NOTICE OF


The three books, with which the learned Professor has now favored the public, are replete with information of the most interesting nature to the Platonic reader. The development in particular, in the fifth book, of the method of reasoning invented by the Eleatic Zeno, and which Plato employs in the Parmenides, is no less novel than important; and that the readers of the Classical Journal, who may not have this work in their possession, may be convinced of the truth of this remark, the following elucidation of that method from Proclus is subjoined.

Two hypotheses being laid down, viz. if a thing is, and if it is not, each of these may be tripled by considering in each what happens, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen: so that six cases will be the result. But since, if a thing is, we may consider itself either with respect to itself, or itself with respect to others; or we may consider others themselves with respect to themselves, or others with respect to that thing itself; and so likewise if a thing is not; hence the whole of this process will consist of eight triads, which are as follow:—1. If a thing is, what happens to itself with respect to itself, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen. 2. If a thing is, what happens to itself with respect to others, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen. 3. If a thing is, what happens to others with respect to themselves, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen. 4. If a thing is, what happens to others with respect to that thing, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen. And the other four, which are founded on the hypothesis that a thing is not, are to be distributed in exactly the same manner as those which have just been enumerated. Such (says Proclus) is the whole form of the dialectic method, which is both intellectual and scientific; and under which those four powers, viz. those of definition, division, demonstration, and analysis, receive their consummate perfection.
Notice of Prof. Cousin's Proclus, &c. 17

In the first hypothesis, therefore, of the Parmenides, Plato considers what does not follow to the one, or the ineffable principle of things considered with respect to itself, and to others. In the second, what does follow. In the third, what follows and at the same time does not follow. And this forms the first hexad. But in the fourth hypothesis, he considers what follows to others with respect to themselves, and what does not follow, what follows and at the same time does not follow. In the fifth, what follows to others with respect to the subject of the hypothesis, what does not follow, what follows and at the same time does not follow. And so two hexads, or four triads, are by this mean produced from the five hypotheses, if the one is. And the reader will easily perceive how each of the other four, which suppose the one is not, may form a triad: so that these four triads in conjunction with the preceding four, will give the whole Eleatic or dialectic method complete. It is likewise requisite to observe, that the four latter hypotheses by taking away the one, entirely subvert all things, both such as truly are, and such as subsist in generation, i.e. in becoming to be, and show that no being can any longer exist. The one therefore, or the great first cause of all, being admitted, all things subsist even to the last hypostasis; and this being taken away, essence itself is immediately destroyed.

Proclus observes, "that the difficulty of this dialectic method in the use of it is evident from this, that no one posterior to Plato has professedly written upon it; and on this account (says he) we have endeavored to illustrate it by numerous examples."

One of these examples, which I conceive to be a most happy and important specimen of this method, is as follows:

If providence is, there will follow to itself with respect to itself, the beneficent, the infinitely powerful, the efficacious; but there will not follow, the subversion of itself, the privation of counsel, the unwilling. That which follows and does not follow is, that it is one and not one.¹ There will follow to itself with respect to other things, to govern them, to preserve every thing, to possess the beginning and the end of all things, and to bound the whole of sensibles. That which does not follow is, to injure the objects of its providential care, to supply that which is contrary to expectation, to be the cause of disorder. There will

¹ Because under the one first providence, there are other providential powers, according to the Platonic theology, that energise ministrant to it.
follow and not follow, the being present to all things, and an exemption from them; the knowing and not knowing them; for it knows them in a different manner, and not with powers co-ordinate to the things known. There will follow to other things with respect to themselves, to suffer nothing casually from each other, and that nothing will be injured by any thing. There will not follow, that any thing pertaining to them will be from fortune, and the being unco-ordinated with each other. There will follow and not follow, that all things are good: for this will partly pertain to them, and partly not. To other things with respect to it there will follow, to be suspended from it, and on all sides to be guarded and benefited by it. There will not follow, an opposition to it, and the possibility of escaping it. For there is nothing so small that it can be concealed from Providence, nor so exalted that it cannot be vanquished by it. There will follow and not follow, that every thing will participate of Providence: for in one respect all things partake of it, and in another not of it, but of the good which is imparted to every thing from it.

But let Providence not have a subsistence, again there will follow to itself with respect to itself, the imperfect, the unproli-
fic, the inefficacious, a subsistence for itself alone. There will not follow, the unenvying, the transcendently full, the sufficient, the assiduous. There will follow and not follow, the unsolicita-
tious, and the undisturbed: for in one respect these will be present with that which does not providentially energise, and in another respect will not, in consequence of secondary natures not being governed by it. It is also evident that there will follow to itself with respect to other things, the unmingled, the priva-
tion of communion with all things, and the not knowing any thing. There will not follow, the assimilating other things to itself, and the imparting to all things the good that is fit. There will follow and not follow, the being desirable to other things: since this in a certain respect is possible, and not possible. For if it should be said, that through a transcendency exempt from all things, it does not providentially energise, nothing hinders but that it may be an object of desire to all secondary natures; but yet considered as deprived of this power, it will not be desir-
able. To other things with respect to themselves there will follow, the unadorned, the casual, the indefinite in passivity, the

1 Because the existence of Providence being admitted, apparent injury terminates in real good.
2 For what is evil to a part, is good to the whole.
reception of many things adventitious in their natures, and the being conducted in a confused and disorderly manner. There will not follow, an allotment with respect to one thing, a distribution according to desert, and a subsistence according to intellect. There will follow and not follow, the being good: for so far as they are beings, they must necessarily be good; and yet, Providence not having a subsistence, it cannot be said whence they possess good. But to other things with respect to Providence there will follow, the not being passive to it, and the being unco-ordinated with respect to it. There will not follow, the being measured and bounded by it. There will follow and not follow, the being ignorant of it: for it is necessary they should know that it is not, if it is not. And it is also necessary that they should not know it: for there is nothing common to them with Providence.

I shall now proceed to compare the three books of this work published by the Professor with those of the Harleian manuscript; noticing the difference in the text of the one from that of the other, wherever the discrepancy is important; and adding such conjectural alterations of my own as appear to me to be real emendations. In p. 1, therefore, Proclus observes, that Parmenides interrogates Socrates about the hypostasis of forms or ideas, in order that he may know, εἰτῇ δεικτικῷς εἴχε περι αυτα ο Σωκράτης εξ αλλότριων ναματῶν πεπληρωμένος, εἰτῃ νοεράς αυτος κατόν εἰπ την τουτον θεαν ανεγειρας καὶ κατα νουν ενεργησας καὶ δεσπομενος προ των κατεγεμενων μοναδων τας εξηρημένας, καὶ προ των μετεχομενων τας αμεθητους. In this passage, for Ναματῶν, which is also the reading of the Harleian Ms., I substitute νοηματων, and for τουτον θεαν, τουτων θεαν; for εξ αλλότριων νοηματων is a very common mode of expression with Proclus, and appears to me to be much more appropriate, in this place, than εξ αλλότριων ναματων. For then what Proclus says will be in English: "Whether Socrates was doxastically affected about ideas (or had nothing more than a mere opinion respecting them), being replete with conceptions on this subject foreign to the truth, or whether he intellectually excited himself to the survey of these, energising according to intellect, and beholding exempt prior to co-arranged monads, and imparticpable monads prior to such

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1 In the Platonic philosophy, imperticipable monads are such leading natures as are not consubsistent with beings inferior to themselves. Thus imperticipable intellect is that intellect which is not consubistent with soul, but produces that intellect which soul participates; and so in other instances.
Notice of Prof. Cousin's Proclus, &c.

as are participated. In p. 5, Proclus commences an elaborate and admirable discussion about the existence of ideas, considered as subsisting in the intellect of the Maker of the universe, and as the paradigms of all sensible forms; and in order to prove the necessity of their existence, he demonstrates, in the first place, that the world is not self-subsistent; because in things self-subsistent it is the same thing which generates and is generated; so that what is self-subsistent will be entirely impartible. But the world is not a thing of this kind; for every body is divisible, and is therefore not self-subsistent. He adds, that every thing self-subsistent is self-energetic: for by a much greater priority that which generates itself, is naturally adapted to energise to itself (i. e. to have an energy directed towards itself). After this, in p. 6. l. 2, he observes: o de kosmos oustos oux estin autokinhtos, sava-matikos an. oudeon yuion ton osmaton olas aima kai kineiastai kai kinei perikes, oude ynar aima olon eauto thermaienv kai v' eauton ther- moinastai. In this extract, for olas, the Harleian Ms. has rightly olon, as is evident from what follows after this word, which, thus amended, will be in English: "But the world being corporeal is not self-motive. No body, therefore, is at one and the same time naturally adapted to move and to be moved according to the whole of itself: for neither at one and the same time can the whole of it heat and be heated by itself." After wards Proclus investigates whether the cause of the world produced it kata peraistin kai logismov according to deliberate choice and a reasoning process, ή autw to eisai, or by his very being. And he observes, that if he produced the universe from deliberate choice, his productive energy (ποιησις) will be unstable and dubious, and will subsist differently at different times (και αλλοτε αλλας ἔχουσα).

P. 10. l. 5. Ειτα η μεν μερικη ψυχη δυναται τοις των φαινο- μενων τελειωτερων τι και ακριβεστερων απογενεσθαι, και θεωρειν εις εαυτη και σφαιραν ακριβη, και κυκλον, και κυκλον και ισον, και εκαστον περι- βαλλοντα των ειδους η δε του παντος κοσμου και των φαινομενων, καλλιον ουτε γενην ουτε ὧραι δυναται; και πως το μεν του παντος οὕτω δημιουργος η δε μερους του παντος; η γαρ μειζων δυναις τελειωτερων ουτω αυτικη, και η αυλοτερα κινησις κρειτωνον εις θεωρηματον θεωρουν. Such also is the reading in the Harleian Ms. of this passage. But for ειτα, in the beginning of it, I read Ει αυτα. And instead of η δε του παντος κοσμου, it is requisite to read η δε αυτη του παντος κοσμου. In the last line likewise, for η αυλοτερα κινησις, it appears to me to be necessary to read η αυλοτερα νοησις. For then what Proclus says, will be in English: "For if a partial soul [such as ours] is able to generate something more perfect
and more accurate than the phenomena, and to behold in itself the accurate sphere and circle, the accurately beautiful and equal, and to produce from itself every form; but the cause of the whole world, and of the phenomena, is neither able to generate, nor to perceive any thing more beautiful [than sensible objects]: how is it, that the one is the Demiurgus of the universe; but the other of a part of the universe? For a greater power is the prolific cause of more perfect natures, and a more immaterial intelligence is the contemplator of more excellent spectacles.” P. 11. 1. 7. ἣ ἀρα νους εστίν αὑτός, ἥ καὶ συντάξει πάντα αλληλοις; ἥ γὰρ δημιουργὸς τοῦ παντός, τὸ δὲ παν ποικιλὸν ἐστὶ, καὶ οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς μετέχει τὰ μεγά πάντα καὶ αἴσθαν καὶ τάξεως. τίς ὁ τιν αὕτων αὐτών μετρόν ὑποτηθὰς αὐτα; Here in the beginning of this extract, for ἥ ἂρα, the Harleian Ms. has rightly εἰ ἂρα, and in ἥ καὶ συντάξει the same Ms. very properly omits ἥ. And in the third place, for ἥ γὰρ δημιουργὸς, the Harl. Ms. has also rightly εἰς γὰρ δημιουργός. The passage, therefore, thus amended, will be in English: “If, therefore, intellect is the cause [of the world], and co-arranged all things with each other; (for the Demiurgus of the universe is one, but the universe is various, and all the parts of it do not participate of the same dignity and order,)—this being the case, who is it that measures the dignity of them, except the power that gave them subsistence?”

T.

NOTICE OF

The WONDERS OF ELORA; or, the Narrative of a Journey to the Temples and Dwellings excavated out of a mountain of granite, and extending upwards of a mile and a quarter, at Elora, in the East Indies, &c. By J. B. SEELY, Captain in the Bombay Native Infantry, and late in the military service of His Highness the Rajah of Nagpaur. 8vo. pp. 536. 1824.

The temples of Elora had been visited by several, and an essay on them appeared in the Asiatic Researches; but Captain Seely is the first person who encountered the dangers of such an attempt, and introduced them to his countrymen at home. His journey, not to be followed on the despicable little maps of which Bryant complains, was made, in 1810, by the
Notice of Prof. Cousin's Proclus.

Qui secum vitae quondam melioribus annis.
Consortes curas deliciasque tulit.
Scilicet hoc poterit tantos aboleere dolores—
Exigua hæc merces, at satis ampla, mali.

NOTICE OF


Part II.—[Continued from No. Lxi.]

P. 12. l. 4. Proclus continuing the series of his arguments to prove that divine forms or ideas, which are the paradigms of the sensible word, subsist in the intellect of the Demiurgus, or maker of the universe, observes: εἰ δὲ μὴ μαθητὴν ἐξ ὑμν. αἰσθήσεως πάντων, αναγκὴ δὴ που κατ᾽ εκεῖνα πάντων ορίζειν τὴν ταξίν, καὶ ὅσιος εἰναι πάντων αἰνητὸν αἰτίον, καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ εἰναι πάντων αἰνητὸν αἰτίον, τὴν ταξίν καὶ εἰναι πάντων αἰνητὸν αἰτίον. The words of the last part of this sentence, viz. καὶ εἰναι πάντων αἰνητὸν, are rightly omitted in the Harl. Ms.: for they are evidently superfluous, as being a repetition of what Proclus had previously said. P. 13. l. 8. from the bottom; Proclus having observed that the generation of man is not from chance, but from seed, adds, that seed possesses λογον, i.e. forms or productive powers in capacity, and not in energy; for, being a body, it is not adapted to possess these powers impartially; and in energy. He then asks what that is which contains productive powers in energy; because every where a subsistence in energy is the leader of a subsistence in capacity; since the latter, being imperfect, requires some other thing to bring it to perfection. After this, he remarks, ἡ τῆς μετρὸς φυσις, ερεις' αυτη γαρ ἡ καὶ τοις λογοις τελεσθαι, καὶ διαπλασσόμενα το γεγονόμενον ου γαρ τοι το φαινόμενον σιδος τῆς μετρος τοις το βρεφος, ἀλλ' η φυσις αυτοματος ουσα δυναμικας και αρχη κινησεως, ας φαιν. In this extract for καὶ τους λογους, the Harl. Ms. has rightly κατα τους λογους. For then what Proclus says will be in English: "You will say it is the nature of the mother; for this perfects and fashions that which is-ge-
nerated according to productive powers. For it is not the visible form of the mother which makes the infant, but nature, which, as we say, is an incorporeal power, and the principle of motion. P. 14. 1. 5. from the bottom; τος ἐν ἀντέχων, φυτών ἄλλα ἄλλα γεννᾷ φυτά, χάρις συνεπηκόντος ενμελείας; ἡ δὲ τις τῆς ολίγος φυτών ὅρας συνεπής και τοιχίας τοὐτων αὐτοῦ τοῦ εὐωρόντος εὐωρόντων ἐν εὐωρέω δυνάμεις. καὶ τι χαὶ λέγων; οὕτω γαρ ἀναγεγέρτες, τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ στροφήν φυτών περιλαμβάνον τούτων καὶ κατὰ ξανα εὐρέων τὴν ἐν σάλπερ τῶν ἐν πάσιν εὐωρόν ων καὶ κατα κυριεύονται γενέσθαι καὶ ἐν εὐώρον τῶν εὐώρον τῶν ἔσχατον τὸν ἔρημον προειρηται μοῦν' καὶ οὕτω διὰ τὰν σφαιρὰν ποιησαμενον τὴν σφάλεων, εἰ σεβάουμεν λοιπὸν τὴν φυσιν τοῦ πάντως. In this extract, for συστοϊχον, which the Harleian Ms. also has, it is requisite to read στοιχεῖον. For Proclus, in order to prove the subsistence of paradigmatic forms in the intellect of the maker of the universe, shows that the productive powers in partial and total natures in the earth, in all the elements, in the celestial spheres, and in Nature herself considered as a whole comprehending all other natures, are from thence derived. Hence, by adopting this alteration, the meaning of Proclus in this place will be obvious, and will be in English as follows: "How does it happen that in the same place different genera of plants are produced at different times without human care and attention? Is it not evident that it is from Nature considered as a whole, and containing in herself the forms and productive powers of all these? And what occasion is there to add, that by a recursion of this kind, we shall find that the nature in each of the elements has the power of containing the animals peculiar to that element; but the nature which is in the moon, comprehends the forms which are in all the elements. For all generation is governed from thence; and in her the exempt monad of material natures is antecedently contained. Hence, by thus making our ascent through the spheres, we shall afterwards arrive at the nature of the universe."

P. 16. 1. 9. Proclus having observed that the most principal cause of effects must necessarily be exempt from its productions; because by how much more the maker is exempt from that which is made, by so much more purely and perfectly it

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* i.e. To total Nature, or that great whole from which all other natures proceed. For according to the Platonic philosophy, every thing originates from a whole or monad. Thus all natures originate from one first nature, all souls from one first soul, all intellects from one first intellect, and all beings from one first being; and all these monads are centered and rooted in the monad of monads, the great first cause of all.
On the Parmenides of Plato.

will make, afterwards adds: καὶ οἶλος, εἰ αἰλόγος ἡ φύσις, δει τῷ μεγάλῳ αὐτῷ, αὖθις οὖν τι ἕτι καὶ πρὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῶν τῶν λογίων, εἰς οὕς δεὶ τα ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ πάντα τὴν ἀναφοράν εἴσαι. In this passage for ἀγων τῶν λογίων which the Harl. Ms. likewise has, I read ἀγων τῶν λογίων. The learned Professor found in a Ms. which he denotes by c, φύσεως ἀγων ἀγων; but ἀγων is here evidently superfluous. For εἰς οὕς δεὶ τα ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, the Harl. Ms. has rightly ὅδε δεὶ τα κ., τ., λ. And then the whole will be in English: “And in short, if nature is irrational, it requires a leader. Hence there is something else prior to nature, which contains forms, or productive powers, and from which it is necessary that every thing in the world should be suspended.” P. 18. I.

7. from the bottom: καθαρά τοινοι ομολογημα κοινον, την ἀποδείξιν εκ αὐτῶν εἶναι, καὶ φυσι τιμιοτέρων. ἀλλ' εἰ ὁι αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ταῦτα εἰς τα καθόλου παρά γαρ ἀποδείξεις οἱ τοι τῶν. In this extract, the Harleian Ms. does not make ἀλλ' εἰ ὁι αἱ ἀποδείξεις interrogative, but rightly separates these words from what follows by a comma. For Proclus is here citing a celebrated assertion of Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics, “that the things of which demonstrations consist are universals.” P. 19. I.

9. from the bottom. Proclus in this page inquiring what led So- crates to admit the existence of an ideal essence, observes that it must have been the conception of a man converting himself to intellect, separating himself from the composite, [i.e. from the irrational life and the body] surveying the psychical separately from the corporeal life, and considering as not at all wonderful, that the subject [body should be one thing] that which is participated and is in the subject as another, and the exempt and imparticipable form [i.e. the rational and intellectual soul] as different from both these. He then adds, ὅ τοιοτι περὶ τὴν τῶν δειν τούτων μοναδῶν υποθέσειν. This is also the reading of the Harl. Ms., but very erroneously. For it is necessary to make the words an interrogative sentence, and to read ὅ τεδεν ὅ τοιοτι περὶ τὴν τῶν δειν τούτων μοναδῶν υποθέσειν; i.e. “Or whence arises such an astonishment about the hypothesis of these divine monads?” In p. 22. I. 11. Proclus continuing his demonstration of the existence of ideas in the intellect of the Demiurgus, observes that it is necessary he should know himself to be the cause of all things, or that being ignorant of this, he should also be ignorant of his own nature. After this he adds: εἰ δὲ οἶδαν ὅτι υἱόν υἱῶν ὅτι τοῦ πάντος αὐτῶν, οὐκ οὐκ αὐτίν' το γαρ ορισμένον εἶδος δατερὸν οἴδαν εἰς αὐτηγης. In this extract, for το γαρ ορισμένον εἶδος δατερὸν κ. τ. λ. the Harl. Ms. has rightly το γαρ ορισμένον εἶδος δατερὸν καὶ δατε-
Notice of Prof. Cousin’s Proclus

... And then what Proclus says will be in English:

But if he knows that he is essentially the cause of the universe, he also knows that of which he is the cause: for that which definitely knows one of these, must from necessity likewise definitely know the other." Immediately after he observes: οἱ άνθρωποι οὐκ έχουσι καταθέσιν ὠργής. οἵ τε εἰπεί τινα, καὶ πάντα εἴρεται εὐνοοῦσι καὶ καθότι πάντα τοι τις γίνεται, τοις πάντοις τοις ἁγιοις. καὶ ταῦτα εἴρεται εὐνοοῦσι καθότι πάντα τοι τις γίνεται. In this passage, for οἳ τα μετ’ αυτῶν λέγοις κ. τ. λ., which is also the reading of the Harl. Ms. it is necessary to read, οἳ τα μετ’ αυτῶν έλεγον, εἴρεται, (subin. βέβαια) πάντα ἁγιοις. λέγοις εἴρεται κ. τ. λ. And then this extract will be in English: "He knows therefore definitely that of which he is the cause. Hence, he likewise knows the universe and every thing of which the universe consists, and of which he is the cause. But if this be the case, he either knows things posterior to himself, by looking into, and knowing himself, or by looking to things external to himself, which is impossible. By immaterial productive powers and forms therefore, he knows the mundane productive principles, and the forms of which the universe consists, and the universe subsists in him as in the cause of it, separate from matter." P. 26. l. 7. from the bottom: αὖτα μὲν γε γινεται το κατισχυμεν και τα ειδη τοις αισθητοις ειδοιν αναιλληγον ειρεται, έ σκοτε της προτερου ειδον. Here for αυτισισιν, which the Harl. Ms. also has, it is requisite to read ειδοθεσιν. For sensible natures partake of the immovable and the perpetual from the first forms. And the first forms are those which subsist at the extremity of the intelligible order, which is characterised by the eternal, and the immutable. P. 28. l. 9. from the bottom: δι γε γαρ τα δευτερα παντα τοις προ αιτων μετεχειν και αυτος εκαστην εκπλασων ας εκαστης ταχεος αληθης. τοιτο δε ειτον ειδοι, αλλ’ έ και αυτας τας των θεων προδουσ. In this extract the Harl. Ms. for αλλ’ έ has erroneously αλλη, but the true reading is αλλ’ έ. For Proclus says, "It is necessary that all secondary natures should participate of the beings prior to them, and thus enjoy the benefits proceeding from each of these, conformably to the order in which each secondary nature ranks. But this is nothing else than a participation conformable to the progressions of the Gods themselves." P. 31. l. 4. ετει γουν και ο δημιουργικος νους μετος ειτων, έχουν εν ο λοιπη της και ανειρον, τοση εν λογιτα και εν και πλησιν το γεν το εσωτερο, περας εστι τα δι πλησιν ο ευσωματων εν τον ανειρον εστι και τον σοματων το ειδος μεριστον εστι και το εν το εσωτερος το
en tounos epaio 6o avrntou to anerw. In that part of this extract, the word avrntou is added by the learned Professor, but erroneously, and is omitted in the Harl. Ms. Omitting therefore avrntou, and adding a comma after tounos, the meaning of Proclus will be evident, and will be in English as follows: "Since therefore the Demiurgical intellect is mingled, containing in itself bound and infinity, on this account it may be said to be one and multitude. For its essential one is bound, but the essential multitude in it is infinite; since also the form of bodies, and the essential one in them, is bound; but that which is partible in them is the infinite."

P. 31. l. 14. Proclus having observed that bound and infinity are primarily in intelligibles, adds, ou to en kai polla en tois noestos kai noevois en tis evn evrthos pertoys, ois h diwteria bidakei panta evis prouveis. to mev epaio en kai evrthos, to de kai evrthos tou pertoys kai to anerw, kai en tis plhith oramae kai en tis sunkei, kai pereiKatekateovn ontovn en evos kai en polla evde eva en evrthos monon. Here, for pereiKatekateovn ontovn, which is also in the Harl. Ms., it is necessary to read pereiKatekateovn en; for then this extract will be in English: "Thus also the one and the many are in the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order, in the number which there first subsists, as we are informed in the second hypothesis [of the Parmenides]: the former [i.e. the one] being bound, and pertaining to number, but the latter [i.e. the many] being number, and pertaining both to bound and infinity, and being surveyed in multitude and the continuous, and containing in itself the one and the many: for these subsist in number alone." P. 32. l. 9. from the bottom, Proclus speaking of soul says: dia ois ev en aiwv monon tes noestos idrwmata ouv elagen, efitei de tis afros aNerwnev tov ouv pereiKatekateovn oramae tis en autw telwstov, kai tou evos ekain kai aplo tou noevoe esidous, peridei te autov kai perixeosei kukla, kai tais metabastes twn epiloan dianei to avrntov twn eivwv, kathemerneu kai ev to avtov karais, kathemerneu de ev avdikaion, kathemerneu de en estovn twn allon, kai kath en pantia, kai ouk omou pantia vousta. Here, for dianei to avrntov twn eivwv, which is also in the Harl. Ms., it is necessary to read dianei to avrntov x. t. l.

1 See the Philebus of Plato, who there asserts, and cites Philolaus as a sufficient authority for his assertion, that God, or the first cause, mingled all things from bound and infinity.

2 This order subsists immediately after the intelligible triad. See my collection of the Chaldean Oracles in Nos. XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII of the Classical Journal.
For soul, according to Plato in the Timaeus, is a medium between an impartible essence, (i.e. intellect,) and an essence divisible about bodies (i.e. the corporeal life). With this emendation therefore, what Proclus says will be as follows: "For because soul is not allotted intellectual perceptions alone established in eternity, but desires to comprehend the at-once-collected energy of intellect, aspiring after the perfection which intellect contains, and after the one and simple form of its intellection, she runs round it, circularly [as it were] dances about it, and by the transitions of her intuitions divides the impartibility of forms, surveying indeed the beautiful itself, the just itself, and each of the other forms separately, and intellectually perceiving all things according to one [i.e. one at a time,] and not all things at once." P. 34. l. 1. os γαρ ο εν προφορα λόγος το εν και παλλων νομιμα μεριζει, και διεξόδως κατα χρονον ταις γνωμαι του του νοετος. This likewise is the reading of this passage in the Harl. Ms.; but something is evidently wanting. It appears to me therefore, that after os γαρ ο εν προφορα λόγος, it is requisite to add, τον ενδον λόγον διαιρει, ουτος ο εν διαίων λόγος ξ. τ. λ. And then what I conceive to be the meaning of Proclus, will be in English: "For as external speech divides that which is internal, thus also the dianoetic energy distributes the one and simple conception of intellect, and proceeds about its united intelllections discursively and temporally."

P. 34. l. 7. from the bottom: καλλος γαρ φησι ο ει Παυδρος Σωκρατης, ταυτην του χειριν εκαμην εκφανεισταμεν ειναι και εκαμησταμεν. διακισισης δε φερων ευθευ ειναι εν τως τω ρηθη εμοιοιμασιν το δε ουκ εις τα αναλοιμασιν κατα την εκαμαν εκαμην τους φυσις. κατα ταυτην την εις καλλον κατα τη συμμετριαν την τον εικονον της την υλην, συμμετρα ην εις την εικονον κατα ταυτην την αναλοιμασιν κατα την εικονον την την συμμετριαν το καλλον επαναλητεια τοις τοις σωματι. In this passage, after pros την υλην, it appears to me to be necessary to add το καλλον εκλαμβανει, and γαρ I conceive is wanting after συμμετρα μεν. And then the whole will be in English: "For Socrates in the Phaedrus says, that beauty has the allotment of being most manifest and most lovely; but that justice is not accompanied by any splendour in the resemblances of it which are here. And the good perfects all things according to the peculiar essence of each. For according to the symmetrical union of form with matter, beauty shines forth to the view; since symmetry then

1 For diaeresis, according to the Platonic philosophy, is διεξόδως κατα τον λόγον"
exists when that which is naturally more excellent has dominion over that which is inferior in excellence. According to this symmetry therefore, beauty is resplendent in bodies.”

P. 39. 1. 6. και ous theoματων των μεν κοινωνων ημας τις εις της λεγειν, των δε προκειμαινη μη εφαπτοσθαί ταῖς οπισθολαις· εις γαρ τας ατομως και τας ιδιας παντων διαφορας χωρειν, πρεπειν ουτων η τα πραται νουν, το δε παντη η επι πλειον διατεινουτων, μελλον ημιν διαιρεθαι δωσων. Here for το δε παντη x. t. λ., which the Harl. Ms. also has, it appears to me to be requisite to read τον δε παντη x. t. λ. For what Proclus says is this: “That it is not wonderful we should be able to speak of the peculiarities of things that are more common, but should be incapable of apprehending such as are more partial. For to proceed to the indivisible and proper differences of all things, exceeds the ability of the human intellect; but we are more able to survey the differences of things which are universally or very widely extended.” P. 39. 1. 9. from the bottom: και γαρ αυτων ην, ευς ρητα τας συγκαταθεσιν, ενεχειν τας αποφασεις, και ουδαμως ανδρες επιστατικου. πριν ουν αποφηση περι τινων] πρωτων περι των αυτων λεγει των των αυτω τεταγμενων. In this extract, the words within the brackets are erroneously omitted in the Harl. Ms., and for επιστατικου, which is one of the omitted words, I conceive it necessary to read επιστημονικου. But for the last word τεταγμενων, the Harl. Ms. has πρωτα τεταγμενων, which is also the reading of the Ms. denoted by the Professor by the letters c. d. The true reading, however, appears to me to be πρωτα τεταγμενων. P. 40. 1. 9. ορας ουν παλιν οτι και τελεα και συγκαταθεσις, και νεκραις, και η αποκρονης του καιρου και του ενωσεως. Here for επιστατις the Harl. Ms. has rightly επιστατης. P. 40. 1. 9. from the bottom, και γαρ εν τη διανοια του πολιτικου παντα εστιν ενοματικας, ο στρατηγος, ο επιτραπεζης, ο δημος. Here, for ο δημος, the Harl. Ms. has rightly ο δημος, as is evident from what immediately follows, και των ενοματων προς ονν αλληλα μικρα πις οσι διαφορα παντα γαρ εστι ξωτικαι και ομοι συνεφοικτητα εν τη του πολιτικου διανοια, αλλ' εξων πλειον διαφορα στρατηγου και δημου' και γαρ ενδον τα εις υπερηφανης. But for μεριστων, in the concluding part of this extract, which is also the reading of the Harl. Ms., it is requisite to substitute αμεριστων; and then the whole of what Proclus says will be in English as follows: “For in the ratiocinative part of the politician all things exist in a conceptive manner, the general, the rhetorician, the centurion, and the plebeian, and the difference of the conceptions with respect to each other is but small; for all of them are vital, and co-exist simultaneously in the reasoning power of the
Notice of Prof. Cousin's Proclus, &c.

politician. Externally, however, there is the greatest difference between the general and the plebeian; for within [that is, in the mind of the politician] these were forms only, and that which is so it were their subject [i.e. humanity] is impartible.

Proclus adds, immediately after: οὗτος ορα και in την τετράδιαν ομορχειαν ουτων, ει την οποιαν παρατηλη της ομορχειαν διαφορα αητων προς αιαντα, και αυτογεων προς αυτογεων, και αυτογεων προς λογικα, πασυν εκα και αλλων εκτων εις ζευγγα και κυκλους. But here, for ομορχειαν, which is also the reading of the Harl. Ms., it is requisite to substitute ομορχειαν. For according to the Platonic philosophy all things subsist in a divine intellect eternally, vitally, and intellectually, and not contemporaneously, since time pertains to ουτως and not to intellect. It is usually therefore said by Platonic writers; that every thing which subsists in intellect is ομορχειος, because every thing intellectual is characterised by sameness.

P. 42. l. 10. Proclus in the investigation of what things there are ideas, and of what there are not, inquires ει και των μοριων, οιον οφθαλμου και δακτυλου και των τοιων ει και αυτων των τεχνων ει και των κακων τελευτων. In this extract, after των τοιων, the Harl. Ms. has rightly, ει και των συμβεβηκτων, και ποιων μεν, πασι δ' ου' ει και των τεχνων: for without this addition the inquiry would be incomplete. The whole of the passage therefore thus amended will be in English: "Whether there are ideas of parts, such as the eye, the finger, and the like; if of accidents, and these so as to subsist in one respect indeed, but not in another: whether there are ideas of things artificial, and of the arts themselves: and in the last place, whether there are ideas of things that are evil." P. 43. l. 7. και γαρ αλλας μερισμος εστι πατα η νοημα φυσιν. In this passage, for μερισμος, the Professor found in a Ms. denoted by c, μερισμος; but the Harl. Ms. has rightly αμερισμος: for every intellectual nature is according to Plato and all his followers impartible. Proclus afterwards adds, και η προοδος αυτης δια ταυταπτης γεγονεν ουδεν η δε και ανεξαρτητα τα δευτερα των πρωτων εστι, και ταυτα μερικας α το ωλον μερικας. Here, for the last word μερικας, the Harl. Ms. has very properly ολικως; for then what Proclus says will be in English: "And the progression of it (i.e. of an intellectual nature) is effected through sameness; whence also secondary intellects subsist in unproceeding union with such as are primary, and the former are partially what the whole intellectual essence is totally." P. 44. l. 9. και ει εν τω οντι μη ξης μονον εστιν, ως φαγον ο εν Φιλοσοφῳ Σωκρατης, αλλα και ψυχην αυτων υποτιθεται παραδειγματικα του προσλοντος απο του πληθους των ψυχων,
PUERILIA.

No. IV.—[Continued from No. XLIX.]

—— nova proles
Artubus infirmis teneras lasciva per herbas
Ludit.

1.—Isaiah xiv.

"Art thou also become weak as we? art thou become like
unto us?"

—— "H σο γάρ τά μίν πέλεις
ήμιν ὁμοίοις; ἡ σὲ γ', αἷς ἡμᾶς, σβάνους
ήματι βάναυσος; μουσίκης δὲ σοι γηλυκίς
φόνογγος βέβηκε, η ἐπολύχησος χρυσῆ;
Αἰὲς δὲ σοι κάτωθι ἐστρωνται λέων,
Αἰὲς δὲ νάωθεν; οἴον ἀρ' ἐξοράνθιν
πέτρωσας, ὁ φαυσφόρ, ἠφον γάνατος;
οἴον πρόκειται σωμάτως, δὲ λαῦτον τὸ πέλι
ηχηθεὶς ἀπαχώσας; ἐν δὲ καρβία
τοιαῦτ' ἐβαλλεις; οὐρί παύσωδαί πυρν,
πρὶν δὲ τὸν ἀποτελέσαι ἐμβιάσαι πολὺ
κύκλον, πύρῳ τῷ τῶν θεοκτίστων πέρα
γάρ εἰπεν ἐγκαταστήσαι· θρόνων"