On the Immortality of the Soul.

in mystic order: such as might be expected from devotees to the sacred theory of numbers.

Finally, that the conjoint symbol was a figure, connected with, and perhaps represented and explained in, the mysteries, is corroborated by another representation.

There is a plate in Denon where, surrounded by a circle, and placed upon a sceptre, it forms the terminating point of a flight of fourteen steps (a mystic number) to which a procession of as many priests is directing its approach. It is placed exactly as if to imply, that it is the grand object of the procession: and the figure of the Hierophant Hermes, known by his Ibis head, waiting its arrival, indicates beyond dispute an Initiation.

That connected with this indication and with the sceptre and globe, it may possess another meaning than that which I have assigned, I shall not dispute. New combinations of figure produced, without doubt, a different interpretation. Besides, the signs themselves were cabalistical; that is, they involved variety of meaning, according as the analysis was theological, philosophical, or physical.

I shall not therefore object to those, who may discover the Egyptian trinity in the object of this initiation, referring the helm-surmounted eye, to the governing mind, the tongue to wisdom or the Logos, and the volute to the universal soul or Binah of the Jews.

Should these remarks correspond with the general tenor of your Classical miscellany, I will enter more fully on that interesting, but hitherto unproductive, field of speculation, the Hieroglyphical Language.

Cleronomus.

Platonic Demonstration of the Immortality of the Soul.

Part 1.

Plato has demonstrated the immortality of the rational soul in three of his dialogues, viz. in the Phædo, in the 10th book

There are five arguments in the Phædo for the immortality of the soul, the fifth of which properly and fully demonstrates it from the essence of the soul. See the notes to my translation of that dialogue.
of his Republic, and in the Phædrus. But though the arguments employed by him in each of these dialogues, in proof of this most important truth, will be found to possess, by those that understand them, incontrovertible evidence; yet, it appears to me that this is peculiarly the case with the reasoning in the Phædrus, which is not only, in the language of Plato, accompanied by geometrical necessities, but is at once admirably subtle and singularly sublime.

As this reasoning is most perspicuously developed by the Platonic Hermeas in his Scholia on the Phædrus, I shall give a translation of his elucidations, and also of the text of Plato, on which these elucidations are a comment. The words of Plato are as follow:

"Every soul is immortal: for that which is always moved is immortal. But that which moves another thing, and is moved by another, in consequence of having a cessation of motion, has also a cessation of life. Hence that alone which moves itself, because it does not desert itself, never ceases to be moved; but this is also the fountain and principle of motion, to such other things as are moved. But principle is unbegotten. For it is necessary that every thing which is generated, should be generated from a principle, but that the principle itself should not be generated from any one thing. For if it were generated from a certain thing, it would not be generated from principle. Since, therefore, it is unbegotten, it is also necessary that it should be incorruptible. For the principle being destroyed, it could neither itself be generated from another thing, nor another thing be generated from it, since it is necessary that all things should be generated from principle. Hence, the principle of motion is that which moves itself: and this can neither be destroyed, nor generated. For otherwise, all heaven and all generation falling together must stop, and would never again have any thing, from whence being moved, they would be generated. Since then it appears, that the nature which is moved by itself is immortal, he who asserts that this is the essence and definition of soul, will have no occasion to blush. For every body, to which motion externally accedes, is inanimate. But that to which motion is inherent from itself, is animated; as if this were the very nature of soul. If this however be the case, and there is nothing else which moves itself except soul, it necessarily follows that soul is unbegotten and immortal."

The following are the elucidations of Hermeas:

"In the first place, it must be inquired about what kind of soul Plato is speaking. For some, among which is the Stoic Po-
sidonius, are of opinion that it is alone about the soul of the world, because it is said πασα, and it is added a little after, 'all heaven and all generation falling together must stop.' But others say, that is simply concerning every soul, so as to include the soul of an ant, and a fly. And this was the opinion of Harpocration. For he understands the word πασα, as pertaining to every soul. If however, it be requisite neither to restrict the problem, nor to extend it simply to all animals, we must assume from Plato himself, what kind of soul it is, of which he is now speaking. He says therefore, that it is necessary in the first place to speak about the nature of soul both the divine and the human, i.e. about every rational soul; so that the present discourse is concerning the rational soul. To which we may add, that the ancients are accustomed to call the rational soul, that which is properly soul. For they call that which is above it, intellect, and that which is beneath it, not simply soul, but the irrational life, or the animation of the spirit, the life which is distributed about bodies, and the like. But they denominated the rational part that which is properly soul. For Plato also calls the rational soul, that which is properly man. He previously, however, enunciates the conclusion, since he is about to make the demonstrations, from things which are essentially inherent in the soul, and which pertain to it, so far as it is soul. On this account therefore, he first enunciates the conclusion, indicating by so doing that the διοτι, or the why, is contracledly comprehended in the oti, or the that. For the soul possesses the immortal from its essence. Hence, prior to the evolved, divided, and expanded demonstration, he gives the contracted and that which contains the why together with the that. But there are here, two demonstrative syllogisms, through which the immortality of the soul is demonstrated, and which directly prove that it is so; and there is also another syllogism which demonstrates this, through a deduction to an impossibility. Why, however, is there this number of syllogisms? For the intention of Plato, was not simply to adduce a multitude of arguments, since in this case he would have employed many others, as he does in the Phædo; but he employs such as are adapted to each subject of discussion. For now, as we have already observed, he adduces arguments derived from the essence of the soul, and from things which are essentially inherent in it. In answer to this it must be said, that since it is proposed to demonstrate that the soul is

1 For τω ὁτι here, it is necessary to read τω ὅτι.
2 The same reading as the above, must also be adopted here.
immortal, if we see how many modes there are of corruption, and show that the soul is not corrupted according to any one of these, we shall then have demonstrated that it is incorruptible and indestructible, and it will also be evident that it is immortal. For every thing that is corrupted, is corrupted in a twofold respect. For either it is itself corrupted by itself, through the matter which it contains, or it is corrupted externally. Thus for instance wood, by alone lying on the ground, is corrupted through the putrefaction which is in itself: for it contains in itself the cause of its corruption; as Plato also says in the Republic, that every thing which is corrupted, is corrupted by its own appropriate evil. But it may also be corrupted externally, by being burnt, and cut. Since, therefore, there are two modes of corruption, on this account Plato adduces two syllogisms. For one of these demonstrates, that the soul is not corrupted by itself, which he shows through its being self-moved and perpetually moved; but the other syllogism demonstrates that neither is the soul corrupted by any thing else, which he shows through its being the principle of motion.

Shall we say, therefore, that each of these syllogisms is imperfect, but that the demonstration derives perfection from both? Or shall we say, that in either of them the other is comprehended, but that the peculiarity of each, previously presents itself to the view? For that which is not corrupted by itself, cannot be corrupted by another thing. For having itself in itself, the cause of preserving itself, and always being present with itself, how can it be corrupted by any thing else? For that which is self-motive is a thing of this kind, as will be demonstrated. And how can that which is not corrupted by another thing, but is the principle and cause of other things being preserved, be corrupted by itself? For the principle of motion will be demonstrated to be a thing of this kind. For neither will it be corrupted by the things which are above it, since it is preserved by them, nor by the things posterior to itself, since it is the cause of their being and life. If, therefore, it cannot be corrupted by any thing, how, since it is the fountain of life, can it be corrupted by itself? Hence, as we have said, each of the arguments is of itself perfect, and comprehends in itself the other. But one of them shows, and is characterized by this, that the soul is not corrupted by itself; and the other by this, that the soul is not corrupted by any other thing. Let us however, in the first place, arrange the prepositions of the syllogisms, and afterwards consider the development of them.

The first syllogism therefore, is as follows: The soul is self-moved. That which is self-moved is perpetually moved.
That which is perpetually moved is immortal. The soul, therefore, is immortal. Hence this reasoning shows us that the soul is not corrupted by itself. But the second syllogism is, the soul is self-moved. That which is self-moved is the principle of motion. The principle of motion is unbegotten. The unbegotten is incorruptible. The incorruptible is immortal. The soul, therefore, is immortal. And this reasoning demonstrates to us that the soul is not corrupted by a certain other thing. The truth of the assumptions, therefore, we shall accurately discuss in what follows. But now considering the first and common proposition of the two syllogisms by itself, that the soul is self-moved, and which Plato arranges in the last place of the whole reasoning, let us survey how that which is self-moved is the first of things that are moved, especially since no casual man doubts concerning the existence of the self-motive essence. And perhaps it will be found that the philosophers do not dissent from each other. For Aristotle indeed takes away all corporeal motions from the soul, which we also say is most true. But Plato clearly shows that the motions of the soul are different from all the corporeal motions. For he says in the 10th book of the Laws, “that soul conducts every thing in the heavens, the earth, and the sea, by its motions, the names of which are to will, to consider, to attend providentially to other things, to consult, to opine rightly and falsely, together with rejoicing, grieving, daring, fearing, hating and loving.” That there is, therefore, a certain principle of motion, and that it is that which is self-moved, will be from hence evident. For as it is manifest that there is that which is alter-motive, this will either be moved by another alter-motive nature, and that by another, and so on to infinity; or alter-motive natures will move each other in a circle, so that the first will again be moved by the last; or, if it is not possible that either of these modes can take place, it is necessary that the self-motive nature must have the precedence. It is evident, therefore, that motive natures cannot proceed to infinity: for neither is there the infinite in essence, nor is there any science of infinites. But neither is it possible for motive natures to be in a circle. For the order of beings would be subverted, and the same thing would be both cause and effect; so that it is necessary there should be a certain principle of motion, and that motion should neither be to infinity, nor in a circle. This principle of motion, however, which, according to both the philosophers, is soul, Plato says is self-moved, but Aristotle immovable.

\[\text{i.e. Aristotle.}\]
But that it is necessary this principle of motion should be demonstrated to be self-moved, even from the dogmas of Aristotle, you may learn from hence. In all beings nature does not proceed without a medium from a contrary to a contrary, as, for instance, from winter to summer; but it is entirely requisite that a medium should precede, at one time spring, and at another time autumn; and the like takes place in all bodies and incorporeal essences. Here, likewise, as there is the alter-motive and the immovable nature, it is necessary there should be a medium which is the self-moving essence, being one and the same in number, and in subject. For that which Aristotle calls the self-moving nature, as, for instance, the animal, is not that which is now proposed for investigation. For the animal, according to him, being composed of the immovable and the alter-motive, he says that the whole is self-moving. So that, as there is which is entirely immovable, such, for instance, as the principle of all things, and as there is that which is alter-motive, such as bodies, there will be between them the self-moving nature, which will be nothing else than soul. For that which we see moved by it, this we say is animated, so that this is the very nature of soul, itself to move itself. There are, therefore, these three things according to Aristotle, viz. intellect, life, and being; and in the first place, that we may speak of being, as there is something which is generated from another thing and which receives existence from another, there is also that which imparts existence to itself, such as the heaven and intellects, which he says always exist unbegotten by any other cause. For, according to him they are neither generated by a cause, as neither are they generated in time, but they are always unbegotten, and the causes of existence to themselves. And again, in life there is that which receives life from other things, for man generates man; and there are also things which have life from themselves, such as again, the heaven and intellect. For they have not an adscititious, but a connascent life. Farther still, as there are things which receive from others the power of intellectual perception, and become through them intellective, as the intellect which is in capacity, according to Aristotle, there is also intellect which is in energy, which possesses from itself intellectual perception, and intellectually perceives itself. Hence from all this it follows, that as there is

And this intellect in energy is the medium between the intelligible, properly so called, which is superior to intellect, and the intellect which is in capacity.
that which is moved by another thing, there is also necessarily that which is the cause to itself of being moved, and imparts self-motion to itself. For, otherwise, it would be absurd to pass entirely from the alter-motive to the immovable without assuming that which is self-moved as the medium, in the same manner as it is absurd to pass from that which is generated, and which only sometimes exists, to that which is super-essential non-being, without assuming being as the medium. For it will be immanifest what kind of non-being we assume, whether that which is inferior to a generated nature, or that which is superior to it, unless we assume the intermediate nature, which is eternal being. Thus, likewise, in motion, it will be immanifest, what kind of the immovable we assume, whether that which is subordinate, or that which is superior to the alter-motive nature, unless the self-moved is assumed as a medium. And the like takes place in life, intellect, and other things.

This self-motive motion, therefore, is demonstrated by the philosopher in the Laws, to be the first principle of all other motions, and the cause of them according to all the significations of cause. For it is the effective, the paradigmatic, and the final cause of them, which are alone properly causes. For the formal cause is in the effect, and is the effect itself. And the material cause is much more remote from being properly cause; since it has the relation of things without which others are not effected. Hence, that the self-moved nature is the effective cause of other motions is evident, as Plato demonstrates in the Laws. "For if all things, says he, should stand still, what would that be which would be first moved?" Is it not evident that it must be the self-moved nature? For if that which accedes to the motive cause is moved, and all other beings are alter-motive, but that which is self-motive possesses in itself a motive power, and does not merely approximate to it, but is united to it, or rather, has motion for its essence, it is evident that this, being first moved, will move other things. For as, if the sun did not set and rise, but was immovable, we should be dubious what is the cause of so great a light, and if he were invisible to the things which he illuminates, we should be still more dubious; thus also, with respect to the soul, since being incorporeal it is the cause of all motions, it occasions us to doubt how this is effected. As, therefore, the sun who illuminates all

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1 Because it is that from which or in which, other things are effected.
2 This is on the supposition that all things stand still.
Platonic Demonstration of things, much more makes himself luminous, thus, likewise, the soul, which moves all things by a much greater priority, moves itself. For every cause begins its energy from itself; and you will find that the motions of the soul are the paradigms of corporeal motions.

Let us then assume the corporeal motions; but these are eight in number, being rather passive than effective; viz. generation, corruption, increase, diminution, lation, circulation, mixture, and separation. In the soul, therefore, there is increase, when giving itself to more excellent natures it multiplies its intellects. But there is then corruption in it; when departing from thence it becomes more imbecile, and more sluggish in its intellectual perceptions. Again, generation takes place in it when it ascends from this terrene abode. But the corruption of it is its last lapse from the intelligible. And mixture, indeed, in it, is collected intelligence, and at the same time the contemplation of forms. But separation in it may be said to be a more partial intelligence, and the contemplation of one form only. Again, lation in the soul is the motion of it according to a right line, and into the realms of generation. But circulation in it is its periodic revolution about forms, its evolution, and its restitution to the same condition. Circulation, therefore, may be more appropriately assigned to divine souls, but lation to ours. You may also perceive in divine souls both these motions. For the Demiurgus, says Plato in the Timaeus, taking two right lines, bent them into a circle. Hence it is evident that the circular inflection and intelligence of souls is not without the right line. For it pertains to intellect alone to be purely moved in a circle. But the ninth motion, which is that of incorporeal natures about bodies, such as calefactions, or refrigerations, or animations, has a paradigmatic cause in the soul, so far as the soul gives life to bodies.

And thus we have sufficiently shown that there are motions of souls, which are the paradigms of corporeal motions. It remains, therefore, to demonstrate that the motions of the soul are the final causes of other motions. For immortality is not pre-

1 For this is, as it were, a new birth of the soul.

2 The demonstration of this is wanting in the original. For in the original after λιπται ἔγκαι τεῖκνας ἐντὸς αὐτὸς αὐτοίζων, there immediately follows εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν χρυσόμων καὶ τὸν, which evidently implies that something preceding is wanting. And it is obvious from the translation of what follows, that there is no demonstration of the motions of the soul being the final causes of other mo-
the Immortality of the Soul.

dicated of the soul, as a certain other thing, but is co-essentialised in the very essence of it, and unically comprehends the whole demonstration. For immortality is a certain life in the same manner as self-motion. Plato, therefore, afterwards ad-
duces an evolved and expanded demonstration, when he says, "for that which is always moved is immortal," &c. omitting to say that the soul is self-moved, as being common to the two syllogisms, and intending to introduce it as the last of the four arguments, where also we may more accurately investigate it. Now, however, prior to the discussion of the parts of the first arguments, let us logically adapt the words themselves of Plato to the propositions.

All the propositions, therefore, of the syllogisms are three. The soul is self-moved: the self-moved is always moved: that which is always moved is immortal. But as we have said, the first and smallest of all the propositions, which says the soul is self-moved, is ranked as the last. For the third and greatest of all of them is placed first, as being connective of the whole reasoning; and this is that in which Plato says, "for that which is always moved is immortal." But the proposition posterior to this, which says, that which is self-moved is always moved, is introduced through the contrary, the alter-motive, together with demonstration. For Plato here says: "But that which moves another thing, and is moved by another," i.e. the alter-motive nature, "in consequence of having a cessation of motion," i.e. not being always moved, "has also a cessation of life," i.e. is not immortal. If, therefore, that which is moved by another, in conse-
quence of not being always moved, is not immortal, that which is self-moved, being always moved, is immortal. All the propo-
sitions, however, are assumed essentially, and so far as each of them is that which it is. For from that which is moved by ano-
ther, it is not only demonstrated that the self-moved is always moved, but also that the always-moving is self-moving; so that they convert, as for instance, the self-moved is always moved, and the always-moving is self-moving. For if that which is moved by another has a cessation of motion, i.e. if the alter-
motive is not always-moving, it will be evident that the always-

motions. It may, however, be summarily shown as follows, that the motion of the soul are the final causes of other motions. The motions of the soul are, as has been demonstrated, the effective causes of other motions. Every thing desires good. Good is proximately imparted.
it is evident that the always-moving is not alter-motive. But that which is not alter-motive is self-motive. And from the words, "because it does not desert itself," it is collected, that every thing which is always-moving is self-moving. For if the alter-motive is likewise always-moving, it is in consequence of subsisting in conjunction with the motive cause. Much more, therefore, will that which is self-moving be always-moving, because it is not only always present with itself, but is united to itself.

ON THE ORIGIN OF THE DRAMA.

The origin of the Drama has been assigned to various periods and various causes; but, as it would seem, without such definite precision of inference and such force of evidence, as are necessary to make it no longer a question. In tracing the drama to the mysteries, I should perhaps be wrong to presume on any striking originality, but, I may venture to say that, although this mode of accounting for the origin of the stage may have been previously broached as a surmise, it has hitherto never assumed the mature form of a regular hypothesis.

We have very few glimmerings of light to direct our search for the origin of the drama in Greece. All that we collect with any certainty is, that it was introduced originally to the public under a very unnatural and inelegant form, and that a perambulating stage, in no degree better than similar contrivances of our tumblers and mountebanks, was the humble cradle in which Melpomene and Thalia first made their appearance before the Grecian world.

Nevertheless there is reason for pronouncing, on a slight examination of their features, however disguised by so unworthy a garb, that the same superstition which fabricated the Pagan mythology was their parent, and that the Pagan Hierarchy was the Lucina who presided at their birth. It appears, indeed, that the abuses of the original comedy, or rather farce (for in its original state it resembled more what we have since designated by that name), were of a very undisguised complexion. The gestures and actions of the by-standers were mimicked with the grossest caricature, and their lives and characters laid open, to the lash of scorn with the most unsparing scurrility. Now it is well known that the particular branch of Poetry called