

cru le retrouver dans le sébestier (*cordia mira*), dont le fruit visqueux est tout différent. M. Delisle a été plus heureux : ayant observé dans un jardin du Caire un individu de l'arbre appelé par Linnæus *ximenia aegyptiaca*, il lui trouva la plupart des caractères du perséa : une hauteur de dix-huit à vingt pieds, des branches épineuses, des feuilles ovales persistantes, longues d'un pouce à dix-huit lignes, traits qui ont pu donner lieu à la comparaison avec le poirier ; un fruit de la forme d'une datte, doux lorsqu'il est mûr, contenant un noyau un peu ligneux, etc. Parvenu dans la haute Egypte, M. Delisle en rencontra deux autres, et il apprit, par les habitans des contrées supérieures, que l'espèce est commune en Nubie et en Abyssinie, et très-estimée dans le Darfour ; cependant il n'a pu savoir si le cœur du bois est noir comme le disent les anciens de leur perséa.

Cet arbre se nomme aujourd'hui, en Nubie, *eglig*. M. Delisle lui trouve des différences assez marquées pour le séparer des autres *ximenia*, et il en fait un genre sous le nom de *balanites*.

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On the philosophical meaning of the words βίος, κίνημα, ενεργημα, and αίσθημα.

The following explanations satisfactorily show the necessity of studying the commentaries of the Platonic and Peripatetic philosophers that have been preserved to us, as the accurate signification of the above words is only in these writings to be obtained.

Concerning the first of these words therefore, Proclus observes as follows in Tim. p. 229, Ψυχῆς γὰρ οικειοτάτος ὁ βίος. εἰ δεποτε καὶ ἐπὶ νοῦ λεγοίτο, καθάπερ ἐν Φιληβῳ, τὴν ιδιοτητα σημαίνει τῆς ζωῆς. δύο γὰρ ὁ βίος ταῦτα δηλοῖ, τὸ, τὸ ἴδιον ἐκαστοῦ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος, καὶ τὴν ἀνελιξίν τῆς αἰρεσιῶς ἀφ' ἧς ἔχει τὴν προοδόν. λέγεται οὐκ κυρίως μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν ψυχῶν. ἐν ταῦταις γὰρ ἡ ἀνελιξις. i. e. "The life signified by the word βίος is most adapted to the soul. For if at any time this word is used in speaking of intellect, as in the Philebus, it signifies the peculiarity of the life. For βίος manifests these two things, viz. the peculiar form of each life, and the evolution of the choice, from which it has its progression. It is properly, therefore, asserted of souls : for in these there is an evolution [of choice]." What is here said by Proclus, that βίος signifies the evolution of choice, is confirmed by the following passage from the 10th book of the Republic of Plato. Ἀναγκῆς θυγατρὸς κορῆς Λαχεσσεως λογος. Ψυχαὶ ἐφημεροὶ, ἀρχὴ ἄλλης περιόδου θνητοῦ γένους θανατηφόρου οὐχ ἡμᾶς δαιμον λήξεται, ἀλλ' ἡμῶν δαιμονα αἰρησεσθε' πρῶτος δ' ὁ λαχων, πρῶτος αἰρεσθῶν βίον, ὡ συνεσται ἐξ ἀναγκῆς ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδύσποτον, ἢ

τίμων και κτήμαζων, πλεον και ελαττον αυτης εκαστος εξει' αυτην ελαμ-
 νου' θεος αναιτιος. i. e. "The speech of the virgin Lachesis, the
 daughter of Necessity: Souls of a day! The beginning of another
 period of men of mortal race. The dæmon shall not receive you
 as his lot, but you shall *choose* the dæmon. He who draws the
 first, let him first make *choice of a life* (βιος), to which he must
 of necessity adhere. Virtue is independent, which every one
 shall partake of more or less, according as he honors or dis-
 honors her: the cause is in him who makes the *choice*, and God
 is blameless." The evolution of lives which follows this speech,
 is therefore evidently the evolution of choice. And the word βιος
 perpetually occurs in the whole of what is said by Plato about the
 different lives of the human soul.

In the next place, we are informed by Simplicius in his Com-
 mentary on the 6th book of Aristotle's Physics p. 230, that κίνημα
 signifies *the boundary or end of motion*. For he says, ομοιωσ δε και
 το νυν του χρονου, και το κίνημα της κινήσεως. καλουσι γαρ ούτω το
 της κινήσεως περας. i. e. "The *now* of time, and the κίνημα of
 motion, are similar. For thus the end or boundary of motion is
 called." In like manner ενεργημα, which occurs in Proclus on the
 Parmenides, and also on the Timæus, is *the boundary of energy*.
 For in the latter of these Commentaries p. 233, he says, λογου δε
 ενεργημα το λεγειν, ως του το νοειν, ως φυσικως το φθειν. i. e. "To speak
 is the ενεργημα of reason, in the same manner as to perceive intel-
 lectually is the ενεργημα of intellect, and to germinate, of nature."
 Thus too, in the last place, αισθημα, which occurs in the MS.
 Commentary of Proclus on the Parmenides, is the boundary of
 αισθησις, or sensible perception. And as αισθημα, being the termi-
 nation of sensible perception, is an impression of it in the senso-
 rium, that which is analagous to this must be conceived to take
 place in κίνημα and ενεργημα. For the *now*, or an instant, is, as it
 were, an *evanescent impression* of time, and κίνημα may be said to
 be an *impression* of motion. For the latter is analagous to a point
 which marks the end of the flux of a line on another line.

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On Mr. Bellamy's Translation of the latter part of the 9th and 19th Chapters of Genesis.

In his translation of these two passages, Mr. Bellamy has
 entirely done away the account of Noah's drunkenness, and of
 Lot's incest. Will any of your readers oblige the world with a
minute criticism of the alterations in question? Mr. Bellamy has