

NOTICE OF

PROFESSOR COUSIN'S Edition of the two first books of PROCLUS on the Parmenides of Plato, 8vo. Paris, 1821.

THE volume containing these commentaries, is the fourth which Professor Cousin has most laudably given to the public; of the works of Proclus; and I trust that the same zeal and the same ability which induced him to bring to light these inestimable works, from an oblivion no less long than disgraceful to countries which profess to be polished, will also enable him to publish all that remains of the writings of this Coryphæan Platonist, and incomparable man.

These commentaries, indeed, are justly called by the Professor, ¹ “an ancient, great, and venerable monument of Grecian and Egyptian wisdom;” and to the generality of readers, and in short, to every one who has not *legitimately* studied the philosophy of Plato, they will also be what he denominates them, *obscure*. But by the man who has happily penetrated the depths of that philosophy, at which, as Bishop Berkeley well observes, ² *many an empty head is shook*, they will be found to be as clear an explanation of dogmas and truths, which, though in their own nature most luminous, but to the multitude impentrably dark, as it is possible for the most *enlightened* genius to effect. And hence this work is very properly said by Damascius ³ to be *υπερσπουδα ερηνησις*, a *super-excellent exposition*.⁴

Among the Harleian manuscripts in the British Museum, there is a copy of these commentaries, of which, by permission of the Trustees of that excellent Institution, I made a transcript, upwards of thirty years ago. And the following are the emendations, which from a frequent perusal of this work, I have been induced to consider as not only probable, but for the most part indispensably necessary.

In the first place, in p. 4. l. 12, which is towards the close of a most splendid exordium, in which Proclus magnificently invokes the several orders of those divine powers that are

¹ Vid. Præfat. tom. ii. p. 10.

² In his *Siris*.

³ Vid. Photii Biblioth. p. 1070.

⁴ I refer the English reader, who has a genius for such speculations, to the 3d volume of my translation of Plato, in the notes on which, I have given the substance of this admirable commentary.

Notice of Professor Cousin's *Proclus*, &c. 337

eternally rooted and centred in the great first cause of all, he also invokes his preceptor, Syrianus, as follows: ἀνηλώσει δε ταις εαυτου καθαρισταταις επιβολαις ο τω Πλατωνι μετ συμβακχευσας ως αληθως, και ο μεστος καταστας της θειας αληθειας, της δε θεωριας ημιν γενομενος ταυτης ηγεμων, και των θειων τουτων λογων οντως ιεροφαντης. In this passage, ο μεστος καταστας, is evidently erroneous. The Harleian Ms. has ομοστικος καταστας; but this is not more sound than the other. Instead of these therefore, I read ομοστικος καταστατης. For as both Syrianus and Proclus labored in endeavouring to restore the philosophy of Plato, hence Proclus very properly calls Syrianus *his associate in the restoration of divine truth.*

The words that immediately follow are, ον εγω φαινη αι φιλοσοφιας τυπων εις ανθρωπους ελθειν, επ ευεργεσια των τηδε ψυχων, αντι των αγαλματων, αντι των ιερων, αντι της ολης αγιστειας αυτης, και σωτηριας αρχηγον τοις γε νυν ουσιν ανθρωποις, και τοις εισαυθις γενησομενοις. And they apply, according to Professor Cousin, to Syrianus. But though grammatically considered, they evidently admit of this construction; yet when they are attentively examined, it will be found to be impossible that they should be applicable to any individual of the human species, however exalted above the rest of mankind by superior genius and virtue. I conceive therefore, that as Proclus had just before implored divine assistance, in order that he might participate in perfection of the most mystic theory of Plato, which is unfolded in the Parmenides, he afterwards speaks of the philosophy of Plato in the above beautiful manner. Hence it appears to me that two or three lines are wanting, and that this passage is a part of a sentence containing a most magnificent encomium of the Platonic philosophy; viz. *“that it came to men for the benefit of the souls that are here, instead of statues, instead of temples, instead of the whole of sacred institutions, and that it is the primary leader of salvation to the men that now are, and to those that shall exist hereafter.”* This conjecture is greatly confirmed by the following passage in Suidas, in which philosophy is said to proceed from the first cause, through all the middle divine genera, and the more excellent natures¹ posterior to the Gods, as far as to the dregs of beings [i. e. as far as to matter itself, which is the last of things]; but that religion which is the worship of the Gods, originates from adorning causes. ιερατικη, και φιλοσοφια, ουκ απο των αυτων αρα αρχων. αλλ η μεν φιλοσοφια απο της μιας της παντων αιτιας εις την υποσταθμην των οντων καθηκουσα, δια μεσων των ολων γενησθαι

¹ These more excellent natures are dæmons, and heroes.

θειων τε και των μετα θεου κρειττοτων, και εν τριτω φασι βηματι φανερωσαν: την δε ιερατικη η εστι θεου θεατητα, αυτων εν ποθεν και των περιουσιων (ισοτε. περιουσιων) αυτων (φαισι) αρχισθαι, και περι αυτα πραγματωσθαι, &c. &c. Conformably to this also, Plato says in the *Timæus*, that a greater good than philosophy was never imparted by divinity to man. Proclus therefore, living at a period in which the Grecian theology was in a most fallen condition, speaks thus magnificently of the philosophy of Plato, as of a thing designed by Divinity to be a substitute for temples and statues, and the worship of the Gods.

In the next place, Proclus, speaking of the analogy of the persons in this dialogue to the things which are discussed in it, and to the order of beings in the universe, says, (p. 19. l. 7.) υ δε δη Κεφαλος, και οι εκ Κλαζομενων φιλοσοφοι τας μερικαις ψυχαις και τη φύσει συμπολιτευομενοι, ισται την ομοιαν εχοντες εν τούτοις χρωραν, ατε δη και αυτοι φυσικοι τινεσ οντεσ. In this passage, for συμπολιτευομενοι, it appears to me to be necessary to read συμπολιτευομεναισ. So that the meaning will be, that *Cephalus and the philosophers from Clazomenia, are analogous to partial souls, [i. e. to such as human souls] and to such as are conversant with nature, because they have a rank similar to that of these philosophers, who were physiologists, as being of the Ionic school.*

P. 35. l. 19. και εσται αναλογον ως ο δημιουργοσ προς τα εγκοσμια, το εν προς παντα απλωσ δε ουχ ενοσ τισ γαρ θεοσ και ουτοσ; ο γαρ κατα το εν θεοσ, ου τισ θεοσ, αλλ' απλωσ θεοσ. τισ δε θεοσ ο δημιουργοσ; διοτι θεου τισ [lege τινοσ] εστιν ιδιοτησ η δημιουργικη, και αλλων ουσων ιδιοτητων, θειων μιν, ου μιντοι δημιουργικων. To this passage some words are wanting, and there is also in it an erroneous punctuation. The words which I conceive to be wanting are του δημιουργου ενοσ τινοσ οντοσ, which should be inserted immediately after το εν προς παντα. And the erroneous punctuation is in τισ γαρ θεοσ και ουτοσ, and also in τισ δε θεοσ ο δημιουργοσ, neither of which is interrogative. Hence the whole passage will be accurately as follows: και εσται αναλογον ως ο δημιουργοσ προς τα εγκοσμια, το εν προς παντα του δημιουργου ενοσ τινοσ οντοσ, απλωσ δε ουχ ενοσ τισ γαρ θεοσ και ουτοσ, ο γαρ κατα το εν θεοσ, ου τισ θεοσ, αλλ' απλωσ θεοσ. τισ δε θεοσ ο δημιουργοσ, διοτι θεου τινοσ εστιν ιδιοτησ, &c. &c. i. e. "As the Demiurgus is to mundane natures so is the one [or the ineffable principle of principles] to all things; the Demiurgus being a certain one, but not simply one. For the Demiurgus is a certain God. For the God which subsists according to [or is characterised by] the one is not a certain God, but simply God. But the

Demiurgus is a certain God; because the demiurgic peculiarity is the peculiarity of a certain God, there being also other peculiarities, which are indeed divine, yet not demiurgic." What Proclus here says, necessarily follows from the Platonic theory, that as the first God is *the one*, all the other Gods are *unities*, proceeding from and at the same time rooted in *the one itself*.

Page 38. l. 1, for *εμορφιαν*, the Harleian Ms. has *αμορφιαν*, which is the true reading. But the passage in which this word occurs is the following: τα μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ θεῖα καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀπλοτητι τοῦ ἐνὸς ἰδρυμένα, τὴν ἀκαλλακτιστὸν εμορφιαν, [αμορφιαν] ὡς φησι τις τῶν τα ὅσα σοφῶν, διαφερόντως ἀγαπῶντα καὶ πρῶτον πάντα τοῖς εἰς αὐτὰ βλέπειν δυναμένοις. i. e. "For some things are divine, being established in the simplicity of *the one*; transcendently rejoicing in, and extending to those who are able to survey them, as some one of the piously wise says! That *αμορφιαν* is the true reading, is evident from this, that according to the Platonic philosophy, divine natures are more properly celebrated by *negations* than by *affirmations*.

P. 40. l. 2, for *ὀνοματα των θεων*, the Harleian Ms. has rightly *ὀνοματων των θεων*.

P. 41. l. 8. *αδίαστρόφων*, which is also the reading of the Harleian Ms., should be *αδιαστροφων*. This will be evident from an inspection of the passage in which this word occurs, viz. *ἐν μὲν τῇ τῆν διαλεκτικῆν μηδαμῶς προσηκεν παραδιδόσθαι κοινῇ, ὡς ο Σωκράτης ἐν Πολιτικῇ φησι, μὴ λαθεῖσιν εἰς παρανομίαν ελασάντες, τῇ δυναμει των λογῶν χρωμένοι πρὸς τὴν των αδιαστροφων [αδιαστροφων] ἔνοιαν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀντιτροφῆν*. No expression is more common in Platonic writers than *αδιαστροφαί νομοίαι*, *unperverted conceptions*. And that this is the true reading is evident from the place in the Republic of Plato which forms a part of that to which Proclus alludes: for it is the following, *ἐστὶ κοινῶν δόγματα ἐκ παιδῶν περὶ δικαίων καὶ καλῶν, ἐν οἷς ἐκτετραμμένα, ὡσπερ ὑπο γόνατι, πειθαρχοῦντες τε καὶ τιμῶντες αὐτὰ* (lib. vii. p. 146. Cantab. 1713). For these dogmas concerning things beautiful and just, in which we have been nourished from our childhood, are *the unperverted conceptions*, mentioned by Proclus.

"For according to Plato the Demiurgus is not the supreme God; since in the *Timæus* he says, "that it is difficult to discover the Demiurgus and father of the universe, and when found, impossible to reveal him by language to all men; but in the *Parmenides*, he celebrates *the one*, or the first principle of things, as perfectly ineffable. For he says, at the conclusion of the first hypothesis concerning it, "Neither therefore does any name belong to it, nor discourse, nor any science, nor sense, nor opinion."

340 Notice of Professor Cousin's Edition

P. 57. l. 12. τῶν ἀνομῶν ; but the Harleian Ms. has rightly τῶν κτῶν. For Proclus says, τῶν μὲν γὰρ φυσικῶν εἰδῶν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀνομῶν [ἀτομῶν] χεῖρον, μετεχει δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ συντεταγμένου ἑνὸς τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, πρὸ δὲ τούτου ἐστὶ τὸ ἐξηρημαίνον ἐν, τὸ πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὁ δὲ ἰδέα ἐστὶ παρα Πλάτωνι, i. e. "For in physical forms multitude [i. e. the multitude of them] is less excellent than the individuals [in which these forms are inherent]; but the multitude participates of that one which is co-arranged with the many. Prior, however, to this [i. e. to this co-arranged monad], is the exempt one, antecedent to the many, which with Plato is *idea*." For forms when materialised become inferior to their recipients, because they are wholly dependent on them for their subsistence, having departed from their own simplicity and indivisibility into foreign compositions and intervals.

P. 80. l. 12. For ἐξηρημαίνας, which also the Harleian Ms. has, it is necessary to read ἐξηρητημαίνας. The erroneous substitution of one of these words for the other, frequently takes place, not only in the manuscripts, but also in the printed copies of the writings of Proclus.

P. 88. l. 20. πρὸς τὸ ἐν, so the Harleian Ms., but it is requisite to read πρὸς τὸ ἐν, as will be at once evident to the Platonic reader from an inspection of the following passage in which these words occur: ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς θεῶς, τὰ δευτέρᾳ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐστὶ, καὶ πάντα ἀπλῶς συνηγῶνται πρὸς τὸ ἐν [ἐν] ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ἡ προδοξία καὶ ἡ ἑκτασις τοῖς οὐσίῳ.

P. 94. l. 13. Proclus, here speaking of the arrangement of the persons of the dialogue, and what the arrangement indicates, says: τίνος οὖν ἐνδείξιν ἔχει τὸ τοιοῦτον, καὶ διὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τῷ Παρμενίδῃ συντετακται καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου ἀφελείται. Πυθόδαρος δὲ τῷ Ζηνῶνι πρὸ Σωκράτους· πρότερος γὰρ διακηκοῖ τῶν λόγων, Σωκράτης δὲ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν σοφοῖν, προκαλοῦμενος μὲν τὸν Παρμενίδειον νοῦν, ἑκατορῶν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Ζηνῶνος λόγους. In this passage, it appears to me, that between the words Σωκράτης δὲ, and ἀμφοῖν τοῖν σοφοῖν, it is necessary to insert τὸ μῆσον ἐστίν.

P. 111. l. 15. Proclus in this place, speaking of the difference between the dialectic of Zeno, and that of Parmenides, and having observed that the former is more *logical*, but the latter more *intellectual*, adds: ὁ δὲ Παρμενίδης αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ὑπ' ἡμετέρου, αὐτὴν τὴν ἐνάσιον εἴδατο τοῦ ὄντος, τῇ νοεραῖ διαλεκτικῇ χρωμαίνοντος, ἐν ἀπλῶς ἐπιβολαῖς τὸ κυρὸς ἐγγούση· διὸ καὶ ὁ μὲν [i. e. Zeno] εἰς πλῆθος κατῆμι λόγων, ὁ δὲ [i. e. Parmenides] τῆς νοεραίας ἐπιβολῆς αἰεὶ τῆς αὐτῆς μονοειδῶς ἀντειχέτο τῶν ὄντων. In this passage,

instead of ο δε της νοερας επιβολης και της αυτης, I conceive it necessary to read, ο δε δια της νοερας επιβολης απτητου ουσης. For the energy of νοερα επιβολη, by which Platonic writers usually express the intuitive perception of intellect, is *invincible*, because it is superior even to scientific demonstration.

P. 121. l. 12., &c. Οτι δε ειναι δαι το εν ον προ του πληθους, λαβοις αν δια μιας μεν εφοδου λογικης τοιαυτης· η ομοθυμως λεγεται το ον κατα των οντων παντων, η συνθυμως, η ως αφ' ενος και προς εν' αλλ' ομοθυμως αδυνατον, επιερ τε μεν μαλλον ον φαιμεν, το δε ηττον' το γαρ μαλλον και ησσον ουκ εστιν εν τοις ομοθυμοις· επι δε συνθυμως εστιν εν ον κατα παντων λεγομενων. In this passage there are three mistakes, and they also occur in the Harleian MS. For instead of ομοθυμως in αλλ' ομοθυμως αδυνατον, it is necessary to read συνθυμως; since *being itself* is not predicated of all beings synonymously, for the reason assigned by Proclus, viz. that one thing is *being* in a greater, but another in a less degree. And for the same reason in το γαρ μαλλον και ησσον ουκ εστιν εν τοις ομοθυμοις, we must substitute συνθυμως for ομοθυμοις. But for συνθυμως εστιν εν ον κ. τ. λ., in the last part of this passage, it is obviously requisite to read ομοθυμως; the former emendations being admitted.

P. 123. l. 15., &c. Proclus, in speaking in this place of the opinion of the vulgar, who survey multitude as having a dissipated subsistence, but do not see the absurdities which must necessarily ensue from separating multitude from unity, observes as follows: Ζηναν δε προς την Παρμενιδειον θεσιν ουδε αντιβλεπειν ειχε την δε των πολλων δοξαν διηλεγχε τα πολλα και διεσπαρμενα βαρουμεναι, και ταυτην ελεγχων, ανηγεν αυτους επι το εν, τοις πολλοις ενδεικνυμενος ως ει μεν χωριζοιεν τα πολλα του ενος, πολλα και ατοπα συμβησεται τω λογω. Here instead of ανηγεν αυτους επι το εν, τοις πολλοις ενδεικνυμενος κ. τ. λ., it is necessary to read ανηγεν αυτους επι το εν τοις πολλοις, εν δεικνυμενος κ. τ. λ.; and then this passage will be, in English, "Zeno does not oppose the position of Parmenides, but confutes the opinion of the vulgar, who survey multitude and things *which are dispersed, or have a dissipated subsistence*, and elevates them to *the one* which is in the many, indicating that if the many were separated from *the one*, many absurdities would follow." For the proper ascent is from the one or the incorporeal form which multitude participates, and by which it is connected and held together, to the form or idea which is exempt from multitude, and which has a subsistence αυτο καθ' αυτο.

P. 125. l. 14. For κατ' αιτιαν εστιν εν, which is also the reading
VOL. XXIV. Cl. Jl. NO. XLVIII. Z

342. Notice of Professor Cousin's Edition

of the Harleian MS., it is requisite to read κατ' αἰτίαν πρὸς αἰτίας. But the whole passage is as follows: ἡ δὲ αἰτία τοῦ πλάθους ἐστὶ πρὸς καὶ αὐτὴ κατ' αἰτίαν τοῦ πλάθους, ὡς περὶ καὶ τὸ εἶναι αἰτίαν τῆς ἐκείνης κατ' αἰτίαν ἐστὶν ἐν. The causal subsistence of a thing is better than that thing when it has proceeded out of its cause—i. e. than when it subsists καθ' ὑπερβίον. Hence the one being the cause of union, is more excellent than union, and is therefore κατ' αἰτίαν ἐνασίς.

P. 141. l. 11., &c. ὁ καὶ Ἐμπειροκλῆς ὑπερὸν εὐρακούς, ἀπὸ Πυθαγορείου καὶ αὐτοῦ, πρὸς σφαιροῦ ἀπεικάζει τὰς τὸ κίνησον ἐφ' ἠμερῶν ἔντα, καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν συννεύει τὸν καλλοποιὸν καὶ ἐνοποιὸν θεῶν τοῦ καλλοῦ, θεῶν. So likewise the Harleian MS.; but for καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν συννεύει κ. τ. λ., I read, καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν δυνάμει συννεύει θεῶν τοῦ καλλοποιῶν καὶ ἐνοποιῶν τοῦ καλλοῦ θεῶν.

P. 154. l. 9. ἐστὶν ἀρα ἐν τῷ δημιουργικῷ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ αἰτίαν τῶν δαδημιουργημάτων, κ. τ. λ. But the Harleian MS. has, for δημιουργικῷ, δημιουργῶν, which is the true reading.

P. 156. l. 14. Proclus, in speaking of demiurgic similitude and dissimilitude (ὁμοιοῦς δημιουργικῆ καὶ ἀνομοιοῦς), says, καὶ ἡ μὲν συναγωγὴ—ἡ δὲ διακριτικὴ, προοδῶν δὲ χαιρὶ καὶ ποικιλίᾳ καὶ κινήσει κ. τ. λ.: i. e. “And the former indeed is of a collective, but the latter of a separating nature, and rejoices in progression, variety and motion.” The Harleian MS. has in this place κίνησον for κινήσει; but κινήσει is obviously the true reading. In l. 19; also of the same page, he speaks of the powers of similitude and dissimilitude, and observes: καὶ δυνάμεις ἀναλογῶν τῆ οὐσίᾳ τῆς μὲν ὡς εἶρηται, συναγωγοὶ καὶ ἐνοποιοὶ καὶ περατωτικοὶ καὶ μονοειδῆς τῆς δὲ, διακριτικοὶ καὶ αλλοιωτικοὶ, καὶ ἀπειροποιοὶ καὶ δυσειδῆς. But in this passage for δυσειδῆς, which the Harleian MS. likewise has; it is requisite to read δυοειδῆς. For as the powers of similitude are μονοειδῆς, those of dissimilitude are δυοειδῆς; that which is more excellent being every where characterised by the monad, but the less excellent by the duad.

P. 157. l. 13. μέσα δὲ, ὅσα τούτων μὴ ἐπιπλεον ἐκτείνονται, μὴ εἰς πάντα δὲ τὰ ὄντα ἐνεργεῖ τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον, εἰ βούληι, ψυχῆς μὲν ὑπάρχει, σώμασι δ' οὐ πρὸς καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀψυχῆς. In this passage the Harleian MS. has also μὴ ἐπιπλεον, but erroneously; as it should be μὲν ἐπιπλεον. For Proclus had a little before been speaking of the most generic forms, viz. essence, sameness, and difference, and also of the most special, which he denominates the monads in individuals such as man, dog, &c. (μονάδες ἐν τοῖς ἀτομοῖς) and then he observes, that the media between these, are such forms as extend farther indeed than the latter, but do not [like the former] energize on all beings. The last part of this

passage differs from the reading in the Harleian MS. For this instead of *σωμασι δ' ου πως και αυτοις τοις αψυχοις*, has *σωμασι δε πως, και αυτοις τοις αψυχοις*; which appears to be the true reading. For then Proclus will say, "For justice [which is part of these middle forms,] is indeed inherent in souls, but how is it present with bodies, and inanimate natures themselves?"

P. 169. l. 7., &c. *λογω δε οιον τα εν τω αμεθεκτω νω των εν τω μετεχομενω δευτερον των οντων ειδων απ' εκεινων.* In the Harleian MS. *δευτερον* is omitted, and also *των οντων*, so that the reading there is *των εν τω μετεχομενω ειδων απ' εκεινων.* And this appears to be the true reading.

P. 169. l. 18. *ταυτα ορθως ειρηται.* But the Harleian MS. has, very properly, *ει τονν ταυτα ορθως ειρηται*, as will be evident from a perusal of the words which immediately follow.

P. 174. l. 12. *αλλα κατα τωσουτον εκαστον τουτων λεγεται ομοιον και ανωρισον, καθ' οσον αν μεταλαγγχανοι της αυτου ομοιοτητος το μιν μαλλον, το δε ηττον.* So likewise the Harleian MS. But there is evidently an omission in this passage of *και της αυτου ομοιοτητος*, immediately after *αυτου ομοιοτητος*.

P. 184. l. 7. *τα δε νοητα την ενωσιν εχει την αυτοις πρατουσασιν και την ανωγχυτον δε αλληλων δεξιω.* Thus too the Harleian MS. But for *δεξιω*, I read *διεξιω*. So that the meaning of Proclus in this passage will be, "that intelligibles possess an union adapted to their nature, and pass through each other without confusion."

In p. 186. Proclus shows that similitude and dissimilitude participate of each other; and in line 10th observes, "that if similitude imparts itself to other things, it becomes *dissimilar* to them [because it is *different* from them]: for thus the former will impart, but the latter receive." *αλως γαρ ει μεταδιδασι τοις κλειστοις η ομοιοτης αυτης, ανομοιωσται αυτοις ου γαρ (sic Harl. MS., sed lege ουτω γαρ) αν η μιν μετεδιδου, τα δε μετελαμβανε.*

P. 188. l. 1. *Και ουτε η ομοιοτης ανομοιοτης εστιν, ουτε καθ' αυτο η ομοιοτης.* So also the Harleian MS.; but it is necessary to add after *αυτο η ομοιοτης* the words *ανομοιοτης εστι.* Thus too in l. 3., &c. of the same page, *ανομοιοτης* is wanting immediately after *ομοιοτης*. So that instead of *ουθ' ελως ομοιοτης, αλλα μετ' εχει της ανομοιοτητος καθ' ολην παντην*, we must read *ουθ' ελως ομοιοτης ανομοιοτης, αλλα μετ' εχει κ. τ. λ.* For the design of Proclus in this part of his commentary is, to demonstrate that similitude itself and dissimilitude itself participate of each other, yet so as not to confound their proper natures in the participation.

P. 192. l. 10: Proclus having observed, that the different intellectual orders are to be surveyed, in which the form of similitude subsists, adds, *και τουτο το ειδος εν εκαστω τω νω θεωρουμενον*

344 Notice of Professor Cousin's Edition

οικειως· υπερκοσμιως μιν εν τοις υπερκοσμοις· εγκοσμιως δε εν τω υπερ του κοσμου μετεχομενοις. In which passage, for υπερ του κοσμου, it is necessary to read υπο του κοσμου.

P. 193. l. 5. εκαστον δε τα λοιπα ουκ εχει, αλλ' εχει μετα τη κοινασιας και την αμιξιαν. So likewise the Harleian MS.; but for ουκ εχει, I read ουκ εστιν.

P. 194. l. 1. το γαρ κοινου τινος μετειληχος, εν εστι κατ' αυτο τουτο το κοινον· ωστε ει κοινον αυτοις το ουχ εν εσται, εν τα πολλα κατα το ουχ εν. και παλιν το ουχ εν ωσαυτως εν τω εν πασιν· εναι ταυτον. This is also the reading of the Harleian MS., but it is in more respects than one erroneous. For in the first place the punctuation is wrong in ωστε ει κοινον αυτοις το ουχ εν εσται, εν τα πολλα, κ. τ. λ., which should be ωστε ει κοινον αυτοις το ουχ εν, εσται εν τα πολλα κ. τ. λ. And in the next place, for εν τω εν πασιν εναι ταυτον, it is necessary to read εν τω εν πασιν ουχ εναι ταυτον. For the design of Proclus in this part, is to illustrate the reasoning of Zeno, in confuting those who separate *the many* from *the one*. Hence, after having observed that things which thus subsist, are *many*, in consequence of not participating of unity: for things in which unity is not predominant are many; and since it is common to them not to be one, again, they are on this account one,—he then adds, “For that which participates of a certain something which is common, is one through this something common: so that if the not being one is common to *the many*, *the many* will be one, through the not-one [being common to them.] And again in a similar manner they will not be one, in consequence of there not being in all of them the same thing [because where there is the same thing in the many, there is a participation of unity.]” For sameness, as it is accurately defined by Aristotle in the 6th book of his *Metaphysics*, is a *participation of unity*.

P. 195. l. 15. και το αυτοζων προς το ζων. So likewise the Harleian MS. But for προς το ζων, it is necessary to read προς το αζων. This will be evident from what Proclus says prior to this. For a little before, he had observed, that each of us is both one and many, and that we are evidently so through a similitude to the universe. And he then adds, πολλω γαρ προτερον ο κοσμος ουτος ο παμμεγας εις εστι και πολυς· πολυς μιν, ου κατα τα σωματικον μονον· και κατα τουτο μιν γαρ τοσαυτην εχον εξαλλαγην, οσην το αιδιον προς το φθαρτον, και το αυλον προς το ενυλον, και το αυτοζων προς το ζων [αζων], απο της οικειας συστασεως.

P. 198. l. 20. και γαρ το ενοποιον του πληθους περας εστιν, αλλ' ουκ αναπαλιν. This is also the reading of the Harleian

MS. But after *περας εστιν*, it is requisite to add, *και το πληθο-
πών απειροποιον εστιν*; and after *ανακαλιν* to add, *το απειροποιον
πληθοποιον εστι*. This will be obvious to the Platonic reader,
from an inspection of the reasoning of Proclus in this place.

P. 205. l. 5., &c. *επ' αυτην την τελευτατην ο Σωκρατης αναδει-
ραμικεν υποθεσιν περι της κοινωνιας των ειδων, και συγκρινεσθαι παντα
ειπων ταυτα γαρ υπαρχειν αμα, αμφω δε τοις θειοις εκεινοις πραγμα-
σιν, ενωσιν τε ασυγχυτον και διακρισιν αδιαιρετον, ινα και εν αλληλοις
η και σωζη την καθαροτητα την εαυτων*. So the Harleian MS.; but
after *των ειδων*, it is necessary to add *διακρινεσθαι*; and after
διακρισιν αδιαιρετον, something is obviously wanting, and this
I conjecture to be the word *παρρχουσι*. So that what
Proclus says will be, in English, as follows: "Socrates
recurs to the most perfect hypothesis concerning the com-
munion of forms, asserting that all of them are separated
from, and yet mingled with each other. For these properties
are at one and the same time present with them. And both
these impart to those divine things, unconfused union, and an
indivisible separation or distinction, in order that they may subsist
in each other, and yet preserve their own purity." But that it
is necessary to add *διακρινεσθαι* in the place above mentioned, is
evident from the following text of Plato, the beginning of the
Commentary on which, is the passage I have quoted: *εαν δε τις
ωι δη εγω ελεγον, πρωτον μιν διαιρηται χωρις αυτα καθ' αυτα τα
ειδη, οιον ομοιοτητα τε και ανομοιοτητα, και πληθος και το εν, και
στασιν, και κινησιν, και παντα τα τοιαυτα: ειτα εν αυτοις ταυτα δυνα-
μενα συγκερανθησθαι τε και διακρινεσθαι αποφανη, αγαμμη αν εγωγε
θαυμαστας, εφη, ω Ζηνων*.

P. 205. l. 19. *ταυτην ουν ζητει την συγκρασιν ο Σωκρατης μετα
της διακρισεως ιδειν επι των αμερων και νοητων υποστασεων, και επι
ταυτην προκαλειται τους ανδρας: και ταυτην αγαται την θεωριαν την
νιζουσαν αμα και διακρινουσαν τας νοητας δυναμεις των αισθητων,
ομοιοτητα εκεινη και ανομοιοτητα, πληθος το εκει και το εν, στασιν την
θειαν και κινησιν*. In this passage for *αισθητων*, which is also the
reading of the Harleian MS., it is necessary to substitute *νοητων*.
This is evident from the above words of Plato, in which, as
Proclus justly observes, Socrates is represented as admiring the
theory which unites and at the same time separates the intellec-
tual powers of intelligibles; which powers are similitude and dissimilitude, the multitude and the one which are there, and divine
permanency and motion.

P. 206. l. 12. *και το ισταμενον εν τινι εστιν ενι, και παν το κιν-
ουμενον εξισταται του ενος, ωστε τα πολλα ει μη μετεχοι τινος ενος,
αστατα εστι: και παλιν ει αυτο τουτο εχοι κοινον το μη μετεχειν τινος, εν*

346 Notice of Professor Cousin's Edition

τινι εσται. So the Harleian MS. But for παν το ισταμενον εν τι κ. τ. λ. it is necessary to read παν το ισταμενον εν τινι κ. τ. λ. "every thing which stands still is in a certain thing." And for το μη μετεχειν τινος, εν τινι εσται, it is requisite to read, το μη μετεχειν τινος, εν τινι εσται, "if it is common to the many, not to participate of a certain one, they will be in a certain thing." For that which is common comprehends the multitude to which it is common.

P. 208. l. 15. ει δε και εδραζει τον ολον κοσμον κ. τ. λ. In the Harleian MS., by an unaccountable mistake, these words, and all that follows, are omitted, as far as to the words ταυτα μιν ευνεηθη κ. τ. λ. in l. 19. p. 212.; and then all that is here omitted is to be found in what follows in p. 220., after the words οτι εξεκαταστη ημιας ως κ. τ. λ., in the last line of that page.¹

P. 209. l. 1. ει δε και, ως φησιν εκεινος, οιον ζωη των κοσμητων εστιν η κινησις. So the Harleian MS.; but for ασωματων it is necessary to read σωματων. For Proclus is here citing the well-known saying of Aristotle, "that motion is as it were the life of bodies."

P. 209. l. 14. αλλ' οτι μιν εστιν οικη και στασις και κινησις, θηλον δια τούτων, και ως η μιν εστι το αιωνιον της δημιουργικης νοησεως και το της προνοιας ενεργον. But for προνοιας in this passage the Harleian MS. has ενεργιας, which I have no doubt is the true reading: for as permanency is the perpetuity of demiurgic intellection, so motion is that which gives efficacy to the energy of the Demiurgus.

P. 216. l. 15. τελευταιον τονν τε, ω Ζηνων, δια της ανακλιμασεως προσρησιν εμφανει της επιστημης αυτου κ. τ. λ. So the Harleian MS. But for προσρησιν I read προκλησιν.

P. 221. Proclus, speaking of Pythodorus, one of the persons of the dialogue, says of him; ουδε φιλοσοφος εστι κατα το ηθος, ουδε σοφιστικος, αυτος γουν την συνουσιαν απαγγελων, ουδε το εαυτου καδος απεκρυψε, ινα πασιν εξαγγελη την ζωην και εκβρη των ως την πρωτην ουσιαν τετελεκοτων. This is likewise the reading of the Harleian MS.; but instead of εις την πρωτην ουσιαν it is necessary

¹ Thus too in the Commentaries of Proclus on the Timæus, as I have observed in my translation of that admirable work, after the words δε και το λογιον υδροβατηρας καλει τους θεους ταυτους (p. 270), the words τε δε οντως και δια ταυτα immediately follow, which belong to the Commentary in p. 266. And the part which should immediately follow υδροβατηρας, and begins with επι δε των επομενων τοις θεοις γινωσκ, is to be found in p. 272. line 6. from the bottom.

to read *εις την πρώτην συνουσίαν*, as will be evident from a perusal of the commentary of Proclus on the Introductory part of the Parmenides.

P. 223. l. 2. Proclus having observed, that Socrates could not endure to remain in visible objects, nor to be busily employed in the monads which are coarranged with them, adds, *αλλ' ἐπ' αυτας τας αἰλους και αμεριστους και νοερας μοναδας αναφεραντος τον εαυτου νοου, και απο της προοδου της κατα το πληθος, κατα δε τινα κυκλον, ἐπ' αυτο παλιν το εν ποιουμενου τα θεια τα μετα την γονιμον δυναμιν των δευτερων, της προοδου το περας, επι την οικειαν αρχην ανεπισσονται.* So also the Harleian MS. But after the words *ἐπ' αυτο παλιν το εν ποιουμενου*, I conceive the words *την επιστροφην μιμουμενου* are wanting. So that the whole passage in English, thus amended, will be: "But elevating his intellect to the immaterial, impartible, and intellectual monads, and from a progression according to multitude; and in a certain circle again making a regression to the one itself; [in so doing] imitating divine natures, who after the prolific power of secondary natures convolve the end of the progression to the proper principle of it." For in every divine order there are *μονη, προοδος, και επιστροφη, permanency, progression, and regression.*

P. 223. l. 12. *οικεια γαρ τοις μεν πατρικοις και μοναδικοις δευτεροις απο τούτων η γονιμος δυναμις, και η μεχρι του πληθους.* So likewise the Harleian MS. But after *πατρικοις και μοναδικοις*, it is requisite to add *η μονη*, and also after *δευτεροις* to add *δε*. So that this passage will be in English, conformably to what we have above observed of every divine order, as follows: "For permanency is adapted to paternal and monadic natures, but prolific power, and a progression as far as to multitude, to the natures which are secondary to these."

In the last line of the same page, I conceive with the Professor, that *ποιουσι* is wanting after the word *συναρτην*. And there is the same deficiency in the Harleian MS.