is not Sāmkhya, when they merely mean that it is or is not in accord with the doctrines laid down by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the Sāmkhyakārikās. The manner in which this work combines primitive crudities with advanced ideas of much subtlety and refinement is alone sufficient to show that it is an attempt to bring an antiquated system up to date, by enshrining traditional matter in a restatement of principles on more modern lines. The resulting scheme is individual (eigenartig), as Garbe rightly called it, but this is due, not to its being the invention as a whole of a highly original personality, but to the fusion of new and old in a single mould.

So much most scholars would have no hesitation in admitting; but to the question what was the original teaching which is modernized in the SK., no generally accepted answer can be given, and there are not a few who would contend that our sources are so confused and lacking in authority that a reply in clear terms is not possible. Anyone who has tried to win enlightenment from the texts cannot but sympathize
with this contention, yet ultimately in my view it is based as a rule on a misconception of the facts, namely the belief that there was a single system of early Sāmkhya. Now the Chinese sources tell us that there were eighteen Sāmkhya schools,¹ the authority for this statement being in the last resort the learned Paramārtha, who lived in the sixth century A.D. and whose testimony cannot be lightly rejected in so far as it concerns the beliefs and traditions of his own day.² The figure eighteen may well be a round number, but after allowance for this, the statement is in accord with what would naturally be inferred from the Indian evidence. Thus the bhāṣya on YS., ii, 23, mentions eight different theories on the supremely important point of the reason for the union between purusa and prakṛti, the fourth being that of the SK. (described as śruti), and Vācaspati Miśra adds that all the eight alternatives are taken from treatises on Sāmkhya. Further we know the names of the two most important schools, those of Pañcasākha and Vārsaganya, of whom more hereafter. We have no right then to expect that a single comprehensive statement should cover all the doctrines that have been transmitted to us, but, as in Buddhism, we should look for the acceptance of certain fundamental categories and certain general principles, within the framework of which unlimited variation is permissible without the teaching thereby ceasing to come under the denomination of orthodox Sāmkhya.

The objects then, which this essay sets out to attain, are to ascertain the principles common to all forms of early Sāmkhya, to show in what respects differences of opinion were tolerated, and to trace the evolution of doctrine up to its culmination in the Sāmkhyakārikās. Such is the aim, but it must be admitted that it has not been completely achieved; for, though the authorities used permit of well-assured results in some matters, in others definite statements would only be

¹ Takakusu, BEFEO, 1904, p 58
² For his life and work, see P C Bagchi, Le canon bouddhique en Chine, pp. 418 ff
possible by resort to theories incapable of cogent proof, and it is towards demonstrable fact, not towards speculation on possibilities, that this inquiry is directed. In these circumstances, before proceeding to the collection and appreciation of evidence bearing on these points, it is desirable as a preliminary measure to discuss the sources with reference to their validity, relative dating and the like, and to explain the methods adopted for their exploitation.

The works taken into consideration here fall of themselves into four classes, of which only the first and last have been discussed at all fully so far. The former of these two is that of the Upanisads. The oldest of these texts provide the circle of ideas out of which the Sāṃkhya system evolved, and we find its categories assumed as the basis of thought for the first time in the last four vallis of the Katha Upanisad. This work is substantially older on the face of it that any of the other sources for early Sāṃkhya, but in view of the facts dealt with in the next section the relevant part of it can hardly be earlier than the fourth century B.C., while the sixth valli may be a later addition. The Mundaka Upanisad also expounds a scheme of purusa and ātman which agrees in its main lines with that of the Katha U.p., but does not appear otherwise to accept Sāṃkhya principles. The Pṛṣṇa Upanisad shows some affinity with Sāṃkhya thinking, but, if one or two useful points can be gained from it, it is not certain that it knows the completed system, though some scholars attribute a much later date to it. A considerable period of time seems to have elapsed between the composition of these three texts and that of the Śvetāsvatara Upanisad which applies to its doctrines of yoga and bhakti the main principles of Sāṃkhya. Opinion is more or less unanimous that it preceded the Bhagavadgītā, and in all probability it was well known to Asvaghosa, whom Chinese tradition represents, possibly rightly, as having been a follower of Śiva before his conversion to Buddhism.

1 S, xvi, 17 reproduces Svet U.p., 1, 2, and in my notes on B, xii, 21 and p. 38, I have pointed out the connection with ib, v, 2 and vi, 8 respectively.
only other Upaniṣad that needs discussion is the Maitrī, which has a number of Śāmkhya passages. It contains ideas so late in origin as to be unknown to the MBh, and it shows marked affinities with the earlier parts of the Yogasūtras.¹

The next class consists of the various expositions of doctrine, either specifically Śāmkhya or based on Śāmkhya thought, in the Moksadharmā and Anuśīrā sections of MBh, xi and xiv, and in the Bhagavadgītā, it is in connection with them and with the following class that the validity of the evidence has to be considered.² The teaching in the epic is of a semi-popular character and is not given with the precision of statement which would be expected of a formal treatise on philosophy. Further it covers a considerable period of time and emanates from many different writers and from several schools, naturally therefore there is discordance between different passages. But frequent ambiguity and lack of consistency do not prove that these epic descriptions are not to be taken seriously. Either we must accept them as authorities ³ and make the best we can of them, or we must reject them as the compositions of writers, who either deliberately or out of stupidity flout the teachings of the very schools they profess to be expounding and substitute doctrines of their own invention. The second alternative is highly improbable. For Śāmkhya always claimed to be orthodox and it is treated as such in the sacred and semi-sacred works of Brahmanism, for more than half a millennium it was the standard philosophy for all Hindus who found the Vedic scheme of worship unsatisfactory, and much of it passed into the common stock of Hindu thought. Is it at all credible,

¹ Cf. Keith, Śāmkhya System, p 14, and references there, for the late date of this Upaniṣad.
² This question, as regards the epic, is discussed with much ability and good sense by O. Straus, Indische Philosophie, pp. 126-7.
³ As secondary, not as original authorities; for in view of the evidence of the Buddhacarita discussed below, it seems that Śāmkhya textbooks were already in existence when the relevant portions of the epic were composed and that the teaching of the latter is dependent on them.
1. INTRODUCTORY. SOURCES AND METHODS

given what we know of the respect in which authority has always been held in India, that writers, adding to a work which already ranked as the encyclopædia of Hindu beliefs, should elaborate arbitrary systems to please themselves, instead of following constituted authority, or alternatively that they were incapable of understanding the standard philosophy of the day? I see nothing to be said for accepting such a view except that it would save us from the necessity of striving to understand what it is that the epic writers wish to express. This essay is based on the whole-hearted acceptance of the other alternative, and I would submit that by adopting proper methods of inquiry it is possible to work out a coherent scheme, in which the data of the epic find a natural place.

The MBh. passages have at least one advantage, which has not been fully appreciated. The bulk of Sanskrit philosophical literature is contained in commentaries on other works, and the object of a commentator is almost invariably to show that the particular views advocated by him are to be found in the work he is elucidating, when there is a substantial difference of date between text and commentary with much advance of thought in the interval, the commentator reads into his text much that was not intended to be there, and the scholar, as the records of modern Sanskrit learning show, in guilelessly following the commentator, may easily lose sight of the historical development of ideas. From the religious standpoint there is no objection to restating the views of an old text to suit the needs of the commentator’s own day, but the historical student must not let himself be blinded by the procedure. This danger is absent from the epic’s philosophical expositions, which are straightforward in statement and are not obscured by a desire to prove that old ideas and new ones are identical. The real difficulty with them lies in their use of language whose precise significance cannot be easily determined. Subject to proper caution on this account, they may be taken as being intended to reproduce, and as in fact
reproducing in popular form, the thought of the day, and no hesitation need be felt about the propriety of endeavouring to extract positive information from them.

Of the age of the *Mokșadharma* and the *Anugītā* no precise determination is possible. The earlier passages belong to the same stage of thought in general as the system expounded by Aśvaghosa, the later show some advance, but with the exception of one or two passages the gap between the *SK* and the later strata of the *MBh* is much wider than might have been expected *prima facie*. Analysis of the occurrences of technical terms produces, however, the noteworthy result that the use of terms in their earlier sense is more frequent in the beginning sections of the *Mokșadharma*, and in their later sense towards the end. Thus I have registered that most ambiguous word *guna*, whose exact significance often remains uncertain, in the meaning of "object of the senses" only between verse 6847 and the passage beginning at verse 10518 (where more than one sense is possible), but the classical use to denote the three factors of the *anyakta* is rare up to this point, but regular farther on. It looks as if it was the practice of the epic writers to insert whole new episodes at the point where the book then ended, but to make interpolations of lesser extent at any suitable place, for the latter I may note the passage beginning at verse 7842, which recalls by some of its phrases the arguments of the *SK*. Similarly the *sadāṃśa* passage, 11466 ff., has all the appearance of being a later addition to the *Vasisthakārīlayanakāsamvāda*. No such principle can be arrived at for the *Anugītā*, which, though late in the main, preserves earlier thought in a few cases.

The *Bhagavadgītā*, which stands on a different footing to the two sections just discussed, cannot be brought into definite correlation with Aśvaghosa, who provides the one more or less fixed point in the chronology of the period, but the great antiquity sometimes assigned to it is not borne out by analysis of the technical terms used in it. In the first half the usage of Śāmkhya expressions is closely parallel to the earlier.
passages of the *Mokṣadharma*, but from canto xxi on it corresponds to the later strata of that book. It seems to me, therefore, impossible to hold that it is all the work of one hand or of one age, though I see no reason for not supposing it to reproduce throughout the views of the same school of thought at different stages of development. This conclusion is consonant with the literary quality of the poem, the inspiration and the elevation of thought and language, which have secured for the *Gītā* its high place in the religious literature of the world, are markedly absent from the last six cantos, and it is difficult to believe that the writer who was capable of composing the earlier cantos could have fallen to the prosaic level of the later ones. The work adds little to our knowledge of early Śāmkhya, but is useful as a control of results obtained from other sources.

The third class covers the accounts of Śāmkhya in other literary works of the period. Two of these are of outstanding importance, the *Buddhacarita* of Āśvaghoṣa and the medical work which passes under the name of the *Carakasamhitā*. The former contains in canto xxi a formal statement of the Śāmkhya and Yoga systems together with a refutation of them according to the Buddhist arguments of the day, and in the later cantos, xvi, xvii, xviii, and xxvi, now only extant in the Tibetan and Chinese translations, particular points of Śāmkhya theory are subjected to analysis and criticism. The date of this work can be determined with some approach to accuracy, since it cannot be earlier than 50 B.C., and is unlikely to be later than A.D. 100, the probable time being about midway between the two.\(^1\) The expositions of Śāmkhya

\(^1\) I have dealt at length with the evidence for the date of Āśvaghoṣa in section 1 of the introduction to part II of my edition of the *Buddhacarita*, but only saw too late for consideration, except in the addenda, Mr K. P. Jayaswal's book, *An Imperial History of India*, in which the historical chapter of the *Āryamaṇḍūrikūrīmalakalpa* is edited and interpreted with much brilliance. He considers (pp. 18, 20, and 76) that work as placing the poet in the reign of Buddhakapāsa, whom he identifies with Kadphises I. This would agree with my views, but I doubt if his conclusion can be held to be proved. The text at the point where Āśvaghoṣa is referred to is not
principles in it are not to be taken as the outcome of poetic invention. Accurate knowledge of the various sciences and philosophies was part of the equipment of every kṣṇa; and no one can spend years, as I have done, in the study of this writer’s works without being deeply impressed by the extent of his learning and by its correctness, wherever there is extant authority by which to test his statements. It is inconceivable that a poet of his reputation and position should have exposed himself to public ridicule by a wrong description of a system whose principles were well known to everyone with any pretension to culture.

The Sāmkhya and Yoga schools, whose teachings are summarized by Āvaghoṣa, can fortunately be identified with some degree of certainty. B., xi, 33, quotes the sūtra avidyā pañcaparvā as being laid down by the Sāmkhya teacher (vrdvat) in question, and this aphorism, which is as old as Śvet. Upaniṣads, 1, 5, and is included in that mysterious little work, the Tattvānādāsā, is attributed by Vācaspati Miśra on SK., 47, to Vṛṣaganyā. Again, 1b., 67, names as the exponents of the variety of yoga there detailed Jāgīśavyā, Janaka, and Vṛddha Pārāśara. Of Janaka as a teacher of yoga nothing certain is known, but Vṛddha Pārāśara is in order, and it seems to me doubtful whether the line mentioning Buddhāpakṣa is to be construed with the following verse about Āvaghoṣa or whether it does not rather refer to the previous line, only partly preserved in the Sanskrit and omitted in the Tibetan. Further, it is more in accord with Buddhist tradition to suppose that the account given of Buddhāpakṣa refers to Kāṇisaka. If therefore the line about Buddhāpakṣa is to be taken with the verse about Āvaghoṣa, it would seem that it merely repeats the regular, but valueless, Buddhist legend of an association between Kāṇisaka and the poet. Similarly it should be noted that, when this work dates Nāgārjuna 400 years after the Nirvāṇa, it is not proof that he lived in the first century B.C., any more than the similar statement that Aśoka lived 100 years after the Nirvāṇa is evidence that he lived in the fourth or fifth century B.C. In fact, for the period before the Gupta dynasty the Aśramaṇamātrāṇālakalpa is obviously dependent on Buddhist legendary material and affords no definite information of which we were not already in possession.

1 See section 11 of the introduction to part II of my edition of the Buddhacarita, for the evidence on this point.
another name for Pañcaśikha, as appears from MBh., xi, 11875, Parāṣarasagotrasya vṛddhasya sumahātmanah | bhūksok Pañcaśikhasya, and we know from the numerous quotations in the bhāṣya on the YS. that the Sāmkhya side of Patañjala’s doctrine is based on the teaching of Pañcaśikha. Not much is known of Jagiśāvya, who is named in a list of Sāmkhya seers at MBh., xii, 11782, and is quoted in the bhāṣya on YS., xi, 55 and xi, 18. There is, however, a curious parallelism between the sources, which corroborates my view of Āśvaghoṣa’s trustworthiness, for his account of yoga begins at B., xi, 46, 47, with emphasizing the necessity of śīla in terms that might well be a summary of Jagiśāvya’s views reported at MBh., xi, 8431 ff., and the following verse teaches the suppression of the senses, for which the same teacher is quoted as the standard authority in the bhāṣya on YS., xi, 55, his dictum being paraphrased by Vācaspati Māra with the words cattasyaikūryat sahendriyavr apravrūtr eva śabdādissu ¹

It appears then that B., xi, gives us in outline the teaching of the two chief schools of Sāmkhya and Yoga, those of Vārasāngya and Pañcaśikha, in the form in which they were

¹ One of the differences between the yoga of the older Hinayāna Buddhism (as distinguished from the final Abhidharma view, A.K., kārtōk 1, 40) and that of Brahmanism is that the former teaches the control of the senses, indriyaśamācara, under which they still function, but only in a limited fashion, and the latter prescribes, as above, their complete suppression, the bhāṣya on YS., xi, 55, knows indeed of sense control in various forms, but rejects it as incomplete in favour of Jagiśāvya’s view. Now Māyāhama, III, 298, describes the Buddha’s refutation of the view of a Pārāśāriya Brahman that indriyabhāsana consists in arriving at a state in which the senses cease to function. This passage of the canon is quoted in full in the Vihāras (Tanbo Issakujo ed., XXVII, 729, a29), where this particular tenet is attributed to a Pārāśāri śīrthaka, for the reference to this sūtra (cf. A.K., VI, 121), and a translation of the Vihāras passage, I am indebted to the kindness of Professor de la Vallée Poussin. As Pārāśāra is to be identified with Pañcaśikha, the canon gives here a fragment of the teaching of his school. This doctrine of suppression of the sense faculties is frequently mentioned in the MBh., thus xi, 7133 ff., 7469–7473, 8738, 8785, 11377–11383, xiv, 548, 567, 1153, 1157, Gītā, vi, 12, 24, xi, 4, xviii, 51, and the expression used in the Buddhist canon is reflected at xii, 7147, indriyagṛāmam samparābhāvayet, and that of Āśvaghoṣa in xi, 8738, indriyamgrahāt.
prevailant in the first century A.D., so that the origin of these two schools must be placed at a more remote date than is often done by scholars. But it does not necessarily follow that the various fragments attributed to these two teachers are also earlier than Āśvaghoṣa, for in most cases they seem to belong to a more modern stratum of thought and should probably be assigned to later restatements of the doctrine.

The other work, the Carakasamhitā, contains in adhyāyas 1 and 5 of the Śārīrasthāṇa a fairly full account of a kind of Sāmkhya, which in its essential details stands very close to that described by Āśvaghoṣa. The language suggests a slightly later date, as may be seen by comparing B., xii, 23-32, with the corresponding passage in Car., pp 360-361. A point deserving notice is the series of questions with which the first adhyāya opens, for they mention the matters, which were in dispute between the Sāmkhya and its opponents, and which are in a number of cases specifically handled by Āśvaghoṣa.

The value of these two authorities lies partly in the fact that each are by a single hand (that is, for Car., so far as the Sāmkhya passage in the Śārīrasthāṇa is concerned), whereas all the other works here dealt with, except the SK., are composite and mix up material belonging to different stages of thought. They provide therefore a most useful check on the analysis of the MBḥ.

The other old medical work, the Sūrūta, also contains a Sāmkhya passage in its Śārīrasthāṇa, but this is much later.

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1 This accounts for the inclusion of the Śaṣṭītantra in the oldest list of Brahmanical works given by the Jain canon, see Charpentier, Uttara-dhyayanasūtra, p 28.

2 Thus, when Vasubandhu, AK, IV, 63-4, quotes a Sāmkhya statement, he expressly gives it as emanating, not from Vāraśaganya himself, but from his school, and the saying attributed to Vāraśaganya in the bhāṣya on YS, iii, 52, appears to belong to polemics against the Vaiśeṣikas and must therefore also be later in date.

3 Surendranath Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, I, pp 213 ff, was the first to bring to notice the historical importance of this account, but I differ from his interpretation of it in some details.
than the corresponding section of the Carakasamhitā and has no value for the present inquiry. An occasional point of interest can be gleaned from Manu, and reference should also be made to the account in the Tamil work, the Maṇimekālai. This latter is undoubtedly early, seeing that it is ignorant of the tanmātras and treats puruṣa as a single universal soul, but in other respects the details are not clear enough for comparative purposes and the text is possibly not in order.

The last class, the terminus ad quem of this essay, consists of the two standard works for classical Sāmkhya in its earliest form, namely, the Yoga variety as given in the sūtras of Patañjali, and the orthodox version of Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the Sāmkhyakārikās. The former is obviously a composite work and presents in general an earlier form of the doctrine, thus the eightfold buddhi is unknown to the sūtras, though occasionally mentioned in the commentaries, and it is evident that in the earlier part the theory that prakṛti becomes active in order to effect puruṣārtha is not accepted and is possibly unknown. The YS. are thus a valuable link between the MBh and Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The SK needs no discussion, for its understanding I have used four commentaries, the bhāṣya of Gauḍapāda, the Mātharavṛtti which is closely related to it and which, though possibly preserving a little earlier matter, seems on the whole to be later, the commentary related to both the foregoing which was translated into Chinese by Paramārtha, and the Sāmkhyatattvākaumudī of Vācaspati Miśra, which puts the arguments into a more modern shape.

1 Translated by Suryanarayana Sastri, Journ of Ind Hist, VIII, pp 322-4.

2 Edited in the Chaukamba SS. Cf Keith, Religion and Philosophy of the Veda, p 304, for its date, his arguments still hold good in my opinion. The name Māthara is associated with Sāmkhya at an early date, for the list of Brahmanical works in the Jain canonical books, the Nandī and Anuyogadvīra, as quoted by Charpentier, Uttarādhyaśyanasūtra, p 29, gives the Mādhara next the Saṅghāntara.

3 Translation by Takakusu, BEFEO, 1904, pp. 978–1061.
and introduces a certain amount of new matter. Another recently published commentary, the *Jayamangalā*, adds nothing to our knowledge.

There is thus no lack of documents for exploring the early history of Sāmkhya, but the difficulty lies in so putting their evidence together as to produce a coherent sequence of development, and the very multiplicity of statements, varying to a greater or less degree among themselves, adds to the embarrassment of the inquirer. The method most usually adopted to solve the problem is to consider one or more expositions separately and see what the outcome is; such efforts end unavoidably in confusion, for the frequent ambiguity of the terms employed baffles the inquirer and no one account becomes intelligible till its details have been compared with those of all the rest. I have preferred a different method, less ambitious but more laborious, that of taking all the occurrences of each term together and considering their effect. Thereby the real significance of each term is brought out, and the changes it undergoes in the course of time become clearer. Logically such a proceeding may be deemed defective as involving the probability that passages belonging to other schools will be improperly employed to explain that which is pure Sāmkhya; in practice, however, this danger appears negligible, as the terms in question are little used except in genuine Sāmkhya discussions or in systems that accepted the Sāmkhya principles as the basis of their thought. The counters remain the same, it is only the arrangement which differs. The real difficulty is the impossibility of deciding in many cases which of the several meanings of a term is to be applied, and discussion has often to be restricted to passages which are free from ambiguity. In this essay I have not attempted to list all the occurrences of each term, partly because many would have had to be entered as unclassified in view of their uncertain significance,

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1 Calcutta O.S., 19.
but I have endeavoured throughout to give every reference which has serious relevance to the point under discussion.

*Internal* comparison by itself is, however, insufficient; for the texts presume in their readers (or hearers) a knowledge of many fundamental points which remain obscure to the modern scholar, and so leave room for an amount of speculation which might easily vitiate results so painfully acquired. It is here that comparison with other contemporary systems gives the aid necessary for grasping the real bearing of the texts. For during the centuries that the various Indian philosophies were in process of evolution, their history manifests one well-marked characteristic, in that each epoch sees the emergence of certain new ideas and principles which are taken up into all systems still capable of growth and are modified by each school to suit its needs; thus mutual influence takes the form of repulsion as well as of attraction, the insistence by one school on a particular principle causing others to define their position in respect of it and often to take up the directly opposite view. A typical example is the way in which the atomistic and molecular theories developed in the different schools, certain points in the process are still not clear, and the question is of little importance for the history of early Sāmkhya except as helping to explain how the *tanmatra* category came into existence, so that discussion is needless here. In any case similar phenomena may be observed in the histories of other subjects and in other countries than India. By making use of this characteristic much which would otherwise remain in the dark becomes clear to us, and I would suggest that the real criterion of success in the delineation of Sāmkhya development is to be sought in the extent to which the scheme, so worked out, fits into the general framework provided by what is known of other systems.

In the application of this principle the present state of knowledge limits comparison for the earlier period almost entirely to Hinayāna Buddhism, as not enough is yet known of the early stages of Jain thought for it to be adduced except
very occasionally. For practical purposes I distinguish several stages in the growth of Buddhism, though these divisions, overlapping each other as they do, have no absolute validity, nor can precise dating be suggested as yet. We have first the period of the Buddha and his immediate successors, about whose views on philosophical questions little positive assertion can be made. Next comes the period of the earliest dogmatism, represented by the greater part of the four Pali Nikāyas, excluding the small amount of really early matter and those parts which belong to the next period. To the latter belongs the development of the Abhidharma, contained in the earlier books of the Pali Abhidhamma and the Sarvāstivādin Jñānapratisthāna with its six feet, about which latter little is yet known. Finally there is the stage of the full-blown Abhidharma, now familiar to scholars from the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu. With the beginning of this last period a new phase begins, when the pace of progress

1 For early Jain dogmatism it is difficult for those who are not specialists to go behind the works of Kundakunda, of which the most usable is the Pravacanasūra (ed. and trans. by A N Upadhye, Bombay, 1935, and trans. by B Faddégon, Cambridge, 1936) Professor Upadhye, p xxm, puts the date of this text at the beginning of the Christian era, but Professor Keith, reviewing the book in JRAI, 1936, pp 528-9, concludes that the evidence shows that Kundakunda "may be placed not later than the fourth century A D." Professor F W Thomas, in the introduction, p xix, to Faddégon’s translation, suggests the third or fourth century A D. The views of these two scholars agree with the opinions I have formed about the development of Indian thought and philosophical terminology. Kundakunda’s use of the terms parināma and paramāṇu are more appropriate to a date in the neighbourhood of the third or fourth century A D, and similarly in the Samayavāra (Sacred Books of the Jainas, VIII), 124, 127, and 356-361, he refers to the Sāmkhya doctrine of the connection between soul and prakṛti in language that could hardly have been used at a much earlier date. Upadhye’s analysis of the Pravacanasūra, pp. lxii-xcv, is of much interest and suggests that the earliest form of Sāmkhya, as outlined in this essay, stood very close to the earliest Jainism in certain essential matters, notably in the relation between soul and the physical side of the individual as well as in the similarity between the Jain upayogas and the Sāmkhya gunas in their original form, and that the subsequent divergence was due to the transformation of the prakṛti theory. The time, however, has not yet arrived when it is possible to work out the parallelism and the differences in detail.
quickens and Hinayāna Buddhism retires to the background, ceasing to be one of the dominant influences in Indian thought. On the one hand, Mahāyāna Buddhism, first with the Mādhya-
mikas and then with the Viśṇānavādins, gives philosophy a new direction by insisting that the fundamental problem for investigation is the nature of reality.\(^1\) On the other, Brah-
manical thought is clarified by the rise of the Vaiśeṣika system, which, though its first beginnings may date further back, seems to have taken definite form between Aśvaghoṣa\(^2\) and Nāgārjuna, its views being crystallized in sūtras before the Kalpanāmandatikā of Kumāralāta was composed. While this philosophy clearly owed much in its origin, as pointed out below, to the form of Sāmkhya most prevalent at the time, it exercised in its turn at a later date considerable influence on certain details of the classical Sāmkhya. At this point is reached the end of the period of which this essay treats, and it will be unnecessary to deal with subsequent developments in considering whether the scheme here out-
lined is intelligible in relation to what is known of the modifica-
tions undergone by other schools of thought.

\(^1\) As Strauss points out, Indische Philosophie, p 49, the older texts deal with the problem of “Weltwert”, not “Weltrealität”.

\(^2\) See B, part ii, p lv, for Aśvaghoṣa’s ignorance of the Vaiśeṣika system.
§ 2. Origins

Whatever the other difficulties of this inquiry, it is at least easy to give a definition of Śāmkhya, which covers its varieties at all stages. It is that system which divides the object of investigation into two sides, which are held widely asunder. The first contains either one principle, psychical, or two, one psychical and one divine (īśvara), the former is the orthodox classical view, held not only by the SK., but also by the YS., whose īśvara is merely a special purusa, while the latter, represented in the epic, survived till a later date, if the refutation of the seśvarasāmkhya tenets in Tatvamāsya, 94 ff may be considered evidence of the continued existence of the belief up to Śāntaraksita’s day. The other consists invariably of twenty-four principles, material, mental, and emotive, and undergoes no change in its constitution, except that in early Śāmkhya the material principles are made up of five great elements and five objects of the senses, and in the classical school of five subtle elements and five gross elements. A scheme so peculiar as this must have required a long period of gestation, during which its various constituents were recognized and correlated, till perhaps some genius arose who cast the whole in a mould that imposed general acceptance. Hitherto in the search for its origin disproportionate attention has been paid to the classical theory of the guṇas, which are often supposed to derive more or less directly from the cosmogonical speculations of the earlier Upaniṣads. But, as will be shown in the next section, the primitive theory of the guṇas was of an entirely different nature to that usually taken for granted, and received much less emphasis than it did in the classical school, for early Śāmkhya thought with respect to the cosmos we must look in other directions. If we examine the twenty-four principles of the physical side without regard

1 See JRAS, 1930, pp 864–872.
to later developments, it is evident that thirteen of them, the three mental principles and the ten faculties of sense and action, are conceived in relation to the individual, and that ten of the remaining eleven, the material principles, transcend the individual and are cosmic in essence. In classical Sāmkhya the two groups are brought into co-operation by a supersensual cosmic "matter", prakṛti, but this doctrine, as will appear from the next section, is not known to the earliest Sāmkhya and there still survived a tradition in the classical epoch that the original (mūla) Sāmkhya believed in the existence of as many prakṛtis as persons.¹ Early Sāmkhya was in fact little concerned with the cosmos, and when an explanation had to be given of it in the terms of that philosophy, resort was had to mythological interpretation of the principles, such as the identification of ahamkāra with Prajāpati or Brahmā (MBh., xii, 6780, 11234, 11575, 11601, and xiv, 1445) or the four vyūhas of the Pāṇcarātra school. Evidently before the question of the nature of ultimate reality was brought into the foreground of speculation, no need was felt to give a philosophical, as distinct from a religious, explanation of the universe, and the cosmic elements were only considered in their relation to the individual.

The corresponding developments in Buddhism are illuminating in this respect. The formulas of the earlier dogmatism, the five skandhas and the like, relate solely to the individual, and even in the final form of the Abhidharma, where the individual is conceived as a samādha, an incessant flux of consciousness, composed of a succession of moments, in each of which a number of ultimates called dharmas, both material and psychological, appear in combination, nothing is ever said to show in what respect these ultimates are real or how they are related to the cosmos. It is not till we reach the Mahāyāna that the place of the individual in the universe begins to receive consideration.

¹ Cf. Surendranath Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, I, p. 217.
Early thought in Sāmkhya, as in Buddhism, was in fact almost exclusively concerned with the religious fate of man, a tendency already observable in the Brāhmaṇas and early Upanisads, which repeatedly attempt the analysis of the individual with this end in view. Two aspects of the case there received special attention. Firstly there was the desire to discover what was the essential component of the individual in the last resort, originally for the symbolic interpretation of the Vedic rites, by which alone they attained full efficacy, and later for the benefit of those, who had discarded the rites in favour of asceticism or yoga, to enable them to reach the final goal. Secondly, the nature of life beyond the grave in the cycle of transmigration exercised many minds in the search for an answer to the question what elements of the individual survived into the next existence.

It is from inquiries such as these that early Sāmkhya originated, and a good starting point is provided by the passage in Śatapathabṛāhmaṇa, x, 1, 3, 4, which divides the individual into five immortal parts and five mortal parts. Thus division foreshadows the difference of aspect noted above between the material and mental principles of Sāmkhya on its physical side, for the five mortal parts constitute the corporeal body, which dissolves at death, and they correspond therefore in function to the great elements, which in early Sāmkhya constitute the material body of the individual and take back at his death its constituents into themselves. The group of the five immortal parts will repay more prolonged consideration. It recurs in the early texts in many different forms, the commonest of which consists of manas, vāc, caṇḍus, śrotā, and prāṇa. In this formula, which recognizes only two senses, sight and hearing, prāṇa originally meant "breath" taken as the highest principle, but the recognition of the

1 Cf. BĀU, i, 3 and ii, 4, 14: ChU,. i, 2, 11, 11, and iii, 18. Kauśitak, Up., ii, 14. Kena Up., i, 1, etc., and see O. Strauss, Udgaṇḍavyā, SBPAW, 1931, pp. 243-8, for the group.

2 So also Oldenberg, Die Weltanschauung der Brāhmaṇatexte, p. 63, for the corresponding passages of the Brāhmaṇas.
existence of another sense, that of smell, caused it in the BĀU. and ChU. to be understood as the olfactory power, nāsikya prāṇa. In consequence of this development a sixth factor is often added as containing in contrast to the other five the essential element, such as prāṇa in the sense of "breath", BĀU, i, 3, ChU., i, 2, etc., ādyaya, BĀU., iv, 1, 7, vyānāna, BĀU., n, 4, 14, or praṇā, Kauśitaki Up., ii, 3. Progress takes the form of recognizing more and more elements in the individual, and the relative age of different passages in this period may be estimated by the number of senses mentioned, because, once the existence of a sense faculty has been discovered, it is unlikely that it would be omitted from such lists. Thus BĀU., iv, 3, 23 ff., knows all five senses, and ultimately the two versions of the Yājñavalkya-Maitreyī dialogue in the BĀU., which are generally admitted to belong to the later portions of the work,¹ detail in ii, 4, 11 and iv, 5, 12,² the mind, the five organs of sense and the five organs of action.

Evidently those of the passages quoted above which know only two or three senses date from before the formulation of the Sāmkhya system, those which refer to all five may or may not be earlier than it, but, as that peculiar group, the five organs of action, of which only vāc was included in the original group, is detailed in the Yājñavalkya-Maitreyī dialogue, there is a distinct possibility that that passage, in the final form at least, was composed by some one acquainted with Sāmkhya categories. The recognition of the five sense faculties naturally brought with it the recognition of the five corresponding objects of the senses, as in the two versions of the Yājñavalkya-Maitreyī dialogue. This duplication was

¹ Cf Oldenberg, Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus, p 341, n 8

² The first of these passages is probably not original, but was substituted in imitation of the later version in lieu of something more primitive, for the concluding section, n, 4, 14, clearly recognizes, not the extended group, but the old group of five given above plus vyānāna as forming the individual.
found so attractive that *Praśna Up.*, iv, 8, enumerates no less than twenty-one principles with their appropriate objects.

Thus of the twenty-three evolutes of the *avyakta* in the complete scheme, seventeen are recognized as forming part of the individual in the later parts of the *BĀU.*, namely, *vijñāna* for which later *buddhi* was to be substituted, *manas*, ten organs of sense and action, and the five objects of the senses. By this time, however, the idea that these elements represent the immortal side of the individual can no longer be traced, and the emphasis has shifted to a complete analysis of corporeal personality. Of the remaining principles, *ahamkāra* has an obscure history, which will have to be discussed later; in the occurrence at *ChU.*, vii, 25, if the passage is not an interpolation, it has a different meaning, and the list of *tattvas* in *Katha Up.*, III, substitutes the *mahān ātmā* for it, the first unmistakable references being in the *Praśna* and *Śvet. Up.* It should be added that the first principle, the *avyakta*, cannot be traced in the older Upaniṣads at all and is first mentioned in *Katha Up.*, III, which is the earliest passage to suggest knowledge of Sāmkhya as a completed system.

The original scheme of early Sāmkhya on the physical side is completed by the addition of the five great elements, the *mahābhūtas*, whose historical evolution has been worked out by Oldenberg and need not occupy us here; they first appear as a complete group in *Aitareya Up.*, III, 3, and *Tattvīrya Up.*, I, I. Their conception, as already remarked, differs radically from that of the other physical principles; for they are part of the cosmos, not of the individual, being divine forces (*devatā* in *ChU.*, vi, 3, 2, and *daiva* in *Bhagavādgītā*, xviii, 14) which create the mortal part of the individual and receive their contribution back at his death.

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1 Cf. Margarethe Steiner, *Der Ahamkāra in den älteren Upaniṣads*, in *Festeschrift Garbe*, p. 111. For the meaning see Senart’s translation of *ChU*, p. 104.

As such, therefore, their place in the individual scheme is not specifically mentioned, till we reach regular Sāṃkhya enumerations of the principles, though presumably it had long been recognized.

This analysis of the evidence shows that Sāṃkhya is rooted in the speculations of the Brāhmaṇas and the oldest Upaniṣads about the constitution of the individual and that, as is generally agreed, its formulation took place at the earliest in the interval that separates the oldest group of Upaniṣads from the middle group, subject to the possibility that certain passages in the former may be subsequent to that event. To suggest a precise date would be rash, but some idea of the possible limits may be obtained by a comparison with the evolution of Buddhist doctrine.

The standard formula for the individual in the earliest Buddhist dogmatism is that known as the five skandhas, which in its content corresponds closely to the early Sāṃkhya analysis of the corporeal individual, omitting the avyakta; for rūpa covers the great elements and their emanations, the objects of the senses, vedanā, "sensation," is to be equated with the senses and samjñā, "the naming faculty," with the mind, samskāra has some similarity of idea with ahāmkāra, the exact original content of both words being obscure, though connected with the integrating action of the personality, and vyānā in the earliest documents has much the same content as buddhi. The Buddhist formula is, however, distinguished for its replacement of the concrete Sāṃkhya terms by more generalized conceptions and may therefore be presumed to belong to a slightly later stage of thought.

But have we any right to include the formula of the five skandhas in the original teaching of the Buddha himself? Buddhism was a new start in Indian religions, and its founder would naturally reject the old lumber and only include in his doctrines those conceptions which in his day were still vital and capable of growth. Any really old ideas to be found in the canon should be presumed to have become part of
Buddhism at a time when they were still living ideas in Indian thought as a whole. Now there are two groups dealing with the analysis of the individual, which are repeated in Buddhist texts of every age and school, which further reflect more primitive conceptions than those classified under the head of the five skandhas, and which were living ideas in Brahmanical thought only at the time of the oldest Upanisads and were little known to later speculation. The first of these is nāmarūpa, used in later Buddhist literature as an abbreviation of the five skandhas. It appears first as two words, not as a compound, in the philosophical portion of the Atharvaveda, x, 2, 12 xi, 7, 1 and xii, 5, 9, the last of these passages shows knowledge of two senses only, sight and hearing, and is therefore on the same level of thought as the division, discussed above, of the immortal parts of the personality into five components at the earlier stage, that of the Brāhmaṇas. Similarly at Śrutaputhabrāhmaṇa, xi, 2, 3, 3, and 6, and Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa, iii, 2, 7, 1 Treated as a compound, it is found in the Upanisads as follows, BĀU., i, 4, 7, and 6, 3. ČhU., vi, 3, 2, and 3, and viii, 14, 1 Mundaka Up., iii, 2, 8 (and also separately at i, 1, 9) and Praśna Up., vi, 5. The scope of the phrase in all these passages is made clear by BĀU., i, 6, where the individual person is described as made up of nāma, rūpa, and karmā, a statement which, so far as the actual words go, would have been entirely acceptable to Buddhists, but which seems to indicate more primitive conceptions there. The term belongs to a pre-Sāmkhya stage of thought, and the Buddhists, in taking it over, gave it a new and wider meaning, but the point stands that, if Buddhism had originated at a later date, it is unlikely that it would have retained an antiquated formula, which was soon felt to be incapable of conveying the real significance of the facts and which had to be replaced by an enlarged group.

The second phrase, whose antiquity and authoritativeness

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1 Cf O. Strauss, Indische Philosophie, pp 35–6
are equally guaranteed by its appearance throughout the whole range of Buddhist literature, is the category drśta, bruta, npata, and vyñāta; its mere mention is sufficient to demonstrate its relationship to the Upaniṣadic pentad, already discussed, in the form to which vyñāna was added as the sixth, vāc and prāna alone being omitted. It is to be noted as suggestive of its date that the group recognizes two senses only. A good set of references to the occurrences in the Pali canon is given in Rhys Davids-Stede's Pali Dictionary under the word muta; and support for my view is to be found in the obiter dictum there of the authors, who had not observed that the phrase derived from the thought of the Brāhmanas and early Upaniṣads, "Thus quite a main tenet of the old (popular) psychology." For the canonical works of the Mahāyāna I confine myself to quoting Pañcavimsatisāhasrikā-prajñāparamitā (ed. N. Dutt), pp. 78 and 82. That the group soon ceased to be intelligible to the Buddhists themselves may be inferred from the difficulty which the commentators experienced in explaining it, all agreeing that muta stands for the action of the three faculties of touch, taste, and smell, and that vyñāta refers to the manas.¹

The Buddhist records thus preserve two elements of speculation, probably from their sanctity relics of the Buddha's own teaching, which reach back to a remote antiquity, before the various items which make up the early Sāmkhya scheme had been gathered together, and which it is inconceivable would have been adopted, if the more modern categories of the latter had been known in the Buddha's day. The conclusion then cannot be avoided that, contrary to widespread opinion ² on the subject, Buddhism originated before Sāmkhya,

¹ e.g. Visuddhimagga, p 451, A.K., III, p. 160 (on kārikā iv, 75), Abhisamayālamkārāloka (ed. Tucci), p 270 (=ed. Waghara, p 418), Viññaptimātratāsūthi, pp 454 and 525. The connection, however, between manas and the sense of touch is an old one, referred to at BĀU, i, 5, 3

² I use the word "opinion" advisedly, as definite evidence has never been brought forward. Among the grounds put forward for holding Buddhism to have originated after Sāmkhya, apart from those based on
which should be placed in the epoch when the primitive teaching of the Buddha was being transformed by the first growth of dogmatism.

The obvious influence of Śāṅkha on dogmatic Buddhism, which need not consideration here, the three most tangible arguments are that Eastern India, in which Buddhism first arose, was at that time little conversant with orthodox Brahmanical ideas on religion, that the Pali canon entirely ignores the Upanisadic speculation on brahma and ēśvar, and that it depicts a world of big towns with an advanced civilization and extensive commerce such as is unknown to the early Upanisads. With the first argument I would agree in so far that Buddhism probably made its appeal mainly to those classes and in those regions on which the Brahmanical system had the least hold, but that it did not come into touch at once with orthodox Brahmanism is improbable. For according to the texts Mithunā, to the east of the area in which Buddhism had its birth, early became the stronghold of Brahmanical orthodoxy which it has ever since remained, and of the Brahman it is families tradition especially associates the Āṅgirasas with North Bihar (Pargiter, Ancient Indian Historical Tradition, p 219), and the Kāśyapas are reported as far east as the river Kauśika and the kingdom of Aṅga (ibid, pp. 232–3) The latter case is important, as Kāśyapas play an important part in Buddhist legend. I see, therefore, no reason for holding that Brahmanism and Buddhism could not have exercised mutual influence on each other from the start, and the evidence given above suggests that such influence was in fact at work. The bearing of the second argument is not clear to me, nor in view of the similar silence of most Brahmanical works, other than the later polemical treatises, about Buddhist doctrines, is it safe to use arguments ex silentio to draw conclusions about dating. The third argument rests for its force on an early dating of the Buddhist canon, which is now generally rejected
§ 3. The *Avyakta* and its Three *Gunas*

So far the general line of development is clear enough, but from this point it becomes impossible to arrange the material in a chronological sequence that will show the gradual progress of thought, and the alternative method has to be adopted of taking all terms whose exact content is uncertain and considering each of them singly. I start with the first principle on the physical side, the *avyakta*, whose philosophical significance is associated in the classical school with the three aspects under which causality is there considered, namely *tatvavākāra*, the procession of each principle from a preceding one by modification, *guna-parināma*, which by the ever varying proportions of the *guna* is responsible for the manifoldness of phenomenal appearances, and *saikārya*, the existence of the effect in the cause. Though the scriptural authority for these conceptions was derived from mythological speculations such as those contained in *ChU*, vi, 2, the second and third are not to be found in the *MBh.*, or coeval sources. Nor probably should the first be read into the oldest Sāmkhya text, the *Katha Up.*, despite the fact that it provides a scale of precedence for the principles, the reference there is apparently to yoga, in which the adept on the upward path achieves sight of each principle in turn, and there may be some survival of the idea that the ultimate constituent of the individual had to be recognized in order to give by symbolism the fullest efficacy to the Vedic rites. The *vikāra* theory is first mentioned in *Śvet. Up.*, i, 4¹ (cf. also v, 3), which recognizes the division of the physical side into two groups, one of eight *prakṛtis* or primary constituents, the other of sixteen *vikāras* or secondary constituents. This division is taught in a number of epic passages, is the standard doctrine in *B.*, xii, Car. and the *Tattvasamāsa*, and is still found in texts as late as the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. It is implicit in the

¹ See *JRAS.*, 1930, p. 865.
prakṛtyālaya theory of the classical school and is even hinted at by the SK., which has one prakṛti, seven principles which are both prakṛti and vikṛti, and sixteen which are only vikṛti. The question thus arises whether this doctrine in its original form postulates an absolute division, that is, whether the eight prakṛtis are all solely prakṛti and none of them vikāras also, or whether we are to interpret it throughout on the lines of the SK. If the answer to this results in an affirmation of the first alternative for the earlier texts, it follows that the avyakta is not the sole ultimate source of phenomenal existence, and therefore that its content must have been entirely different from that explained by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, but inquiry into its real significance must take the form of investigation into the use of the various terms applied to it from time to time.

Three such names are in current employment, a fact which of itself suggests fluctuation of idea through the centuries, avyakta, pradhāna, and prakṛti. The first appears regularly in all schools and at all stages of thought, and a registration of its occurrences will not further the inquiry at this point Pradhāna is the regular term used by the YS., and also in the two Upanisads which specifically teach yoga, the Śvet Up and the Maith. Occurrences in the epic are not common, those I have listed being xi, 9105, 9115, 11635, 11794, 13035, 13537, and xiv, 522, 529, 579, 953, 1399; some of these passages are certainly connected with Yoga, and it is probable that it is the term specially associated with that school. In origin perhaps it meant simply the “chief” of the eight prakṛtis, and the use is too general to help in the quest for enlightenment. The third term is the crux, and that caution is necessary appears from the fact that the St Petersburg Dictionary notes for the epic, apart from the Gītā, no reference to prakṛti as denoting the avyakta alone, citing it only as signifying the group of eight. This group is referred to, sometimes in the plural as aṣṭau prakṛtayaḥ (MBh, xi, 7670, 11396, 11552), sometimes in the singular with prakṛti as a collective name covering the entire group,
3. THE AVYAKTA AND ITS THREE GUNAS

B., xii, 17 and Car., p. 327, l. 19. The same passage in the Buddhacarita gives vikāra also in the singular as a general term for all sixteen secondary constituents. It may, therefore, be inferred that MBh, xii, 8051, intends the singular to be understood similarly in praktau ca vikāre ca, and both uses are found together at 7668-7670, prakṛtī and vikāre against mūlaprakṛtayō 'ṣṭau. The difficulty, therefore, lies in determining the significance of prakṛti in the singular.

The earliest apparent occurrence is in Svēt. Up., iv, 10, māyām tu prakṛtim vadyān māyāna tu maheśvaram, where prakṛti evidently denominates the avyakta; but elsewhere this Upanisad uses the term pradhāna and knows the division into eight prakṛtis and sixteen vikāras. Further the verse is an anuṣṭubh inserted into a series of tristubh verses, which describe the īśāna, and it disturbs the flow of thought. I have, therefore, little doubt that it is a later gloss, added to explain the māyāyā of the preceding verse, the text of this Upanisad being notoriously corrupt and interpolated. The Maitrī Up. belongs to a period when prakṛti usually means the avyakta, and the two occurrences of the word in it, at vi, 10 and 30, should presumably bear this sense, but are ambiguous as they stand. In the earlier part of the Moksadharmā the use of prakṛti as a name of the avyakta does not appear to be known; thus the Śūkūnapraśna section, reproducing Vāśya’s system, is shown to be fairly early by the remarkable verbal coincidences certain passages show with the Sāmkhya exposition of Buddhacarita, xii, and prakṛti does not appear for avyakta anywhere in it. The indisputable occurrences are to be found (1) in the Manubhraspatvasamvāda, verses 7481 and 7483, the passage diverges in doctrine from the norm of the Sāmkhya schools and seems from its Vaiṣṇava tendency and use of purusa in place of kṣetrajña to be late, (2) in the Vārṣṇeyādhyāmakathā, 7850 ff., where the argument with its similarity to SK., 10 and 11, is of a late character, (3) repeatedly in Vaśṭha’s and Yājñavalkya’s systems, verses 11255 onwards. The Anuṇgītā seems to avoid using the
term; at the only occurrence, xiv, 522, pradhānām asrjavat prakṛtuṁ sa bārīrṇāṁ, it may have no technical significance. On the other hand the Bhagavadyūtā has the word frequently, often in a general sense, and it will suffice here to consider certain passages of a Sāmkhya tinge. At vii, 4 and 5, Kṛṣṇa describes his eightfold aparā prakṛti, consisting of buddhi, ahamkāra, manas, and the great elements, while his parā prakṛti is said to be jīvabhuta. The two verses have puzzled translators, because they have failed to observe the parallels in the rest of the epic. The term jīva, which is dealt with below, is not to be understood in its later sense, and the aparā prakṛti is not the classical Sāmkhya prakṛti, which is excluded from it by the definition Verse 4 should be understood as giving a different version, not attested elsewhere, of the doctrine of the eight prakṛtis, by which manas is added to the group and avyakta omitted from it. Moreover, in the systems which teach the existence of the eight prakṛtis it is necessary to use an epithet to distinguish the avyakta, if it is called prakṛti. Thus MBh, xi, 11396, refers to the eight prakṛtis, and ibid., 11394,1 calls the avyakta the parā prakṛti, similarly in the Nārāyanīya, verse 13041 mentions the eight prakṛtis and verse 13142 the parā prakṛti, meaning, as the context shows, the avyakta. Therefore Kṛṣṇa’s parā prakṛti is simply the avyakta, elsewhere called his māyā. On the other hand in xiii, 19 ff., xiv, 5, and xv, 7, prakṛti without distinguishing epithet stands for the avyakta, and the theory of an eightfold prakṛti is not admitted by this later part.

The evidence thus shows that the use of prakṛti to denote the avyakta alone is a later development and that the original use of the word was in connection with the theory of the eight prakṛtis, which is known in two forms. One of them uses prakṛti in the singular to denote the group of eight as a whole, and is probably the older doctrine, since, as noted above,

1 The Calcutta edition here has the nonsensical text, prakṛtum param, the Bombay edition rightly parām.
only traces of it are to be found in the epic as it has come down to us; the philosophical implications will be discussed in the fifth section of this essay. But it may be observed that vikāra equally has hardly its later significance, and seems to mean no more than a secondary or specialized constituent, without any suggestion of the idea of procession. This school is atheistic, as the action of prakṛti leaves no room for a deity. In the second form the group is called the eight prakṛtis in the plural, this being the regular use in the epic occurrences. The sense of vikāra has widened, for the epic in these passages regularly gives the orthodox version of the procession of each principle from a preceding one. This school is normally atheistic, if the epic is to be trusted on the point, and it would seem to have a close relation with the Vaiṣeṣika theory of the dravyas, which correspond almost exactly in content; under the latter manas includes the buddhi and ahamkāra of Śāmkhya (just as all three are united in the citta of Śāmkhyan Yoga), dīś and kāla are both subsumed under the avyakta in its classical sense (for kāla in this connection note also MBh, xii, 11569 ff.), the five elements stand without change and only ātman is added. Both schools, as will appear later, contributed to the scheme drawn up by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and the first of them certainly, and the second probably (at any rate in its early stages), regard the avyakta as co-operating on equal terms with the other members of the group to create the individual. Evidently therefore it is not yet the subtle primordial matter of the ŚK., and the meaning which is to be read into it can only be determined by discussing the original idea at the base of the theory of its three constituent guṇas, to which I now turn.

Much has been written on the latter subject, but, as speculation has not been controlled by thorough-going examination of the texts, hardly to the advance of knowledge. Without a clue the evidence is certainly difficult to understand, and the fluctuations of technical phraseology at first sight puzzling. Fortunately the names for the three guṇas, sattva, rajas,
and *tamas*, remained unaltered throughout the literature, though not always free from ambiguity; for *sattva* has many other meanings and in particular is used occasionally in early Sāmkhya and the *YS*. to express the corporeal, as distinct from the spiritual, individual, so that it has to be handled from that point of view in the next section. On the other hand the term, *guna*, besides its general meanings, is used in three different technical senses in early Sāmkhya to indicate (1) the three factors of the *avyakta*, (2) the objects of the senses,\(^1\) parallel to the Buddhist term *kāmagūṇa*, which probably originated in the period of the early dogmatism before the rise of the Abhidharma, (3) a *vikāra* in extension of the previous sense, each *tattva* being the *guna* of the *tattva* by which it is produced; this last use is quite clear at *MBh*, xi, 11431 ff., and xiv, 1084 and 1400 ff., and should be accepted at xi, 11121 and 11399, and probably in a number of other passages as well. To distinguish between these different uses is hardly possible in many places, where more than one of them would fit the context; thus at *Gītā*, iii, 5, *prakṛtyaṁr gūṇaṁ*, and 27, *prakṛteḥ ... gūnaṁ*, it is probable, but not absolutely certain, that the secondary evolutes should be understood. Nevertheless in this essay I use *guna* in the classical Sāmkhya sense, as any fixed translation, such as factor, strand, etc., might at times impede the prompt understanding of the argument.

Attention, therefore, must be confined to passages in which the three *gunas* are specified by name, and two points become clear at once. Though Īśvarakṛṣṇa describes in detail how the *gunas* enter into each *tattva*, the earlier accounts limit their activity to the sphere of the *avyakta*, of which they are factors. Secondly the group as such was not necessarily known to the earliest Sāmkhya, seeming that there is no reference to them in the *Kaṭha* or other Upaniṣads of about the same

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\(^1\) Some references at *JRAS*, 1930, p 867, but the use in this sense is probably not so late as I put it there. Other references in the epic are xi, 6847, 7780, 8559–8563, 8824, and xiv, 542 and 671.
date, though later speculation about them may well have been influenced by Chū., vi, 4 and 5. The earliest mention of the group is probably to be found in the epithet trivrtā of the brahmacakra at Śvet. Up., 1, 4, but the various occurrences of the word gūna in this Upānīsad are most easily understood as signifying the inferior tattvas and possibly once in the phrase sarvendraṇayagunābhāsam, 11, 17, as the objects of the senses. The allusions in the Maṭrī Up. belong to a later stage of speculation and their consideration is best deferred.

References in the epic are abundant and embarrassing by their diversity and often enough by their ambiguity, three classes may be distinguished. Firstly at xi, 6923 and 8822, sattva, rajas, and tāmas are described as the three jīvagunas, statements which are more important for the elucidation of the difficult word, jīva, than for that of this group. In the next class either the three are denominated the three bhāvas, "states of being", as at xii, 7081, 10500, and xiv, 1564, or an account is given of the sāttvika, rājasa, and tāmasa bhāvas, as at xi, 7701, 7831, 7959, and 11258. That bhāva is probably the original name for the group appears from the Gītā, which in the older of its two Sāmkhya passages, that in canto vii, though not describing the gūnas as a whole, mentions in verse 12 the sāttvika, rājasa, and tāmasa bhāvas, and in 13 the gunamaya bhāvas, whereas in canto xiii and later it uses the term gūna alone. The connection between bhāva and the gūnas continued to be recognized till a much later epoch; thus Kamalaśīla, dealing with the four alternative Sarvāstivādin explanations of the reality of the past, present and future in his commentary on Tattvasamgraha, 1787-1790, p. 504, says, Tatra bhāvānyathāvadī bhadantaDharmaratāḥ, sa kalāha, "dharmasyādhvasu vartamānasya bhāvānyathātvam eva kevalam, na tu dravyasyeti" . . . Kāḥ punar bhāvas

1 The uses of the word gūna in the Gītā are particularly puzzling, all that is certain is that from canto xiii on it has the orthodox sense of classical Sāmkhya, but in the occurrences in the first twelve cantos the third of the technical senses I have given for it is usually the most appropriate, despite phrases such as rajagunāsamudbhāva et iii, 37.
teneśṭah? Guṇaviśeṣah, yato 'tīdāyabhīdāhānañānapravṛttiḥ . . . Tatra prathamah (sc. Dharmatrāta's theory) parvāma-
vādīt vāt Sāṃkhya-matān na bhidyate. Nevertheless the name
must have been inconvenient in use; for there is a very
similar group of three bhāvas, which characterizes the buddhi
and, consisting of suhka, duhkha and either moha or that
which is neither suhka nor duhkha, is more or less identical
with the triple vedanā of Buddhist dogmatism, and at times
the two groups coalesce into one. Typical passages are xii,
7089 ff., 7955, 9004 ff., 10506 ff. The tendency to evanes-
cence of the distinction between the two has its importance
for the evolution of Sāṃkhya theory, since Iśvarakṛṣṇa,
accepting the existence of the three states of buddhi as a fact
not requiring further proof and identifying them with the
gunas, uses them to prove that the gunas are equally exist-
ent in the first principle. This triplet of sensation was also
naturally held to exist in the tattvas inferior to buddhi and thus
played its part in the growth of the doctrine that the gunas
are to be found in all the tattvas. Further this explains why,
though rajas is held to be the factor of energy from the earliest
moment that philosophical conceptions were applied to the
guna theory, it is often described as duhkha, which is by no
means the same thing. Besides the two classes of cases already
described there is the third class, the largest perhaps, in which
the three factors of the avyakta are called guna, as in the
classical school, avoiding ambiguous passages, I may note
the following occurrences as typical, xii, 7850, 11289, 11327,
11635, 11761, and 12886, and xiv, 990 and 1058. The
usage of the Bhāgavadgītā has already been described, and
it does not seem that Aśvaghosa and Caraka ever used either
guna or bhāva in this sense.

The differences of phraseology and the confusion of similar
groups, which mark the epic descriptions, suggest that the
original idea of the gunas was not that known to us in classical
Sāṃkhya and that the later theory was only in process of
growth in the epic period. The SK. and the YS. present a
clear-cut doctrine, by which all three gunas are inherent in every phenomenon and cause the differences between them by the ever varying proportions in which they enter into each. This theory is known as gunaparināma and is first mentioned in a phrase of the Maññi Upan., vi, 10, triguṇaḥbhe
daparīṇāmatvā; its object is to bring the multifariousness of the world under a single principle, a matter with which early Sāmkhyya, devoting all its attention to the analysis of the individual, was little concerned.) The epic does not use the word parināma, which belongs to a later stage of philosophical development and need not have originated in the Sāmkhyya schools at all. For it is well known in later Buddhism, where the Sautrāntikas, objecting to the Sarvāstivādin explanation of the manner in which the samtāna was subject to perpetual change, invented the principle of parināma
dōvīsesa 1 to account for the rise and disappearance of the dharmas in the individual’s flow of consciousness. Later it was used by those members of the Viññānavādin school, who believed in the existence of the ālaya-vyūhana, to explain the extension of the store-consciousness into the remaining seven consciousnesses, certain details of their theory of perception suggest incidentally that Sāmkhyya thought may have exerted some influence on the form which the scheme took. It is needless to do more than just refer to these points, in order to show that the principle of parīṇāma belongs to the latest strata of the period under discussion. But if the epic does not know the word or the theory, it illumines in one passage, a very late one evidently, the beginning of its development, namely xiv, 987–1083, which teaches that the three gunas are inseparable, yet ever varying in the proportion they bear to each other. The author (or authors) of the passage had good reason to enter at length into the matter, because the views there set out are incompatible, as will shortly appear, with earlier doctrines.

In considering in detail the epic’s handling of the gunas,

1 See A.K., Index, s.v.
the first point that strikes the eye is the number of passages, which subdivide them into a number of moral qualities to be found in the individual; as characteristic I may quote *xu, 7727 ff., 8992 ff., and 11621 ff.* That this is part of the original theory or legitimately deducible from it is suggested by the names of the *guna*s, which imply an attention directed not to the cosmos, but to the ethical standard of the individual. In this moral aspect their action is fundamental to the fate of the individual, and the variety of existence to which he will transmigrate in future births is determined by the proportion in which the three *guna*s are present in him. Thus *MBh.*, *xii*, 7419, 7710 with 7723, 11157 ff., 11256, and 11637, and *xiv*, 882-4; the last but one of these perhaps puts the position most clearly and equates the action of the *guna*s with that of *punya* and *papa*. In this view they are not the motive cause of the cycle of transmigration, which is said to be *avidya* in early Sāmkhya as in the *YS*. *(ii, 24, *tasya* (sc. *samyogasya*) *hetur avidya*, and *bhāṣya* on *ii, 15, tad asya mahato dhikhasamudāyasya prabhavabhiṣam avidya) against the *puruṣārthatā* theory of the *SK.*; nor are they the machinery which carries it out, that being *karma* either alone or associated with other agencies. They may be best described as the record the individual carries on himself of his moral balance sheet. In the classical system the *guna*s have entirely lost this function, which is carried out by *dharma* and *adharma*, two items of the eightfold *buddhi*, this last category is unknown to the Upanisads, to the *Mokṣadharma* and *Anugītā* (only reference in the epic, in, 64) and also to the *YS.*\(^1\) (though

\(^1\) An intermediate stage is shown by the *YS*, which has, *ii, 12*· *kleṣa*-mūlaḥ *karmāntyo dṛṣṭādṛṣṭya-vanavēdadāniḥ*, where the *bhāṣya* explains that *karma* proceeds from *kāma*, *lobha*, *mohā*, and *krodha*. Though in content these correspond to *rayas* and *tamas* in the earlier texts, the reference is really to a new group of *kleśas*, whose appearance in various shapes in the *MBh* shows it to have been then in process of formation, it had some affinities with the fivefold *avidya* of the Vāraṇasīya school, but there is no certain proof, though it may be probable, that it was accepted at any stage by Sāmkhya theory outside the *Yoga*. For the group, see *Jacobi, SBPAW*, 1929, pp 593 ff, and my remarks in *JRAI*, 1930, 861-2, and 873.
not to the bhāsyā) and is one of the latest ingredients therefore of the SK.

This aspect of the guṇas naturally involves considerable modification in the theory of salvation, which according to the classical Sāmkhya is attained by passing beyond the range of the three guṇas, a doctrine already laid down in Bhagavadgītā, xiv, 19–20, and MBh., xi, 11643 and 12609–12610. But the original view is that rebirth is due to the accumulation of rajas and tamas and that salvation is to be won by their extinction and by the increase of sattva: it may be remarked in passing that under this theory the three guṇas were necessarily not inseparable. Primitively salvation may have been conceived as heaven, the devaloka, but in the texts which give most details it is only when sattva is still contaminated with some degree of rajas that it leads to heaven, while sattva by itself gains apavarga. A number of passages in the epic seem to imply this doctrine, and it is enunciated in clear terms at xii, 7736–7, 9104–5, 12288, and 12913, and perhaps also at xiv, 1449. Car., p. 329, takes the same view:—

Rajastamobhyām yuktasya samyogo ‘yam anantavān|
Tāḥhyām nrākṛtāḥhyāṁ tu sativavṛddhyā nvrartate. ||

And in the Sāmkhya known to Aśvaghōsa, sattva with rajas leads to Paradise, sattva alone to salvation, B., vi, 53; and he explains the matter fully in B., xxvi, where the relevant passage runs:—

“(9) Then Subhadra perceived that the final good was not obtained in the path which he had previously seen, and obtaining a path he had not seen before, he put away that path which is accompanied by tamas in the heart.

“(10) For according to those teachers evil karman is accumulated by following tamas accompanied by rajas,

Therefore the expression sattvastha, whose meaning in the Gītā has given rise to controversy and which recurs frequently in the epic, is used to indicate one who has reached salvation by abiding in sattva alone.
while good karman is extended by rajas brought to a higher level by sattva.

"(11) With sattva increasing through learning, intelligence and effort, and by reason of karman being destroyed by the disappearance of rajas and tamas, karman is extinguished."

In the earliest stage of Śāmkhya then the theory of the mutual interaction and inseparability of the gunas is unknown, and they have nothing to do with explanations of the multifariousness of phenomena, their sole function is to register the moral state of the individual as determined by his acts. Understanding of this point may be furthered by a comparison with Hinayāna Buddhism, in which equally till a late age the emphasis is on the moral character of the individual, not on the composition of the universe; comparison is all the more desirable, in that the standard accounts of Buddhist thought fail to recognize what is in my view the fundamental doctrine in this matter. According to Buddhism the sphere of rebirth depends on karman, the theory of which was worked out in the Abhidhamma with much elaboration as part of the network of causation, but, though salvation is attained by the exhaustion of karman, or by passing beyond its domain, the earlier texts prefer, instead of saying this explicitly, to put it that salvation comes from the disappearance (kṣaya) of certain bad qualities. The most common group in the texts that may be assigned to the age of early dogmatism consists of rāga, dosa (Sk. dveṣa) and moha; thus, when an unbeliever throws doubt on the finality of the Buddha's Enlightenment, the stereotyped phrase runs that Gotama is avītarāga, avītadosa, avītamoḥa. In the Abhidhamma, which substitutes lobha for rāga, these three bad qualities are called the akusalamulāṃ, the roots of evil, and opposed to them are the three roots of good. The relationship of the three roots of evil to Śāmkhya theories is explained by Āvaghoṣa.

1 I omit the last pāda as the reading in the Tibetan is uncertain, and in any case it does not materially affect the sense of the passage.
who always seems anxious to minimize as far as possible the difference between Buddhist and Brahmanical thought. He equates rāga and dveṣa regularly with rajas, and the correctness of this parallel is confirmed by Bhagavadgītā, iii, 34 and 37, where rajas consists of rāga and dveṣa or the equivalents, kāma and krodha, and by Manu, xi, 26. The action of these three evil qualities is explained in S., xvi, 20–24, according to which the moral character, with which an individual is equipped on entering a new state of existence, is determined by the extent to which his actions in the past have tended to promote or hinder the growth in him of rāga, dveṣa, and moha respectively. Further, as their extirpation is necessary to salvation, S., xvi, 53 ff., lays down that the subject of meditation for the religious aspirant must be chosen with reference to whichever of the three qualities is predominant in him. With these qualities and their opposites is specially associated the conception of hetu, the motive force derived from the nature of the individual's past acts, which determines his character and conduct in the present, as appears both from the Dhammasangani (see index under akusalamūla and hetu) and from Āśvaghoṣa (the use of hetu, B., i, 56, xi, 68, and S., v, 16, 17). Karman is thus a more vital conception in earlier Buddhism than it was reduced to later; it is not merely vipāka, the recompense in a future existence of the good and evil deeds committed in past existences, as held by the Vaubbhāṣikas, but it is the creator of the individual's moral character from the religious standpoint. The parallel between Sāmkhyan rajas and tamas and the Buddhist akusalamūlāni is complete, but there is not a similar parallel between sattra and the kuśalamūlāni. By the time that Buddhist thinkers had worked out the theory of the roots

1 See note on S., iii, 39, in my translation
2 Āśvaghoṣa seems to use hetu only for the motive force working for good in the individual, the prototype of the gotra theory in Mahāyāna. In the epic, xi, 7701, suggests a connection between hetu on one side and rajas and tamas on the other, cf also the use of hetu in 7864 and 7871.
of good and evil, it was held that salvation lay, not in the acquisition of merit and the reduction of demerit, but in arriving at the condition where karmāṇa, either good or bad, was no longer accumulated; the Arhat enters into the stage of ātmāntya, in which his actions are devoid of effect on his future. That is, Buddhist thought was by then parallel in development with the later form of early Sāmkhya, which preached the necessity of passing beyond the range of the gunās, when the mere increase of sattva was favourable to salvation but did not bring it about, the possibility however remains that the influence of Sāmkhya thought should be detected in the Buddhist theory of the roots, at any rate in its complete form.

If then the gunās according to the early texts are intimately associated with the working of the law of karmāṇa and determine the moral state of the individual, as he passes from life to life, in accordance with the impressions made upon his character by his past deeds, in what manner was this action supposed to take place? Our sources afford no clear answer, but a probable explanation can be advanced. Early Indian thought, as exemplified for instance by Sāmkhya, drew no clear line of demarcation between the maternal, mental, and psychical phenomena of the individual. This characteristic is to be found in primitive thought elsewhere; thus according to the Old Testament, whose evidence has been examined with a thoroughness still to seek for Indian texts, the Hebrews considered psychical and ethical functions to be as appropriate to the bodily organs as physiological ones. In India we may perhaps represent the position by saying that all classes of phenomena are looked on alike as having a maternal basis, the difference resting merely on the degree of subtlety attributed to the basis. Of the classical systems Jainsm alone

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1 There is no proof that Aśvaghoṣa held the doctrine of the roots of good, though of no great importance in later dogmatism, they are frequently mentioned in the Mahāyāna sūtras.

has preserved this antique feature, when it regards karman as working through a subtle material deposit. For Buddhism no similar action has, so far as I know, ever been suggested; but that religion developed, parallel with the theory of rāga, dveṣa, and moha but probably somewhat later, a conception that the individual was retained in the cycle of transmigration by the action of three forces known as āsravas. This term denotes the influences which the outside world exerts on the individual and which have to be overcome in order to obtain Arhatship; in the technical phrase the Arhat is ḫśināsrava. Presumably the word is formed from the root ā-sru, and it therefore indicates the influences which flow on to the individual from outside. It seems obvious to explain the doctrine by the theory that originally this flux consisted of some subtle material which adhered to the individual and prevented his release from transmigration. The action of the guṇas would similarly be satisfactorily explained if we supposed that they caused a supersensory deposit on that portion of the individual which accompanied him from life to life. The terminology of the texts supports this view; the verb vṛ, "cover" (with or without ṝ), is often used in association with the effect of karman or the action of the guṇas, thus Śvet. Up., 1, 4 (tristaya of the guṇas), MBh., xii, 6983, 7759, 7854, 9999, 11304, and xiv, 483, Bhagavadgītā, iii, 38–40 (of ṛajas). The proof is not complete, but there is a reasonable degree of probability in the explanation.

As the guṇas are the three factors which make up the first principle, the avyakta, it is now possible to consider the original connotation of the latter term. Since no passage in the early texts suggests that the avyakta has any functions

1 Jacobi, SBPAW., 1929, pp 611–15, however, sets out the arguments for holding similar views to have prevailed in the older school of Yoga.

2 It would be natural to suppose that this doctrine derived, directly or indirectly, from the Jains, if it were not that in that religion the original term seems to have been aṇhaya rather than āsava. Cf. Schubring, Die Lehre der Jinas, p 113.

3 Cf. also the wording of Atharvaveda, x, 8, 43
beyond those it carries out through the gunas, it can definitely be held to be the embodiment of the law of karmam, the unseen moral power which regulates the fate of every being, and it is named the "unmanifested" in a double sense, in that its working cannot be detected by the senses and that it sums up the potentiality of the acts, whose effects will manifest themselves in the future. It is thus equivalent to the apūrva of the Mīmāmsakas and to the adṛśta of the Vaiṣeṣikas. The parallel with the latter school, who, as I have suggested above, were strongly influenced by early Sāmkhya, goes very far, Praśastapāda teaching in his bhāṣya1 that on the destruction of the universe there is a cessation of activity on the part of the unseen qualities (adṛśta), which are possessed by all souls and which determine bodies, sense faculties, and the great elements, and that on creation the same qualities recover their activity, giving rise to conjunctions between souls and atoms. Little change of expression would be required to bring this statement into line with the views of early Sāmkhya. Further this explanation of the avyakta illuminates two puzzling points. If it originally stood, as in the SK., for the subtle matter which is the substratum of all phenomena, why should brahman (n) and, in the Śvet. Up. and Bhagavadgītā, māyā have been used as synonyms for it?2 There is no similarity of idea in the ordinary view, but the matter becomes clear if my conclusion is accepted Brahman according to the Upaniṣads is the unseen power which underlies all phenomena, and māyā is the mystic force of iśvara by which in the bhakti systems the world is regulated; the function of both is parallel to that of avyakta in the early sense, as determining the life-course of the individual. The change of meaning of the term in later thought is discussed in the fifth and sixth sections of this essay, but the substance of this and the preceding sections may be put into a single

1 At p. 19 of Kazi S. S. edition, translated by Faddgeon, The Valgavana System, p. 163. The latter remarks justly, p. 165, that the role of Iśvara, as compared with the unseen qualities of the soul, is superfluous.
phrase by saying that the earliest Sāmkhya, subject to some change of content, is an elaboration of the formula in BĀU., i, 6, analysing the individual into nāma, rūpa, and karman.

§ 4. LIFE AND THE SOUL

At this point it seems best to tackle the hardest part of the inquiry, the nature and growth of Sāmkhya ideas about life and the soul. The difficulty arises not only from the ambiguity of the texts, but still more from the vague and often contradictory ideas that have clustered round beliefs about the soul in all ages. In India in particular further confusion is created by the emergence of the doctrine of a world soul and by the universal acceptance of transmigration as a fact not requiring proof. It is not surprising then that Sāmkhya at no stage gives a really intelligible account of the soul, and, if the following discussion fails to arrive at clarity or to do more than pick up and follow some of the more important strands, the blame does not lie entirely at my door.¹

The period covered by this essay saw the elaboration of a genuine soul theory, but, in order to understand how it came into being and why it took the form it did, something must first be said of its primitive origin. It is a remarkable fact that, so far as the evidence goes, all uncultured peoples have

¹ In preparing this section, I have been much influenced by two papers E. Arbman, "Untersuchungen zur primitiven Seelevorstellung mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Indien," Monde Oriental, XX, pp 85–226, and XXI, pp 1–185, deals with the evidence of anthropologists on soul theories current among primitive peoples and discusses the similar ideas in the older Indian literature. I accept his general principles, but consider that his views require much modification, in so far at least as they relate to the period covered by early Sāmkhya, the sources for which he has almost entirely ignored H Wheeler Robinson, in the article entitled "Hebrew Psychology", which has been quoted above, analyses the ancient Hebrew theories about the soul and the individual; the Old Testament provides on this subject abundant evidence, which has been examined with great care, and the striking similarities to, and the points of difference from, Indian ideas are both alike valuable to anyone looking for a track by which to pass through the still uncleared jungle of the Sanskrit texts.
held in the past, or do hold in the present, beliefs on this subject of the same general type. Firstly the body is held to be animated by one or more principles, which are sometimes conceived as separate entities; in the earliest stage this animating power dies with the body and ceases to be of further importance, so that the view may not be inaccurately described as that of an animated body, not of an incarnated soul. But looking at the matter from a totally different standpoint, primitive peoples believe in the existence of a ghost-soul, the psyche of Homer. It is supposed to be what we should call immaterial; it inhabits the body in life, but does not animate it or perform any other function, though its presence is essential to life. It is, however, capable of separate existence without the body, and leaves it in dreams or unconscious states, when it becomes exposed to the magic operations of others, it also leaves the body at death, to carry on a life of its own. In appearance an exact replica of the corporeal person, so that it is looked on as identical with him, it is often thought of as being of miniature dimensions, thumb size or the like, and may appear, for instance, as the "mankin" in the eye, usually it is devoid of mental and similar organs. When the body dies or is overcome by unconsciousness, the continuity of the individual's existence passes to the psyche, which is often, therefore, spoken of as if it were the individual himself and may be called by his name, or more generally the "man", the "dead man", the "departed", etc. Thus, though without most of the characteristics which we recognize as forming the individual's personality, yet in a sense it is his personality. These conceptions, of animating corporeal principles on the one hand, and of a psyche on the other, are maintained distinct in primitive thought, not from any devotion to logic or formal theory, but simply because their origins are separate, so that they are not felt to be associated in any way. Nevertheless a combination of the two would produce all the

1 Cf. in Homer, Odyssey, x, 493, and Iliad, xxi, 104
elements which may be considered essential to a soul in later views, if we define the latter as a single spiritual entity, which is capable of independent existence outside the body, which survives the death of the body, which is the principle animating the body it inhabits and which in some sense or other constitutes the individual's personality. The fusion of the two original ideas takes place slowly, and then not always completely, obvious remains of primitive beliefs persisting even in lands that hold themselves to be civilized. In India this process takes a peculiar form owing to the belief in transmigration as the fundamental law of life, and is, therefore, not easily susceptible of analysis. That it was spread over a very long period of time seems, however, to be certain; for the Rigveda contains traces of both conceptions and of the beginning of their amalgamation, the impulse apparently being provided by the desire to find a fuller life beyond the grave than that which was open to the psyche. This subject is, however, highly contentious and uncertain in its details, nor would its discussion here further the aim I have in view. I propose therefore to start with the well-established doctrine of classical Sāmkhya, then to discuss the occurrences of the various terms used in the earlier schools in connection with the soul and the life of the body, and to end with an attempt to put the evidence so collected into its historical sequence.

According to Iśvarakṛṣṇa there exists a multiplicity of individual souls denominated by the term purusa, which, though bearers of the individual personality, are divested of almost all the characteristics which are usually thought of as constituting human personality. The personal functions of the individual are attributed instead to a subtle body, the līnga, which contains all the physical principles except the material ones which compose the mortal body in each existence; it accompanies the soul during its course through the cycle of transmigration, the samsāra, and only abandons it when the goal of salvation is reached. The intricate and
unusual point in this theory is the manner in which transmigration is explained, and it will be well to examine first the terms used in the older literature in connection with this subject. It may be observed that *linga* in the specialized sense of "subtle body" is unknown to the early texts; passages such as *MBh.*, xi, 7407, suggest that the usual sense is that of visible appearance or mark, indicating the existence of something not accessible to perception, and often "body" alone renders the significance fairly accurately.1 Two other terms are, however, in general use whenever the question of transmigration is raised, namely *jīva* and *bhūtātman*, and these, therefore, come up first for analysis.

The first of these words is employed in classical Sanskrit to denote that portion of the divine all-soul which forms the soul of the individual and it is the regular term in Jaimism for the soul. But this is not its significance in the period under discussion; thus the latest early Sāmkhya source has, *Maurī Up.*, vi, 19, aprāṇād iva yāsvat sambhūtaḥ prānasampanjanako jīvaḥ, tasmāt prāṇo va turīyakhye dhārayet prāṇam, and the explanatory verse appended ends with the words *tac ca lingam nivrārayam*, recalling the closing words of *SK*, 41, nivrārayam lingam, with reference to the subtle body. The natural inference from this passage would be that *jīva* denotes, not the soul, but an animating principle of the nature of prāṇa, which passes from body to body in the course of transmigration, and this interpretation is supported by the numerous occurrences in the epic. That it is not the same as the soul (ātman or kṣetrajña, the term puruṣa not being associated in the epic with jīva) is frequently stated, thus xi, 8655–6, the chariot of the individual is kṣetrajñādhyālita but jīvatyaṅka, and 8822–3 run, Tamo rajas ca sattvam ca vidhī jīvagunatmakam | jīvam atmagunanam vidyād ātmānam paramātmanah || Sacetanam jīvagunanam vadantri sa cetaste

1 For the occurrences in the *MBh*, which are less frequent than might be expected, note especially besides the above passage, xi, 7431–3, 7771, 7975, 8138, 11309 ff, and 11334 ff.
jīvayate ca sāvam, and 9099, sa jīvaḥ kṣetrasamyāṅakah. In the Pāṇcarātra system Vāsudeva is the kṣetrajña, and Saṁkar-śaṇa the jīva, xii, 12904. On the other hand it is a separate entity from the body, Pāṇcaśikha, xii, 7908, attributing the opposite view to the materialists (nāstika), but it is always present in the body with other components, xii, 8746. It is that form of the individual which suffers in hell, xii, 10006 (so also Manu, xii, 22), and which transmigrates, xii, 10009, leaving the body at death and being incarnated in a new body with all its good and bad karmas, xiv, 470-484. The nature of the jīva, including its immateriality, its function of animating the body, and its survival of the body, is described at length xii, 6883-6929, which ends with the definition mānasā 'gnih sarīresu jīva ut abhidhiyate. Only some of these passages belong to definite descriptions of early Saṁkhya, but the same view prevails in all of them and it is legitimate, therefore, to complete the picture by taking them all into consideration together. Turning to the two occurrences in the Bhagavadgītā, in the earlier passage, vii, 5, Kṛṣna's parā prakṛti, which, as already shown (p. 28), is the avyakta, his māyā, is described as jīvabhūta, and the association recalls the statement just quoted from MBh, xii, 8822, that the three gunas are jīvagunātmaka, the point is that the jīva is not identical with the soul or with the avyakta, but is closely connected with both as that which bears the burden of good and evil deeds whose potentialities are not yet exhausted. The association of the jīva with the avyakta in a particular form finds expression in another passage of the epic, xii, 7754 —

Jñānādhiṣṭhitam avyaktam buddhyahankāralakṣaṇam
Tad bijam dehnām āhū tad bijam jīvasamyuṣitam

The later passage of the Gītā, xv, 7, states that a portion (amśa) of the divinity in the shape of the jīva (jīvabhūta) is incarnated in the individual body, and seems further to say, assuming the jīva to be indicated by īśvara in verse 8, that it

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1 The passage recurs, omitting the second line, at 6923-4.
takes the senses and the mind with it as it passes along the cycle of transmigration; this shows a shift of idea, and we are approaching the classical sense of the term. *Manu*, xii, 13-23, also describes the ātma at some length as opposed to the bhūtātman and the kṣetrajña; the definition in the first verse is of interest —

濟vasamjño 'utarātmānyah sahayah sarvadehinām
Yena vedyate sarvam sukham dukkham ca janmasu

The ātma is here losing its function of animating the body as a whole, and is associated with the triple vedanā, as in *MBh*, xiv, 471; it is but a small step from this stage to the theory of the *SK.*, according to which prāṇa provides the motive force for the mental and sensory principles.

No mention of the ātma is to be found in Āśvaghosa or Caraka, but both use the word jantu (*B.*, xii, 23,1 and *Car*, p. 328, l. 24) in what seems to be a technical sense; the exact significance is far from clear, though the same use is perhaps to be seen in *MBh*, xii, 8810. The only passage which throws any light on it is *MBh.*, xiv, 470, which opposes the ātma to the ṭhāra and the jantu to the kṣarā and suggests that the jantu consists of those tattvas which accompany the ātma in the course of transmigration and may even include the ātma. What those tattvas were is not clear from the epic, except that xii, 7407* and 7686 both name the senses, and the former also manas and buddha, neither passage necessarily reporting the orthodox Sāmkhya teaching of the time.

The references in the Upanisads can now be considered with more hope of success. In the *Kātha Up.*, the word occurs once, at iv, 5.—

Ya ṛnam madhvaḍam veda ātmānam ātman antikāt
Īsānam bhūtabhayasya na tato viyugupsate

This vālī knows also, verses 12-13, the puruṣa, which it describes as existing madhya ātmāni and as being angustha-

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1 Cowell's MSS offer the wrong reading here, *yus tu* for *jantus*.

2 For *sumahān* of the Calcutta and *sumanāh* of the Bombay edition, read *samanāh* with the commentary.
mātra; that is, the puruṣa is conceived largely in terms of the psyche and is not identical with the jīva atman. Further the previous valli gives the tattvas in the upward order as buddhi, the mahān ātmā, the avyakta, and at the summit the puruṣa, and, on the reasonable assumption that the two vallis stand on the same plane of thought, the jīva atman can only be the same as the mahān ātmā, which is the rathin of the chariot of the individual. Similarly Praśna Up., v, 5, describes the puruṣa as beyond the jīvaghana, which Śāmkara glosses with hṛṇyagarbha, a name of the buddhi; evidently the jīva here is the same as the jīva atman of the Katha Up. The much later Śvet. Up. is less clear in its outlook, it does not seem to use puruṣa as a term for the individual soul, except in in, 13, which is modelled on Katha Up., iv, 13, etc. The jīva is described in v, 7–12, in terms partly reminiscent of the puruṣa, as the animating principle (prānādhypa) which transmigrates and experiences the fruit of past deeds, and which is endowed with manas and ahamkāra and accompanied by the qualities (gūṇa) of buddhi and the ātman¹, the term, dehn is also used as a synonym for it.² The soul theory of this Upaniṣad depends on its belief in an īśvara, and the details are not always certain; but at least it is clear that the jīva is not really a kind of soul but the animating principle of the person, which transmigrates with those functions of the individual that survive death. The word jīva has a long history before these Upaniṣads which are acquainted with Śāmkhya thought; thus Chū., vi, 3, 2, and vi, 11, 1, mention the jīva atman, and possibly even jīva asu at Rgveda, 1, 113, 16, and 140, 8, should be taken pregnantly. But it is hardly necessary to go into these matters here.

¹ This last phrase is ambiguously expressed and can be understood in more ways than one. Ātmaguna possibly means the religious state of the individual, the relative proportion of his merit and demerit.

² I cannot trace any assured similar use of dehn and kārin for the animating principle in later literature; in all passages it can, in most it must, stand for the ātman or the kṣetrajña. But it is synonymous with jīva atman in Katha Up., v, 4 and 7.
Of other words that belong to the same order of ideas as the ジャヴァ, the most important and the most baffling is the bhūtātman. Though it only appears in a small range of texts, the usage is often ambiguous, as if its connotation had never been exactly fixed. Of the Upānīṣads dealt with here only the Mātrī mentions it; at m, 2, it explains it as the ātman of the bhūtas, either the great elements, mahābhūtas, or the subtle elements, tanmātras, and apparently understands ātman as meaning "body", for it proceeds to equate bhūtātman and Ārīra  This sense of ātman is possible, since it often indicates the essence of a thing in contrast to accessores or adjuncts and thus occurs in earlier literature, especially in the Śatapathabrāhmaṇa (iv, 2, 2, 16, and 3, 3, vi, 1, 1, 6, and 7, 2, 6; vii, 5, 1, 21, xii, 2, 3, 6, and 7), in the meaning of the "trunk" of the body as opposed to the limbs. But it seems doubtful if this definition of the Upānīṣad is to be pressed, the rest of the section proving by its use of pari-bhramati that the word means more precisely that part of the corporeal being which transmigrates. The passage may, therefore, postulate a doctrine related to that of the hūgā in the SK., though unknown to the MBh., according to which the portion of the body which transmigrates includes the elements in a subtle form, if the reference to the tanmātras is original, not a gloss. The following section describes it as the "doctr", kārti (cf. Manu, xii, 12, where it is defined in contrast to ジャヴァ as yah karoti tu karmān), with the inner soul (antahpurusa) setting it in action as kārayitr. According to m, 5, its manifold forms are determined by rajas and tāmas. The later occurrences in iv, 1, 2, and 3, and vi, 10, add nothing of importance. For the majority of passages in the epic the word refers also to that part of the corporeal being which transmigrates, though the partition between it and the ジャヴァ is distinctly thin at times. Thus xii, 9107, 9112, and 10918, all regard it in this fashion, and a similar view is probably to be understood at xii, 8744, 8754, 11248, and 11849, xiv, 790 and 1427, though possibly at some of these it may
actually be the same as the jīva. A common use is also in the phrase sarvabhūtātmanabhūta, applied to the highest principle, whether God or the universal ātman, and to the released soul, e.g. xii, 7112, 7766, 8756, 9017, 9668, 12897 (of Vāsudeva), xiv, 1423, and Bhagavadgītā, v, 7; though related to the preceding, the exact shade of sense is uncertain. At xii, 7423, the bhūtātman is described as jñānātmanavat, an ambiguous term which may imply that the senses belong to it or that it is the same as the mahān ātmā in its original sense of jīva ātman.

The tendency to equate the bhūtātman with the jīva partly accounts perhaps for a curious usage. At MBh, xii, 11601, the ahāmkāra is called Pragyāpati and bhūtātman; the connection between ahāmkāra as bhūtādu, the originator of the elements, and Pragyāpati, the creator of the elements, is easy enough to understand and occurs elsewhere. But why should ahāmkāra and bhūtātman be identical? A possible explanation is to be found no doubt in the relation of both to the elements; but, if the bhūtātman is here the same as the jīva, there is another alternative. For ahāmkāra, the last of the Sāmākhya tattvas to be generally accepted, was substituted for the original mahān ātmā, and there may at first have been some coincidence of content between them, thus at MBh, xii, 11118, in an enumeration of the Sāmākhya scheme ahāmkāra is omitted and the mahāt is substituted in its place as dependent on buddhi. If this passage had derived direct from the Kaṭha Up., the relative positions of the mahāt and the buddhi would have been reversed. Finally it may be noted that, while Aśvaghoṣa does not mention the bhūtātman in any of his Sāmākhya passages, it occurs three times in Car., at p. 331, l 2, p. 333, l. 8, and p 339, l 2; in the first two passages it could stand either for jīva alone or for jīva with those parts of the body that transmigrate, but in the last case it appears to denote the individual soul. The conclusion to be drawn from all these references probably is that originally

¹ For other references see p. 17
the bhūtātman consisted of the vital principle, the jīva, together with those constituents of the body which persisted throughout transmigration, but that ultimately with the first development of the subtle body theory it was reduced to representing the jīva alone, that it was thus understood in later times appears from Kullūka on Manu, v, 109, who takes bhūtātman to be the jīva ātman, when thought of apart from the lingāsārīra, though Manu at xi, 12 and 13, clearly differentiates between the two. The occurrences show that it is a word of much later origin than jīva, and they also suggest that its use is limited to thought impregnated with Śāmkhya ideas as against the far more general employment of the other term.

Another word that belongs to this category is sattva, treatment of which is impeded by the ambiguity of many passages and by the confusion with the guṇa of the same name and with the many ordinary senses of the word. The earliest occurrence of the use in question is at Katha Up, vi, 7, where in an enumeration of the tattvas sattva takes the place of buddhi in the corresponding passage of valli iii. For the reasons already given it is impossible to equate the mahān ātmā of this verse with the buddhi, or the sattva with the later ahamkāra and bhūtātman. But, if it is hard to explain the significance here, the use persisted, especially in Yoga thought. It recurs again at MBh, xi, 7677, where there is no doubt of the identity of sattva and buddhi, and in the bhāṣya on the YS the expression buddhassattva is frequently found, where buddhi alone would apparently have been sufficient. Similarly in the phrase sattvapravṛtānyatākhyāti, often employed by Vyāsa, it seems that sattva should be understood as buddhi, and the explanation may be sought in his comment on YS, ii, 19, describing buddhi not only as the mahān ātmā but also as sattāmātra, that is, the buddhi is the essence of existence as regards the corporeal being, a view which is to be expected in Yoga schools and which naturally followed from the identification of the buddhi with the mahān ātmā or mahat.
That *sattva*, however, was always so understood in the Yoga schools is open to doubt. Vyāsa on *YS.*, ii, 5, quotes a sentence from Pañcarākṣa, beginning *vyaktam avyaktam vā sativam ātmavābhīprātiṣṭhyā*, where the *vyaktam* *sattva* can hardly mean anything else than the corporeal being and the *avyaktam sattva* the *jīva* or the like.¹ This last use is probably connected in fact with a verse which is repeated three times in the *MBh*, at xi, 7103, 9020, and 10517, declaring the difference between the *sattva* and the *kṣetrayāṇa* to be that the former creates the *gunas* and the latter does not; *guna* here probably means the *vikāras*, the subordinate *tattvas*. One would expect the contrast to be between two apparently like things, so that the *sattva* should be something of the nature of soul, such as the *jīva*, *prima facie* it would have been possible to understand *buddhi* also here, if this solution were not excluded by the mention of the latter in the first and last of the three occurrences at verses 7107 and 10522. There are a number of other passages, into which some similar use may be read, but they are too uncertain to be worth discussion. The term never reached a fixed technical sense and altogether is far vaguer in conception than *jīva* or *bhūtātman*. This is shown by Aśvaghoṣa, who uses *sattva* to mean corporeal existence as including *prakṛtis, vikāra*, birth, old age, and death at B, xi, 17 and 23, and *Car*, p 360, l 15, employing wording almost identical with B, xi, 23, reads *sattā* for *sattva*. An exact parallel to this use is not to be found with certainty in other texts, and elsewhere Caraka in the *Śūtrasthāna*, p 4, l. 21, a passage with much Vaisēṣika phraseology, divides the being into ātman, *sattva*, and *śārīra*, where *sattva* seems to mean *cetanā* and is presumably more or less identical with *buddhi*.

Having now examined all the terms which are connected with the idea of an animating principle, I next take up the consideration of the words used for the soul, of which three alone are significant, *purusa, ātman*, and *kṣetrayāṇa*. The inquiry would be much simplified if certainty was possible

¹ Vācaspati Miśra fails to give a satisfactory explanation of the saying
about the state of soul theory in the older Upaniṣads; such different opinions are held on this subject that it does not afford a safe starting point for discussion, and the relative ages of the various parts of the BĀU. and ChU. to each other and to those Upaniṣads which show some knowledge of Sāmkhya cannot be determined with that approach to accuracy which alone would justify theorizing on the historical course of development. Nevertheless it can be taken as certain that there are three elements in the soul doctrines of the BĀU and the ChU., firstly the puruṣa, which displays all the characteristics of the psyche of primitive thought, secondly the jīva ātman, the principle of life or animation in the individual, and thirdly the ātman proper, which is to the cosmos very much what the jīva ātman is to the individual. What remains in dispute is the extent to which these three terms had been fused into the idea of a soul in the sense defined at the beginning of this section. That the process can hardly have gone very far seems probable, since all three elements are still found separately in early Sāmkhya and a unitary conception of soul is only reached towards the end of the period under discussion.

Of the terms named, puruṣa, the one which finally survived into classical Sāmkhya, is also the word used in the earliest text, the Katha Up. Its description there corresponds closely to the psyche, it is not the principle that animates the body, that being the mahān ātma or jīva as has already been shown, nor has it any of the mental or psychological functions of the individual, these being included in the subordinate tattvas. That it should be the term selected to describe the soul in classical Sāmkhya is therefore natural; but it does not follow therefrom that primitive Sāmkhya made as sharp a division between the soul and the twenty-four physical tattvas as the SK. does, nor is such a conclusion prima facie probable, in view of the fact that the earliest known form

1 This is clearly put in the Mundaka Up., at 11, 1, 2, the puruṣa is aprāṇa and amanasa, and at 11, 2, 7, the ātman is manomaya and prāṇakariraneḥ.
that salvation takes postulates that the soul does not pass beyond the realm of all three guṇas of the avyakta, but beyond rajas and tamas alone. The later occurrences of the word prove the doubt justifiable. Thus in the Śvet. Up. puruṣa is used in the cosmic sense of the supreme deity, in whom all creation has its being, except in one verse, vii, 13, which is merely a variant of the expressions in the Katha Up and is hardly in unison with the rest of the adhyāya. In the Bhagavadgītā the regular meaning in the first eleven cantos is the same, and it is only from canto xii onwards that puruṣa denotes the individual soul. Similarly the epic produces the impression that puruṣa only figures in those Śāmkhya passages which on other grounds would be held as belonging to the later strata, and that in earlier passages the theory of the ātman, doubled by the kṣetrajña, holds undisputed sway. That the epic passages which use puruṣa for the Śāmkhya soul are relatively modern is corroborated by the fact that Āśvaghosa, whose exposition of this system is on the same plane of thought as the earlier parts of the Mokṣadharma, only uses ātman and kṣetrajña, the puruṣa theory known to him, B., xviii, 47–51, has no connection with Śāmkhya. The gap thus established in the use of the term puruṣa between the Katha Up. and the later Mokṣadharma passages is more apparent than real, in the former the puruṣa is little more than the psyche and is accompanied by an ātman as a separate entity, whereas in the later texts there is no ātman, apart from the puruṣa, so that it has ceased to be a psyche and is now an individual soul with some of the functions previously attributed to the ātman, the remainder being divided up among the physical principles subordinate to the avyakta.

The details of the ātman-kṣetrajña theory are far from easy to follow; on the one hand in passages which are pure Śāmkhya and which teach the existence of an ātman, its association with the kṣetrajña is always expressed or understood, but on the other hand, the latter term can be used by itself without
any idea of its identity with the ātman and later it occurs simply as a synonym of purusa. The ātman theory never looks quite at home in Sāmkhya, and Ásvaghōsa perhaps felt this, when at B., xxii, 20, he attributes the view of the identity of the ātman and the kṣetrajña not to the Sāmkhyas, but to the ātmacintakas, so also Car., p 326, l 14. It is beyond the reach of doubt that the kṣetrajña is the soul in its individual aspect, but it does not necessarily follow that the same applies to the ātman, and no passage is known to me from which such a conclusion can be drawn. Little necessity seems to have been felt to describe its characteristics, but the statements of Ásvaghōsa and Caraka give the details which were generally accepted. In the passage refuting the existence of an ātman at B., xvi, 82 86, it is said to be permanent (miṭya), immanent (vibhu), and inactive (vishrṣya), and Car., p 326, l 18, adds that it is self-dependent (svatāntra), master of itself (vāsin), and omnipresent (sarva-ga). These qualities are equally to be found in the purusa of the classical school, which is permanent ex hypothesi, omnipresent (sarva-traga, Gauḍapāda and Mātharavṛtti on SK, 10), immanent (vibhu, Mātharavṛtti, p. 34, introduction to SK, 21, or vyāpin, Gauḍapāda on SK, 23), and inactive. Despite this agreement ātman and purusa are not equated in the epic as representing the individual soul. In general the MBh. uses ātman for the cosmic soul, and the kṣetrajña, when it is associated with it and is not merely a synonym for purusa, denotes not so much the individual

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1 In the classical period ātman is sometimes used for purusa as the individual soul. Thus the Tatvāvamga's section, vv. 285–310, against the Sāmkhya soul theory is labelled Kāpiākulpātmaparikaḥ, though the kārtikās and commentary refer occasionally to the purusa, but the Puruparikaḥ of the same work, vv. 153–170, is directed against the bhakti religions.

2 As pointed out by Keith, Sāmkhya System, p. 36, there is a distinct theistic tinge in all epic philosophy.
soul as that portion of the cosmic soul which is attached to the individual.¹

The difference between the aspects of soul represented by the two terms is given at MBh., xi, 6921, a verse whose doctrine seems to be accepted through most of the Mokṣadharma:—

Ātmā kṣetrajña ity uktaḥ samyuktah prāktair guṇaikah |
Tair eva tu vinavrutah paramātmey udāhityah ||

This line of division is even once applied to the purusa at the later verse, xii, 12680 —

Sa hy antarātmā bhūtānām kṣetrajnās ceti kathyate |
Trigunanyatirikto vai purusaś ceti kalpitah ||

Philosophically the distinction expresses itself in the question whether the soul is jña or ajña, evidently a much debated point, as appears from B., xi, 80–1, and Car., p 326, l 11, and p. 333, ll. 6–7. The kṣetrajña is, as its name shows, jña, and is called jñātrī at MBh, xi, 11406, cetanāvat, ibid., 11649 (cf cetāmātra at Mauri Up, i, 5), and jñānalakṣaṇā at xiv, 1205. Of the ātman we are told that it is ajña at xii, 11386 only, but this was the regular view of the Vaiśesika school, and it is significant that Āśvaghosa puts the jña alternative with the word kṣetrajña, and the ajña one with the word ātman. The point was still undecided when the term purusa came into general use, for, if it is ajñāh svabhāvatah at MBh, xi, 11658, it is both jña and ajña at ibid., 11763. The crux is a very real one, which had puzzled Indian thought ever since Yañāvalkya amazed Maitreyi with the statement, na pretya samjñāstv (BĀU., ii, 4, 12 = iv, 5, 13). In the classical system both the Yoga and Sāmkhya schools evaded the problem by teaching that, when the purusa takes cognisance of what buddhi presents to it, it only reflects it as it were, without real cognisance; strictly speaking it is not either jña or ajña.²

¹ For Jacobi's views about the origin of the conception of individual souls, see SBPAW, 1930, pp 324–8
² With this question is connected the change in content of the term buddhi, about which the texts do not give enough information for a sketch
The various terms having been considered, it is possible to see to some extent how the theory of the soul developed in Sāmkhya. Assuming that Indian thought started originally from the standpoint of the existence firstly of a psyche, and secondly of a principle animating the body, we would expect one of the two entities gradually to absorb the functions of the other and develop into a unitary independent soul, and in the main this did happen. The first step was probably already taken in the Rigvedic period. The animating principle usually has two aspects, with regard to whether it is looked on as physical, namely the breath, or mental, namely the mind, and both āsu and manas in the Rigveda, especially the former, are conceived as embodying the animating entity.¹ When, therefore, Agni takes as one of his forms that of asunīti, it is because the āsu is no longer destroyed at death but continues to exist, that is, the animating principle is in process of acquiring the attribute of immortality. By the beginning of the Upaniṣadic period the word āsu has given way to prāna, and a new motive has come into play with the necessity of providing an adequate basis for transmigration. Various functions of the individual were looked on as immortal in contrast to the mortal body, as already mentioned; and that element had to be found which constituted the essence of the being and to which the immortal functions were subsidiary. The solution first favoured was naturally that of prāna, the vital breath, and then for a short time it was of the historical development to be possible. Originally it seems to have had much the same meaning as vyānā, something like "consciousness," "awareness." This function under the name cetanā or cañāya was subsequently attributed to the soul, and the significance of buddhi was watered down to the colourless vyārasīya. Nevertheless the YS's account of yoga only becomes intelligible when the original sense of buddhi is read into the term, reluctant as the commentators are to admit the possibility. Classical Sāmkhya retained otherwise no trace of the old use.

¹ Arbman, in the work cited at the beginning of this section, tries to prove that āsu stands for the psyche in the Rigveda. His arguments fail to convince me, for a criticism of them, see Neisser, Zum Wörterbuch des Rigveda, Heft 2, s āsu.
superseded by vyānā, the consciousness. But neither of these were felt to reach the core of the matter; for the individual could still say to himself, "I am breathing," "I am conscious," hence there was some other entity beyond them. The principle required was ultimately found in the ātman, a suitably vague term not connected with any special function of the individual. That the ātman is properly the animating principle is made clear by the definition at ChU., iii, 14, 2–3, Manomayaḥ prāṇakāriro bhārūpah satyasamkalpa ākāśāmī sarvakārnā sarvakāmāḥ sarvagandhāḥ sarvarasah sarvam idam abhyātto 'vāky, anādaraḥ, esa ma ātmāntar hrdaye, anīyān viśher . . . jyāyān prthvvyāḥ; and the same Upanisad enforces the point by its use of jīva ātman at vi, 3, 2, and 11, 1. The doctrine assumes various forms such as the prajñātman of the Kauśitaki Up., and it is extended beyond the individual into the cosmos to be identified with brahman, the animating principle of the universe. So far as concerns the individual, the ātman is an immortal spiritual entity, into which the immortal functions of the being, voice, mind, etc., are absorbed at death to be unmitted again at rebirth. Yet it can hardly be called the soul; for it is not the sole spiritual entity nor does it properly speaking represent the individual personality, but only certain functions. The texts recognize throughout that in the background there still remains the real individual, the puruṣa or psyche, which inhabits the living body or leaves it at death or in sleep, wandering about as it would. Half-hearted attempts are made to identify it with the ātman in one or two places, and very occasionally there is a suggestion of its accepting new attributes in expressions like the vyānānamaya and manomaya puruṣa. But the duality of conception persists, and it was left to later schools to abolish one of the two and to elevate the other to the position of a sole spiritual entity, corresponding to what we mean by soul. Sāmkhya and Yoga selected the puruṣa, and the other Hindu philosophies the ātman, as also did the Jains with their jīva.

The earliest of those Upaniṣads, whose theories about soul
are connected in a greater or less degree with Sāmkhya thought, present a more archaic picture than the later parts of the *BāU*. and the *ChU.*, in that they ignore the more far-reaching speculations of the two latter about the ātman. The ultimate element in the individual is the purusa; and subordinate to it, and in the case of the *Katha Up.* separated from it by the avyakta, is the animating principle, called the mahān ātmā or the jīva ātman.¹ in that text The fullest description of the difference between the two is given in the *Mundaka Up.*, though with a picturesqueness of language that tends to veil the basic thought from us; the animating principle here is the ātman, which, though anu, is brhat, recalling the epithet mahat of the *Katha Up.* Clearly at this period there was a chance that the Sāmkhya scheme would include permanently an animating principle among its twenty-five constituents But events took a different course In the *Śvet Up.* the mahān ātmā is no longer reckoned to be a tattva, its place having been taken by the ahamkāra. It is now known as the jīva, a name which survives throughout the whole range of early Sāmkhya literature, and the passage marks a turning point in more than one respect Firstly the exclusion of the jīva from the principles subordinate to the avyakta, and the attributes given to it, made it possible, or, better perhaps, natural, for it to develop into a proper soul in certain later non-Sāmkhya schools, and secondly for Sāmkhya it is the first step in the break up of the idea of an animating principle which could be a rival to purusa, its functions being divided up under other heads

The jīva, as here conceived, is the animating principle and is, therefore, called pṛāṇādhīpa; this function is occasionally recognized in the *MBh.* and by the time of the *Maitrī Up.* the jīva is considered to be merely a form of pṛāṇa. The last vestige of this aspect of it in classical Sāmkhya is to be found

¹ F O Schrader, *Introduction to the Pañcarātra*, pp 72 ff., equates the mahat with the pṛāṇa, which is right in principle, but does not go far enough.
at SK., 29, which teaches that prāṇa has the function of animating the organs, which latter may be understood as either the three that form the antahkarana with Vācaspati Miśra or as these three together with the ten senses, as explained by Gauḍapāda and the Mādhavavritti. Secondly it is that portion of the individual which transmigrates, carrying with it the balance of good and evil deeds in the individual’s moral account, and accompanied by those principles of the being which are not subject to death, here apparently said to be manas, ahamkāra, and buddhi. This idea goes back a long way to the period when the five immortal parts of the body were held to pass into the prāṇa at death. It is only the immaterial faculties that are thought to transmigrate at this epoch, the material parts of the body returning to the great elements from which they were derived. The attribution of this activity to the jīva did not remain undisputed, the Mātrī Up and certain passages of the epic stating that it is the bhūṭātman which transmigrates. The latter is held to be an entity of a spiritual type in the epic, but in the Mātrī Up it seems for the first time to take some subtle portion of the elements with it in transmigration. The line of partition between the jīva and the bhūṭātman, even as late as this Upanisad, is thin, and the original idea may have been that the bhūṭātman consisted of the jīva with those constituents of the individual which it carried with it along the cycle of transmigration. (The conception of something transmigrating, which was not included in the twenty-four physical tattvas and which yet was accompanied by some of the tattvas, fitted uneasily into the Sāmkhya scheme, and the relation between this something and the soul was never, so far as our sources go, clearly worked out. By the time of the Mātrī Up, the theory was becoming threadbare, and it was simple for classical Sāmkhya to reject altogether the idea of a jīva or bhūṭātman and to postulate in its place a subtle

1 I express this hesitatingly, because it is possible that tannāṭra in the passage in question is a later gloss
body, which contained no components except those included in the tattvas and which adhered to the soul till the latter was released.

The jīva is thus the historical forerunner of two elements in classical Sāmkhya, the role allotted to the prānas and the theory of the subtle body, besides these points it contributed to the content of the two principles of buddhi and ahamkāra. To the former it surrendered its name of the mahān ātmā, and perhaps it also accounts for the belief, expressed in the Yoga school by the use of the term sattva, that the buddhi represents the essence of physical being. For ahamkāra the case is more difficult, because the real significance of that principle, in early Sāmkhya as in the classical system, is so hard to determine. The name indicates that it is the ego-principle, that which makes the corporeal individual believe himself to be "I" and which causes his activity, and its connection with the self is shown by its being substituted in the scheme for the mahān ātmā, by the name āsmīta given to it in the YS, and by its association with the bhūtātman. But so little definite is said about it that any attempt to delineate its characteristics in early Sāmkhya could be based only on conjecture, not on solid evidence.

Turning back from this point to the soul theory of the Śvet. Up, we find substantial differences in terminology and ideas from the Katha Up. Purusa as the psyche, the highest individual principle, has practically disappeared, and the word is used in a cosmic sense for the deity, conceived pantheistically, a practice followed in the earlier cantos of the Bhagavadgītā. On the other hand the animating principle is considered not only as such under the denomination of jīva, but also as in effect the individual soul under the names of ātmān, hamsa, dehn, ksetrajña. In this aspect its special function is as bhoktr, the "enjoyer" of the physical world. The idea is certainly as old as Kaṭha Up., iii, 4, the received text of which runs:—

Ātmendriyamanoyuktam bhoktety āhur maniṣīnāḥ
As it stands, this can only be construed, it would seem, "That which is conjoined with the ātman, mind and the senses is called the enjoyer by the wise," and the purusa would be indicated; but such a meaning is directly contradictory to the Katha Up's conception of the purusa and to the teaching of the Śvet. Up. It seems necessary, therefore, to understand, as is done by Hume, and as is required by the epithet madhva of the jīva ātman at iv, 5, "The ātman, when conjoined with mind and the senses, is called the enjoyer by the wise," that is, either ātman is neuter, for which there is no shred of authority elsewhere, or the text must undergo the trifling alteration to "yukta."

"Enjoyment" remains the constant attribute of the individual soul in Sāmkhya, though its connotation is whittled down in the classical school.

In the next stage of thought the logical consequence of excluding the jīva ātman from the physical principles is realized, and its two aspects are separated for good and all into two different entities, the jīva, the physical principle of life, a glorified prāna, and the soul, ātman or ksetrajña. The last is the soul regarded from the individual standpoint and is subsumed by the ātman in a manner that is never clearly explained, while the ātman, developing in accordance with the speculations of the older Upanisads, is conceived cosmically and in theistic schools often becomes identical with the supreme deity. This theory was probably found by experience weak in two respects. Firstly it was difficult to account satisfactorily for the dual aspect of the soul, especially in schools that did not take a theistic view. Secondly there always remained a suggestion about the word ātman that it was somehow or other connected with the physical self, whereas Sāmkhya from the start tended to draw a sharp distinction between the soul and the physical self. It is not surprising then that Sāmkhya teaching in the later part of the epic

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1 Deussen translates, "that which is put together (das Gefugte) out of the ātman etc ", but this rendering of yuktas is hardly possible, and the sense conflicts with iv, 5, quoted above.
reverts to the term *purusa*, which from the nature of its origin was felt to be the real psychical representative of the individual at the same time that it was entirely dissociated from his emotional, mental, and physiological sides. This solution was found to meet the case, though the *ksetrajña* idea was not dropped at once and is still to be found in a modified form in the *Maurī Up*, the conception of *purusa* as an individual soul, capable of contact with the physical elements as well as of separate existence in the state of salvation, gradually won its way to being the sole orthodox theory and thus provided Śāmkhya with a single spiritual entity which could incontestably be called a soul, as we usually understand the term. The attention of thinkers could then be concentrated on the exploration of what exactly was to be understood by the soul's capacity for knowledge and enjoyment, matters which are more important for the comprehension of classical Śāmkhya and Yoga than for that of the earlier schools.

Throughout this discussion no use could be made of parallels with other schools of thought, but it is worth inquiring whether the history of soul theories in early Śāmkhya can be of any assistance in illuminating the growth of Buddhist doctrine. By the time that that religion had reached the dogmatic stage, orthodox thought refused to admit the existence of anything possessing the nature of a soul in the individual, and the question has been much debated whether such a position was taken up by the Buddha from the first or not. The controversy would perhaps have been more fruitful of result, if the preliminary measure had been undertaken of determining the nature of soul theories in contemporary Brahmanism. Evidently if by soul is meant a soul in the modern sense, the question does not arise, for, as has been argued above, in no school of thought whose date on the most optimistic view could be put back to the Buddha's day was the theory held of a single psychical entity as the substratum of the individual, and the Buddha could have neither believed nor disbelieved in the existence of such an entity.
As has been seen, Indian thought till long after the Buddha’s time divided up the psychical functions under two separate heads, purusa, the psyche, and the animating principle, the ātman or jīva. It is a curious fact that the former does not appear to be mentioned in any of the older Buddhist texts at all; the existence of the psyche is as much a popular belief as a philosophic doctrine, and the possibility that the early Buddhists did not know of it must, it seems, be definitely excluded as a solution. *Prima facie* no particular reason is obvious why they should or should not have accepted it; they may for instance have looked on it as an admissible popular belief without bearing on the question of salvation or on the practice of the path thereto, or they may have deemed the philosophic theory too tenuous to need refutation. If no positive statement can be made on this point, the case stands on a different footing with the ātman conceived, not as a soul, but as the permanent animating principle, the focal point of the individual’s mental and physical life, both in this existence and in past and future existences. The canon in its teaching on this subject declares that there is no ātman in the five skandhas, taken either singly or jointly, to put it in terms of Sāmkhya, the ātman is neither a tattva, nor included in any tattva, nor a combination of several tattvas, whence it follows that it is not a reality. The target of these arguments is not the purusa, to which they would be inapplicable, nor equally the ātman conceived as the world soul for the same reason, but the ātman as the animating principle of the earlier Upaniṣads, or the jīva, to use the later term. It is within the limits of possibility, within the limits even of probability, that this theory of the ātman had already been promulgated in the Buddha’s day, and the canonical statements are so definite, so strongly worded, that the rejection of the ātman in this sense must have been the orthodox position in Buddhism at an early date. For all Indian philosophico-religious systems proceed on the principle that no change should be introduced into the system, which cannot be shown, ostensibly at least,
to be consistent with, or an unavoidable development from, its main tenets as originally laid down. If the Buddha had taught the existence of anything in the nature of an ātman in this sense, his followers in later ages could not by the exercise of even the most ingenious dialectics have reconciled such a thoroughgoing refutation of the ātman with orthodoxy.

But this conclusion does not of itself settle the controversy, or even reach the heart of it, the point being whether the Buddha believed in the existence of a "person", or whether the "person" was for him merely an empirical aggregate. In later times undoubtedly the second was the only orthodox doctrine, but the evidence suggests that at an earlier stage the matter was uncertain. Mrs. Rhys Davids has repeatedly drawn attention to passages in the canon, which look as if their authors had believed in the existence of a "person", though the form which that belief might have taken cannot be inferred in detail from the texts, and it is reasonable to hold that, if those passages had been written in later times, they would have been worded differently so as not to suggest any conflict with the doctrine of nairūtmya. Belief in the existence of a "person" did in fact prevail in one school of thought known as the Pudgalavādins, generally described as Vātsīputrīyas and said to be a section of the Sammitiīyas. According to them there was a "person", the pudgala, who was neither the same as the five skandhas nor different from them; our knowledge of the theory is scanty and only derived from polemics against it, but enough is known to show that it differed materially from the ātman theory of the early Upanisads. The school must have been of some antiquity, since the arguments directed against it in the Kathāvatthu and in the corresponding Sarvāstivādin Vyākhyā are so similar as evidently to go back to a common original, older than either, and the refutations of it in more modern works such as Abhidharmakosa, ch. ix, and Tatvāsāṅgraha, vv. 336–349, do not contain any allusions to later treatises

1 See AK, VI, xxxiii ff. (=Notes bouddhiques, 11)
defending the theory. So far as the evidence goes, it was an ancient heresy, that had a short life and that was not forgotten only because it provided a good pūrvapakṣa for discussions on the nature of the skandhas. If the matter is looked at from the Buddhist point of view, the obvious conclusion would be that, while the Buddha may have known and, if so, did reject the theory of the ātman as a permanent animating principle, the question of the existence of a "person" had never occurred to him as one requiring solution, that it was only at a later age when certain difficulties made themselves apparent that the necessity arose for a decision, and that then a definite meaning had to be read into the vague expressions used by the Buddha, the limits of interpretation being determined by the teaching about the non-existence of an ātman. The Sāṃkhya evidence suggests equally that these aspects of soul theory received little attention in the early stages of philosophical speculation. It is immaterial to the practice of the path to salvation to know whether there is a real "person" or not, and it only becomes important when a theory of transmigration has to be worked out in detail. The fact of transmigration was accepted at an early age, but the texts reviewed in this section show that the question of what was the entity that transmigrated was not seriously debated till the time of the Śvet. U.p., and that a coherent answer was not discovered till much later; nor, if the question had frequently come up in early polemics, is it probable that our texts would have failed to deal with the subject at length and furnish it with a comprehensible solution free from ambiguity, in place of the casual references whose correct valuation can only be arrived at with much difficulty.

§ 5. Some Theoretical Principles

So far the discussion has related to the Sāṃkhya categories, the tattvas, and the most important differences in this respect between the early and the classical schools have been put on record, so far as the sources admit of certain or reasonably
probable results. I now turn to a consideration of some of the theories which explain the action of these principles, namely those concerning the action of *prakṛti* in its older sense and the causes for the implication of the soul in the cycle of transmigration.

In dealing with the various accounts which describe the division of the twenty-four physical principles into two groups of *prakṛti* and *vikāra*, it was suggested that the original use of *prakṛti* was in the singular to denominate the first group as a whole, so that beneath the apparent pluralism of the octet we may discern the existence of an underlying unity. *Prakṛti* denotes the primitive or fundamental form of a thing, and so its essential or real form, its nature, the introduction of the term, therefore, seems to imply some degree of preoccupation with the problem of the nature of reality. Primitive thought in India did not consciously grasp the existence of the problem, and it was probably first brought into the foreground of philosophical speculation by Nāgārjuna, but such radical views as his do not appear suddenly but demand a long period of incubation. In Brahmanical thought the first steps on the road can be seen in the development of the *prakṛti* theory. The school of Vārṣaganya, in which apparently this doctrine was first evolved, is shown to have devoted some thought to the question of ultimate reality by Vasubandhu's quotation of its principle, *AK.*, iv, 64, "That which is, is, and that which is not, is not, that which is not does not come into existence, and that which is is not destroyed"; much the same idea is attributed to the *tattvadarśins* (i.e. the Sāmkhya theorists) at *Bhagavadgītā*, ii, 16.—

*Nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate satah*

The principle so enunciated, which need not go back to Vārṣaganya himself according to the actual wording of Vasubandhu's statement, is not, it should be noted, equivalent to the *satkāryavāda* of Iśvarakṛṣṇa, a doctrine which was
still unknown to Nāgārjuna,\(^1\) and which cannot, therefore, be held to have arisen before the third century A.D.; I would regard the Vārṣaganyā axiom as a half-way house to the later theory. To ascertain what is indicated in this direction by the use of prakṛti in the singular, in the absence of philosophical statements on the point, is only possible by considering the terms applied to it, and the first word I propose to take is svabhāva, which is synonymous with prakṛti in the sense of “nature”, which occurs frequently in Sāmkhya texts, and which is much employed in Buddhist philosophical treatises to express the idea of ultimate reality.

In the first place we must distinguish the use of svabhāva by the school of materialists, the bhūtaçintakas of MBh, xi, 8529, but better known as Svabhāvavādins. Their views, which are mentioned at Śvet. Up., i, 2, and rejected at MBh, xi, 8690 ff., are described by Āśvaghoṣa at B., ix, 59–62, and seem to have been that the ultimates of existence are the four elements only (excluding space from the regular group of five), and that though, when taken singly, they are in mutual opposition to each other, yet they coalesce to form all created things under the impulse of svabhāva, which is not a cosmic principle but merely their own inherent nature, just as heat is not a separate entity but merely the inseparable nature of fire. This theory, which is undoubtedly of considerable antiquity but which apparently had ceased to be current at a relatively early date, may have exerted some influence on the form taken by the classical Sāmkhya theory of the gunas, which equally are dissimilar, even hostile, by nature, but which combine in all manifestations of physical life by virtue of their svabhāva as pointed out below. That this is not as impossible as might be supposed on the face of it appears from the fact that Pañcasikha’s system in the MBh. teaches a very similar principle to account

\(^1\) See W. Liebenthal, Satkārya in der Darstellung seiner buddhistischen Gegner, Stuttgart, 1934. His proof on this point seems to me conclusive, whatever reserves may be felt about his other views.
for the action of the great elements in combining to create physical bodies and in separating at the dissolution of the bodies, XI, 7937, te (sc. pañca dhātavah) svabhāvena tushānti vijnayante svabhāvatah.

Moreover the action of svabhāva is recognized by the classical systems to a modified extent. Gaudapāda on SK., 27, inquires whether, in view of the fact that the pradhāna, buddhi, and ahamkāra are unconscious (acetana) and that the puruśa is inactive, the sense faculties, being separate in function and separate in object, are created by a creator (īśvara) or by svabhāva, to this he replies that on this point (vha) the Sāmkhyas postulate a certain cause called svabhāva. He then goes on to state that in this text (atra, that is, in contradistinction to the previously mentioned Sāmkhya view) the difference of the senses and of external objects arises from gunaparīnāmatvādasa. The manner of expression is odd and might imply that Gaudapāda did not share the Sāmkhya view, but it seems to me a better explanation to understand him to mean that the earlier Sāmkhya schools believed in the creative power of a principle called svabhāva, but that Īśvarakṛṣṇa did not. How the corresponding passage was worded in the commentary translated by Paramārtha requires elucidation, because in the Chinese translations prakṛti and svabhāva are rendered by the same characters; as translated by Takakusu, BEFEO, 1904, p. 1014, it runs “Neither the soul nor Īśvara is the cause of them. The true cause is Nature. Nature produces the three guṇas and the Sentiment of the ego, etc.” Here in view of Gauḍapāda’s commentary Nature must stand for an original svabhāva, not prakṛti, all the more so as prakṛti in the classical sense does not produce the three guṇas but is made up of them. The Mādhavavṛtti diverges from the commentary translated by Paramārtha on this point, but is in substantial agreement with the statements of Gauḍapāda as construed above; on kāriṇa 27 it lays down that neither puruṣa, īśvara, nor svabhāvā is the cause in this matter according to the Sāmkhya view;
and that the separate disposition (niksepa) of the senses is effected by the three guṇas when working in the ahaṅkāra. On 61 again it denies the existence of svabhāva as a reality (padārtha) or as a cause.\(^1\) The inference from these passages is that previous to the SK a principle called svabhāva was known to the Sāmkhyas as exercising a certain creative power and as having some special connection with the guṇas. Īśvarakṛṣṇa rejected this view, substituting the gunaparināma theory, which he may have borrowed from the Yoga form of Sāmkhya. The YS do not accept any svabhāva theory, and this in view of their belief, however attenuated, in an īśvara is natural\(^2\), but the view that the guṇas act by virtue of their inherent nature (svabhāva) is a Yoga tenet, as appears from the bhāṣya on iii, 13, guṇasvabhānyam tu pravṛttikārānam uktam gunānām. The later part of the Bhagavadgūḍa, xvi, 2, and xvii, 41, goes farther in describing the guṇas as produced by svabhāva, the view already noted as that of the commentary translated by Paramārtha. For completeness' sake it may be observed that the Gaudapādākārikās associate the Sāmkhyan 'prakṛti with svabhāva in the definition at iv, 9.

\[ \textbf{Prakṛtiḥ seti vyāneya svabhāvan na jahān yā} \]

But svabhāva here is not a separate force or cause.

If the classical texts suggest the existence of some connection of svabhāva with Sāmkhya theory, they leave the exact position uncertain. The epic also makes some use of the term, unfortunately in a manner that is only too often ambiguous. At three very similar passages, xii, 7939, 8746, and 11121, svabhāva is one of the elements of the individual complex and may possibly stand for the eightfold prakṛti, none of whose constituents are named in these lists; somewhat similarly at Bhagavadgūḍa, v, 14, and vii, 3, svabhāva

\(^1\) This statement occurs again on kārikā 31, where the negative is omitted by the MSS, but rightly supplied by the editor.

\(^2\) The commentaries are quite clear on this point. Vācaspati Muśa on YS, ii, 17, refutes the view that the connection between the puruṣas and pradhāna is due to svabhāva and holds it to be naṃsuttika; and the bhāṣya takes the same line on iv, 10.
is easiest understood as the aparā prakṛti of vi, 4, consisting of buddhi, ahamkāra, the five elements and manas. Again at MBh., xi, 8035–8055, Prahrāda, in a dialogue with Śākra, attributes everything to svabhāva; but in spite of the use of many Sāmkhya terms the relationship of this passage to that system is not clear. Further in a few places causal efficiency is predicated of svabhāva. Thus at xi, 7114, it is said of the human being, svabhāvayuktyā yuktas tu sa nityam sṛjate gunān, where guna means the vikāras (bhūta-bhautika according to the commentary), and similar lines are to be found at 9025 and 10524. Again at xi, 7692, in describing the evolution of the vyakta from the avyakta it is said, svabhāvahetuyā bhāvah, where the commentary glosses svabhāva with pūrvasamskāra; but in view of the mention of the rājas and tāmasa bhāvas at verse 7701 below, bhāvah here may mean the gunas, which would make the teaching of the passage equivalent to that quoted above from the Gītā. The association of svabhāva and hētu recurs also at xi, 7971.

But if the epic speaks with uncertain voice on this matter, the sources include one author who was a keen controversialist and master of all the philosophies of his day. Āśvaghoṣa in canto xviii of the Buddhacarita devotes a long passage to the refutation of the various theories then held regarding the creation of the universe. After disposing of the arguments in favour of an īśvara, he goes on to consider in verses 29–41 the case for Nature. The expressions used by the Tibetan and Chinese translations alike indicate indifferently either prakṛti or svabhāva. If the original Sanskrit had prakṛti, it would stand for the eightfold prakṛti of canto xi, not for the avyakta, but, though occasional passages speak of prakṛti as creating the world (e.g. MBh., xi, 7666–7), the stock principle in contrast to īśvara, as is shown by Gaudapāda and the Mātharavṛtti on SK., 27, is svabhāva, and I do not think there can be any doubt that the poet used this term here, understanding by it the power which sets the eightfold prakṛti in motion, in the terms of Bhagavadgītā, v, 14,
5. SOME THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES

svabhāvas tu pravartate. The refutation takes the form of considering in turn each quality of the svabhāva postulated as the cause of creation and showing it to be inconsistent with the function of creation. Nature is described as a single principle, all-pervading, having the quality of producing things (of prasavadharmān, SK, 11), without attribute or characteristic, eternal, unmanifested (avyakta), and unconscious (sems-med, probably equivalent to acetana here). The only argument that need be noticed is that to the effect that, since Nature has neither attribute (guna) nor characteristic (vrīḍa), therefore its products equally should have neither, and since the evolutes show the presence of both, they cannot have been produced by Nature.\(^1\) This definition of svabhāva coincides exactly with Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s account of the avyakta as prakṛti, but with the all-important difference that the SK. can meet the argument propounded by Āsvaghoṣa about Nature’s lack of attribute or characteristic by pointing to the action of the gunas under the principle of gunaparimāna.\(^2\) But in Āsvaghoṣa’s time the gunas, as pointed out in section 3 above, were conceived only from the moral aspect of the law of karman and were not concerned in any way with the attributes of the evolutes. The course of development, though not the steps by which it was brought about, now becomes plain, the functions and qualities of svabhāva as the motive force of the eightfold prakṛti are transferred to the avyakta, which ceases to be the unseen force embodying the moral law in order to become the cosmic principle that effects the creation of the world, and at the same time the three gunas

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\(^1\) The argument all through is based on the rule that the attributes of an effect must also be attributes of the cause. This is not used elsewhere in Āsvaghoṣa and in view of the rules of Indian polemics we must infer that it was a recognized principle of Śāmkhya polemics, another step in the development of Vārṣāgānya’s maxim quoted above towards the sat-kāryavāda

\(^2\) Another difference is implied by ‘B, xxvi, 12, where it is said that in the Śāmkhya rajas and tamas are attributed to Nature, apparently the doctrine referred to above in Paramārtha’s commentary and the Gītā that stūbhāva produces the gunas.
of necessity are no longer limited to determining rebirth and, as mutually interdependent forces entering into everything, cause by their parināma the multifariousness of all phenomena, while their original duties are taken over by a new group, the eightfold buddhi. It may be assumed that this theory of svabhāva was only gradually worked out and that the account of it in the Buddhacarita presents it to us in its final stage of development shortly before the decisive step was taken of identifying the avyakta alone with prakṛti. Further the theory of svabhāva can only have been current in the anīvara schools, in those systems, which accepted an īśvara on the lines described in the Śvet. Up., the īśvara himself has the function of creation and the necessity for a principle of svabhāva, separate from prakṛti and setting it in motion does not arise, and accordingly the use of the term in such systems is not frequent. With the elaboration of this principle early Śāmkhya of the atheistic type arrived at the fundamentally dual view of the universe, which was to constitute its leading characteristic ever afterwards, though it may remain doubtful to what extent the history of the development was affected by the desire to discover the nature of absolute reality, as distinct from the urge, ever present in India, to achieve a unitary framework.

Next I would deal with a pair of terms, which exercised some influence on the Śāmkhya conception of reality, aksara \(^1\) and its opposite ksara. The latter is a later introduction, but the former, which is mentioned as one of the topics of the Śaśāntantra in Ahrubudhnyasamhitā, xiii, 21, has a long history, beginning with BĀU, iii, 8, 7-11. Yājñavalkya there uses the term to designate the ultimate essence of the universe on the one side and of the individual person on the other side (cf. ibid., iii, 7, 23, which uses the same terms of the

\(^1\) For this word, see P. M. Modi, Aksara, a Forgotten Chapter in the History of Indian Philosophy. Though, as will appear from the following, I cannot accept his conclusions, his discussion of the word is original and stimulating. I omit all the passages dealing with aksara as a character of the alphabet, most of which relate to speculation about the word om.
antaryāmin ātman as iii, 8, 11, does of aksara), it represents accordingly the identification, or at least the fundamental similarity of brahman and ātman. This passage was taken up by the Mundaka U., whose expression at ii, 2, 5, yasmin dyāvā prthivi cāntrikṣam otam, recalls the phraseology of the older Upaniṣad. This text does not maintain the identification of brahman and ātman, but teaches the existence of three ultimates, puruṣa, conceived cosmically,¹ the aksara brahman, also called aksara alone, from which everything is produced, and the ātman as the animating principle of the body. The relations between these three are not clearly defined and the language is often involved.² Similarly at Katha U., iii, 2, the brahman is called aksara. The term occurs also in a different use at Praśna U., iv, 9–11, which teaches that the corporeal being (puruṣa, the sat purusa of Mundaka U., i, 1, 7), who is the seer, the hearer, etc., and is of the nature of consciousness, is based on the supreme aksara ātman, this ātman is lower than the para purusa and is therefore the animating principle more or less elevated into the position of the individual soul. In all these passages the word has to be understood as “that which does not pass away”, “permanent”, but later thought seems to understand it by a shift of the emphasis as “unchanging”, “immutable”, on the ground that that alone is real which is not subject to change, and this development begins with the Śvet U., which is the first text to oppose ksara to aksara. As brahman is held to be a synonym of the avyakta, one might have expected that aksara would have been applied to the latter, not ksara, in this Upaniṣad; but this is not the case. It accepts and transforms the triad

¹ Cf Hertel, Mundaka Upaniṣad, pp 47–8, pointing out the relation to the skambha hymns, Atharvaveda, x, 7 and 8. It is conceived cosmically despite the fact pointed out in the previous section that in one verse it has the characteristics of the individual psyche also.

² Thus, at i, 2, 13, yenakkaram purusam veda satyam, the three words, aksara, purusa, and satya have to be understood as signifying the three principles, not as purusa qualified by two epithets, unless the verse is treated as an interpolation referring to the same aksara purusa as in the Bhagavadgītā passages dealt with below.
of the *Mundaka Up*. The cosmic *purusa* becomes a personal but pantheistic deity, the independent impersonal *brahman* \(^1\) has given way to the *avyakta* of the Sāmkhyas, here called *pradhāna*, and conceived, not as a separate entity, but as the *māyā* of the deity, and the *ātman*, also called *jīva*, *hamsa*, and *dehin*, has much the same position as in the *Praśna Up.*.

The verse, v, 1, runs —

\[
\text{Dve aksare brahmapure (or \textit{opare) tv anante vidyāvīdye nāthe yatra gūḍhe |}} \\
\text{Kṣaram tv avidyā hy amrīm tu vidyā vidyāvīdye īśār yas tu so 'nyāḥ ||}
\]

Here it is possible with the reading *brahmapure* to understand *aksare* as locative agreeing with it, but the solution is improbable and without parallel, and I prefer to take it as a dual, meaning not the two *aksaras* but *aksara* and *ksara* as a pair, as the context makes necessary. *Kṣara* is used to describe the *pradhāna* at 1, 10, and also in the above verse as equivalent to *avidyā*, the fundamental cause of transmigration, and the sense seems to be \("\text{that which is ever flowing}\)\", \("\text{mutable}\)\", as opposed to the *aksara ātman* which remains the same throughout the cycle of transmigration.

The usages in the Upaniṣads explain the occurrences in the *Bhagavadgītā*, which are more easily dealt with by taking the later passages first. At xv, 16–18 three *purusas* are named, of which the highest is the *Īśvara*, the *paramātman*, Kṛṣṇa in fact as verse 18 shows. The other two are the *ksara* and *aksara* *purusas*, the first, explained as equivalent to \("\text{all beings}\)\", *sarrūṇi bhūtāṁ*, derives from *purusa* in its ordinary sense of

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\(^1\) Except for passages which are deliberate remembrances of older literature, and do not therefore affect the doctrine of the Upaniṣad *brahman* in this text means the \("\text{esoteric, highest religious knowledge}\)\.

\(^2\) In 1, 7, the reading *supraśūṭhāksaram* is very suspicious, and should probably be amended with Schrader, *Religionsgeschichtliches Lesebuch*, 14, *Der Hinduismus*, to *supraśūṭham ksaram ca*, and in 1, 10, I take *karaḥ* as the neuter *kara*, not the masculine synonym of *Śiva*, also with Schrader, op cit, and understand it as signifying the *ātman*. 
5. SOME THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES

"man" and is the same as the purusa of Praśna Up., iv, 9, and the sat purusa of Muṇḍaka Up., i, 1, 7, the other is the kṣara kūṭastha purusa, that is the individual soul, the successor of the aksara ātman of the Praśna and Śvet. Up. Going back to canto xii, we find Arjuna inquiring in the first verse which is the best course, bhakti towards Kṛṣṇa, or worship of the avyakta aksara; Kṛṣṇa describes the latter in verse 3 among other epithets as kūṭastha and sarvatraga. The second of these has already been shown in the previous section to be a recognized attribute of the soul in early as well as classical Śāmkhya, and kūṭastha has to be understood as in xv, 16, therefore the aksara here is the individual soul as conceived by the Śāmkhyas. In the other passages the same usage of aksara in the masculine occurs at vii, 21, and equally refers to purusa, which is found in the next verse, but that word here, as always in the earlier parts of the Gītā, is used technically of the cosmic purusa, that is Kṛṣṇa. Probably the same sense is to be understood at vii, 15, where karmāris from brahma, and brahma from the aksara. In the remaining occurrences aksara is used in the neuter as an epithet of brahma, expressed or implied, and the last passage of interest in the present connection is the line, aksaram brahma paramam svabhāvo ’dhyātamam ucyate | at vii, 3, where, if the phraseology is transposed into the terms of Śāmkhya current in this work, brahma is the parā prakṛti, the avyakta, and svabhāva is the eightfold aparā prakṛti of vii, 4–5. Ksara occurs only at this place, viii, 4, and at xv, 16 and 18, and refers to corporeal existence in the world of phenomena.

The facts of the epic are not too easy to classify, firstly there are cases of the application of aksara to brahma at xii, 7393–4, 7655, 8135, which do not materially concern Śāmkhya doctrine, and at the last of these brahma is ksara also, with reference to the phenomenal world. At 8764–7 the ātman is described as twofold, ksara, the corporeal being, and aksara, the soul, but in the following adhyāya, which
expounds a system of Yoga, the adept at 8789 is told that aśino hi rahasya eko gacchet aksarasāmyatām, which is then explained as meaning that he should stop the action of the sense faculties and the mind. As the senses and the mind are suppressed by being merged in the buddhi, it would be natural to suppose that aksara here denotes the latter, and support for this view is to be found in xi, 11232, where it is expressly stated to be a synonym of the buddhi. This curious usage may be due to the importance of the buddhi in Yoga practice or to the influence of the name mahān ātmā; in any case that aksara has this sense is certified by the occurrence in Ahrvadhnyasamhitā, xi, 21, where its place in the enumeration of the topics of the Śāṅk曙光ra makes this the only possible meaning for it.\(^1\) Then again we can trace the beginning of the classical doctrine that, when the subordinate principles merge into the prakṛti, the latter comes to a state of rest with its three guṇas in equilibrium (sāmya) at 11434, which reads —

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\(^1\) The account in this Pañcarātra work is distinctly later, and the system set out can be very little older than the SK. As it does not appear to have been critically considered, it may be worth while retelling its contents with brief comments. The Śāṅkhya system is divided into two parts, the priyottanta mandala and the vāṣṭīya mandala, of which the former covers the twenty-five tattvas and contains thirty-two tantras as follows: (1) brahma, indicating either the system as a whole (“the sacred knowledge”), the brahmacātra of the Śvet U up) or the cosmos, as including all the purusas and the twenty-four physical tattvas, (2) purusa, (3–5) saṃkṣet, niyati, and kāla, the three aspects of the aryakta, (6–8) the guṇas, (9) aksara, equated above to the buddhi, (10) prāna, as a vīti of buddhi, (11) and (12) kartṛ and sāmi, the second of which is unintelligible, but which between them probably stand for the ahamkāra and the bhūtātmā, (13–17) guṇa, the five organs of sense, (18–22) kriyā, the five organs of action, (23–32) five mātrās, and five bhūtas, either the objects of sense (cf the explanation of bhūtātmā in Kaustubha U p, iii, and mātrāsparka, Bhagavadgīta, 11, 14) and the great elements, or the tannātrās and the gross elements. The vāṣṭīya mandala deals with general subjects and consists of twenty-eight śūndas as follows: (33–7) kriyā uncertain, perhaps the pañca karmātmanah of Tatvasamāsa, 13, (38) bhoga, (39) vīti, that is śīla, (40–4) leśa, the fivefold avyā, (45–7) pramāna, (48–51) khyāti, dharma, varṣagya, and abhāvarṣya, evidently the eightfold buddhi, in its earliest form, (52) guṇa, uncertain, (53) leśa, uncertain whether in the old or the later sense, (54) dṛṣṭa, (55) ānudarśaka, presumably as in the SK, (56) dukkha, also as in the SK, (57–9) sattva, kāsāya, and samaya, uncertain, (60) mokesa.
This last quotation comes from a passage which deals at length with the question of aksara and kṣara. According to 11364 aksara is ekatva, and kṣara is nānātva, and this axiom is developed at 11418–11465 in connection with vidyā, standing for the soul, and avidyā, that is the avyakta in a state of activity (sargapralayadharman). This chapter is expressed in a fashion which is both ambiguous and hard to follow, a defect due possibly to lack of a clear conception of the relation between the soul and the physical principles, but the author seems to take the line that kṣara represents physical existence in its manifoldness and constant mutability, the result of ignorance, and that aksara is unity, reality, true knowledge, unchangeableness. This view is summed up at xiv, 809, that aksara and kṣara are the two aspects of the ātman, the former being its state of absolute reality (sadbhāva) and the latter its phenomenal state in the world (svabhāva).

It will be seen then that earlier thought knew no definite principle called aksara but used it as an adjective, much in the fashion that the Buddhists used the word nutya, but that the Sāmkhya teachers, as they were gradually reaching out to the position of the classical school, developed an opposition between aksara and kṣara to express the difference between real and phenomenal existence, this teaching never attained a fundamental consistency, and therefore, though it had some share in shaping the final doctrine of prakṛti, it failed to maintain its place in the completed scheme.

This discussion has touched incidentally on the view taken in early Sāmkhya of the samsāra, the cycle of transmigration, on which the sources have little to say, and that little in general terms. There is nothing strange in this lack of information; a man in danger of drowning wants to know how he is to be saved and is not interested in the nature of the mishap by which he fell into the water, and it is only as the emphasis
passes from religion to philosophy that the difficulties are faced. Two aspects of the case present themselves for investigation, firstly, what is the cause of the union (samyoga) between the soul and the physical principles, and, secondly, why does the union continue to subsist? The first of these questions is complicated by two considerations. As appears from Car., p. 333, ll. 4–5, which is in answer to the difficulties raised at p. 327, ll. 1–3, the bond between the soul (ksetrajña, ātman) and the corporeal being (ksetra) is without beginning (anādī) and has, therefore, always been in existence, and Āśvaghosa in his dialectics at B, xi, 78–9, urges that salvation is impossible under this view. Further early Sāmkhya sees salvation in release from rajas and tamas only, not from all three guṇas; therefore, as sattva remains, the soul does not become free from all the twenty-four principles, and the union that causes transmigration is union with rajas and tamas alone (Car., p. 329, ll. 8–9, and p. 332, l. 1). Subject to these points, an answer can be given in general terms, though it is impossible to state how the difficulties that are obviously inherent in it were met. In theistic Sāmkhya the union was merely part of the action of the deity (samyogavimittahetu, Śvet. Up., v, 12), but in the atheistic schools the cause is avidyā, the fivefold ignorance of Vāraṇaganyya. This idea in its first stage is to be found in Śvet. Up., v, 1, and fully developed in B., xi, 33–36, it is connected with the use of the term kṣara as noted above, while the parallel with the position of avidyā in the chain of twelve causes as worked out by the Hinayāna dogmatists is too obvious to need more than mention. In the classical schools, the Yogasūtras, which rejected in this as in other respects theories peculiar to theistic Sāmkhya and fitted a nominal theism to the tenets of the atheistic branch, are sufficiently archaic to accept this view, u, 23 and 24, to the embarrassment of the commentators. The bhāṣya on u, 23 mentions seven other alternatives, all of Sāmkhya origin according to Vācaspati Mīśra, but with one exception I have not found it possible to ascertain
who were the authorities for the various explanations. The exception is the theory of the *SK.*, that the *prakṛti* comes into action to effect the purpose of the *purusa*; if it is asked why it becomes active for this purpose, there seems to be no answer except that it is the nature of *prakṛti* so to do, in other words the motive force of *prakṛti*, which is the cause of union and of the cycle of transmigration, is *svabhāva*, not as in the older schools a separate power, but simply its inherent nature.

The second question formulated in the preceding paragraph really concerns the mechanics of transmigration, and the normal reply for the Sāṃkhya of every age would be that it is *karmaṇa*, understood in the primitive school as evil *karmaṇa* and in the later schools as *karmaṇa* of every description, whether good or bad, which keeps the individual ever moving on the wheel of life. The point is put clearly by *YS.*, ii, 12, which states that it is the *karmākaya*, the disposition created by the act, which is the cause of transmigration and which itself derives from the *klesa*.\(^1\) *SK.*, 40–43, does not accept this view, seeing the action of *karmaṇa* in the development of the eight states (*bhāva*) of the *buddhi*, a category which is unknown to earlier thought, even to the *YS*. At an earlier stage, however, a more complicated theory was held according to *B*, xii, 23–32, and *Car.*, p. 330, l. 19, and p. 360, l. 12, to p. 361, l. 5, under which the causes, which retain the corporeal being on the wheel of transmigration, are the act (*karmaṇa*), desire (*tiṣṇā* according to Āśvaghoṣa, *ucchā* and *dvesa* according to *Car.*), and lack of knowledge (*ajñāna* in the *Buddhacarita*, *moha* in *Car.*), and they are effective by reason of eight faults, wrong belief (*vipratajaya*), etc.\(^2\) The group does not occur in this form in the *MBh.*, but a variant, substituting *aṇḍyā* for *ajñāna* (or *moha*), is refuted in Paṇcaśikha's system at xi, 7912, and is accepted at xii, 117, and possibly its influence

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\(^1\) That the doctrine of this śūtra is archaic is shown by its acceptance of the view that only bad *karmaṇa* is operative for transmigration.

\(^2\) For the details see notes on this passage in the translation of *B.*
is to be detected in the statements of the bhāṣya to YS., i, 12 and 15, that the disposition created by the act (karmāśaya) proceeds from an equivalent group of four qualities, kāma (or rāga), lobha, mohā, and krodha (or dveṣa). The absence of other authority for this theory argues that it never secured wide prevalence, a neglect which it justly earned by its incoherence, and we may close this section with the remark that the failure of our texts to explain the mechanics of transmigration is a useful indication of the attitude adopted by early Śāmkhya towards philosophic questions, which had no immediate religious relevance.

§ 6. Conclusions

In the preceding sections the evidence for the historical development of early Śāmkhya has been collected and, so far as possible, critically handled, and the way has thus been cleared for an attempt to depict in outline the various stages through which the system passed by fitting together the different pieces of the puzzle. The origin lay, as has been seen, in the analysis of the individual undertaken in the Brāhmaṇas and earliest Upanisads, at first with a view to assuring the efficacy of the sacrificial rites and later in order to discover the meaning of salvation in the religious sense and the methods of attaining it. The components of the individual are separated into two groups, one consisting of his functions, both mental and physical, the other of the material parts of the body. The latter represents the mortal side of the individual, and its ingredients dissolve at death into the cosmic elements. The former, on the other hand, contains those parts which may be looked on as having, as it were, an independent life of their own, expressible in such ideas as "I see", "I speak", "I think", and which are considered to survive the death of the body (e.g. Kausītakas U.p., ii, 13), this conception of functions not subject to death springs ultimately from the desire for a fuller life beyond the grave than that enjoyed by the psyche, and it exercised māch
influence on the growth into a religious dogma of the belief
in transmigration, a point that need not be followed up here.
In this group search is directed towards finding that one of
them, which is the basis of the individual, and the remaining
members of the group are said to be absorbed into it when
the individual dies or is asleep (e.g. Kauśītakī Up., ii, 13
and 14, ChU., iv, 3, 3). Here in germ are to be found two
of the main ideas of classical Sāṃkhya, the absorption of
the inferior principles (tattva) into the superior ones and their
emanation from them, and the existence of a subtle body,
consisting of the functions and potentialities of the individual,
which accompanies the soul so long as it revolves on the wheel
of transmigration.

In the process of speculation this group was gradually
enlarged, till the existence of all the Sāṃkhya physical
principles was recognized with the exception of avyakta and
ahamkāra. In the final solution the ultimate physical reality
of the individual was attributed to an animating power called
the “self”, the ātman or occasionally jīva ātman, which,
though neither superseding nor incorporating the psyche,
possessed most of the characteristics of a soul in the modern
sense. The stage was now set for the entry on the scene of the
Sāṃkhya system, which first appears in the Katha Up.,
but not in a complete form, for it mentions only twenty
tattvas, omitting the great elements of the later texts.\(^1\) Here
the essence of the person is said to lie in the puruṣa, the
double or psyche, the “mānṇikīn”, whose existence is
separated to such an extent from the corporeal being that it
has no part to play in the simile likening the latter to a chariot.
The avyakta similarly is looked on as above the corporeal
individual, and possibly as outside it, since it also is not
mentioned in the chariot simile, in accordance with what
may be learnt from later texts, this principle stands for the
unseen force, the law of the act, which regulates the destiny

\(^1\) But the bhūtebhūr of iv, 7, could be understood as a reference to the
clements, though not so taken by the various translators.
of the individual, as he passes along the cycle of transmigration. Whether the theory of the three gunas as the factors of the avyakta had yet been elaborated or not does not appear directly from this Upanisad; but it would not be unreasonable to infer from the status of the avyakta in relation to the corporeal being that a negative answer should be given to the question The remaining principles differ in several respects from classical Sāmkhya. Nothing in the first place is said about emanation or absorption, and the scale in which the different members are drawn up evidently has reference to the practice of yoga, the adept starting at the bottom and realizing each principle in order, one by one or group by group. Ahamkāra is not yet recognized, and in its place there occurs the mahān ātmā, the immortal soul-like animating power, while the buddhi is treated as the vijnāna, "conscience" or "awareness". The omission of the great elements, the mahābhūtas, and the inclusion of the objects of sense are both due to the same cause, preoccupation with the technique of yoga; for the great elements are only associated with the ephemeral body, which is of no interest to the adept, whereas the objects of sense are closely connected with the sense faculties, whose suppression is the first task of the yogin. The position of the Katha Up. on this matter was not followed later, when the great elements became a special object of yoga (Śvet. Up., 11, 12), and were particularly associated with the prakrtilaya theory.

No direct evidence exists to show what developments took place in the interval between the Katha Up. and Śvet. Up., but their nature may be inferred from the statements of the latter, which prove that Sāmkhya had been regularly formulated and put on a more philosophical basis by a school, which was probably that of Vārsagānya. The chief feature of the doctrines of this school was a division of the twenty-four physical principles into two groups of eight primary

1 So also in the kṣrenāyatana practices of Buddhism.
6. CONCLUSIONS

and sixteen secondary constituents on lines entirely different from the division in earlier times into the immortal and mortal parts of the body. The eight primaries consist of the avyakta, which functions in a triple form through sattva, rajas, and tamas, originally known as the bhāvas but later called the guṇas, the buddhi, the ahāmkāra which had replaced the mahān ātmā, and the five great elements. The importance given to these last may reflect to some degree the influence of the materialist school, which regarded the four great elements (excluding space) as the sole ultimates of reality and as coalescing to form creation by the nature (svabhāva) inherent in them. The secondaries are made up of mind, the ten faculties of perception and action, and the objects of the senses. The nature of the relationship between the two groups is indicated by the names given to them, prakṛti and vikāra, which do not seem at this date to imply the full theory of tattvavikāra, the procession of each principle from a higher one, into which it is absorbed at the destruction of the universe. Apparently each of the primaries is an independent entity, but at some period, whether originally or as a later development is not clear, the group is held to form a whole, whose action can be resumed under the principle of svabhāva, the real creator of the phenomenal universe, which possesses most of the qualities characteristic of prakṛti in the classical school. The precise significance of the introduction of the ahāmkāra cannot be determined; evidently it was intended to take over some of the functions of the mahān ātmā, namely those which were concerned with the ego, excluding those connected with the animation of the body and with the soul, but to define those functions precisely is not possible. Salvation consists in the entire elimination of rajas and tamas from the individual, on which only the sattva part of the avyakta remains in him and he becomes sattvastha, while implication in the cycle of transmigration, or in other words the union (samyoga) of the soul with the physical principles, is due to the fivefold ignorance (avmdyā).
The occurrence of the terms jīva and kṣetrajña in the Śvet. Up. suggests that the soul theory of this school had already taken the curious form characteristic of the earlier strāta of the Mokṣadharmā. Belief in the psyche, the purusa of the Katha Up., as a doctrine of religious or philosophical significance, has been put on one side, perhaps in consequence of the identification of the term with the cosmic purusa of texts such as the Mundaka Up., in favour of an ātman, which is not an individual soul, but the world-soul of the brahman-ātman speculation of the early Upamāṇas. From the standpoint of the individual soul, as caught up into the cycle of transmigration, is known as the kṣetrajña, whose relations with the ātman are left obscure. In essence it is the enjoyer, bhokti, and the cogniser, jña, while the ātman, at least in later thought, is ajña. Neither of these souls has the capacity to animate the body, and this function is left to the jīva, later confused with a newer conception in the shape of the bhūtiātman, and which is a kind of super-prāṇa belonging to the physical side of the individual; on the body’s death it transmigrates, carrying with it the individual’s balance of good and evil deeds which have still to fructify and accompanied by the ahāmkāra and the buddhi, into which probably the mind and the sense faculties have been absorbed, but the relation between this jīva, which forms the substratum of existence between death and rebirth, and the soul is left vague.

Though the theories so far described are atheistic, most of them are taken up in the Śvet. Up., which knows the eightfold prakṛti, the sixteenfold vikāra, the principles of svabhāva and the fivefold avidyā, and the kṣetrajña and jīva, but adapts them to fit into its theistic scheme. The conception of the deity, if deliberately attached in the third adhyāya to the older speculation of the cosmic purusa in the Mundaka Up. and other sources, is nevertheless a new departure in essence; the divine principle is the īśvara, the creator and destroyer

1 Known also to Bṛhaddevatā, iv, 40, as a prāṇa
of everything, in whom and through whom all being has its existence, and it is this īśvaravāda, which is criticized by Aśvaghoṣa at B., xviii, 20–29. The older teaching was a self-contained whole, with no room for a Creator, and the addition of the new principle inevitably brought about in due course the remodelling of the system and is thus, in my view, a leading factor in the evolution of Sāṁkhya in the next period. The first steps in this process are already apparent in the Śvet. Up. and the Bhagavadgītā. The fivefold ignorance is no longer the cause of union between the soul and the physical organism, but is merely an expression for the physical side of life, the Creator being the real cause of union, the sam-yogamuttathetu Indian thought did not entertain the idea of a Creator operating on matter outside himself, but considered the act of creation to be one of emission from the Creator. The eightfold prakṛti could not, therefore, subtend as an independent entity, and the first breach is made by identifying the avyakta with the supernatural power, the māyā, of the deity, so that it evidently did already, or must soon come to, connote much more than the unseen power of the act, containing, as it did, more than a hint of its possession of creative power. The Bhagavadgītā in its older part attempts to retain some relics of the original scheme by postulating an inferior eightfold prakṛti, no longer containing the avyakta and subordinate to it, in which the number is made up to eight by the inclusion of manas and which could still be said to be svabhāva (vii, 3) in a sense; but this solution failed to obtain general acceptance. The alternative was found in the reversion to a much older idea, adumbrated in ChU., vi, 2 and 3, that the Creator emits something, which in its turn generates something else and so on, and a transformation of the already recognized term vikāra was found to provide what was wanted. Each principle (tattva) was thus held to emanate from one of those superior to it, and so it may be reasonably held that the doctrine of tattvavākāra originated in the theistic school.
The theory of the *guna* now had to be reconsidered also in the light of the *avyakta*'s changed position. On the one hand, theism took the view that salvation consisted in the absorption of the individual soul in the divine, that is, that salvation involved unconditional release from the physical principles. But if salvation meant merely the annihilation of *rajas* and *tamas* and the increase of *sattva*, this was not the case; therefore the soul must pass beyond the domain of *sattva* also to obtain release. Further, as the *avyakta* was now outgrowing the idea that it merely embodied the force of the act and as it was made up of the three *gunas*, the latter must come to stand in time for much more than the factors which determined the future rebirths of the individual. The steps of the process which culminated in the *guna* theory of the *SK* are not clear, and a number of different motives may have come into action, such as the question of the relation between a thing and its attributes.

While theism thus, in taking over Śāmkhya thought, found its original formulation unsuitable, it may well be that the actual elaboration of the reconstructed scheme to suit new ideas was carried out in the atheistic schools. Among the developments to be attributed to this period comes the transfer of the general function of the eightfold *prakṛti* as subsumed under the principle of *svabhāva* to the *avyakta*, which received the name of *prakṛti*, and, parallel with this change, we must no doubt place the first steps taken in widening the significance of the *gunas* as seen in the theories of the later epic about their mutual interaction. The conception of a clear-cut distinction between the soul and the physical principles was accepted, and this involved abandonment first of the term *ātman*, whose associations connected it too intimately with the physical organism as well as with the theory of the *brahman*, and then of the term *ksetrajña*, in favour of the unitary principle of the *purusa*, which had always been dissociated in thought from the mental as well as the material activities of the individual. With the general recognition of this term
Sāmkhya finally arrives at the doctrine of an individual soul as a separate entity, though the evidence of the Manimēkalai suggests that the change at first was no more than the substitution of the cosmic puruṣa for ātman as the world-soul, the belief in a plurality of souls should therefore thus be held to have arisen in this epoch. The question of what was meant by the soul’s power of enjoyment necessarily came now into the foreground; if the soul had no real connection with the physical principles, it was difficult to find a means by which it could accept the experiences presented to it by them. To judge from the frequent quotation of Pañcaśikha in the bhāṣya on the YS., it was that school which, probably for the purposes of yoga, investigated the relations between the puruṣa and the buddhi and laid down the main lines along which the problem was solved in the classical schools. The Yoga school seems also, though probably at a fairly late date, to have invented the guṇaparināma theory, by which the guṇas were stripped of much of their moral significance and held to be the agents which brought about the multifariousness of the universe.

The main positions of classical Sāmkhya were by now established, and there is no evidence to show how or by whom the remaining changes were carried out. The evolution of the guṇas into cosmic forces was completed by divesting them of the function of determining the individual’s rebirth, which was handed over to the buddhi with the invention of a new category, the eight bhāvas of that principle. The twenty-four physical principles took their final form with the substitution, possibly under Vaiśeṣika influence, of the tanmātras and the gross elements for the great elements and the objects of the senses, and the possibility of any reality existing outside the scheme was excluded by dropping the already attenuated belief in a jīva or bhūtātman as an animating principle of the corporeal being and by bringing its substitute, the fivefold prāṇa, into line as a vṛtti of the buddhi. By the rejection of the jīva those portions of the individual which accompany
him from birth to birth were deprived of any substratum on which to rest, a deficiency which was made good by holding them to be attached to the soul in the shape of a subtle body, which was given corporeal substance by the addition of the tanmātras to the mental and sensory principles, alone supposed previously to transmigrate. Further in regard to the problem of causation, which was already partially covered by the theories of tattvavikāra and guṇaparināma, the view of the Vārṣagāṇya school that only the existent comes into being received its logical extension with the discovery of the principle of satkārya, one step towards which is perhaps to be found in the dialectics of Aśvaghosa, and which was to become the central point of the philosophy of the classical school. None of these changes need have been the invention of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, but the evidence of the YS. suggests the possibility that he did contribute one novelty in the theory that prakṛti comes into action to effect the purpose of the puruṣa, thereby finally doing away with the older explanation that avidyā was the cause of the implication of the soul in the universe. Therewith Śāmkhya attains its full growth and was to become incapable of substantial change or modification in the future to meet new ideas or conditions, and the historical development of the early school reaches its culminating point.
INDEX

akuśalamūla, 36-7
akṣara, 72-7
Anga, 24
ajñā, 55, 84
ajñāna, 79
Anāhyā, 39
Athravaveda, 22, 39, 73
adṛṣṭa, 40
adharma, 34
aññāvara, 72
Anugāti, 4-6, 27, 34
Anuyogadvāra, 11
antakarana, 59
antahpurusa, 48
aparā prakṛtu, 28, 70, 75
apavarga, 36
apūrva, 40
Abhudhamma, 14, 36
Abhudharma, 9, 14, 30, 36
Abhudharmakośa, 14, 64
avidyā, 34, 74, 76-9, 83, 84, 88
avyaktā, 6, 20, 21, 25-41, 45, 51, 53, 58, 70-7, 81-6
Āśoka, 8
Āśvaghoṣa, 3, 6, 7-10, 15, 32, 35-7, 38, 46, 49, 51, 53-5, 67, 70, 71, 78, 79, 85
āsu, 47, 56
asmitā, 60
ashankāra, 17, 20, 21, 28, 29, 45, 47, 49, 58-9, 60, 68, 70, 76, 81-4
Aññudhyāsmyāhhitā, 72, 76
Āṅgusāra, 24
ātman, 3, 24, 29, 44, 46-9, 51-65, 73-75, 78, 81, 84, 86-7
ātmanentakas, 54
ānijnya, 38
ānukāvika, 76
Āryamāyurvedimūlakalpa, 7
Ālayavijñāna, 33
āśava, 39
āśraya, 39
icchā, 79
indriyabhāvanā, 9
indriyasamhara, 9
īśvara, 16, 45, 47, 68, 69, 70, 72, 74, 84
īśvarakṛṣṇa, 1, 11, 29, 32, 43, 66, 68, 69, 71, 98
upayoga, 14
Ṛgveda, 43, 47, 56
Aitarṣeya Upaniṣad, 20
uṣāvṛya, 73
Katha Upaniṣad, 3, 20, 25, 30, 46-7, 50, 52-3, 58, 60, 73, 81, 84
Kathāvatthu, 64
Kanva, 8
Kamalaśila, 31
karma, 22, 34-41, 45, 71, 75, 79
karmāśaya, 34, 79, 80
Kalpanāmaṇḍhitā, 15
kasāya, 76
kāma, 34, 37, 80
kāmagnipa, 30
kāla, 29, 76
Kāṣyapa, 24
Kundakunda, 14
Kumāralāta, 15
Kullīka, 60
kuśalamūla, 37
kuṭṭastha, 75
kṛtya, 76
Krṣṇa, 28, 45, 74-5
Kauśika, 24
Kauśitakī Upaniṣad, 19, 57, 78, 80, 81
krīyā, 76
krodha, 34, 37, 80
kleśa, 34, 78, 79
kṣara, 46, 72-7, 78
kṣīnaśraya, 39
kṣetra, 45
kṣetrajña, 44-7, 51-62, 78, 84, 88
khyāti, 76
gūpa, 6, 14, 16, 29-41, 45, 51, 53, 67, 69, 70, 71, 76, 78, 82-7
gunāpamāna, 25, 33, 68-9, 71, 87
Gotama, 36
gotra, 37
Gaudapāda, 11, 59, 68
Gaudapādakārikā, 69
cakṣus, 18
Carakasamhitā, 7, 10, 32, 35, 46, 49, 51, 54, 55, 78, 79
cuta, 29
INDEX

cēta, 51, 55, 56
ceṭā, 55
caitanya, 56
Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 19, 31, 47, 52, 57, 58, 81, 85
Janaka, 8
jāntu, 46
Jayamāṅgalā, 12
jīva, 28, 31, 44–50, 51, 52, 58–61, 63, 74, 81, 84, 87
Jaṅgīṣṭhāva, 8–9
juśa, 55, 84
jūnas, 55, 76
Jñānaprāthārāṇa, 14
tattvavākṣyā, 25, 83, 85, 88
Tattvasaṅgraha, 16, 31, 54, 64
Tattvasamāsa, 8, 25, 76
tanmātra, vi, 11, 13, 48, 50, 76, 87, 88
tamas, 30–9, 48, 53, 78, 83, 86
tṛṣṇā, 79
Tattvārtha Upaniṣad, 20
dūṣa, 29
duhkhā, 32
dṛṣṭa, 23
dṛṣṭi, 76
dehin, 47, 60, 74
dosa, 36
dravya, 29
dveṣa, 38–7, 39, 79, 80
dharma, 17, 33, 34, 76
Dharmakāra, 31–2
Nandī, 11
Nāgarjuna, 8, 15, 66, 67
nāma, 22, 41
nāmarūpa, 22
nāsaṅkhyā prakṛta, 19
nāstika, 45
Nikāya, 14
nyāya, 76
nrāśraya, 44
nirāśraya, 64
nairāśraya, 69
Pāñcarātra, 17, 45, 76
Pāñcarātrāhāsaḥprajñāpāramītā, 23
Pāñcasikha, 2, 9, 45, 51, 67, 79, 87
Patañjali, 9
paramāṇu, 14
paramāṇa, 55, 74
Paramārtha, 2, 11, 68
parā prakṛti, 28, 45, 75
Pārāśara, 8–9
paramāṇa, 14, 33, 72
paripāvītta, 33
pāpa, 34
Pārāśāri, 9
Pārāśarya, 9
punya, 34
pudgala, 64
Pudgalavāda, 64
puruṣa, 3, 11, 16, 43, 44, 46–7, 51–63, 68, 73–5, 76, 81, 84, 86–8
puruṣārtha, 11, 34
prakṛtīlaya, 26, 82
Prayāti, 17, 49
prayāša, 19
prayāḥśman, 57
pravīhana, 26, 28, 68, 69, 74
pramāṇa, 76
Pravacanasūtra, 14
Praśastapāda, 40
Praśna Upaniṣad, 3, 20, 47, 73, 74
prāṇa, 12, 19, 44, 46, 56, 58, 59, 60, 76, 84, 87
prāṇādhipa, 47, 58
Buddha, 14, 21–4, 36, 62–5
Buddhacarita, 7–10, 35, 54–5, 70, 72, 79
Buddhapāka, 7
buddhi, 11, 20, 21, 28, 29, 32, 34, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, 55, 46, 59, 60, 68, 70, 72, 76, 79, 82–4, 87
buddhistsva, 50
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 19, 22, 23, 41, 52, 55, 58, 72
Bṛhaddevatā, 84
brahmacakṣa, 31, 76
brahman (n.), 24, 40, 57, 73, 74, 75, 76, 84, 89
Brahma, 17
bhakti, 3, 75
Bhagavadgītā, 3, 4, 6–7, 25, 32, 45, 53, 66, 74–5, 85
Bhāgavatapurāṇa, 25
bhāva, 31–2, 70, 79, 83, 87
bhūta, 48, 78
bhūtacintaka, 67
bhūtāśmann, 44, 46, 48–51, 59, 60, 76, 84, 87
bhojtr, 60, 84
bhoga, 76
Manumākalā, 11, 87
meta, 23
manas, 18, 20, 23, 28, 29, 46, 47, 56, 59, 85
INDEX

Manu, 11, 15, 46, 48, 50
Manubhraspatasamhâda, 27
mahat, 49, 50, 58
mahân ātmâ, 20, 47, 49, 50, 52, 55, 56, 62, 83
mahâbhûta, vi, 20, 48, 82
Mahâyâna, 15, 17, 23, 37, 38
Mâtharavrûti, 11, 54, 59, 68
mâtrâ, 76
Mâdhyamika, 14
mâya, 27, 29, 40, 45, 74, 85
Mithilâ, 24
Mîmâmsâka, 40
Munâsaka Upaniṣad, 3, 52, 58, 73, 84
Maitri Upaniṣad, 4, 26, 27, 33, 44, 46, 58–9, 62
moksa, 76
Mokṣadharma, 4–6, 27, 34, 53, 55, 84
moha, 32, 34, 36, 39, 79, 80

Yajñavalkya, 19, 72
yoga, 3, 8, 18, 25, 26, 56, 82, 87
Yogasûtra, 4, 11, 16, 26, 30, 32, 34, 50–1, 60, 69, 78, 80, 87, 88

rajas, 29–39, 48, 53, 78, 83, 86
râga, 36–7, 39, 80
rûpa, 21, 22, 41

linga, 43–4, 48, 78
lingâsarasâ, 50
lobha, 34, 36, 80

Vasisthâkarâlajaanakasamhâda, 6
Vasubandhu, 10, 14, 66
vâc, 18, 19
Vâcaspati Miśra, 2, 8, 9, 11, 51, 58, 69, 78
Vâtsiputriya, 64
Vârṣaganyâ, 2, 8–10, 34, 66, 67, 71, 76, 82, 88
Vârṣeyâdhyâtmanakathana, 27
Vâgdeva, 45, 49
vikâra, 26, 27, 29, 30, 51, 66, 70, 83, 84, 85

vyûti, 26
vijñâna, 23
vijñâna, 19, 20, 23, 56, 57, 82
Vijñânakâya, 64
Vijñânavâdin, 15, 33
vidyâ, 77
vipaka, 37
vipratyasaya, 79
Vibhâgâ, 9

vrtta, 76
Vrydda Parâsara, 8
vedânâ, 21, 32, 46
Vaibhâgika, 37
vârâga, 76
Vâsasâka, 10, 15, 29, 40, 51, 55, 87
vyakta, 51, 70
vyavasâya, 56
vyûha, 17

sakti, 76
Satapathabrâhma, 18, 22, 48
sarîrîn, 47
Sàntirâkṣa, 16
âlã, 9, 76
Sukânuprâna, 27
âruta, 23
ârotra, 18
Svetâvatara Upaniṣad, 3, 25, 27, 31, 47, 53, 58, 60, 65, 67, 72, 73–4, 82, 84–5

sadvîmâ, 8
Saṃsitântara, 10, 11, 72, 76
samyoga, 78, 83
samâkâra, 21
Samkara, 45
samâjñâ, 21, 55
satkârya, 25, 66–7, 71, 88
sattã, 50, 51
sattva, 26–39, 50–1, 60, 78, 83, 86
satvâstha, 35, 83
sadbhâva, 77
samâtana, 17, 33
Samayasâra, 14
Sammiti, 64
sarvârâga, 54, 75
Sarvâstivâdin, 14, 31, 33, 64
Sâmkhyakârikâ, 1, 2, 11, 16, 26, 29, 32, 35, 52, 54, 59, 68–71, 76, 79, 86
Sâmkhyatattvavakumudî, 11
siddhi, 76
sukha, 32
Subhadra, 35
Suârûta, 10
Sautrântika, 33
skandha, 17, 21, 22, 63–5
skamka, 73
svabhâva, 67–72, 75, 77, 83–6
Svabhâvavâdin, 67

harsha, 60, 74
Hînayâna, 9, 13–15, 36, 78
lrdaya, 19
hetu, 37, 70