THE
SAMKHYA PHILOSOPHY

CONTAINING
(1) SÂMKHYA-PRAVACHANA SÛTRAM, WITH THE VRITTI OF ANIRUDDHA,
AND THE BHÂSYA OF VIJNÂNA BHIKŠU AND EXTRACTS
FROM THE VRITTI-SÂRA OF MAHÂDEVA VEDANTIN;
(2) TATVA SAMÂSA;
(3) SÂMKHYA KÂRIKÂ;
(4) PANCHÂŚIKHÂ SÛTRAM.

TRANSLATED BY
NANDALAL SINHA, M.A., B.L., P.C.S.
DEPUTY MAGISTRATE, DALTONGANJ.

PUBLISHED BY
SUDHINDRA NATH VASU,
THE PÂÑINI OFFICE, BHUVANESWARî ÂŚRAMA, BAHADURGANJ,
Allahabad
PRINTED BY APURVA KRISHNA BOSE, AT THE INDIAN PRESS
1915
PREFACE.

The present volume of the *Sacred Books of the Hindus* which bears the modest title of the *Sāmkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram*, is, in reality, a collection of all the available original documents of the School of the Sāmkhyas, with the single exception of the commentary composed by Vyāsa on the *Sāmkhya-Pravachana-Yoga-Sūtram* of Patañjali. For it contains in its pages not only the *Sāmkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram* of Kapila together with the *Vṛitti* of Aniruddha, the *Bhāṣya* of Vijñāna Bhikṣu, and extracts of the original portions from the *Vṛtti-tīrtha* of Vedāntin Mahādeva, but also the *Tattva-Samāsa* together with the commentary of Narendra, the *Sāmkhya-Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with profuse annotations based on the *Bhāṣya* of Gaudapāda and the *Tattva-Kaumudi* of Vāchspatī Miśra, and a few of the Aphorisms of Pañcha-sīkha with explanatory notes according to the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* which has quoted them. An attempt, moreover, has been made to make the volume useful in many other respects by the addition, for instance, of elaborate analytical tables of contents to the *Sāmkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram* and the *Sāmkhya-Kārikā*, and of a number of important appendices.

In the preparation of this volume, I have derived very material help from the excellent editions of the *Vṛitti* of Aniruddha and the *Bhāṣya* of Vijñāna Bhikṣu on the *Sāmkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram* by Dr. Richard Garbe, to whom my thanks are due. And, in general, I take this opportunity of acknowledging my indebtedness to all previous writers on the Sāmkhya, living and dead, from whose writings I have obtained light and leading in many important matters connected with the subject.

An introduction only now remains to be written. It is proposed, however, to write a separate monogram on the Sāmkhya Darśana, which would be historical, critical and comparative, in its scope and character. In this preface, therefore, only a very brief account is given of some of the cardinal doctrines of the Sāmkhya School.

The first and foremost among these is the *Sat-Kārya-Siddhānta* or the *Established Tenet of Existent Effect*. It is the Law of the Identity of Cause and Effect: what is called the cause is the unmanifested state of what is called the effect, and what is called the effect is only the manifested state of what...
is called the cause; their substance is one and the same; differences of manifestation and non-manifestation give rise to the distinctions of Cause and Effect. The effect, therefore, is never non-existent; whether before its production, or whether after its destruction, it is always existent in the cause. For, nothing can come out of nothing, and nothing can altogether vanish out of existence.

This doctrine would be better understood by a comparison with the contrary views held by other thinkers on the relation of cause and effect. But before we proceed to state these views, we should define the terms "cause" and "effect." One thing is said to be the cause of another thing, when the latter cannot be without the former. In its widest sense, the term, Cause, therefore, denotes an agent, an act, an instrument, a purpose, some material, time, and space. In fact, whatever makes the accomplishment of the effect possible, is one of its causes. And the immediate result of the operation of these causes, is their effect. Time and Space, however, are universal causes, inasmuch as they are presupposed in each and every act of causation. The remaining causes fall under the descriptions of "Material," "Efficient," "Formal," and "Final."

Aristotelian Division of Causes.
The Sāmkhya Division.

The Śāmkhyas further reduce them to two descriptions only, viz., Upādāna, i.e., the material, which the Naiyāyikas call Samavāyī or Combinative or Constitutive, and Nīmitta, i.e., the efficient, formal, and final, which may be variously, though somewhat imperfectly, translated as the instrumental, efficient, occasional, or conditional, because it includes the instruments with which, the agent by which, the occasion on which, and the conditions under which, the act is performed. Obviously, there is a real distinction between the Upādāna and the Nīmitta: the Upādāna enters into the constitution of the effect, and the power of taking the form of, in other words, the potentiality of being re-produced as, the effect, resides in it; while the Nīmitta, by the exercise of an extraneous influence only, cooperates with the power inherent in the material, in its re-production in the form of the effect, and its causality ceases with such re-production.

To take the case of a coin, for example: the material causality was in a lump of gold; it made possible the modification of the gold into the form of the coin, it will remain operative as long as the coin will last as a coin, and after its destruction, it will pass into the potential state again; but the operation of the Nīmittas came to an end as soon as the coin was minted.
Similarly, the Sāṁkhyas distinguish the Effect under the twofold aspect of simple manifestation and of re-production. Thus, the coin is an instance of causation by re-production, while the production of cream from milk is an instance of causation by simple manifestation.

Now, as to the origin of the world, there is a divergence of opinion among thinkers of different Schools: Some uphold the Theory of Creation, others maintain the Theory of Evolution. Among the Creationists are counted the Nāstikas or Nihilists, the Buddhists, and the Naiyāyikas; and among the Evolutionists, the Vedāntins and the Sāṁkhyas. The Nāstikas hold that the world is non-existent, that is, unreal, and that it came out of what was not; the Buddhists hold that the world is existent, that is, real, and that it came out of what was not; the Naiyāyikas hold that the world is non-existent, that is, non-eternal, perishable, and that it came out of the existent, that is, what is eternal, imperishable; the Vedāntins hold that the world is non-existent, that is, unreal, and that it came out of what was existent, that is, real, namely, Brahman; and the Sāṁkhyas hold that the world is existent, that is, real, and that it came out of what was existent, that is, real, namely, the Pradhāna. Thus, there are the A-Sat-Kārya-Vāda of the Nāstikas that a non-existent world has been produced from a non-existent cause, and of the Buddhists that an existent world has been produced from a non-existent cause, the Abhāva-Utpatti-Vāda of the Naiyāyikas that a non-eternal world has been produced from an eternal cause, the Vivarta-Vāda of the Vedāntins that the world is a revolution, an illusory appearance, of the one eternal reality, viz., Brahman, and the Sat-Kārya-Vāda of the Sāṁkhyas that an existent world has been produced from an existent cause.

Against the theories of A-Sat-Kārya, Abhāva-Utpatti, and Vivarta, and in support of their theory of Sat-Kārya, the Sāṁkhyas advance the following arguments:

I. There can be no production of what is absolutely non-existent; e.g., a man's horn.

II. There must be some determinate material cause for every product. Cream, for instance, can form on milk only, and never on water. Were it as absolutely non-existent in milk as it is in water, there would be no reason why it should form on milk, and not equally on water.

III. The relation of cause and effect is that of the producer and the produced, and the simplest conception of the cause as the producer is that it possesses the potentiality of becoming the effect,
and this potentiality is nothing but the unrealised state of the effect.

IV. The effect is seen to possess the nature of the cause, e.g., a coin still possesses the properties of the gold of which it is made.

V. Matter is indestructible; "destruction" means disappearance into the cause.

It follows, therefore, that cause and effect are neither absolutely dissimilar nor absolutely similar to each other. They possess essential similarities and formal dissimilarities. Such being the relation between cause and effect, the world cannot possibly have come out of something in which it had been absolutely non-existent, and which accordingly was, in relation to it, as good as non-existent. For the world is neither absolutely unreal nor absolutely real. The test of objective reality is its opposition to consciousness. It is distinguished as Pratibhasika or apparent, Vyavaharika or practical or phenomenal, and Paramarthika or transcendental. Of these, the world possesses phenomenal reality, and must, therefore, have a transcendental reality as its substratum. Thus is the Doctrine of Sat-Karya established.

A natural corollary from the above doctrine is the other doctrine of

The Doctrine of Parinama or transformation. It is the doctrine that, as all effects are contained in their causes in an unmanifested form, the "production" of an effect is nothing but its manifestation, and that, as cause and effect are essentially identical, an effect is merely a transformation of the cause.

Now, the question arises, whether the cause of the world be a single one, or whether it be manifold. Some think that, according to the Naiyayikas, who declare the existence of Parama-Avus or the ordinary Atoms of Matter, the world has sprung from a plurality of causes. This is, however, to take a very superficial view of the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika Darśana. The Naiyayikas were certainly not timid explorers of metaphysical truths; there is absolutely no reason for supposing that they either would not or could not penetrate behind and beyond the ordinary Atoms of Matter. As I have elsewhere pointed out, it would be a mistake to treat the six Darşanas as each being a complete and self-contained system of thought; in respect of their scope and purpose, they bear no analogy to the philosophies of the West. They are singly neither universal nor final; but they mutually supplement one another. Their Risis address themselves to particular sets of people possessing different degrees of mental and spiritual advancement. They reveal
and explain the truths embodied in the Vedas to them from their point of view and according to their competence, and thus help them in realising the truths for themselves and thereby in progressing towards Self-realisation. If the Naiyāyikas, therefore, do not carry their analysis of the world further than the ordinary Atoms of Matter, it must not be assumed that they teach a sort of atomic pluralism as the ultimate theory of the origin of the world, and are in this opposed to the authors of the other Šastra which teach a different origin. The right explanation is that they make but a partial declaration of the Vedic truths and cut short the process of resolution at the ordinary Atoms of Matter, because they address themselves to a class of students who do not possess the mental capacity to grasp subtler truths.

For the sense of unity which has found expression in the Law of Unity of the Cause of Parsimony, points to a single original of the world or material manifestation, as revealed in the Vedas. And the Sāmkhya makes its students acquainted with this. It is called the Root, and is described as the Pradhāna, that in which all things are contained, and as Prakriti, the mother of things.

It is a long way from the ordinary Atoms of Matter to the Pradhāna or Primordial Matter. The Sāmkhya undertakes to declare and expound the successive transformations of the Pradhāna down to the Gross Matter, with the object of accomplishing the complete isolation of the Self from even the most shadowy conjunction with the Pradhāna.

The definition of Prakriti is that it is the state of equilibrium of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, called the Guṇas. It is the genus of which the Guṇas are the species. Their state of equilibrium is their latent, potential, or inactive state, the state of not being developed into effects. The Guṇas are extremely fine substances, and are respectively the principles of illumination, evolution, and involution, and the causes of pleasure, pain, and dullness. For, Sattva is light and illuminating, Rajas is active and urgent, and Tamas is heavy and enveloping. They are in eternal and indissoluble conjunction with one another, and, by nature, mutually overpower, support, produce, and intimately mix with, one another.

This doctrine of the Three Guṇas is the very foundation of the Śaṁkhya Tantra. It is explained in the following manner: (1) Everything in the world, external as well as internal, is in constant change; and there can be no change, whether it be movement in space, or whether it
be movement in time, without rest. Side by side, therefore, with the principle of mutation, there must be a principle of conservation. And, as Berkeley tells us, existence is perception,—whatever is not manifested to Consciousness, individual or universal, does not exist. Another principle is, therefore, required which would make the manifestation of the other two principles and of their products, (as also of itself and of its own), to Consciousness possible. Thus, at the origin of the world, there must be a principle of conservation, a principle of mutation, and a principle of manifestation. (2) Similarly, an examination of the intra-organic energies would disclose the existence of three distinct principles behind them. These energies are the eleven Indriyas or Powers of Cognition and Action, and Prâna or Vital Force. Among them, the Powers of Cognition, e.g., Seeing, Hearing, etc., cause manifestation of objects, the Powers of Action, e.g., seizing by the hand, etc., produce change, and Prâna conserves and preserves life. (3) In the mind, again, modifications of three distinct characters take place; viz., cognition, conation, and retention; and these could not be possible without there being a principle of manifestation, a principle of mutation, and a principle of conservation respectively. (4) Likewise, a psyche-aesthetic analysis of our worldly experience yields the result that everything in the universe possesses a threefold aspect, that is, it may manifest as agreeable, or as disagreeable, or as neutral, i.e., neither agreeable nor disagreeable. It must then have derived these characteristics from its cause; for nothing can be in the effect which was not in the cause. The principles of manifestation, mutation, and conservation, therefore, which are operative in the change of the states of agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral, must also possess the nature of being pleasant (sânta), unpleasant (ghora), and dull (mûdha).

It is these principles of manifestation, mutation, and conservation, possessing the nature of pleasure, pain, and dullness, that are respectively the Guṇas, Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, of the Sûmkhyas. They are the constitutive elements of Prakriti. They are Guṇas in their manifested forms; they are Prakriti in their unmanifested form.

The transformations of Prakriti are either prakrīti-vikrīti, original or evolvent as well as modification or evolute, or vikrīti, modification or evolute merely. The former are themselves transformations of their antecedents, and, in their turn, give rise to subsequent transformations. They are Mahat, Ahamkāra, and the five Tanmātras. The latter are the eleven Indriyas and the five gross Elements. The transformation of Prakriti ceases with them. Of course, the gross Elements combine and evolve the
material world; but the world is not a different Tattva or principle from the Elements, because it does not develop a single attribute which is not already possessed by them. For the test of a Tattva or original or ultimate principle is that it possesses a characteristic property which is not possessed by any other Tattva.

The objective world thus contains twenty-four Tattvas, namely, Prakṛti, Mahat, Aham-kāra, Manas, the five Indriyas of Cognition, the five Indriyas of Action, the five Tan-mātras, and the five gross Elements.

At the beginning of creation, there arises in Prakṛti Spandana or cosmic vibration which disturbs its state of equilibrium, and releases the Guṇas from quiescence. Rajas at once acts upon Sattva and manifests it as Mahat. Mahat denotes Buddhī, the material counterpart and basis of what we term Understanding or Reason. Buddhī is called Mahat, great, because it is the principal among the Instruments of Cognition and Action. Mahat also means “light”; it is derived from the Vedic word Mahas or Maṅgas, meaning light. And Buddhī is called Mahat, because it is the initial transformation of Sattva which is the principle of manifestation. Or, Buddhī which is the first manifestation of the Guṇas and which is the material cause of the world, is called Mahat, in order to distinguish it from individual or finite Buddhīs which are its parts. For “what is the Buddhī of the first-born golden-egg (Brahmā), the same is the primary basis of all Buddhīs; it is here called the ‘great self.’”

The function of Buddhī is Adhyātma or certainty leading to action. It manifests in eight forms; viz., as virtue, knowledge, dispassion and power, while Sattva is predominant in it, and as vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness, while Tamas is predominant in it. And these, again, are modified into innumerable forms, which are classified as Error, Incapacity, Complacency, and Perfection. Such is Pratyaya-sarga or the creation of Buddhī or intellectual creation as contra-distinguished from elemental creation.

From Buddhī springs Aham-kāra: from “cogito,” I think, “sum,” the I, the I-maker. It is the material counterpart and basis of what we term egocentric, and causes modifications of Buddhī in the forms of “I am,” “I do,” etc., etc. It is the principle of personal identity and of indivisibility. Its function is Abhimaṇa, conceit, thinking with reference to itself, assumption of things to itself. But it is not a mere function; it is a substance
in which reside Vásanās or the resultant tendencies of accumulated experience, and which is capable of modification into other and grosser forms.

This Āham-kāra, which is the first transformation of Buddhi, is the cosmic Āham-kāra, the Upādhi or adjunct of the golden-egg Brahmā, the Creator. It is the infinite source of the finite Āham-kāras of individual Jivas.

The modification of Āham-kāra is twofold, according as it is influenced by Sattva or by Tamas. The Sāttvica modifications are the eleven Indriyas, that is, the five Indriyas of Cognition, viz., the powers located in the Eye, Ear, Nose, Tongue, and Skin, the five Indriyas of Action, viz., the powers located in the voice, hand, feet, and the organs of generation and of excretion, and Manas. Manas is both a power of cognition and a power of action. Assimilation and differentiation are its distinctive functions.

The Tāmasic modifications of Āham-kāra are the five Tan-mātras, viz., of Sound, Touch, Form, Flavour and Smell. They are pure, subtle or simple elements, the metaphysical parts of the ordinary Atoms of Matter. They are "fine substances," to quote from Vijñāna Bhikṣu, "the undifferentiated (a-viśeśa) originals of the Gross Elements, which form the substratum of Sound, Touch, Form, Flavour and Smell, belonging to that class (that is, in that stage of their evolution) in which the distinctions of Śānta (pleasant), etc., do not exist." The process of their manifestation is as follows: The Tan-mātra of Sound, possessing the attribute of Sound, is produced from Āham-kāra; then, from the Tan-mātras of Sound, accompanied by Āham-kāra, is produced the Tan-mātra of Touch, possessing the attributes of Sound and Touch. In a similar manner, the other Tan-mātras are produced, in the order of their mention, by the addition of one more attribute at each successive step.

The transformations of the Tan-mātras are the Gross Elements of Ether, Air, Fire, Water, and Earth,—the ordinary Atoms of Matter, in which appear for the first time the distinctions of being pleasant, painful, and neutral. All Bodies, from that of Brahmā down to a stock, are formed of them.

Now, all this objective world is non-intelligent, because its material cause, Prakṛti, is non-intelligent. It does not, therefore, exist or energise for its own sake. There must be some one else of a different nature,
some intelligent being, for whose benefit, i.e., experience and freedom, all this activity of Prakṛiti is. Thus do the Śaṅkhyas explain the existence of Puruṣa.

The Twenty-five Tattvas.

To classify the Tattvas logically, they may be exhibited thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jñā. Knower, Intelligent, Subject:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 Puruṣa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A-Jñā. Non-knower, Non-intelligent, Object:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A-vyakta. Unmanifest:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 Prakṛiti, the state of equilibrium of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vyakta. Manifest:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 Mahat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Aham-kāra.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>×Sattva.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indriyas of Cognition:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 Manas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indriyas of Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 Hands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Feet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Speech.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Excretory Organ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Organ of generation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>×Tamas.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>20 The Eye.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 The Ear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 The Nose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 The Tongue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 The Skin.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10 Sound.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 Ether.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8 Touch.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 Air.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6 Form.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 Fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Flavour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Water.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Smell.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Earth.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of these, Puruṣa is the principle of Being, Prakṛiti is the principle of Becoming: Puruṣa eternally is, never becomes, while Prakṛiti is essentially Movement; even during Pralaya or Cosmic Dissolution, its activity does not altogether cease; it then undergoes homogeneous transformation: Sattva modifying as Sattva, Rajas modifying as Rajas, and Tamas modifying as Tamas. Puruṣa, on the other hand, is eternal consciousness undisturbed. Nothing can come into him, nothing can go out of him; he is Kūṭa-stha, dwelling in the cave. And these two eternal co-ordinate principles of Spontaneity are in eternal conjunction with each other. But Prakṛiti, in conjunction as such does not set Prakṛiti in movement. Creation is caused by Rāga or Passion. Rāga is a change of state which spontaneously takes place in the Rajas of Buddhi, through the influence of Dharma and A-dharma. These are the natural consequences of the previous changes in the transformations of Prakṛiti,
and they reside in Aham-kāra in the form of Vāsanā or tendency, and render impure the Sattva of Buddhi. The activity of Prakṛiti, in the form of the disturbance of its Rajas element, is spontaneously evoked for the purpose of working out and exhausting the stored up Vāsanā; its successive transformation is really a process of purification of the Sattva of Buddhi. This spontaneous tendency towards purification is due to the vicinity of Puruṣa.

The Śāmkhyas constantly hammer on the theme that no pain, no suffering, no bondage ever belongs to Puruṣa. Puruṣa is eternally free, never bound, never released. And because they thus thoroughly reveal the nature of Puruṣa, their doctrine is described as the Śāmkhya, thorough-revealer.

The “experience” of Puruṣa consists in his being the indifferent spectator of the changes that take place in Buddhi; his “bondage” is nothing but the reflection on him of the bondage, that is, the impurities, of Buddhi; his “release” is merely the removal of this reflection which, again, depends upon the recovery by Buddhi of its state of pristine purity, which means its dissolution into Prakṛiti. To say that the activity of Prakṛiti is for the benefit of Puruṣa is, therefore, a mere figure of speech. It is really for the purification of the Sattva of Buddhi.

To think, as people generally do, that pleasure and pain, release and bondage really belong to Puruṣa, is a mistake pure and simple. It is A-vidya. A-viveka is the cause of A-vidya. And A-viveka, non-discrimination, is the failure to discriminate Puruṣa from Prakṛiti and her products. Many are ignorant of the very existence of Puruṣa. Many are ignorant of his exact nature: some identify him with Prakṛiti, some with Maḥat, some with Aham-kāra, and so on. Many, again, know the Tattvas in some form or other, but they know them not: knowledge, in the sense of mere information, they have, but no realisation, and it is realisation which matters. The Śāmkhya, for this reason, enters into a detailed examination of the Tattvas, their number, nature, function, effect, inter-relation, resemblance, difference, etc., and insists on Tattva-abhyāsa or the habitual contemplation of the Tattvas, so that they may be Sākṣat-kṛita or immediately known or realised. The way is also shown as to how, and the means, too, whereby, to discriminate, on the one hand, the gross Elements from the Tan-mātras, the Tan-mātras from the Indriyas, and both from Aham-kāra, Aham-kāra from Buddhi, and Buddhi
from Puruṣa, and, on the other hand, to discriminate Puruṣa from the
gross and subtle Bodies and to prevent their further identification.

The Yoga which is the practice of the Sāṃkhya, which is the theory,
takes up, and starts from, these central teachings
of its predecessor, viz. (1) All activity—all change—
is in and of Prakṛti. (2) No activity—no change—is in Puruṣa. (3) The modifications of the mind are reflected in Puruṣa,
and make him look like modified. (4) When the mind is calm and puri-
sified, Puruṣa shines as he really is. (5) Save and except these, reflection
and its removal, bondage and release do not belong to Puruṣa. (6) Bond-
age and release are really of Prakṛti, or, more strictly speaking, of the
individualised form of its first transformation, viz. Buddhī. From the
point of view of the philosophy of the history of the Darśanas, these are
the last words of the Sāṃkhya.

The Sāṃkhya also has brought the doctrine of Śūkṣma or Liṅga
Śarīra, the Subtle Body, prominently to the fore.
For, the purification of the Satvā of Buddhī may
not be, and, as a general rule, is not, possible in one
life, nor in one region of the Universe. But death seems to put an untimely
end to the process of purification, by destroying the gross Body. How
then can the process of purification be continued in other lives and in other
regions? The Sāṃkhya replies that it can be and is so continued by means
of the Subtle Body. It is composed of the seventeen Tatvas, beginning with
Buddhī and ending with the Tan-mātras. It is produced, at the beginning
of Creation, one for each Puruṣa, and lasts till the time of Mahā-Pralaya
or the Great Dissolution. It is altogether unconfined, such that it may
ascend to the sun dancing on its beams, and can penetrate through a
mountain. And it transmigrates from one gross Body to another, from
one region of the Universe to another, being perfumed with, and carrying
the influence of, the Bhūtas or dispositions of Buddhī characterised as
virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power, and their opposites.

The Sāṃkhyas, again, teach a plurality of Puruṣas. This topic has
been very fully discussed in the Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram, I. 149-159, and the commentaries.
Therein Vijnāna Bhikṣu has mercilessly criticised
the doctrine of Non-duality maintained by some of the Vedāntins, and has
sought to establish the plurality of Puruṣas. And Garbe, in his characteristic style, contents himself with a flippant criticism of Vijnāna Bhikṣu’s
explanations. But Vijnāna Bhikṣu’s criticisms are not aimed principally
against the unity of Puruṣas, but at those interpretations of it, according
to which the empirical Puruṣas, that is, mundane Puruṣas, the plurality of whom is established by irrefutable arguments, as in the Sāmkhya Śāstra, are reduced to mere shadows without substance. He does not so much attack the unadulterated A-Dvaita of the Vedas and the Upaniṣats as its later developments. He was fully aware of the fact that none of the six Darśanas, for example, was, as we have hinted more than once, a complete system of philosophy in the Western sense, but merely a catechism explaining, and giving a reasoned account of, some of the truths revealed in the Vedas and Upaniṣats, to a particular class of students, confining the scope of its enquiry within the province of Creation, without attempting to solve to them the transcendental riddles of the Universe, which, in their particular stage of mental and spiritual development, it would have been impossible for them to grasp. Similarly, Garbe is wrong in thinking that Vijñāna Bhikṣu “explains away the doctrine of absolute monism.” It is only a matter of interpretation and of stand-point; compare Rāmānuja, Madhva, etc. For Vijñāna does not hesitate to do away even with the duality of Prakṛti and Puruṣa when he observes that all the other Tattecas enter into absorption in Puruṣa and rest there in a subtle form, as does energy in that which possesses it. (Vide his Commentary on S-P-S., I. 61). For an explanation, therefore, of the apparent contradictions in the Darśanas, one must turn to the Vedas and Upaniṣats and writings of a similar scope and character. The Bhagavat-Gītā, for instance, declares:—

德拉विधि पुरुषो ठोके क्षरश्चाश्च पव च ।
क्षरः स्वाच्छ भूताति कुरुक्षिप्युरुष उचयते || १५ || १६ ||
उच्चम् पुरुषस्तवन् परमात्मत्युद्भावः ।
ये ठोकरमयमाविश्वाति विभक्ते व्यः ईश्वरः || १५ || १७ ||

In the world there are these two Puruṣas only, the mutable and the immutable. The mutable is all created things; the intelligent experient is said to be the immutable.—XV. 16.

While the highest Puruṣa is a different one, who (in the Upaniṣats) is called the Paramā-Ātmā, the Supreme Self, and who, presiding over the three worlds, preserves them, as the undecaying, omniscient, omnipotent Īśvara.—XV. 17.

Along such lines the so-called contradictions of the Darśanas find their reconciliation and true explanation in the higher teachings of the Upaniṣats.

It will probably be contended that, in the case in question, such reconciliation is impossible in view of “one of the fundamental doctrines of the genuine Sāmkhya, which
is the denial of God” (Garbe). No graver blunder has ever been committed by any student of the Sāmkhya! The genuine Sāmkhya no more denies the existence of God than does Garbe’s illustrious countryman, Emmanuel Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason. To make this position clear, let us paraphrase the Sāmkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram on the subject. Thus, Īśvara is not a subject of proof (I. 92). For, we must conceive Īśvara as being either Mukta, free, or Baddha, bound. He can be neither free nor bound; because, in the former case, being perfect, He would have nothing to fulfil by creation, and, in the latter case, He would not possess absolute power (I.93-94). No doubt, in the Śrutiś, we find such declarations as “He is verily the all-knowing, the creator of all,” and the like; these, however, do not allude to an eternal, uncaused Īśvara (God), but are only eulogies of such Jivas or Incarnate Selves as are going to be freed, or of the Yogins, human as well as super-human, who have attained perfection by the practice of Yoga (I.95). Some say that attainment of the highest end results through absorption into the Cause (III. 54). But this is not so, because, as people rise up again after immersion into water, so do Puruṣas, merged into Prakṛiti at the time of Pralaya, appear, again, at the next Creation, as Īśvaras (III. 54-55). The Vedic declarations, e.g., “He is verily the all-knowing, the creator of all,” refer to such Highest Selves (III. 56). Neither is the existence of God as the moral governor of the world, proved; for, if God Himself produce the consequences of acts, He would do so even without the aid of Karma; on the other hand, if His agency in this respect be subsidiary to that of Karma, then let Karma itself be the cause of its consequences; what is the use of a God? Moreover, it is impossible that God should be the dispenser of the consequences of acts. For, His motive will be either egoistic or altruistic. But it cannot be the latter, as it is simply inconceivable that one acting for the good of others, should create a world so full of pain. Nor can it be the former; because (1) in that case, He would possess unfulfilled desires, and, consequently, suffer pain and the like. Thus your worldly God would be no better than our Highest Selves. (2) Agency cannot be established in the absence of desire, for, behind every act, there lies an intense desire. And to attribute intense desire to God would be to take away from his eternal freedom. (3) Further, desire is a particular product of Prakṛiti. It cannot, therefore, naturally grow within the Self, whether it be God or the Jiva; it must come from the outside. Now, it cannot be said that desire, which is an evolute of Prakṛiti, directly has connection with the Self, as it would contradict hundreds of
Vedic declarations to the effect that the Self is _Asaṅga_, absolutely free from attachment or association. Neither can it be maintained that _Prakṛti_ establishes connection of desire with the Self by induction, as it were, through its mere proximity to it; as this would apply equally to all the Selves at the same time (V. 2-9). Furthermore, the above arguments might have lost their force or relevancy, were there positive proof of the existence of God; but there is no such proof. For, proof is of three kinds, _viz._, Perception, Inference and Testimony. Now, God certainly is not an object of perception. Neither can He be known by Inference; because there is no general proposition (_Vyāpti_) whereby to infer the existence of God, inasmuch as, _Prakṛti_ alone being the cause of the world, the law of causation is of no avail here. And the testimony of the Veda speaks of _Prakṛti_ as being the origin of the world, and hence does not prove the existence of God (V. 10-12).

Thus the _Sāṃkhya_ maintain that it cannot be proved by evidence that an eternal, self-caused God exists; that the ordinary means of proof, Perception, Inference and Testimony, fail to reach Him; and that there is no other means of correct knowledge on our plane of the Universe. And when, therefore, _Kapila_ thus declares that the various objective arguments for the establishment of theism, _viz._, the ontological, the cosmological, the teleological, and the moral, cannot stand, and pronounces the verdict of ‘non-proven’ in regard to the existence of God, he takes up the right philosophical attitude, and there is absolutely no justification for branding his doctrine as atheistical merely on this score.

“The notion that the existence of God is susceptible of dialectic demonstration has been surrendered, in later times,” as Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall remarks, “by most Christian theologians of any credit: it now being, more ordinarily, maintained that our conviction of deity, on grounds apart from revelation, reposes solely on original consciousness, antecedent to all proof.”

Thus the _Sāṃkhya_ is _Nir-Īśvara_, but not _Nāstika_. It is not _Nāstika_, atheistical, because it does not deny the existence of God. It is _Nir-Īśvara_, _lit._ god-less, as it explains all and every fact of experience without reference to, and without invoking the intervention of a divine agency. Those who imagine that, in the _Sāṃkhya_, there is a denial of God, obviously fail to recognize the distinction between the two words, _Nāstika_ and _Nir-Īśvara_. They, further, fail to bear in mind that the Sanskrit _Īśvara_ and the English _God_ are not synonymous terms. For, the opposite of _Nāstika_ is _Āstika_ (believer), one who believes in the existence of God, the authority of the
Veda, immortality, and so forth. Accordingly, the Hindu Darśanas have been classified as being either “Āstika” or “Nāstika,” and the “Nir-Iśvara” Sāmkhya has been always regarded as falling under the former category.

DALTONGANJ:

The 15th February, 1915.

N. SINHA.