VII.

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HINDUS.

PART I.¹

[From the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. i. pp. 19–43.]

INTRODUCTION.

[227] The Hindus, as is well known, possess various ancient systems of philosophy, which they consider to be orthodox, as consistent with the theology and metaphysics of the Vedas; and have likewise preserved divers systems deemed heretical, as incompatible with the doctrines of their holy books.

The two Mīmāṃsās (for there are two schools of metaphysics under this title) are emphatically orthodox. The prior one (pūrva), which has Jaimini for its founder, teaches the art of reasoning, with the express view of aiding the interpretation of the Vedas. The latter (uttara), commonly called Vedānta, and attributed to Vyāsa, deduces from the text of the Indian scriptures a refined psychology, which goes to a denial of a material world.

The Nyāya, of which Gotama is the acknowledged author, furnishes a philosophical arrangement, with strict rules of reasoning, not unaptly compared to the dialectics of the Aristotelian school. Another course of philosophy connected with it bears the denomination of Vaiśeshika. Its reputed

¹ Read at a public meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, June 21, 1823.
author is Kaṇāda; who, like Democritus, maintained the
document of atoms.

[228] A different philosophical system, partly heterodox,
and partly conformable to the established Hindu creed, is the
Śāṅkhya: of which also, as of the preceding, there are two
schools; one usually known by that name; the other com-
monly termed Yoga. A succinct exposition of the Śāṅkhya
doctrines is the design of the present essay: they are selected
for that purpose, on account of the strong affinity which they
manifestly bear to the metaphysical opinions of the sects of
Jina and Buddha.

Though not strictly orthodox, both Śāṅkhyas and the
Vaiśeshika, as well as the Nyāya, are respected and studied
by very rigid adherents of the Vedas, who are taught, how-
ever, to reject so much as disagrees, and treasure up what is
consonant to their scriptures. "In Kaṇāda's doctrine, in the
"Śāṅkhya, and in the Yoga, that part which is inconsistent with
"the Vedas, is to be rejected by those who strictly adhere to
"revelation. In Jaimini's doctrine, and in Vyāsa's, there is
"nothing whatsoever at variance with scripture."1

Heretical treatises of philosophy are very numerous: among
which that of Chārvāka, which exhibits the doctrine of the
Jaina sect,2 is most conspicuous; and next to it, the Pāśupata.

To them, and to the orthodox systems before mentioned, it
is not intended here to advert, further than as they are noticed
by writers on the Śāṅkhya, citing opinions of other schools of
philosophy, in course of commenting on the text which they
are engaged in expounding. It is not my present purpose to
exhibit a contrasted view of the tenets of different philo-
sophical schools, but to present to this Society a summary of
the doctrine of a single sect; which will serve, however, to
elucidate that of several more.

1 Quotation in Vijñāna-Bhikshu's Kapila-bhāshya. [Hall's ed. p. 4.]
2 [The Chārvākas are rather materialists, see Sūtra-dārśana-saṅgraha, § 1.
Cf. p. [402] infra.]
[229] Of other philosophic sects, the received doctrines in detail may be best reserved for separate notice, in distinct essays to be hereafter submitted to the Society. I must be clearly understood, however, not to pledge myself definitively for that task.

I proceed without further preface to the immediate subject of the present essay.

A system of philosophy, in which precision of reckoning is observed in the enumeration of its principles, is denominated *Sāṅkhya*; a term which has been understood to signify numeral, agreeably to the usual acceptation of *sankhyā*, number; and hence its analogy to the Pythagorean philosophy has been presumed. But the name may be taken to imply, that its doctrine is founded in the exercise of judgment: for the word from which it is derived signifies reasoning or deliberation; and that interpretation of its import is countenanced by a passage of the *Bhārata*, where it is said of this sect of philosophers: "They exercise judgment (*sankhyā*), and "discuss nature and [other] twenty-four principles, and therefore are called *Sāṅkhya*.

The commentator who has furnished this quotation, expounds *sankhyā*, as here importing 'the discovery of soul by means of right discrimination.'

The reputed founder of this sect of metaphysical philosophy was Kapila; an ancient sage, concerning whose origin and adventures the mythological fables, which occupy the place of history with the Hindus, are recounted variously. In Gauḍapāda's commentary on the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, he is asserted to have been a son of Brahmā; being one of the seven great *Rishis*, or saints, named in *Purāṇas* or theogonies as the

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1 [Sir W. Jones's *Disc. on the Philosophy of the Asiaticks*, *Works*, iii. 236 (8vo. ed.).]
2 *Am. Kesh. 1*, 1, 4, 11.  
3 [Mahābh. xii. 11409–10.]
4 Kapila-bhāṣya [pr. ed. p. 8. For other explanations of the term see Hall's Preface to the *Sāṅkhya-sūtra*, p. 3.]
5 [Wilson's ed., p. 1.]

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offspring of that deity. His two most [230] distinguished disciples, Asuri and Panchaśikha, are there exalted to the same rank and divine origin with himself. Another commentator maintains that Kapila was an incarnation of Vishnu. It had been affirmed by a writer on the Vedanta, upon the authority of a passage quoted by him, wherein Kapila, the founder of the Sānkhya sect, is identified with Agni (fire), that he was an incarnation, not of Vishnu, but of Agni. The commentator is not content with the fiery origin conceded to the author. He denies the existence of more than one Kapila; and insists, that the founder of this sect was an incarnation of Vishnu, born as the son of Devahuti.

In fact, the word kapila, besides its ordinary signification of tawny colour, bears likewise that of fire; and upon this ambiguity of sense many legends in the Indian theogonies, concerning the saint of the name, have been grounded; a sample of which will be found quoted by Col. Wilford, in the Asiatic Researches.

A passage which is cited in the commentaries of Gaudapada and Vāchaspati on the Kārikā, assigns to Kapila intuitive knowledge and innate virtue, with transcendent power and other perfections born with him at the earliest creation: and this is taken by those scholiasts as relating to the founder of the Sānkhya sect. But another commentator of the Kārikā, Rāmakrishna, who belongs to the theistical branch of this sect, affirms that the passage in question concerns Iśwara, or God, acknowledged by that school.

1 [Not the ordinary seven 'mind-born Rishis,' but another group composed of Sanaka, Sananda (or Sanandana), Sanatana, Asuri, Kapila, Vodhu, and Panchaśikha. Cf. supra, p. 162. Sanandana is quoted Sūt. vi. 69.]
2 [I have here and elsewhere corrected Asuri to A'suri.]
3 [Panchaśikha is called the disciple of A'suri, Mahābh. xii. 7890, Sānkhya K. 70. But cf. Hall, Sānkhya-sāra, pref. p. 22.]
5 Vol. iii. p. 355.
6 [He is said to have been born “dharma-jnana-vairgyaiśvarya-sampannah,” cf. Gaudapada and Vāchaspati (Kār. 43); both probably refer to the mention of the rishi Kapila in the Śvetāsvatara Upanishad, v. 2.]
A text quoted in Vyāsa's commentary on Patanjali's Yoga-sāstra, and referred by the annotator Vāchaspadi, as well as a modern scholiast of the Yoga-sāstra, Nāgoji, to Pancha-[231] śikha the disciple of Āsuri, describes Kapila as an incarnation of the Deity: "The holy and first wise one, entering a mind by himself framed, and becoming the mighty sage (Kapila), compassionately revealed this science to Āsuri."  

It may be questioned whether Kapila be not altogether a mythological personage, to whom the true author of the doctrine, whoever he was, thought fit to ascribe it.

A collection of sūtras, or succinct aphorisms, in six lectures, attributed to Kapila himself, is extant under the title of Sānkhya-pravachana. As an ancient work (whoever may have been really its author), it must doubtless have been expounded by early scholiasts. But the only commentary, which can at present be referred to by name is the Kapila-bhāshya; or, as the author himself cites it in his other works, Sānkhya-bhāshya. The title at full length, in the epigraph of the book, is Kapila-sānkhya-pravachana-sāstra-bhāshya. It is by Vijnāna-bhikshu, a mendicant ascetic (as his designation imports), who composed a separate treatise on the attainment of beatitude in this life, entitled Sānkhya-sāra, and wrote many other works; particularly the Yoga-vārttika, consisting of scholia on Patanjali's Yoga-sāstra, and the Brahma-mitmānsā-bhāshya, which is a commentary on a treatise of Vedānti philosophy.

It appears from the preface of the Kapila-bhāshya, that a more compendious tract, in the same form of sūtras or

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1 Patanj. Sāṅkh.-prav. 1, 25.
2 Panch.-sūtra, quoted in Vyāsa's bhāshya.
3 [Translated by Ballantyne, with extracts from the Commentaries, Benares, 1802–1866, and again Calcutta, 1865.]
4 [There is also a commentary by Aniruddha, who probably preceded Vijnāna-bhikshu, as the latter seems to refer to him.]
5 [Edited by Dr. Hall, Calcutta, 1866. A previous edition had appeared at Serampore in 1821; and a new edition has been lately published in Calcutta.]
6 [Edited by Dr. Hall, Calcutta, 1862. It gives a sketch of the whole system.]
aphorisms, bears the title of *Tattva-samāsa*, and is ascribed to the same author, Kapila. The scholiast intimates that both are of equal authority, and in no respect discordant; one being a summary of the greater work, or else this an amplification of the conciser one. The latter was probably [232] the case; for there is much repetition in the *Sānkhya-pravachana*.

It is avowedly not the earliest treatise on this branch of philosophy: since it contains references to former authorities for particulars which are but briefly hinted in the *sūtras*; and it quotes some by name, and among them Panchaśikha, the disciple of the reputed author’s pupil: an anachronism which appears decisive.

The title of *Sānkhya-pravachana* seems a borrowed one; at least it is common to several compositions. It appertains to Patanjali’s *Yoga-bāstra*.

If the authority of the scholiast of Kapila may be trusted, the *Tattva-samāsa* is the proper text of the *Sānkhya*; and its doctrine is more fully, but separately set forth, by the two ampler treatises, entitled *Sānkhya-pravachana*, which contain a fuller exposition of what had been there succinctly delivered; Patanjali’s work supplying the deficiency of Kapila’s, and declaring the existence of God, which for argument’s sake, and not absolutely and unreservedly, he had denied.

Of the six lectures or chapters into which the *sūtras* are distributed, the three first comprise an exposition of the whole *Sānkhya* doctrine. The fourth contains illustrative comparisons, with reference to fables and tales. The fifth is controversial, confuting opinions of other sects; which is the case also with part of the first. The sixth and last treats of the most important parts of the doctrine, enlarging upon topics before touched.

1 Kop. 3, 39 [38, pr. ed.].
2 Kop. 6 [vi. 68. There is a second reference in v. 32].
3 [S’ānkhya Pr. Bhāshya, pp. 7, 110.]
The Kārikā, which will be forthwith mentioned as the text book or standard authority of the Sānkhya, has an allusion to the contents of the fourth and fifth chapters, professing to be a complete treatise of the science, exclusive [233] of illustrative tales and controversial disquisitions. The author must have had before him the same collection of sūtras, or one similarly arranged. His scholiast expressly refers to the numbers of the chapters.

Whether the Tattva-samāsa of Kapila be extant, or whether the sūtras of Panchaśikha be so, is not certain. The latter are frequently cited, and by modern authors on the Sānkhya: whence a presumption, that they may be yet forthcoming.

The best text of the Sānkhya is a short treatise in verse, which is denominated Kārikā, as memorial verses of other sciences likewise are. The acknowledged author is Iśwara-krishṇa, described in the concluding lines or epigraph of the work itself, as having received the doctrine, through a succession of intermediate instructors, from Panchaśikha, by whom it was first promulgated, and who was himself instructed by Āsuri, the disciple of Kapila.

This brief tract, containing seventy-two stanzas in āryā metre, has been expounded in numerous commentaries.

One of these is the work of Gauḍapāda, the celebrated scholiast of the Upanishads of the Vedas, and preceptor of Govinda, who was preceptor of Śankara-ācārya, author likewise of numerous treatises on divers branches of theological philosophy. It is entitled Sānkhya-bhāṣya.

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1 Kdr. 72.  2 Nārāyaṇa-tīrtha.
3 [The 22 or 25 articles of the Tattva-samāsa are given in Hall’s Pref. to the Sānkhya-sāra, p. 42. The Comm. on them, the Sānkhya-krama-dīpikā, was edited and translated by Ballantyne in 1860.]
4 [Dr. Hall has collected in his preface to the Sānkhya-sāra, pp. 22–25, all the passages which he could find quoted from Panchaśikha.]
5 [Edited and translated by Lassen, Bonn, 1832. Mr. Colebrooke’s translation is given at the end of this Essay.]
6 Kdr. 70 and 71.
7 [Edited and translated by Wilson, 1837.]
Another, denominated Sānkhya-chandrikā, is by Nārāyaṇa-
tīrtha, who seems from his designation to have been an
ascetic. He was author likewise of a gloss on the Yoga-
sūtra, as appears from his own references to it.

A third commentary, under the title of Sānkhya-tattva-
kaumudi, or more simply Tattva-kaumudi¹ (for so it is cited
by later commentators), is by Vāchaspanti-miśra, a native of
Tirhūt, author of similar works on various other [234] philo-
sophical systems. It appears from the multiplicity of its
copies, which are unusually frequent, to be the most approved
gloss on the text.

One more commentary, bearing the analogous but simpler
title of Sānkhya-kaumudi, is by Rāma-krishṇa-bhaṭṭāchārya,
a learned and not ancient writer of Bengal; who has for the
most part followed preceding commentators, borrowing fre-
quently from Nārāyaṇa-tīrtha, though taking the title of his
commentary from Vāchaspati’s.

The scholiasts of the Kārikā have, in more than one place,
noticed the text of the sūtras: thus formally admitting the
authority of the aphorisms. The excellence of the memorial
verses (Kārikā), with the gloss of Gauḍapāda and that of
Vāchaspanti-miśra, has been the occasion of both collections of
aphorisms (Tattva-samāsa and Sānkhya-pravachana) falling
into comparative neglect. They are superseded for a text
book of the sect by Iśwara-krishṇa’s clearer and more com-
pendious work. Both sūtras and kārikā may be considered to
be genuine and authoritative expositions of the doctrine; and
the more especially, as they do not, upon any material point,
appear to disagree.

The several works before mentioned are the principal works
in which the Sānkhya philosophy may be now studied. Others,² which are cited by scholiasts, may possibly be yet

¹ [Printed at Calcutta, Samvat 1905, and again a.d. 1871 with a gloss by
Tārānātha-tarkāvāchaspati.]
² [For a complete list of Sānkhya works see Hall’s Preface to the Sānkhya-
sūtra, pp. 39–50.]
forthcoming. But they are at least scarce, and no sufficient account of them can be given upon the strength of a few scattered quotations. Among them, however, may be named the Rājavārttika, to which reference is made, as to a work held in much estimation, and which appears to comprise annotations on the sūtras; and the Sangraha, which is cited for parallel passages explanatory of the text, being an abridged exposition of the same doctrines, in the form of a select compilation.

[235] Concerning the presumable antiquity of either Kapila’s aphorisms or I’swara-krishna’s memorial couplets, I shall here only remark, that notices of them, with quotations from both, do occur in philosophical treatises of other schools, whereby their authenticity is so far established.¹

Besides the Sānkhyā of Kapila and his followers, another system, bearing the same denomination, but more usually termed the Yoga-śāstra or Yoga-sūtra, as before remarked, is ascribed to a mythological being, Patanjali, the supposed author of the great grammatical commentary emphatically named the Mahābhāṣya; and likewise of a celebrated medical treatise termed Charaka² and other distinguished performances.

The collection of Yoga-sūtras, bearing the common title of Sānkhyā-pravachana, is distributed into four chapters or quarters (pāda): the first, on contemplation (samādhi); the second, on the means of its attainment; the third, on the

¹ [Dr. Hall states in his Preface to the Sānkhyā-śāstra, p. 8, that "the sūtras are nowhere cited by S’ankara-āchārya, by Vāchaspati-miśra, or by any other writer of considerable antiquity, or even in the Sarva-darśana-sangraha, which is dated so low as the fourteenth century," and he would assign to them a modern date. In p. 12 he gives a list of the curious similarities between the language of some of the sūtras and that of the Kārikā. I do not know the oldest reference to the sūtras; the earliest reference to the Kārikā which I have found is in S’ankara’s Comm. on the Vedānta Ś. i. 4, 11.]

² [An incarnation of the serpent S’esha is sometimes said to have been the author of Charaka, but I do not remember to have seen him identified with Patanjali. Patanjali, however, is mentioned as a medical writer. See Weber, Berlin Catalogue, No. 974.]
exercise of transcendent power (vibhūti); the fourth, on abstraction or spiritual insulation (kaiwalya).

An ancient commentary on this fanatical work is forthcoming, entitled Pātanjala-bhāshya. It is attributed to Vedavyāsa, the compiler of the Indian scriptures and founder of the Vedānti school of philosophy. Vāchaspati-miśra has furnished scholia on both text and gloss. This scholiast has been already noticed as an eminent interpreter of the Kārikā: and the same remark is here applicable, that the multiplicity of copies indicates the estimation in which his gloss is held above other scholia.

Another commentary is by Vijnāna-bhikshu before mentioned. He refers to it in his other works under the name of Yoga-vārttika. It probably is extant; for quotations from it occur in modern compilations.

A third commentary, denominated Rāja-mārtanda, is ascribed in its preface and epigraph to Rāṇa-ranga [236] malla, surnamed Bhoja-rāja or Bhoja-pati, sovereign of Dhārā, and therefore called Dhāreśwara. It was probably composed at his court, under his auspices; and his name has been affixed to it in compliment to him, as is no uncommon practice. It is a succinct and lucid exposition of the text.¹

An ampler commentary by a modern Mahārāṣṭriya Brāhman, named Nāgoji-bhaṭṭa Upādhyāya, bears the title of Patanjali-sūtra-eritti. It is very copious and very clear.²

The tenets of the two schools of the Sāṅkhya are on many, not to say most, points, that are treated in both, the same; differing however upon one, which is the most important of all: the proof of existence of supreme God.

The one school (Patañjali’s) recognizing God is therefore denominated theistical (Seśwara-sāṅkhya). The other (Kapila’s)

¹ [The Yoga-sūtras were partly translated by Ballantyne, with extracts from this Commentary. The translation has been completed in ‘The Panḍit.’]
² [For a fuller list of works on the Yoga see Hall’s Bibliographical Index, pp. 9-19.]
is atheistical (*Nir\text{\'}\text{\'}\text{i}\text{\'}a\text{-s\'\text{\'}\text{\'}\text{\'}\text{\'}k\text{\'}y\text{\'}a*) as the sects of Jina and Buddha in effect are, acknowledging no creator of the universe nor supreme ruling providence. The gods of Kapila are beings superior to man; but, like him, subject to change and transmigration.

A third school, denominated *Paur\text{\'}\text{\'}n\text{\'}ika-s\'\text{\'}\text{\'}k\text{\'}y\text{\'}a*, considers nature as an illusion; conforming upon most other points to the doctrine of Patanjali, and upon many to that of Kapila. In several of the *Pur\text{\'}\text{\'}nas*, as the *Matsya, K\text{\'}urma* and *Vish\text{\'}nu*, in particular, the cosmogony, which is an essential part of an Indian theogony, is delivered consonantly to this system. That which is found at the beginning of Manu's institutes of law is not irreconcilable to it.\textsuperscript{1}

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**Doctrine of the S\'\text{\'}\text{\'}k\text{\'}hy\text{\'}a.**

[237] The professed design of all the schools of the *S\'\text{\'}\text{\'}k\text{\'}hy\text{\'}a*, theistical, atheistical, and mythological, as of other Indian systems of philosophy, is to teach the means by which eternal beatitude may be attained after death, if not before it.

In a passage of the *Vedas* it is said, "Soul is to be known, "it is to be discriminated from nature: thus it does not come “again; it does not come again."\textsuperscript{2} Consonantly to this and to numberless other passages of a like import, the whole scope of the *Ved\text{\'}\text{\'}nta* is to teach a doctrine, by the knowledge of which an exemption from metempsychosis shall be attainable; and to inculcate that as the grand object to be sought, by means indicated.

Even in the aphorisms of the *Ny\text{\'}\text{\'}ya*\textsuperscript{3} the same is proposed as the reward of a thorough acquaintance with that philosophical arrangement.

\textsuperscript{1} Manu, 1. 14—19.
\textsuperscript{2} Gau\text{\'} on K\text{\'}dr. [Rather Comm. on Tatt\text{\'}\text{\'}w\text{\'}a-kaun. 2.]
\textsuperscript{3} Got.-s\text{\'}\text{\'}tr. [i. 1.]
In like manner the Grecian philosophers, and Pythagoras and Plato in particular, taught that "the end of philosophy is to free the mind from incumbrances which hinder its progress towards perfection, and to raise it to the contemplation of immutable truth," and "to disengage it from all animal passions, that it may rise above sensible objects to the contemplation of the world of intelligence."  

In all systems of the Sāṅkhya the same purpose is propounded. "Future pain," says Patanjali, "is to be prevented. 'A clear knowledge of discriminate truth is the way of its prevention.'"

It is true knowledge, as Kapila and his followers insist, that alone can secure entire and permanent deliverance from [238] evil: whereas temporal means, whether for exciting pleasure or for relieving mental and bodily sufferance, are insufficient to that end; and the spiritual resources of practical religion are imperfect, since sacrifice, the most efficacious of observances, is attended with the slaughter of animals, and consequently is not innocent and pure; and the heavenly meed of pious acts is transitory.

In support of these positions, passages are cited from the Vedas declaring in express terms the attainment of celestial bliss by celebration of sacrifices: "Whoever performs an āsnoamedha (or immolation of a horse) conquers all worlds; "overcomes death; expiates sin; atones for sacrilege." In another place, Indra and the rest of the subordinate deities are introduced exulting on their acquisition of bliss. "We have "drunk the juice of asclepias, and are become immortal; we "have attained effulgence; we have learned divine truths. How "can a foe harm us? How can age affect the immortality of

1 Enfield's Hist. of Phil., i. 382 and 233.
2 Pat. 2. 16. and 26.
3 Kap. 1. 1. Kār. 1.
4 Kār. 1.
5 [Cf. Tuuttiriya Sankh. v. 3, 12. 2.]
6 Soma, the moon-plant: Asclepias acida.
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“a deathless being?"¹ Yet it appears in divers parts of the Indian scriptures, that, according to Hindu theology, even those deities, though termed immortal, have but a definite duration of life, perishing with the whole world at its periodical dissolution. "Many thousands of Indras and of other gods have passed away in successive periods, overcome by time; for time is hard to overcome."² Complete and perpetual exemption from every sort of ill is the beatitude which is proposed for attainment by acquisition of perfect knowledge. "Absolute prevention of all three sorts of pain," as an aphorism of the Sánkhya intimates, "is the highest purpose of soul."³ Those three sorts are evil proceeding from self, from external beings, or from divine causes: the first is either bodily, as disease of various kinds; or mental, as cupidity, anger, and other passions: the two remaining sorts arise from external sources; one excited by some mundane being; the other, by the agency of a being of a superior order, or produced by a fortuitous cause.

True and perfect knowledge, by which deliverance from evil of every kind is attainable, consists in rightly discriminating the principles, perceptible and imperceptible, of the material world, from the sensitive and cognitive principle which is the immaterial soul. Thus the Káriká premises, that "the inquiry concerns means of precluding the three sorts of pain; for pain is embarrassment. Nor is the inquiry superfluous, because obvious means of alleviation exist; for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished. The revealed mode is, like the temporal one, ineffectual: for it is impure; and it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others. A method, different from both, is preferable; consisting in a "discriminative knowledge of perceptible principles, and of the imperceptible one, and of the thinking soul."⁴

¹ Gaud. on Kdr. 2. [Bīg. V. viii. 48. 3;—āmrīta is properly an epithet, "O immortal one! sc. Soma."] ² Ibid. ³ Śān.-prav. 1. 1. ⁴ Kdr. 1 and 2 with Scholia. [Nature is imperceptible, but the principles 2–24 are perceptible to higher beings, if not to man.]
The revealed mode, to which allusion is here made, is not theological doctrine with the knowledge of first principles, insuring exemption from transmigration; but performance of religious ceremonies enjoined in the practical Vedas, and especially the immolation of victims, for which a heavenly reward, a place among the Gods, is promised.

It is not pure, observes the scholiast, for it is attended with the slaughter of animals, which if not sinful in such cases, is, to say the least, not harmless. The merit of it, therefore, is of a mixed nature. A particular precept expresses, "slay "the consecrated victim:" but a general maxim ordains, "hurt no sentient being." It is defective, since even the Gods, Indra and the rest, perish at the [240] appointed period. It is in other respects excessive, since the felicity of one is a source of unhappiness to another.

Visible and temporal means, to which likewise reference is made in the text, are medicine and other remedies for bodily ailment; diversion alleviating mental ills; a guard against external injury; charms for defence from accidents. Such expedients do not utterly preclude sufferance. But true knowledge, say Indian philosophers, does so; and they undertake to teach the means of its attainment.

By three kinds of evidence, exclusive of intuition, which belongs to beings of a superior order, demonstration is arrived at, and certainty is attained, by mankind: namely, perception, inference, and affirmation. All authorities among the Sánkhyaś (Patanjali and Kapila, as well as their respective followers) concur in asserting these. Other sources of knowledge, admitted in different systems of philosophy, are reducible to these three. Comparison, or analogy, which the logicians of Gotama's school add to that enumeration, and tradition and other arguments, which Jaimini maintains (viz.

1 Kdr. 4. Pat. 1, 7. Kap. 1 [87].
2 [For the six pramāṇas of Jaimini's school, cf. infra, pp. [303], [304]. Those named in the text are taken from an obscure and probably corrupt passage of Gauḍāpāda's Comm.]
capacity, aspect, and privation of four sorts, antecedent, reciprocal, absolute, and total), are all comprehended therein. Other philosophers, who recognize fewer sources of knowledge, as Chārvāka, who acknowledges perception only, and the Vaiśeshikas, who disallow tradition, are rejected as insufficient authorities.¹

Inference is of three sorts, equally admitted by the schools of the Sānkhya and Gotama's Nyāya, and in all distinguished by the same denominations. The consideration of them more properly belongs to the dialectic philosophy than to this, and may therefore be postponed. It will be here sufficient to state the simplest explanation furnished by scholiasts of the Kārikā and Sūtras, without going into the differences which occur in their expositions.

[241] One sort, then, is the inference of an effect from a cause; the second is that of a cause from an effect; the third is deduced from a relation other than that of cause and effect. Examples of them are,—1st. Rain anticipated from a cloud seen gathering. 2nd. Fire concluded on a hill, whence smoke ascends. 3rd. A flower's appropriate colour presumed where its peculiar scent is noticed; or motion of the moon's orb, deduced from observation of it in different aspects; or saltiness of the sea, concluded from that of a sample of sea-water; or bloom surmised on mangoe-trees in general, when an individual mangoe-tree is found in blossom.²

In regard to the third kind of evidence, tradition or right affirmation,³ explained as intending true revelation,⁴ commentators understand it to mean the Vedas or sacred writ, including the recollections of those gifted mortals, who remember passages of their former lives, and call to mind events which occurred to them in other worlds; and excluding, on the other hand, pretended revelations of impostors and barbarians.

¹ Comm. on Kdr. ⁵. [The various pramāṇas or sources of knowledge are also discussed in pp. [266], [304], [330], and [408.]
In a dialogue cited from the Vedas, one of the interlocutors, the holy Jaigishavya, asserts his presence, and consequent recollection of occurrences, through ten renovations of the universe (Mahásargga).¹

In a more extended sense, this third kind of evidence is the affirmation of any truth, and comprises every mode of oral information or verbal communication whence knowledge of a truth may be drawn.

From these three sources, by the right exercise of judgment and due application of reasoning, true knowledge is derived, consisting in a discriminative acquaintance with principles; which, in the Sánkhya system, are reckoned to be not less than twenty-five; viz.

[242] 1. Nature, Prakṛiti or Mūla-prakṛiti, the root or plastic origin of all: termed Pradhāna, the chief one: the universal, material cause; identified by the cosmogony of the Purāṇas (in several of which the Sánkhya philosophy is followed) with Māyā or illusion; and, by mythologists, with Brāhma, the power or energy of Brahma. It is eternal matter, undiscrète; undistinguishable, as destitute of parts; inferrible, from its effects: being productive, but no production.

2. Intelligence, called Buddha and Mahat or the great one: the first production of nature, increate, prolific; being itself productive of other principles. It is identified by the mythological Sánkhya with the Hindu triad of Gods. A very remarkable passage of the Matsya-purāṇa cited in the Sánkhya-sāra, after declaring that the great principle is produced "from modified nature," proceeds to affirm, "that the great "one becomes distinctly known as three Gods, through the "influence of the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and "darkness; 'being one person, and three Gods,' (ekā mūrtis "trayo devāḥ), namely, Brahma, Vishnu, and Mahēśwara.

¹ Vāchaspati-mitra quotes this from a dialogue between Kṛṣṇa (Kṛṣṇa?) and Jaigishavya.]
"In the aggregate it is the deity; but, distributive, it appertains to individual beings."

3. Consciousness, termed Āhankāra, or more properly egotism, which is the literal sense of the term. The peculiar and appropriate function of it is (abhimāna) selfish conviction; a belief that, in perception and meditation, "I am concerned; that the objects of sense concern me; in short, that I am. It proceeds from the intellectual principle, and is productive of those which follow.

4—8. Five subtile particles, rudiments, or atoms, denominated Tanmātra; perceptible to beings of a superior order, but unapprehended by the grosser senses of mankind: derived from the conscious principle, and themselves productive of the five grosser elements, earth, water, fire, air, and space.

[243] 9—19. Eleven organs of sense and action, which also are productions of the conscious principle. Ten are external: vīś. five of sense, and five of action. The eleventh is internal, an organ both of sense and of action, termed manas or mind. The five instruments of sensation are, the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin. The five instruments of action are, 1st, voice, or the organ of speech; 2nd, the hands; 3rd, the feet; 4th, the excretory termination of the intestines; 5th, the organ of generation. Mind, serving both for sense and action, is an organ by affinity, being cognate with the rest.

These eleven organs, with the two principles of intelligence and consciousness, are thirteen instruments of knowledge: three internal and ten external, likened to three warders and ten gates.¹

An external sense perceives; the internal one examines; consciousness makes the selfish application; and intellect resolves: an external organ executes.

20—24. Five elements, produced from the five elementary particles or rudiments. 1st. A diffused, etherial fluid (ākāśa),

¹ Kār. 32—35.
occupying space: it has the property of audibleness, being the vehicle of sound, derived from the sonorous rudiment or ethereal atom. 2nd. Air, which is endued with the properties of audibleness and tangibility, being sensible to hearing and touch; derived from the tangible rudiment or aerial atom. 3rd. Fire, which is invested with the properties of audibleness, tangibility, and colour; sensible to hearing, touch, and sight: derived from the colouring rudiment or igneous atom. 4th. Water, which possesses the properties of audibleness, tangibility, colour, and savour; being sensible to hearing, touch, sight, and taste: derived from the savoury rudiment or aqueous atom. 5th. Earth, which unites the [244] properties of audibleness, tangibility, colour, savour, and odour; being sensible to hearing, touch, sight, taste, and smell: derived from the odorous rudiment or terrene atom.

25. Soul, termed Purusha, Pumas, or Atman; which is neither produced nor productive. It is multitudinous, individual, sensitive, eternal, unalterable, immaterial.

The theistical Sánkhyā recognizes the same principles; understanding, however, by Purusha, not individual soul alone, but likewise God (Īśwara), the ruler of the world.

These twenty-five principles are summarily contrasted in the Kārikā. "Nature, root of all, is no production. Seven "principles, the great or intellectual one, etc., are productions "and productive. Sixteen are productions (unproductive). "Soul is neither a production nor productive."²

To this passage a close resemblance will be remarked in one which occurs at the beginning of Erigena's treatise De Divisione Nature, where he distinguishes these four: "That which "creates and is not created; that which is created and creates; "that which is created and creates not; and that which neither "creates nor is created."³

In several of the Upanishads of the Vedas a similar distri-

1 [Pums ?]  ² Kār. 3.  ³ J. Scoti Erigenae de div. nat. lib. 5.
bution is affirmed, *viz.* "eight productive principles and sixteen "productions." ¹

It is for contemplation of nature, and for abstraction from it, that union of soul with nature takes place, as the halt and the blind join for conveyance and for guidance (one bearing and directed; the other borne and directing).³ By that union of soul and nature, creation, consisting in the development of intellect and the rest of the principles, is effected.³

The soul's wish is fruition or liberation. For either pur-[245] pose, it is in the first place invested with a subtile person, towards the formation of which the evolution of principles proceeds no further than the elementary rudiments.⁴ This is composed then of intellect, consciousness, and mind, as well as the rest of the organs and instruments of life, conjoined with particles, or elementary rudiments, of five sorts: thus seventeen principles enter into its composition.⁵

This person or subtile frame, termed *linga, linga-sarira*, or *śūkṣma-sarīra*, is primeval, produced from original nature at the earliest or initial development of principles.⁶ It is unconfined; too subtile for restraint or hindrance (and thence termed *ātivāhika*, surpassing the wind in swiftness); incapable of enjoyment until it be invested with a grosser body, affected nevertheless by sentiments.

¹ Garbha, Praśna, and Maitreya Upanishads. [The S'wethswatara Upanishad is the most direct attempt to reconcile the Sānkhya and the Vedānta.]
² ["Nature, as the object to be experienced, depends on Soul the experiencer, and Soul looks to liberation, as it seeks to throw off the three kinds of pain which, though really apart from it, have come to it by its falling under the shadow of intellect through not recognizing its own distinction therefrom" (Sarva-dari.-sang.). Bondage, etc., reside in the Intellect, and are only reflected in Soul through its proximity. See Sānkhya-prav-.bhūṣhya, i. 58.]
³ [It is this peculiar idea of individual creation which gives to the Sānkhya an apparent resemblance to Berkeley's theory. Every individual soul has been from all eternity in continual connection with Nature, and repeated creations have resulted from this connection. Each soul thus keeps on creating its own world. The material universe, however, has an existence other than that which it possesses from its connection with any particular soul, inasmuch as Hiranyagarbha, the personified sum of existence, may be said to sum up in his ideal creation the separate sub-creations of all inferior beings.]
⁴ Kūr. 40. ⁵ Kēp. 3. 9. ⁶ [It is of atomic size, Kēp. 3. 14.]

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This is termed the rudimental creation (tanmátra-sarga).

The notion of an animated atom seems to be a compromise between the refined dogma of an immaterial soul, and the difficulty which a gross understanding finds in grasping the comprehension of individual existence, unattached to matter.

The grosser body, with which a soul clad in its subtile person is invested for the purpose of fruition, is composed of the five elements; or of four, excluding the ethereal, according to some authorities; or of one, earth alone, according to others. That grosser body, propagated by generation, is perishable. The subtile person is more durable, transmigrating through successive bodies, which it assumes, as a mimic shifts his disguises to represent various characters.

According to Kapila, as he is interpreted by his scholiast, there is intermediately a corporeal frame composed of the five elements, but tenuous or refined. It is termed [246] anushthána-sára, and is the vehicle of the subtile person.

It is this, rather than the subtile person itself, which in Patanjali's Yoga-sástra is conceived to extend, like the flame of a lamp over its wick, to a small distance above the skull.

The corporeal creation (bhautika-sarga), consisting of souls invested with gross bodies, comprises eight orders of superior beings and five of inferior; which, together with man, who forms a class apart, constitute fourteen orders of beings, distributed in three worlds or classes.

The eight superior orders of beings bear appellations familiar to Hindu theology; Brahmá, Prajápatis, Indras, Pítris, Gandharvas, Yakshas, Rákshasas, and Piśáchas; gods or demi-gods, demons and evil spirits.

The inferior orders of beings are quadrupeds, distinguished in two orders; birds; reptiles, fishes, and insects; vegetables and unorganic substances.

1 Kap. 3. 17-19. 2 Kap. 3. 11, 12. [Cf. Wilson's Sámkhya K. p. 134.] 3 [Adhiśthána-sára? 4 [Domestic and wild animals.]
Above is the abode of goodness, peopled by beings of superior orders; virtue prevails there, and consequent bliss, imperfect however, inasmuch as it is transient. Beneath is the abode of darkness or illusion, where beings of an inferior order dwell; stolidity or dulness is there prevalent. Between is the human world, where foulness or passion predominates, attended with continual misery.

Throughout these worlds, sentient soul experiences ill arising from decay and death, until it be finally liberated from its union with person.

Besides the grosser corporeal creation and the subtile or personal, all belonging to the material world, the Sāṃkhya distinguishes an intellectual creation (pratyaya-sarga or bhāva-sarga), consisting of the affections of intellect, its sentiments or faculties, which are enumerated in four [247] classes, as obstructing, disabling, contenting, or perfecting the understanding, and amount to fifty.

Obstructions of the intellect are error, conceit, passion, hatred, fear: which are severally denominated obscurity, illusion, extreme illusion, gloom, and utter darkness. These again are subdivided into sixty-two sorts; error comprising eight species; illusion, as many; extreme illusion, ten; gloom, eighteen; and utter darkness, the same number.

Error, or obscurity, mistakes irrational nature, intellect, consciousness, or any one of the five elementary atoms, for the soul, and imagines liberation to consist in absorption into one of those eight prolific principles.

Conceit, termed illusion, imagines transcendent power, in any of its eight modes, to be deliverance from evil. Thus beings of a superior order, as Indra and the rest of the gods, who possess transcendent power of every sort, conceive it to be perpetual, and believe themselves immortal.

Passion, called extreme illusion, concerns the five objects of sense; sound, tact, colour, savour, and odour; reckoned to be twice as many, as different to man and to superior beings.
Envy or hatred, denominated gloom, relates to the same ten objects of sense, and to eight-fold transcendent power, furnishing the means of their enjoyment.

Fear, named utter darkness, regards the same eighteen subjects, and consists in the dread of ill attendant on their loss by death or by deprivation of power.

Disability of intellect, which constitutes the second class, comprising twenty-eight species, arises from defect or injury of organs, which are eleven: and to these eleven sorts are added the contraries of the two next classes, containing the one nine, and the other eight species, making a total of twenty-eight. Deafness, blindness, deprivation of taste, [248] want of smell, numbedness, dumbness, handlelessness, lameness, costiveness, impotence, and madness, are disabilities preventing performance of functions.

Content or acquiescence, which forms the third class, is either internal or external: the one four-fold, the other five-fold; viz. internal, 1st. Concerning nature; as, an opinion that a discriminative knowledge of nature is a modification of that principle itself, with a consequent expectation of deliverance by the act of nature. 2nd. Concerning the proximate cause; as a belief that ascetic observances suffice to ensure liberation. 3rd. Concerning time; as a fancy that deliverance will come in course, without study. 4th. Concerning luck; as a supposition that its attainment depends on destiny. External acquiescence relates to abstinence from enjoyment upon temporal motives: namely, 1st, aversion from the trouble of acquisition; or, 2nd, from that of preservation; and, 3rd, reluctance to incur loss consequent on use; or, 4th, evil attending on fruition; or, 5th, offence of hurting objects by the enjoyment of them.

The perfecting of the intellect is the fourth class, and comprises eight species. Perfection consists in the prevention of evil; and this being three-fold, its prevention is so likewise; as is the consequent perfection of the understanding. This is
direct. The remaining five species are indirect, *viz.* reasoning; oral instruction; study; amicable intercourse; and purity, internal and external (or according to another interpretation, liberality). They are means of arriving at perfection.

The *Sāṅkhya*, as other Indian systems of philosophy, is much engaged with the consideration of what is termed the three qualities (*guna*): if indeed quality be here the proper import of the term; for the scholiast of Kapila understands it as meaning, not quality or accident, but substance, [249] a modification of nature, fettering the soul; conformably with another acceptation of *guna*, signifying a cord.  

The first, and highest, is goodness (*sattva*). It is alleviating, enlightening, attended with pleasure and happiness; and virtue predominates in it. In fire it is prevalent; wherefore flame ascends, and sparks fly upwards. In man, when it abounds, as it does in beings of a superior order, it is the cause of virtue.

The second and middlemost is foulness or passion (*rajas* or *tejas*). It is active, urgent, and variable; attended with evil and misery. In air it predominates; wherefore wind moves transversely. In living beings it is the cause of vice.

The third and lowest is darkness (*tamas*). It is heavy and obstructive; attended with sorrow, dulness, and illusion. In earth and water it predominates, wherefore they fall or tend downwards. In living beings it is the cause of stolidity.

These three qualities are not mere accidents of nature, but are of its essence and enter into its composition.  

"We "speak of the qualities of nature as we do of the trees of "a forest," say the *Sāṅkhya*. In the *Vedas* they are pronounced to be successive modifications, one of the other: "All "was darkness: commanded to change, darkness took the

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1 Vijñān. on *Kap.* 1. 60. [Hall's ed. p. 45.]

2 [Nature is described as the equilibrium of the three *gunas*; production takes place as soon as any one predominates. *Sūt.* vi. 42.]

3 *Sāṅkhya-sūtra* [Hall's ed. p. 12].
"taint of foulness; and this, again commanded, assumed the
"form of goodness." ¹

They co-operate for a purpose, by union of opposites: as a
lamp, which is composed of oil, a wick, and flame;² substances
inimical and contrary.

Taking the three qualities by which nature is modified, for
principles or categories, the number, before enumerated, is
raised to twenty-eight; as is by some authorities maintained.³

[250] To the intellect appertain eight modes, effects, or
properties: four partaking of goodness; namely, virtue, know-
ledge, dispassion, and power; and four which are the reverse
of those, and partake of darkness, viz. sin, error, incontinency,
and powerlessness.

Virtue here intends moral or religious merit. Knowledge
is either exterior or interior; that is, temporal or spiritual.
Interior or spiritual knowledge discriminates soul from nature,
and operates its deliverance from evil. Exterior or temporal
knowledge comprehends holy writ, and every science but self-
knowledge.

Dispassion likewise is either exterior or interior; as proceed-
ing from a temporal motive, aversion from trouble: or a
spiritual impulse, the conviction that nature is a dream, a mere
juggle and illusion.

Power is eight-fold: consisting in the faculty of shrinking
into a minute form, to which every thing is pervious; or en-
larging to a gigantic body; or assuming levity (rising along a
sunbeam to the solar orb); or possessing unlimited reach of
organs (as touching the moon with the tip of a finger); or
irresistible will (for instance, sinking into the earth, as easily
as in water); dominion over all beings animate or inanimate;
faculty of changing the course of nature; ability to accomplish
every thing desired.

The notion, that such transcendent power is attainable by

¹ [Maitri Upanishad, v. 2.]
² Kār. 13.
³ Vijnāna-bhikshu in Sānkhya-sūtra and Kapila-bhāṣya.
man in this life, is not peculiar to the Sánkhya sect: it is generally prevalent among the Hindus, and amounts to a belief of magic. A Yogi, imagined to have acquired such faculties, is, to vulgar apprehension, a sorcerer, and is so represented in many a drama and popular tale.

One of the four chapters of Patanjali’s Yoga-bástra (the third), relates almost exclusively to this subject, from which it takes its title. It is full of directions for bodily and mental exercises, consisting of intensely profound me [251] citation on special topics, accompanied by suppression of breath and restraint of the senses, while steadily maintaining prescribed postures. By such exercises, the adept acquires the knowledge of every thing past and future, remote or hidden; he divines the thoughts of others; gains the strength of an elephant, the courage of a lion, and the swiftness of the wind; flies in the air, floats in water, dives into the earth, contemplates all worlds at one glance, and performs other strange feats.

But neither power, however transcendent, nor dispassion, nor virtue, however meritorious, suffices for the attainment of beatitude. It serves but to prepare the soul for that absorbed contemplation, by which the great purpose of deliverance is to be accomplished.

The promptest mode of attaining beatitude through absorbed contemplation, is devotion to God; consisting in repeated muttering of his mystical name, the syllable om, at the same time meditating its signification. It is this which constitutes efficacious devotion; whereby the deity, propitiated, confers on the votary the boon that is sought; precluding all impediments, and effecting the attainment of an inward sentiment that prepares the soul for liberation.

"God, Yóswara, the supreme ruler," according to Patanjali,¹ is a soul or spirit distinct from other souls; unaffected by the ills with which they are beset; unconcerned with good or bad deeds and their consequences, and with fancies or

¹ Yoga-bástra 1. 23—24 and 26—29.
"passing thoughts. In him is the utmost omniscience.¹ He is the instructor of the earliest beings that have a beginning (the deities of mythology); himself infinite, unlimited by time."

Kapila, on the other hand, denies an Iśwara, ruler of the world by volition: alleging that there is no proof of [252] God's existence, unperceived by the senses, not inferred from reasoning, nor yet revealed.² He acknowledges, indeed, a being issuing from nature, who is intelligence absolute; source of all individual intelligences, and origin of other existences successively evolved and developed. He expressly affirms, "that the truth of such an Iśwara is demonstrated:"³ the creator of worlds, in such sense of creation: for "the existence of effects," he says, "is dependent upon consciousness, not upon Iśwara;" and "all else is from the great principle, intellect."⁴ Yet that being is finite; having a beginning and an end; dating from the grand development of the universe, to terminate with the consummation of all things. But an infinite being, creator and guide of the universe by volition, Kapila positively disavows.⁵ "Detached from nature, un-" affectèd therefore by consciousness and the rest of nature's "trammels, he could have no inducement to creation; fettered " by nature, he could not be capable of creation. Guidance " requires proximity, as the iron is attracted by the magnet; " and, in like manner, it is by proximity that living souls " govern individual bodies, enlightened by animation as hot " iron is by heat."

Passages of admitted authority, in which God is named, relate, according to Kapila and his followers, either to a liber-

¹ [Rather, "in him the germ of the omniscient becomes infinite." The Yoga considers this to be the proof of a Supreme Being; we see that other properties capable of degrees reach their limit somewhere, as smallness in an atom and magnitude in the ether, so knowledge, which in other beings is less or more, must reach its extreme limit somewhere, i.e. in God. For the Nyāya proof of God's existence see Kusumānjali, v. 1.]
² Kāpi. 1. 92—99; 3. 56—57; 5. 2—12; and 6. 64—69.
³ Kāpi. 3. 57.
⁴ Kāpi. 6. 64 and 66.
⁵ Kāpi. 1. [94, 96, 97, 99.]
ated soul or to a mythological deity, or that superior not supreme being whom mythology places in the midst of the mundane egg.

Such is the essential and characteristic difference of Kapila's and Patanjali's, the atheistical and deistical, Sánkyyas.

In less momentous matters they differ, not upon points of doctrine, but in the degree in which the exterior exercises, or abstruse reasoning and study, are weighed upon, as requisite preparations of absorbed contemplation. Patanjali's Yoga-sástra is occupied with devotional exercise and mental abstraction, subduing body and mind: Kapila is more engaged with investigation of principles and reasoning upon them. One is more mystic and fanatical. The other makes a nearer approach to philosophical disquisition, however mistaken in its conclusions.

The manner in which a knowledge of those principles or categories that are recognized by the Sánkyyas may be acquired, is set forth in the Káriká: "Sensible objects become known by perception. It is by inference or reasoning, that acquaintance with things transcending the senses is attained: and a truth, which is neither to be directly perceived nor to be inferred by reasoning, is deduced from revelation. For various causes, things may be imperceptible or unperceived; distance, nearness, minuteness; confusion, concealment; predominance of other matters; defect of organs or inattention. It is owing to the subtlety of nature, not to the non-existence of this original principle, that it is not apprehended by the senses, but inferred from its effects. Intellect and the rest of the derivative principles are effects; whence it is concluded as their cause; in some respects analogous, but in others dissimilar."1

"Effect subsists antecedently to the operation of cause." 2

1 Kdr. 6. 8.
2 ["The Saugatas (or Buddhists) say that the existent is produced from the non-existent; the followers of the Nyáya that the (as yet) non-existent is produced from the existent; the Vedántins that the whole creation is an illusion from the existent,
a maxim not unlike that ancient one, that "nothing comes of "nothing;" for it is the material, not the efficient, cause, which is here spoken of.

The reasons alleged by the Sāṅkhyaṣ are, that "what exists "not, can by no operation of a cause be brought into existence:"
that is, effects are educts, rather than products. Oil is in the
seed of sesamum before it is ex[254]pressed; rice is in the
husk before it is peeled; milk is in the udder before it is drawn.
"Materials, too, are selected, which are apt for the purpose:"
milk, not water, is taken to make curds. "Every thing is not "by every means possible:" cloth, not earthen ware, may be
made with yarn. "What is capable, does that to which it is
"competent:" a potter does not weave cloth, but makes a jar,
from a lump of clay, with a wheel and other implements.
"The nature of cause and effect is the same:" a piece of cloth
does not essentially differ from the yarn of which it is wove;
as an ox does from a horse: barley, not rice or peas, grows out
of barley-corns.

"There is a general cause, which is undistinguishable." This
position is supported by divers arguments. "Specific "objects are finite;" they are multitudinous and not universal:
there must then be a single all-pervading cause. Another
argument is drawn from affinity: "homogeneousness indicates "a cause." An earthen jar implies a lump of clay of which
it is made; a golden coronet presumes a mass of gold of which
it was fabricated: seeing a rigidly abstemious novice, it is
readily concluded, says the scholiast, that his parents are of
the sacerdotal tribe. There must then be a cause bearing
affinity to effects which are seen. Another reason is "existence
"of effects through energy:" there must be a cause adequate
to the effects. A potter is capable of fabricating pottery: he
makes a pot, not a car, nor a piece of cloth. The main argu-

—and not a real thing; the Sāṅkhyaṣ that the existent is produced from the existent."

—Sarva-darśa-saṁg.]

1 Kār. 9. 2 Kār. 15. 16.
ment of the Sānkhyas on this point is "the parting or issuing "of effects from cause, and the re-union of the universe." A type of this is the tortoise, which puts forth its limbs, and again retracts them within its shell. So, at the general destruction or consummation of all things, taking place at an appointed period, the five elements, earth, water, fire, air, and ether, [255] constituting the three worlds, are withdrawn in the inverse order of that in which they proceeded from the primary principles, returning step by step to their first cause, the chief and undistinguishable one, which is nature.

It operates by means of the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness. It does so by mixture; as the confluence of three streams forms one river; for example, the Ganges: or as threads interwoven constitute a piece of cloth: and as a picture is a result of the union of pigments. It operates "by modification" too: as water, dropped from a cloud, absorbed by the roots of plants, and carried into the fruit, acquires special flavour, so are different objects diversified by the influence of the several qualities respectively. Thus, from one chief cause, which is nature, spring three dissimilar worlds, observes the scholiast, peopled by gods enjoying bliss, by men suffering pain, by inferior animals affected with dulness. It is owing to prevalence of particular qualities. In the gods, goodness prevails, and foulness and darkness are foreign; and therefore are the gods supremely happy. In man, foulness is prevalent, and goodness and darkness are strangers; wherefore man is eminently wretched. In animals, darkness predominates, and goodness and foulness are wanting; and therefore are animals extremely dull.

The existence of soul is demonstrated by several arguments: 1 "The assemblage of sensible objects is for another's use;" as a bed is for a sleeper, a chair for a sitter: that other, who uses it, must be a sensitive being; and the sensitive being is soul. The converse of sensible objects endued with the three quali-

1 Kdr. 17.
ties, goodness, foulness, and darkness, indiscriminate, common, inanimate, and prolific, must exist, devoid of qualities, discriminate, and so forth: that is soul. "There must be superintendence;" [256] as there is a charioteer to a car: the superintendent of inanimate matter is soul. "There must be one to enjoy" what is formed for enjoyment: a spectator, a witness of it: that spectator is soul. "There is a tendency to abstraction:" the wise and unwise alike desire a termination of vicissitude: holy writ and mighty sages tend to that consummation; the final and absolute extinction of every sort of pain: there must then be a being capable of abstraction, essentially unconnected with pleasure, pain, and illusion: and that being is soul.

There is not one soul to all bodies, as a string on which pearls are strung; but a separate soul for each particular body. "Multiplicity of souls" is proved by the following arguments.1 "Birth, death, and the instruments of life are allotted severally:" if one soul animated all bodies, one being born, all would be born; one dying, all would die; one being blind, or deaf, or dumb, all would be blind, or deaf, or dumb; one seeing, all would see; one hearing, all would hear; one speaking, all would speak. Birth is the union of soul with instruments, namely, intellect, consciousness, mind and corporeal organs; it is not a modification of soul, for soul is unalterable. Death is its abandonment of them; not an extinction of it, for it is unperishable. Soul then is multitudinous. "Occupations are not at one time universally the same:" if one soul animated all beings, then all bodies would be stirred by the same influence, but it is not so: some are engaged in virtue, others occupied with vice; some restraining passions, others yielding to them; some involved in error, others seeking knowledge. Souls therefore are numerous. "Qualities affect differently;" one is happy; another miserable; and again, another stupid. The gods are ever happy; man, [257] un-

1 Xdr. 18.
happy; inferior animals, dull. Were there but one soul, all would be alike.

The attributes of the several principles, material and immaterial, discrete and undiscrrete, perceptible and imperceptible, are compared and contrasted. "A discrete principle," as is affirmed by the Sāṅkhyaś, 1 "is causable;" it is uneternal, "inconstant," one while apparent, at another time evanescent: it is "unpervading," not entering into all; for effect is possessed with its cause, not cause with its effect: it is acted upon, and "mutable," changing from one body to another: it is "multitudinous;" for there are so many minds, intellects, etc., as there are souls animating bodies: it is "supported," resting upon its cause: it is involvable, "merging" one into another, and implying one the other; it is "conjunct," consisting of parts or qualities; as sound, taste, smell, etc.: it is "governed," or dependent on another's will.

"The undiscrrete principle" is in all these respects the reverse: it is causeless, eternal, all pervading, immutable, or unacted upon; single, as being the one cause of three orders of beings; unsupported (relying but on itself); uninvolvable (not merging or implying); unconjunct; consisting of no parts; self-ruled.

Discrete principles, as well as the undiscrrete one, have the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness: the one (nature) having them in its own right, as its form or properties; the rest, because they are its effects: as black yarn makes black cloth. They are undiscriminating or "indiscriminate;" not distinguishing quality from quality, and confounding nature with qualities: for nature is not distinct from itself, nor are qualities separate from it. They are "objects" of apprehension and enjoyment for every [258] soul, external to discriminative knowledge, but subjects of it. They are "common," like an utensil, or like a harlot. They are "irrational" or unsentient; unaware of pain or pleasure: from an insensible

1 Kdr. 10, 11.
lump of clay comes an insensible earthen pot. They are "prolific;" one producing or generating another: nature producing intellect, and intellect generating consciousness, and so forth.

Soul, on the contrary, is devoid of qualities; it is discriminative; it is no object of enjoyment; it is several or peculiar; it is sensitive, aware of pain and pleasure; unprolific, for nothing is generated by it.

In these respects it differs from all the other principles. On certain points it conforms with the undiscrète principle, and differs from the discrète: in one regard it agrees with these and disagrees with the other: for it is not single, but on the contrary multitudinous; and it is causeless, eternal, pervading, immutable, unsupported, unmerging or unimplying, unconjunct (consisting of no parts), self-governed.

The attributes of the perceptible, discrete principles and of the undiscrète, indefinite one, are considered to be proved by the influence of the three qualities in one instance, and their absence in the converse; and by conformity of cause and effect: an argument much and frequently relied upon. It concerns the material, not the efficient, cause.

From the contrast between soul and the other principles, it follows, as the Kārikā affirms, "that soul is witness, bystander, spectator, solitary and passive. Therefore, by reason of union with it, insensible body seems sensible: and, though the qualities be active, the stranger (soul) appears as the agent."

"Though inanimate, nature performs the office of preparing the soul for its deliverance, in like manner as it is [259] a function of milk, an unintelligent substance, to nourish the calf."³

Nature is likened to a female dancer, exhibiting herself to soul as to an audience, and is reproached with shamelessness for repeatedly exposing herself to the rude gaze of the spec-

¹ Kdr. 14.  ² Kdr. 19. 20.  ³ Kdr. 67.
tator. "She desists, however, when she has sufficiently shown "herself. She does so, because she has been seen; he desists, "because he has seen her. There is no further use for the "world:" yet the connexion of soul and nature still subsists.

By attainment of spiritual knowledge through the study of principles, the conclusive, incontrovertible, single truth is learned: so the Kārikā declares that "neither I am, nor is "aught mine, nor do I exist."

All which passes in consciousness, in intellect is reflected by the soul, as an image which sullies not the crystal, but appertains not to it. "Possessed of this self-knowledge, soul "contemplates at ease nature thereby debarred from prolific "change, and precluded therefore from every other form and "effect of intellect, but that spiritual saving knowledge." 3

"Yet soul remains awhile invested with body; as the potter's "wheel continues whirling after the pot has been fashioned, by "force of the impulse previously given to it. When separa- "tion of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length "takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is abso- "lute and final deliverance accomplished." 4

"Thus," concludes the Kārikā, "this abstruse knowledge, "adapted to the liberation of soul, wherein the origin, dura- [260] tion, and termination of beings are considered, has "been thoroughly expounded by the mighty saint. The sage "compassionately taught it to Āsuri, who communicated it to "Panchāśikha, and by him it was promulgated to mankind." 6

1 Kār. 59, 61, 66. 2 Kār. 64. 3 Kār. 65.
4 Kār. 67, 68. 5 Kār. 69, 70.
6 [For further information on the Sāṅkhya philosophy see Ballantyne's translation of the Sūtras, Wilson's edition of the Sāṅkhya-kārikā, Hall's Rational Refutation, sect. i., and Bauerjea's Dialogues.]
Translation of the Sánkhya-kārikā.¹

I.—The inquiry is into the means of precluding the three sorts of pain; for pain is embarrassment: nor is the inquiry superfluous because obvious means of alleviation exist, for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished.

II.—The revealed mode is like the temporal one, ineffectual, for it is impure; and it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others. A method different from both is preferable, consisting in a discriminative knowledge of perceptible principles, and of the imperceptible one, and of the thinking soul.

III.—Nature, the root (of all), is no production. Seven principles, the Great or intellectual one, etc., are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (unproductive). Soul is neither a production nor productive.

IV.—Perception, inference, and right affirmation, are admitted to be threefold proof; for they (are by all acknowledged, and) comprise every mode of demonstration. It is from proof that belief of that which is to be proven results.

V.—Perception is ascertainment of particular objects. Inference, which is of three sorts, premises an argument, and (deduces) that which is argued by it. Right affirmation is true revelation.

VI.—Sensible objects become known by perception; but it is by inference (or reasoning) that acquaintance with things transcending the senses is obtained: and a truth which is neither to be directly perceived, nor to be inferred from reasoning, is deduced from revelation.

VII.—From various causes things may be imperceptible (or

¹ [This translation was originally prepared for the Oriental Translation Society, and it was afterwards published in 1837 with Wilson's translation of Gaudapáda's Commentary. It is inserted here to complete Mr. Colebrooke's view of the Sánkhya philosophy.]
unperceived); excessive distance, (extreme) nearness, defect of
the organs, inattention, minuteness, interposition of objects,
predominance of other matters, and intermixture with the
like.

VIII.—It is owing to the subtilty (of nature), not to the
non-existence of this original principle, that it is not appre-
hended by the senses, but inferred from its effects. Intellect
and the rest of the derivative principles are effects; (whence it
is concluded as their cause) in some respects analogous, but in
others dissimilar.

IX.—Effect subsists (antecedently to the operation of
cause); for what exists not, can by no operation of cause be
brought into existence. Materials, too, are selected which are
fit for the purpose: every thing is not by every means pos-
sible: what is capable, does that to which it is competent; and
like is produced from like.

X.—A discrete principle is causable, it is inconstant, un-
pervading, mutable, multitudinous, supporting, mergent, con-
ject, governed. The undiscrte one is the reverse.

XI.—A discrete principle, as well as the chief (or undis-
crete) one, has the three qualities: it is indiscriminative,
objective, common, irrational, prolific. Soul is in these re-
spects, as in those, the reverse.

XII.—The qualities respectively consist in pleasure, pain,
and dulness; are adapted to manifestation, activity, and re-
straint; mutually domineer; rest on each other; produce each
other; consort together; and are reciprocally present.

XIII.—Goodness is considered to be alleviating and en-
lightening: foulness, urgent and versatile: darkness, heavy
and enveloping. Like a lamp, they co-operate for a purpose
(by union of contraries).

XIV.—Indiscriminativeness and the rest (of the properties
of a discrete principle) are proved by the influence of the three
qualities, and the absence thereof in the reverse. The undis-
crete principle, moreover (as well as the influence of the three
qualities), is demonstrated by effect possessing the properties of its cause (and by the absence of contrariety).

XV.—Since specific objects are finite; since there is homogeneousness; since effects exist through energy; since there is a parting (or issue) of effects from cause, and a reunion of the universe,—

XVI.—There is a general cause, which is undiscrète. It operates by means of the three qualities, and by mixture, by modification, as water; for different objects are diversified by influence of the several qualities respectively.

XVII.—Since the assemblage of sensible objects is for another's use; since the converse of that which has the three qualities, with other properties (before mentioned), must exist; since there must be superintendence; since there must be one to enjoy; since there is a tendency to abstraction; therefore, soul is.

XVIII.—Since birth, death, and the instruments of life are allotted severally; since occupations are not at once universal; and since qualities affect variously; multitude of souls is demonstrated.

XIX.—And from that contrast (before set forth) it follows, that soul is witness, solitary, bystander, spectator, and passive.

XX.—Therefore, by reason of union with it, insensible body seems sensible; and though the qualities be active, the stranger (soul) appears as the agent.

XXI.—For the soul's contemplation of nature, and for its abstraction, the union of both takes place, as of the halt and blind. By that union a creation is framed.

XXII.—From nature issues the great one; thence egotism; and from this the sixteenfold set: from five among the sixteen proceed five elements.

XXIII.—Ascertainment is intellect. Virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power are its faculties, partaking of goodness. Those partaking of darkness are the reverse.

XXIV.—Consciousness is egotism. Thence proceeds a two-
fold creation. The elevenfold set is one: the five elemental rudiments are the other.

XXV.—From consciousness, affected by goodness, proceeds the good elevenfold set: from it, as a dark origin of being, come elementary particles: both issue from that principle affected by foulness.¹

XXVI.—Intellectual organs are, the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin: those of action are, the voice, hands, feet, the excretory organ, and that of generation.

XXVII.—(In this set is) mind, which is both (an organ of sensation and of action). It ponders, and it is an organ as being cognate with the rest. They are numerous by specific modification of qualities, and so are external diversities.

XXVIII.—The function of five, in respect to colour and the rest, is observation only. Speech, handling, treading, excretion, and generation are the functions of five (other organs).

XXIX.—Of the three (internal instruments) the functions are their respective characteristics: these are peculiar to each. The common function of the three instruments is breath and the rest of the five vital airs.

XXX.—Of all four the functions are instantaneous, as well as gradual, in regard to sensible objects. The function of the three (interior) is, in respect of an unseen one, preceded by that of the fourth.

XXXI.—The instruments perform their respective functions, incited by mutual invitation. The soul's purpose is the motive: an instrument is wrought by none.

XXXII.—Instrument is of thirteen sorts. It compasses, maintains, and manifests: what is to be done by it is tenfold, to be compassed, to be maintained, to be manifested.

XXXIII.—Internal instruments are three; external ten, to make known objects to those three. The external organs minister at time present: the internal do so at any time.

¹ [For some valuable remarks on this stanza cf. Hall's Preface to his edition of the Śāṅkhya-śāstra, p. 30.]
XXXIV.—Among these organs the five intellectual concern objects specific and unspecific. Speech concerns sound. The rest regard all five objects.

XXXV.—Since intellect, with the (other two) internal instruments, adverts to every object, therefore those three instruments are warders, and the rest are gates.

XXXVI.—These characteristically differing from each other, and variously affected by qualities, present to the intellect the soul's whole purpose, enlightening it as a lamp.

XXXVII.—Since it is intellect which accomplishes soul's fruition of all which is to be enjoyed, it is that, again, which discriminates the subtile difference between the chief principle (pradhāna) and soul.

XXXVIII.—The elementary particles are unspecific: from these five proceed the five elements, which are termed specific; for they are soothing, terrific, or stupefying.

XXXIX.—Subtile (bodies), and such as spring from father and mother, together with the great elements, are three sorts of specific objects. Among these, the subtile bodies are lasting; such as issue from father and mother are perishable.

XL.—(Subtile body), primeval, unconfined, material, composed of intellect, with other subtile principles, migrates, else unenjoying: invested with dispositions, mergent.

XLI.—As a painting stands not without a ground, nor a shadow without a stake, etc., so neither does subtile person subsist supportless, without specific (or unspecific) particles.

XLII.—For the sake of soul's wish, that subtile person exhibits (before it), like a dramatic actor, through relation of means and consequence, with the aid of nature's influence.

XLIII.—Essential dispositions are innate. Incidental, as virtue and the rest, are considered appurtenant to the instrument. The uterine germ (flesh and blood) and the rest belong to the effect (that is, to the body).

XLIV.—By virtue is ascent to a region above; by vice,
descent to a region below: by knowledge is deliverance; by the reverse, bondage.

XLV.—By dispassion is absorption into nature; by foul passion, migration; by power unimpediment; by the reverse, the contrary.

XLVI.—This is an intellectual creation, termed obstruction, disability, acquiescence, and perfectness. By disparity of influence of qualities the sorts of it are fifty.

XLVII.—There are five distinctions of obstruction; and, from defect of instruments, twenty-eight of disability: acquiescence is ninefold; perfectness eightfold.

XLVIII.—The distinctions of obscurity are eightfold, as also those of illusion; extreme illusion is tenfold; gloom is eighteenfold, and so is utter darkness.

XLIX.—Depravity of the eleven organs, together with injuries of the intellect, are pronounced to be disability. The injuries of intellect are seventeen, by inversion of acquiescence and perfectness.

L.—Nine sorts of acquiescence are propounded; four internal, relating to nature, to means, to time, and to luck; five external, relative to abstinence from (enjoyment of) objects.

LI.—Reasoning, hearing, study, prevention of pain of three sorts, intercourse of friends, and purity (or gift) are perfections (or means thereof). The fore-mentioned three are curbs of perfectness.

LII.—Without dispositions there would be no subtile person: without person there would be no pause of dispositions: wherefore a twofold creation is presented, one termed personal, the other intellectual.

LIII.—The divine kind is of eight sorts; the grovelling is fivefold: mankind is single in its class. This, briefly, is the world of living beings.

LIV.—Above, there is prevalence of goodness: below, the creation is full of darkness: in the midst is the predominance of foulness, from Brahmá to a stock.
LV. — There does sentient soul experience pain, arising from decay and death, until it be released from its person: wherefore pain is of the essence (of bodily existence).

LVI. — This evolution of nature, from intellect to the special elements, is performed for the deliverance of each soul respectively; done for another's sake as for self.

LVII. — As it is a function of milk, an unintelligent (substance), to nourish the calf, so it is the office of the chief (principle) to liberate the soul.

LVIII. — As people engage in acts to relieve desires, so does the undiscrete (principle) to liberate the soul.

LIX. — As a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectator, desists from the dance, so does nature desist, having manifested herself to soul.

LX. — Generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself), the wish of ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities.

LXI. — Nothing, in my opinion, is more gentle than nature: once aware of having been seen, she does not again expose herself to the gaze of soul.

LXII. — Verily not any soul is bound, nor is released, nor migrates; but nature alone, in relation to various beings, is bound, is released, and migrates.

LXIII. — By seven modes nature binds herself by herself: by one, she releases (herself), for the soul's wish.

LXIV. — So, through study of principles, the conclusive, incontrovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither I am, nor is aught mine, nor do I exist.

LXV. — Possessed of this (self-knowledge), soul contemplates at leisure and at ease nature, (thereby) debarred from prolific change, and consequently precluded from those seven forms.

LXVI. — He desists, because he has seen her; she does so because she has been seen. In their (mere) union there is no motive for creation.

LXVII. — By attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and
the rest become causeless; yet soul remains a while invested with body, as the potter's wheel continues whirling from the effect of the impulse previously given to it.

LXVIII.—When separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished.

LXIX.—This abstruse knowledge, adapted to the liberation of soul, wherein the origin, duration, and termination of beings are considered, has been thoroughly expounded by the mighty saint.

LXX.—This great purifying (doctrine) the sage compassionately imparted to Asuri, Asuri taught it to Panchaśikha, by whom it was extensively propagated.

LXXI.—Received by tradition of pupils, it has been compendiously written in Aryá metre by the piously-disposed Yśwara-krishña, having thoroughly investigated demonstrated truth.

LXXII.—The subjects which are treated in seventy couplets are those of the whole science, comprising sixty topics, exclusive of illustrative tales, and omitting controversial questions.